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1 | /* |
2 | * linux/kernel/sys.c |
3 | * |
4 | * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds |
5 | */ |
6 | |
7 | #include <linux/module.h> |
8 | #include <linux/mm.h> |
9 | #include <linux/utsname.h> |
10 | #include <linux/mman.h> |
11 | #include <linux/smp_lock.h> |
12 | #include <linux/notifier.h> |
13 | #include <linux/reboot.h> |
14 | #include <linux/prctl.h> |
15 | #include <linux/highuid.h> |
16 | #include <linux/fs.h> |
17 | #include <linux/perf_counter.h> |
18 | #include <linux/resource.h> |
19 | #include <linux/kernel.h> |
20 | #include <linux/kexec.h> |
21 | #include <linux/workqueue.h> |
22 | #include <linux/capability.h> |
23 | #include <linux/device.h> |
24 | #include <linux/key.h> |
25 | #include <linux/times.h> |
26 | #include <linux/posix-timers.h> |
27 | #include <linux/security.h> |
28 | #include <linux/dcookies.h> |
29 | #include <linux/suspend.h> |
30 | #include <linux/tty.h> |
31 | #include <linux/signal.h> |
32 | #include <linux/cn_proc.h> |
33 | #include <linux/getcpu.h> |
34 | #include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h> |
35 | #include <linux/seccomp.h> |
36 | #include <linux/cpu.h> |
37 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> |
38 | #include <linux/fs_struct.h> |
39 | |
40 | #include <linux/compat.h> |
41 | #include <linux/syscalls.h> |
42 | #include <linux/kprobes.h> |
43 | #include <linux/user_namespace.h> |
44 | |
45 | #include <asm/uaccess.h> |
46 | #include <asm/io.h> |
47 | #include <asm/unistd.h> |
48 | |
49 | #ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL |
50 | # define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
51 | #endif |
52 | #ifndef GET_UNALIGN_CTL |
53 | # define GET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
54 | #endif |
55 | #ifndef SET_FPEMU_CTL |
56 | # define SET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
57 | #endif |
58 | #ifndef GET_FPEMU_CTL |
59 | # define GET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
60 | #endif |
61 | #ifndef SET_FPEXC_CTL |
62 | # define SET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
63 | #endif |
64 | #ifndef GET_FPEXC_CTL |
65 | # define GET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
66 | #endif |
67 | #ifndef GET_ENDIAN |
68 | # define GET_ENDIAN(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
69 | #endif |
70 | #ifndef SET_ENDIAN |
71 | # define SET_ENDIAN(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
72 | #endif |
73 | #ifndef GET_TSC_CTL |
74 | # define GET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL) |
75 | #endif |
76 | #ifndef SET_TSC_CTL |
77 | # define SET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL) |
78 | #endif |
79 | |
80 | /* |
81 | * this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for |
82 | * architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past |
83 | */ |
84 | |
85 | int overflowuid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWUID; |
86 | int overflowgid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWGID; |
87 | |
88 | #ifdef CONFIG_UID16 |
89 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowuid); |
90 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowgid); |
91 | #endif |
92 | |
93 | /* |
94 | * the same as above, but for filesystems which can only store a 16-bit |
95 | * UID and GID. as such, this is needed on all architectures |
96 | */ |
97 | |
98 | int fs_overflowuid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID; |
99 | int fs_overflowgid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID; |
100 | |
101 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowuid); |
102 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowgid); |
103 | |
104 | /* |
105 | * this indicates whether you can reboot with ctrl-alt-del: the default is yes |
106 | */ |
107 | |
108 | int C_A_D = 1; |
109 | struct pid *cad_pid; |
110 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(cad_pid); |
111 | |
112 | /* |
113 | * If set, this is used for preparing the system to power off. |
114 | */ |
115 | |
116 | void (*pm_power_off_prepare)(void); |
117 | |
118 | /* |
119 | * set the priority of a task |
120 | * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock |
121 | */ |
122 | static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error) |
123 | { |
124 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p); |
125 | int no_nice; |
126 | |
127 | if (pcred->uid != cred->euid && |
128 | pcred->euid != cred->euid && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) { |
129 | error = -EPERM; |
130 | goto out; |
131 | } |
132 | if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !can_nice(p, niceval)) { |
133 | error = -EACCES; |
134 | goto out; |
135 | } |
136 | no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval); |
137 | if (no_nice) { |
138 | error = no_nice; |
139 | goto out; |
140 | } |
141 | if (error == -ESRCH) |
142 | error = 0; |
143 | set_user_nice(p, niceval); |
144 | out: |
145 | return error; |
146 | } |
147 | |
148 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setpriority, int, which, int, who, int, niceval) |
149 | { |
150 | struct task_struct *g, *p; |
151 | struct user_struct *user; |
152 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
153 | int error = -EINVAL; |
154 | struct pid *pgrp; |
155 | |
156 | if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS) |
157 | goto out; |
158 | |
159 | /* normalize: avoid signed division (rounding problems) */ |
160 | error = -ESRCH; |
161 | if (niceval < -20) |
162 | niceval = -20; |
163 | if (niceval > 19) |
164 | niceval = 19; |
165 | |
166 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock); |
167 | switch (which) { |
168 | case PRIO_PROCESS: |
169 | if (who) |
170 | p = find_task_by_vpid(who); |
171 | else |
172 | p = current; |
173 | if (p) |
174 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); |
175 | break; |
176 | case PRIO_PGRP: |
177 | if (who) |
178 | pgrp = find_vpid(who); |
179 | else |
180 | pgrp = task_pgrp(current); |
181 | do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) { |
182 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); |
183 | } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); |
184 | break; |
185 | case PRIO_USER: |
186 | user = (struct user_struct *) cred->user; |
187 | if (!who) |
188 | who = cred->uid; |
189 | else if ((who != cred->uid) && |
190 | !(user = find_user(who))) |
191 | goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ |
192 | |
193 | do_each_thread(g, p) |
194 | if (__task_cred(p)->uid == who) |
195 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); |
196 | while_each_thread(g, p); |
197 | if (who != cred->uid) |
198 | free_uid(user); /* For find_user() */ |
199 | break; |
200 | } |
201 | out_unlock: |
202 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
203 | out: |
204 | return error; |
205 | } |
206 | |
207 | /* |
208 | * Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will |
209 | * not return the normal nice-value, but a negated value that |
210 | * has been offset by 20 (ie it returns 40..1 instead of -20..19) |
211 | * to stay compatible. |
212 | */ |
213 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getpriority, int, which, int, who) |
214 | { |
215 | struct task_struct *g, *p; |
216 | struct user_struct *user; |
217 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
218 | long niceval, retval = -ESRCH; |
219 | struct pid *pgrp; |
220 | |
221 | if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS) |
222 | return -EINVAL; |
223 | |
224 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock); |
225 | switch (which) { |
226 | case PRIO_PROCESS: |
227 | if (who) |
228 | p = find_task_by_vpid(who); |
229 | else |
230 | p = current; |
231 | if (p) { |
232 | niceval = 20 - task_nice(p); |
233 | if (niceval > retval) |
234 | retval = niceval; |
235 | } |
236 | break; |
237 | case PRIO_PGRP: |
238 | if (who) |
239 | pgrp = find_vpid(who); |
240 | else |
241 | pgrp = task_pgrp(current); |
242 | do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) { |
243 | niceval = 20 - task_nice(p); |
244 | if (niceval > retval) |
245 | retval = niceval; |
246 | } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); |
247 | break; |
248 | case PRIO_USER: |
249 | user = (struct user_struct *) cred->user; |
250 | if (!who) |
251 | who = cred->uid; |
252 | else if ((who != cred->uid) && |
253 | !(user = find_user(who))) |
254 | goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ |
255 | |
256 | do_each_thread(g, p) |
257 | if (__task_cred(p)->uid == who) { |
258 | niceval = 20 - task_nice(p); |
259 | if (niceval > retval) |
260 | retval = niceval; |
261 | } |
262 | while_each_thread(g, p); |
263 | if (who != cred->uid) |
264 | free_uid(user); /* for find_user() */ |
265 | break; |
266 | } |
267 | out_unlock: |
268 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
269 | |
270 | return retval; |
271 | } |
272 | |
273 | /** |
274 | * emergency_restart - reboot the system |
275 | * |
276 | * Without shutting down any hardware or taking any locks |
277 | * reboot the system. This is called when we know we are in |
278 | * trouble so this is our best effort to reboot. This is |
279 | * safe to call in interrupt context. |
280 | */ |
281 | void emergency_restart(void) |
282 | { |
283 | machine_emergency_restart(); |
284 | } |
285 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(emergency_restart); |
286 | |
287 | void kernel_restart_prepare(char *cmd) |
288 | { |
289 | blocking_notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, SYS_RESTART, cmd); |
290 | system_state = SYSTEM_RESTART; |
291 | device_shutdown(); |
292 | sysdev_shutdown(); |
293 | } |
294 | |
295 | /** |
296 | * kernel_restart - reboot the system |
297 | * @cmd: pointer to buffer containing command to execute for restart |
298 | * or %NULL |
299 | * |
300 | * Shutdown everything and perform a clean reboot. |
301 | * This is not safe to call in interrupt context. |
302 | */ |
303 | void kernel_restart(char *cmd) |
304 | { |
305 | kernel_restart_prepare(cmd); |
306 | if (!cmd) |
307 | printk(KERN_EMERG "Restarting system.\n"); |
308 | else |
309 | printk(KERN_EMERG "Restarting system with command '%s'.\n", cmd); |
310 | machine_restart(cmd); |
311 | } |
312 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_restart); |
313 | |
314 | static void kernel_shutdown_prepare(enum system_states state) |
315 | { |
316 | blocking_notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, |
317 | (state == SYSTEM_HALT)?SYS_HALT:SYS_POWER_OFF, NULL); |
318 | system_state = state; |
319 | device_shutdown(); |
320 | } |
321 | /** |
322 | * kernel_halt - halt the system |
323 | * |
324 | * Shutdown everything and perform a clean system halt. |
325 | */ |
326 | void kernel_halt(void) |
327 | { |
328 | kernel_shutdown_prepare(SYSTEM_HALT); |
329 | sysdev_shutdown(); |
330 | printk(KERN_EMERG "System halted.\n"); |
331 | machine_halt(); |
332 | } |
333 | |
334 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_halt); |
335 | |
336 | /** |
337 | * kernel_power_off - power_off the system |
338 | * |
339 | * Shutdown everything and perform a clean system power_off. |
340 | */ |
341 | void kernel_power_off(void) |
342 | { |
343 | kernel_shutdown_prepare(SYSTEM_POWER_OFF); |
344 | if (pm_power_off_prepare) |
345 | pm_power_off_prepare(); |
346 | disable_nonboot_cpus(); |
347 | sysdev_shutdown(); |
348 | printk(KERN_EMERG "Power down.\n"); |
349 | machine_power_off(); |
350 | } |
351 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_power_off); |
352 | /* |
353 | * Reboot system call: for obvious reasons only root may call it, |
354 | * and even root needs to set up some magic numbers in the registers |
355 | * so that some mistake won't make this reboot the whole machine. |
356 | * You can also set the meaning of the ctrl-alt-del-key here. |
357 | * |
358 | * reboot doesn't sync: do that yourself before calling this. |
359 | */ |
360 | SYSCALL_DEFINE4(reboot, int, magic1, int, magic2, unsigned int, cmd, |
361 | void __user *, arg) |
362 | { |
363 | char buffer[256]; |
364 | int ret = 0; |
365 | |
366 | /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ |
367 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT)) |
368 | return -EPERM; |
369 | |
370 | /* For safety, we require "magic" arguments. */ |
371 | if (magic1 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC1 || |
372 | (magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2 && |
373 | magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2A && |
374 | magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2B && |
375 | magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2C)) |
376 | return -EINVAL; |
377 | |
378 | /* Instead of trying to make the power_off code look like |
379 | * halt when pm_power_off is not set do it the easy way. |
380 | */ |
381 | if ((cmd == LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_POWER_OFF) && !pm_power_off) |
382 | cmd = LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_HALT; |
383 | |
384 | lock_kernel(); |
385 | switch (cmd) { |
386 | case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART: |
387 | kernel_restart(NULL); |
388 | break; |
389 | |
390 | case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_ON: |
391 | C_A_D = 1; |
392 | break; |
393 | |
394 | case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_OFF: |
395 | C_A_D = 0; |
396 | break; |
397 | |
398 | case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_HALT: |
399 | kernel_halt(); |
400 | unlock_kernel(); |
401 | do_exit(0); |
402 | panic("cannot halt"); |
403 | |
404 | case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_POWER_OFF: |
405 | kernel_power_off(); |
406 | unlock_kernel(); |
407 | do_exit(0); |
408 | break; |
409 | |
410 | case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART2: |
411 | if (strncpy_from_user(&buffer[0], arg, sizeof(buffer) - 1) < 0) { |
412 | unlock_kernel(); |
413 | return -EFAULT; |
414 | } |
415 | buffer[sizeof(buffer) - 1] = '\0'; |
416 | |
417 | kernel_restart(buffer); |
418 | break; |
419 | |
420 | #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC |
421 | case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC: |
422 | ret = kernel_kexec(); |
423 | break; |
424 | #endif |
425 | |
426 | #ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION |
427 | case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_SW_SUSPEND: |
428 | ret = hibernate(); |
429 | break; |
430 | #endif |
431 | |
432 | default: |
433 | ret = -EINVAL; |
434 | break; |
435 | } |
436 | unlock_kernel(); |
437 | return ret; |
438 | } |
439 | |
440 | static void deferred_cad(struct work_struct *dummy) |
441 | { |
442 | kernel_restart(NULL); |
443 | } |
444 | |
445 | /* |
446 | * This function gets called by ctrl-alt-del - ie the keyboard interrupt. |
447 | * As it's called within an interrupt, it may NOT sync: the only choice |
448 | * is whether to reboot at once, or just ignore the ctrl-alt-del. |
449 | */ |
450 | void ctrl_alt_del(void) |
451 | { |
452 | static DECLARE_WORK(cad_work, deferred_cad); |
453 | |
454 | if (C_A_D) |
455 | schedule_work(&cad_work); |
456 | else |
457 | kill_cad_pid(SIGINT, 1); |
458 | } |
459 | |
460 | /* |
461 | * Unprivileged users may change the real gid to the effective gid |
462 | * or vice versa. (BSD-style) |
463 | * |
464 | * If you set the real gid at all, or set the effective gid to a value not |
465 | * equal to the real gid, then the saved gid is set to the new effective gid. |
466 | * |
467 | * This makes it possible for a setgid program to completely drop its |
468 | * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing |
469 | * a security audit over a program. |
470 | * |
471 | * The general idea is that a program which uses just setregid() will be |
472 | * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setgid() will be |
473 | * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. |
474 | * |
475 | * SMP: There are not races, the GIDs are checked only by filesystem |
476 | * operations (as far as semantic preservation is concerned). |
477 | */ |
478 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid) |
479 | { |
480 | const struct cred *old; |
481 | struct cred *new; |
482 | int retval; |
483 | |
484 | new = prepare_creds(); |
485 | if (!new) |
486 | return -ENOMEM; |
487 | old = current_cred(); |
488 | |
489 | retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE); |
490 | if (retval) |
491 | goto error; |
492 | |
493 | retval = -EPERM; |
494 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) { |
495 | if (old->gid == rgid || |
496 | old->egid == rgid || |
497 | capable(CAP_SETGID)) |
498 | new->gid = rgid; |
499 | else |
500 | goto error; |
501 | } |
502 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1) { |
503 | if (old->gid == egid || |
504 | old->egid == egid || |
505 | old->sgid == egid || |
506 | capable(CAP_SETGID)) |
507 | new->egid = egid; |
508 | else |
509 | goto error; |
510 | } |
511 | |
512 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 || |
513 | (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old->gid)) |
514 | new->sgid = new->egid; |
515 | new->fsgid = new->egid; |
516 | |
517 | return commit_creds(new); |
518 | |
519 | error: |
520 | abort_creds(new); |
521 | return retval; |
522 | } |
523 | |
524 | /* |
525 | * setgid() is implemented like SysV w/ SAVED_IDS |
526 | * |
527 | * SMP: Same implicit races as above. |
528 | */ |
529 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid) |
530 | { |
531 | const struct cred *old; |
532 | struct cred *new; |
533 | int retval; |
534 | |
535 | new = prepare_creds(); |
536 | if (!new) |
537 | return -ENOMEM; |
538 | old = current_cred(); |
539 | |
540 | retval = security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID); |
541 | if (retval) |
542 | goto error; |
543 | |
544 | retval = -EPERM; |
545 | if (capable(CAP_SETGID)) |
546 | new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = gid; |
547 | else if (gid == old->gid || gid == old->sgid) |
548 | new->egid = new->fsgid = gid; |
549 | else |
550 | goto error; |
551 | |
552 | return commit_creds(new); |
553 | |
554 | error: |
555 | abort_creds(new); |
556 | return retval; |
557 | } |
558 | |
559 | /* |
560 | * change the user struct in a credentials set to match the new UID |
561 | */ |
562 | static int set_user(struct cred *new) |
563 | { |
564 | struct user_struct *new_user; |
565 | |
566 | new_user = alloc_uid(current_user_ns(), new->uid); |
567 | if (!new_user) |
568 | return -EAGAIN; |
569 | |
570 | if (!task_can_switch_user(new_user, current)) { |
571 | free_uid(new_user); |
572 | return -EINVAL; |
573 | } |
574 | |
575 | if (atomic_read(&new_user->processes) >= |
576 | current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur && |
577 | new_user != INIT_USER) { |
578 | free_uid(new_user); |
579 | return -EAGAIN; |
580 | } |
581 | |
582 | free_uid(new->user); |
583 | new->user = new_user; |
584 | return 0; |
585 | } |
586 | |
587 | /* |
588 | * Unprivileged users may change the real uid to the effective uid |
589 | * or vice versa. (BSD-style) |
590 | * |
591 | * If you set the real uid at all, or set the effective uid to a value not |
592 | * equal to the real uid, then the saved uid is set to the new effective uid. |
593 | * |
594 | * This makes it possible for a setuid program to completely drop its |
595 | * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing |
596 | * a security audit over a program. |
597 | * |
598 | * The general idea is that a program which uses just setreuid() will be |
599 | * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setuid() will be |
600 | * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. |
601 | */ |
602 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid) |
603 | { |
604 | const struct cred *old; |
605 | struct cred *new; |
606 | int retval; |
607 | |
608 | new = prepare_creds(); |
609 | if (!new) |
610 | return -ENOMEM; |
611 | old = current_cred(); |
612 | |
613 | retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE); |
614 | if (retval) |
615 | goto error; |
616 | |
617 | retval = -EPERM; |
618 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { |
619 | new->uid = ruid; |
620 | if (old->uid != ruid && |
621 | old->euid != ruid && |
622 | !capable(CAP_SETUID)) |
623 | goto error; |
624 | } |
625 | |
626 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1) { |
627 | new->euid = euid; |
628 | if (old->uid != euid && |
629 | old->euid != euid && |
630 | old->suid != euid && |
631 | !capable(CAP_SETUID)) |
632 | goto error; |
633 | } |
634 | |
635 | if (new->uid != old->uid) { |
636 | retval = set_user(new); |
637 | if (retval < 0) |
638 | goto error; |
639 | } |
640 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 || |
641 | (euid != (uid_t) -1 && euid != old->uid)) |
642 | new->suid = new->euid; |
643 | new->fsuid = new->euid; |
644 | |
645 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE); |
646 | if (retval < 0) |
647 | goto error; |
648 | |
649 | return commit_creds(new); |
650 | |
651 | error: |
652 | abort_creds(new); |
653 | return retval; |
654 | } |
655 | |
656 | /* |
657 | * setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS |
658 | * |
659 | * Note that SAVED_ID's is deficient in that a setuid root program |
660 | * like sendmail, for example, cannot set its uid to be a normal |
661 | * user and then switch back, because if you're root, setuid() sets |
662 | * the saved uid too. If you don't like this, blame the bright people |
663 | * in the POSIX committee and/or USG. Note that the BSD-style setreuid() |
664 | * will allow a root program to temporarily drop privileges and be able to |
665 | * regain them by swapping the real and effective uid. |
666 | */ |
667 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid, uid_t, uid) |
668 | { |
669 | const struct cred *old; |
670 | struct cred *new; |
671 | int retval; |
672 | |
673 | new = prepare_creds(); |
674 | if (!new) |
675 | return -ENOMEM; |
676 | old = current_cred(); |
677 | |
678 | retval = security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID); |
679 | if (retval) |
680 | goto error; |
681 | |
682 | retval = -EPERM; |
683 | if (capable(CAP_SETUID)) { |
684 | new->suid = new->uid = uid; |
685 | if (uid != old->uid) { |
686 | retval = set_user(new); |
687 | if (retval < 0) |
688 | goto error; |
689 | } |
690 | } else if (uid != old->uid && uid != new->suid) { |
691 | goto error; |
692 | } |
693 | |
694 | new->fsuid = new->euid = uid; |
695 | |
696 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID); |
697 | if (retval < 0) |
698 | goto error; |
699 | |
700 | return commit_creds(new); |
701 | |
702 | error: |
703 | abort_creds(new); |
704 | return retval; |
705 | } |
706 | |
707 | |
708 | /* |
709 | * This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid, |
710 | * and suid. This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid(). |
711 | */ |
712 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid, uid_t, suid) |
713 | { |
714 | const struct cred *old; |
715 | struct cred *new; |
716 | int retval; |
717 | |
718 | new = prepare_creds(); |
719 | if (!new) |
720 | return -ENOMEM; |
721 | |
722 | retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, suid, LSM_SETID_RES); |
723 | if (retval) |
724 | goto error; |
725 | old = current_cred(); |
726 | |
727 | retval = -EPERM; |
728 | if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) { |
729 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 && ruid != old->uid && |
730 | ruid != old->euid && ruid != old->suid) |
731 | goto error; |
732 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1 && euid != old->uid && |
733 | euid != old->euid && euid != old->suid) |
734 | goto error; |
735 | if (suid != (uid_t) -1 && suid != old->uid && |
736 | suid != old->euid && suid != old->suid) |
737 | goto error; |
738 | } |
739 | |
740 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { |
741 | new->uid = ruid; |
742 | if (ruid != old->uid) { |
743 | retval = set_user(new); |
744 | if (retval < 0) |
745 | goto error; |
746 | } |
747 | } |
748 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1) |
749 | new->euid = euid; |
750 | if (suid != (uid_t) -1) |
751 | new->suid = suid; |
752 | new->fsuid = new->euid; |
753 | |
754 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES); |
755 | if (retval < 0) |
756 | goto error; |
757 | |
758 | return commit_creds(new); |
759 | |
760 | error: |
761 | abort_creds(new); |
762 | return retval; |
763 | } |
764 | |
765 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresuid, uid_t __user *, ruid, uid_t __user *, euid, uid_t __user *, suid) |
766 | { |
767 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
768 | int retval; |
769 | |
770 | if (!(retval = put_user(cred->uid, ruid)) && |
771 | !(retval = put_user(cred->euid, euid))) |
772 | retval = put_user(cred->suid, suid); |
773 | |
774 | return retval; |
775 | } |
776 | |
777 | /* |
778 | * Same as above, but for rgid, egid, sgid. |
779 | */ |
780 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid) |
781 | { |
782 | const struct cred *old; |
783 | struct cred *new; |
784 | int retval; |
785 | |
786 | new = prepare_creds(); |
787 | if (!new) |
788 | return -ENOMEM; |
789 | old = current_cred(); |
790 | |
791 | retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, sgid, LSM_SETID_RES); |
792 | if (retval) |
793 | goto error; |
794 | |
795 | retval = -EPERM; |
796 | if (!capable(CAP_SETGID)) { |
797 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && rgid != old->gid && |
798 | rgid != old->egid && rgid != old->sgid) |
799 | goto error; |
800 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old->gid && |
801 | egid != old->egid && egid != old->sgid) |
802 | goto error; |
803 | if (sgid != (gid_t) -1 && sgid != old->gid && |
804 | sgid != old->egid && sgid != old->sgid) |
805 | goto error; |
806 | } |
807 | |
808 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) |
809 | new->gid = rgid; |
810 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1) |
811 | new->egid = egid; |
812 | if (sgid != (gid_t) -1) |
813 | new->sgid = sgid; |
814 | new->fsgid = new->egid; |
815 | |
816 | return commit_creds(new); |
817 | |
818 | error: |
819 | abort_creds(new); |
820 | return retval; |
821 | } |
822 | |
823 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresgid, gid_t __user *, rgid, gid_t __user *, egid, gid_t __user *, sgid) |
824 | { |
825 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
826 | int retval; |
827 | |
828 | if (!(retval = put_user(cred->gid, rgid)) && |
829 | !(retval = put_user(cred->egid, egid))) |
830 | retval = put_user(cred->sgid, sgid); |
831 | |
832 | return retval; |
833 | } |
834 | |
835 | |
836 | /* |
837 | * "setfsuid()" sets the fsuid - the uid used for filesystem checks. This |
838 | * is used for "access()" and for the NFS daemon (letting nfsd stay at |
839 | * whatever uid it wants to). It normally shadows "euid", except when |
840 | * explicitly set by setfsuid() or for access.. |
841 | */ |
842 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid) |
843 | { |
844 | const struct cred *old; |
845 | struct cred *new; |
846 | uid_t old_fsuid; |
847 | |
848 | new = prepare_creds(); |
849 | if (!new) |
850 | return current_fsuid(); |
851 | old = current_cred(); |
852 | old_fsuid = old->fsuid; |
853 | |
854 | if (security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS) < 0) |
855 | goto error; |
856 | |
857 | if (uid == old->uid || uid == old->euid || |
858 | uid == old->suid || uid == old->fsuid || |
859 | capable(CAP_SETUID)) { |
860 | if (uid != old_fsuid) { |
861 | new->fsuid = uid; |
862 | if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0) |
863 | goto change_okay; |
864 | } |
865 | } |
866 | |
867 | error: |
868 | abort_creds(new); |
869 | return old_fsuid; |
870 | |
871 | change_okay: |
872 | commit_creds(new); |
873 | return old_fsuid; |
874 | } |
875 | |
876 | /* |
877 | * Samma på svenska.. |
878 | */ |
879 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid) |
880 | { |
881 | const struct cred *old; |
882 | struct cred *new; |
883 | gid_t old_fsgid; |
884 | |
885 | new = prepare_creds(); |
886 | if (!new) |
887 | return current_fsgid(); |
888 | old = current_cred(); |
889 | old_fsgid = old->fsgid; |
890 | |
891 | if (security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS)) |
892 | goto error; |
893 | |
894 | if (gid == old->gid || gid == old->egid || |
895 | gid == old->sgid || gid == old->fsgid || |
896 | capable(CAP_SETGID)) { |
897 | if (gid != old_fsgid) { |
898 | new->fsgid = gid; |
899 | goto change_okay; |
900 | } |
901 | } |
902 | |
903 | error: |
904 | abort_creds(new); |
905 | return old_fsgid; |
906 | |
907 | change_okay: |
908 | commit_creds(new); |
909 | return old_fsgid; |
910 | } |
911 | |
912 | void do_sys_times(struct tms *tms) |
913 | { |
914 | struct task_cputime cputime; |
915 | cputime_t cutime, cstime; |
916 | |
917 | thread_group_cputime(current, &cputime); |
918 | spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); |
919 | cutime = current->signal->cutime; |
920 | cstime = current->signal->cstime; |
921 | spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); |
922 | tms->tms_utime = cputime_to_clock_t(cputime.utime); |
923 | tms->tms_stime = cputime_to_clock_t(cputime.stime); |
924 | tms->tms_cutime = cputime_to_clock_t(cutime); |
925 | tms->tms_cstime = cputime_to_clock_t(cstime); |
926 | } |
927 | |
928 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct tms __user *, tbuf) |
929 | { |
930 | if (tbuf) { |
931 | struct tms tmp; |
932 | |
933 | do_sys_times(&tmp); |
934 | if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(struct tms))) |
935 | return -EFAULT; |
936 | } |
937 | force_successful_syscall_return(); |
938 | return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(get_jiffies_64()); |
939 | } |
940 | |
941 | /* |
942 | * This needs some heavy checking ... |
943 | * I just haven't the stomach for it. I also don't fully |
944 | * understand sessions/pgrp etc. Let somebody who does explain it. |
945 | * |
946 | * OK, I think I have the protection semantics right.... this is really |
947 | * only important on a multi-user system anyway, to make sure one user |
948 | * can't send a signal to a process owned by another. -TYT, 12/12/91 |
949 | * |
950 | * Auch. Had to add the 'did_exec' flag to conform completely to POSIX. |
951 | * LBT 04.03.94 |
952 | */ |
953 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setpgid, pid_t, pid, pid_t, pgid) |
954 | { |
955 | struct task_struct *p; |
956 | struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader; |
957 | struct pid *pgrp; |
958 | int err; |
959 | |
960 | if (!pid) |
961 | pid = task_pid_vnr(group_leader); |
962 | if (!pgid) |
963 | pgid = pid; |
964 | if (pgid < 0) |
965 | return -EINVAL; |
966 | |
967 | /* From this point forward we keep holding onto the tasklist lock |
968 | * so that our parent does not change from under us. -DaveM |
969 | */ |
970 | write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
971 | |
972 | err = -ESRCH; |
973 | p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); |
974 | if (!p) |
975 | goto out; |
976 | |
977 | err = -EINVAL; |
978 | if (!thread_group_leader(p)) |
979 | goto out; |
980 | |
981 | if (same_thread_group(p->real_parent, group_leader)) { |
982 | err = -EPERM; |
983 | if (task_session(p) != task_session(group_leader)) |
984 | goto out; |
985 | err = -EACCES; |
986 | if (p->did_exec) |
987 | goto out; |
988 | } else { |
989 | err = -ESRCH; |
990 | if (p != group_leader) |
991 | goto out; |
992 | } |
993 | |
994 | err = -EPERM; |
995 | if (p->signal->leader) |
996 | goto out; |
997 | |
998 | pgrp = task_pid(p); |
999 | if (pgid != pid) { |
1000 | struct task_struct *g; |
1001 | |
1002 | pgrp = find_vpid(pgid); |
1003 | g = pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID); |
1004 | if (!g || task_session(g) != task_session(group_leader)) |
1005 | goto out; |
1006 | } |
1007 | |
1008 | err = security_task_setpgid(p, pgid); |
1009 | if (err) |
1010 | goto out; |
1011 | |
1012 | if (task_pgrp(p) != pgrp) |
1013 | change_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, pgrp); |
1014 | |
1015 | err = 0; |
1016 | out: |
1017 | /* All paths lead to here, thus we are safe. -DaveM */ |
1018 | write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
1019 | return err; |
1020 | } |
1021 | |
1022 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getpgid, pid_t, pid) |
1023 | { |
1024 | struct task_struct *p; |
1025 | struct pid *grp; |
1026 | int retval; |
1027 | |
1028 | rcu_read_lock(); |
1029 | if (!pid) |
1030 | grp = task_pgrp(current); |
1031 | else { |
1032 | retval = -ESRCH; |
1033 | p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); |
1034 | if (!p) |
1035 | goto out; |
1036 | grp = task_pgrp(p); |
1037 | if (!grp) |
1038 | goto out; |
1039 | |
1040 | retval = security_task_getpgid(p); |
1041 | if (retval) |
1042 | goto out; |
1043 | } |
1044 | retval = pid_vnr(grp); |
1045 | out: |
1046 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1047 | return retval; |
1048 | } |
1049 | |
1050 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETPGRP |
1051 | |
1052 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpgrp) |
1053 | { |
1054 | return sys_getpgid(0); |
1055 | } |
1056 | |
1057 | #endif |
1058 | |
1059 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getsid, pid_t, pid) |
1060 | { |
1061 | struct task_struct *p; |
1062 | struct pid *sid; |
1063 | int retval; |
1064 | |
1065 | rcu_read_lock(); |
1066 | if (!pid) |
1067 | sid = task_session(current); |
1068 | else { |
1069 | retval = -ESRCH; |
1070 | p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); |
1071 | if (!p) |
1072 | goto out; |
1073 | sid = task_session(p); |
1074 | if (!sid) |
1075 | goto out; |
1076 | |
1077 | retval = security_task_getsid(p); |
1078 | if (retval) |
1079 | goto out; |
1080 | } |
1081 | retval = pid_vnr(sid); |
1082 | out: |
1083 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1084 | return retval; |
1085 | } |
1086 | |
1087 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(setsid) |
1088 | { |
1089 | struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader; |
1090 | struct pid *sid = task_pid(group_leader); |
1091 | pid_t session = pid_vnr(sid); |
1092 | int err = -EPERM; |
1093 | |
1094 | write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
1095 | /* Fail if I am already a session leader */ |
1096 | if (group_leader->signal->leader) |
1097 | goto out; |
1098 | |
1099 | /* Fail if a process group id already exists that equals the |
1100 | * proposed session id. |
1101 | */ |
1102 | if (pid_task(sid, PIDTYPE_PGID)) |
1103 | goto out; |
1104 | |
1105 | group_leader->signal->leader = 1; |
1106 | __set_special_pids(sid); |
1107 | |
1108 | proc_clear_tty(group_leader); |
1109 | |
1110 | err = session; |
1111 | out: |
1112 | write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
1113 | return err; |
1114 | } |
1115 | |
1116 | DECLARE_RWSEM(uts_sem); |
1117 | |
1118 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(newuname, struct new_utsname __user *, name) |
1119 | { |
1120 | int errno = 0; |
1121 | |
1122 | down_read(&uts_sem); |
1123 | if (copy_to_user(name, utsname(), sizeof *name)) |
1124 | errno = -EFAULT; |
1125 | up_read(&uts_sem); |
1126 | return errno; |
1127 | } |
1128 | |
1129 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
1130 | { |
1131 | int errno; |
1132 | char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN]; |
1133 | |
1134 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
1135 | return -EPERM; |
1136 | if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN) |
1137 | return -EINVAL; |
1138 | down_write(&uts_sem); |
1139 | errno = -EFAULT; |
1140 | if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) { |
1141 | struct new_utsname *u = utsname(); |
1142 | |
1143 | memcpy(u->nodename, tmp, len); |
1144 | memset(u->nodename + len, 0, sizeof(u->nodename) - len); |
1145 | errno = 0; |
1146 | } |
1147 | up_write(&uts_sem); |
1148 | return errno; |
1149 | } |
1150 | |
1151 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETHOSTNAME |
1152 | |
1153 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(gethostname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
1154 | { |
1155 | int i, errno; |
1156 | struct new_utsname *u; |
1157 | |
1158 | if (len < 0) |
1159 | return -EINVAL; |
1160 | down_read(&uts_sem); |
1161 | u = utsname(); |
1162 | i = 1 + strlen(u->nodename); |
1163 | if (i > len) |
1164 | i = len; |
1165 | errno = 0; |
1166 | if (copy_to_user(name, u->nodename, i)) |
1167 | errno = -EFAULT; |
1168 | up_read(&uts_sem); |
1169 | return errno; |
1170 | } |
1171 | |
1172 | #endif |
1173 | |
1174 | /* |
1175 | * Only setdomainname; getdomainname can be implemented by calling |
1176 | * uname() |
1177 | */ |
1178 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setdomainname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
1179 | { |
1180 | int errno; |
1181 | char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN]; |
1182 | |
1183 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
1184 | return -EPERM; |
1185 | if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN) |
1186 | return -EINVAL; |
1187 | |
1188 | down_write(&uts_sem); |
1189 | errno = -EFAULT; |
1190 | if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) { |
1191 | struct new_utsname *u = utsname(); |
1192 | |
1193 | memcpy(u->domainname, tmp, len); |
1194 | memset(u->domainname + len, 0, sizeof(u->domainname) - len); |
1195 | errno = 0; |
1196 | } |
1197 | up_write(&uts_sem); |
1198 | return errno; |
1199 | } |
1200 | |
1201 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim) |
1202 | { |
1203 | if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) |
1204 | return -EINVAL; |
1205 | else { |
1206 | struct rlimit value; |
1207 | task_lock(current->group_leader); |
1208 | value = current->signal->rlim[resource]; |
1209 | task_unlock(current->group_leader); |
1210 | return copy_to_user(rlim, &value, sizeof(*rlim)) ? -EFAULT : 0; |
1211 | } |
1212 | } |
1213 | |
1214 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_GETRLIMIT |
1215 | |
1216 | /* |
1217 | * Back compatibility for getrlimit. Needed for some apps. |
1218 | */ |
1219 | |
1220 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, |
1221 | struct rlimit __user *, rlim) |
1222 | { |
1223 | struct rlimit x; |
1224 | if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) |
1225 | return -EINVAL; |
1226 | |
1227 | task_lock(current->group_leader); |
1228 | x = current->signal->rlim[resource]; |
1229 | task_unlock(current->group_leader); |
1230 | if (x.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF) |
1231 | x.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF; |
1232 | if (x.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF) |
1233 | x.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF; |
1234 | return copy_to_user(rlim, &x, sizeof(x))?-EFAULT:0; |
1235 | } |
1236 | |
1237 | #endif |
1238 | |
1239 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim) |
1240 | { |
1241 | struct rlimit new_rlim, *old_rlim; |
1242 | int retval; |
1243 | |
1244 | if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) |
1245 | return -EINVAL; |
1246 | if (copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim))) |
1247 | return -EFAULT; |
1248 | if (new_rlim.rlim_cur > new_rlim.rlim_max) |
1249 | return -EINVAL; |
1250 | old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource; |
1251 | if ((new_rlim.rlim_max > old_rlim->rlim_max) && |
1252 | !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) |
1253 | return -EPERM; |
1254 | if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE && new_rlim.rlim_max > sysctl_nr_open) |
1255 | return -EPERM; |
1256 | |
1257 | retval = security_task_setrlimit(resource, &new_rlim); |
1258 | if (retval) |
1259 | return retval; |
1260 | |
1261 | if (resource == RLIMIT_CPU && new_rlim.rlim_cur == 0) { |
1262 | /* |
1263 | * The caller is asking for an immediate RLIMIT_CPU |
1264 | * expiry. But we use the zero value to mean "it was |
1265 | * never set". So let's cheat and make it one second |
1266 | * instead |
1267 | */ |
1268 | new_rlim.rlim_cur = 1; |
1269 | } |
1270 | |
1271 | task_lock(current->group_leader); |
1272 | *old_rlim = new_rlim; |
1273 | task_unlock(current->group_leader); |
1274 | |
1275 | if (resource != RLIMIT_CPU) |
1276 | goto out; |
1277 | |
1278 | /* |
1279 | * RLIMIT_CPU handling. Note that the kernel fails to return an error |
1280 | * code if it rejected the user's attempt to set RLIMIT_CPU. This is a |
1281 | * very long-standing error, and fixing it now risks breakage of |
1282 | * applications, so we live with it |
1283 | */ |
1284 | if (new_rlim.rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY) |
1285 | goto out; |
1286 | |
1287 | update_rlimit_cpu(new_rlim.rlim_cur); |
1288 | out: |
1289 | return 0; |
1290 | } |
1291 | |
1292 | /* |
1293 | * It would make sense to put struct rusage in the task_struct, |
1294 | * except that would make the task_struct be *really big*. After |
1295 | * task_struct gets moved into malloc'ed memory, it would |
1296 | * make sense to do this. It will make moving the rest of the information |
1297 | * a lot simpler! (Which we're not doing right now because we're not |
1298 | * measuring them yet). |
1299 | * |
1300 | * When sampling multiple threads for RUSAGE_SELF, under SMP we might have |
1301 | * races with threads incrementing their own counters. But since word |
1302 | * reads are atomic, we either get new values or old values and we don't |
1303 | * care which for the sums. We always take the siglock to protect reading |
1304 | * the c* fields from p->signal from races with exit.c updating those |
1305 | * fields when reaping, so a sample either gets all the additions of a |
1306 | * given child after it's reaped, or none so this sample is before reaping. |
1307 | * |
1308 | * Locking: |
1309 | * We need to take the siglock for CHILDEREN, SELF and BOTH |
1310 | * for the cases current multithreaded, non-current single threaded |
1311 | * non-current multithreaded. Thread traversal is now safe with |
1312 | * the siglock held. |
1313 | * Strictly speaking, we donot need to take the siglock if we are current and |
1314 | * single threaded, as no one else can take our signal_struct away, no one |
1315 | * else can reap the children to update signal->c* counters, and no one else |
1316 | * can race with the signal-> fields. If we do not take any lock, the |
1317 | * signal-> fields could be read out of order while another thread was just |
1318 | * exiting. So we should place a read memory barrier when we avoid the lock. |
1319 | * On the writer side, write memory barrier is implied in __exit_signal |
1320 | * as __exit_signal releases the siglock spinlock after updating the signal-> |
1321 | * fields. But we don't do this yet to keep things simple. |
1322 | * |
1323 | */ |
1324 | |
1325 | static void accumulate_thread_rusage(struct task_struct *t, struct rusage *r) |
1326 | { |
1327 | r->ru_nvcsw += t->nvcsw; |
1328 | r->ru_nivcsw += t->nivcsw; |
1329 | r->ru_minflt += t->min_flt; |
1330 | r->ru_majflt += t->maj_flt; |
1331 | r->ru_inblock += task_io_get_inblock(t); |
1332 | r->ru_oublock += task_io_get_oublock(t); |
1333 | } |
1334 | |
1335 | static void k_getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r) |
1336 | { |
1337 | struct task_struct *t; |
1338 | unsigned long flags; |
1339 | cputime_t utime, stime; |
1340 | struct task_cputime cputime; |
1341 | |
1342 | memset((char *) r, 0, sizeof *r); |
1343 | utime = stime = cputime_zero; |
1344 | |
1345 | if (who == RUSAGE_THREAD) { |
1346 | utime = task_utime(current); |
1347 | stime = task_stime(current); |
1348 | accumulate_thread_rusage(p, r); |
1349 | goto out; |
1350 | } |
1351 | |
1352 | if (!lock_task_sighand(p, &flags)) |
1353 | return; |
1354 | |
1355 | switch (who) { |
1356 | case RUSAGE_BOTH: |
1357 | case RUSAGE_CHILDREN: |
1358 | utime = p->signal->cutime; |
1359 | stime = p->signal->cstime; |
1360 | r->ru_nvcsw = p->signal->cnvcsw; |
1361 | r->ru_nivcsw = p->signal->cnivcsw; |
1362 | r->ru_minflt = p->signal->cmin_flt; |
1363 | r->ru_majflt = p->signal->cmaj_flt; |
1364 | r->ru_inblock = p->signal->cinblock; |
1365 | r->ru_oublock = p->signal->coublock; |
1366 | |
1367 | if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN) |
1368 | break; |
1369 | |
1370 | case RUSAGE_SELF: |
1371 | thread_group_cputime(p, &cputime); |
1372 | utime = cputime_add(utime, cputime.utime); |
1373 | stime = cputime_add(stime, cputime.stime); |
1374 | r->ru_nvcsw += p->signal->nvcsw; |
1375 | r->ru_nivcsw += p->signal->nivcsw; |
1376 | r->ru_minflt += p->signal->min_flt; |
1377 | r->ru_majflt += p->signal->maj_flt; |
1378 | r->ru_inblock += p->signal->inblock; |
1379 | r->ru_oublock += p->signal->oublock; |
1380 | t = p; |
1381 | do { |
1382 | accumulate_thread_rusage(t, r); |
1383 | t = next_thread(t); |
1384 | } while (t != p); |
1385 | break; |
1386 | |
1387 | default: |
1388 | BUG(); |
1389 | } |
1390 | unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags); |
1391 | |
1392 | out: |
1393 | cputime_to_timeval(utime, &r->ru_utime); |
1394 | cputime_to_timeval(stime, &r->ru_stime); |
1395 | } |
1396 | |
1397 | int getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage __user *ru) |
1398 | { |
1399 | struct rusage r; |
1400 | k_getrusage(p, who, &r); |
1401 | return copy_to_user(ru, &r, sizeof(r)) ? -EFAULT : 0; |
1402 | } |
1403 | |
1404 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct rusage __user *, ru) |
1405 | { |
1406 | if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN && |
1407 | who != RUSAGE_THREAD) |
1408 | return -EINVAL; |
1409 | return getrusage(current, who, ru); |
1410 | } |
1411 | |
1412 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(umask, int, mask) |
1413 | { |
1414 | mask = xchg(¤t->fs->umask, mask & S_IRWXUGO); |
1415 | return mask; |
1416 | } |
1417 | |
1418 | SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3, |
1419 | unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5) |
1420 | { |
1421 | struct task_struct *me = current; |
1422 | unsigned char comm[sizeof(me->comm)]; |
1423 | long error; |
1424 | |
1425 | error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); |
1426 | if (error != -ENOSYS) |
1427 | return error; |
1428 | |
1429 | error = 0; |
1430 | switch (option) { |
1431 | case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG: |
1432 | if (!valid_signal(arg2)) { |
1433 | error = -EINVAL; |
1434 | break; |
1435 | } |
1436 | me->pdeath_signal = arg2; |
1437 | error = 0; |
1438 | break; |
1439 | case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG: |
1440 | error = put_user(me->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2); |
1441 | break; |
1442 | case PR_GET_DUMPABLE: |
1443 | error = get_dumpable(me->mm); |
1444 | break; |
1445 | case PR_SET_DUMPABLE: |
1446 | if (arg2 < 0 || arg2 > 1) { |
1447 | error = -EINVAL; |
1448 | break; |
1449 | } |
1450 | set_dumpable(me->mm, arg2); |
1451 | error = 0; |
1452 | break; |
1453 | |
1454 | case PR_SET_UNALIGN: |
1455 | error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); |
1456 | break; |
1457 | case PR_GET_UNALIGN: |
1458 | error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); |
1459 | break; |
1460 | case PR_SET_FPEMU: |
1461 | error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); |
1462 | break; |
1463 | case PR_GET_FPEMU: |
1464 | error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); |
1465 | break; |
1466 | case PR_SET_FPEXC: |
1467 | error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); |
1468 | break; |
1469 | case PR_GET_FPEXC: |
1470 | error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); |
1471 | break; |
1472 | case PR_GET_TIMING: |
1473 | error = PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL; |
1474 | break; |
1475 | case PR_SET_TIMING: |
1476 | if (arg2 != PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL) |
1477 | error = -EINVAL; |
1478 | else |
1479 | error = 0; |
1480 | break; |
1481 | |
1482 | case PR_SET_NAME: |
1483 | comm[sizeof(me->comm)-1] = 0; |
1484 | if (strncpy_from_user(comm, (char __user *)arg2, |
1485 | sizeof(me->comm) - 1) < 0) |
1486 | return -EFAULT; |
1487 | set_task_comm(me, comm); |
1488 | return 0; |
1489 | case PR_GET_NAME: |
1490 | get_task_comm(comm, me); |
1491 | if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm, |
1492 | sizeof(comm))) |
1493 | return -EFAULT; |
1494 | return 0; |
1495 | case PR_GET_ENDIAN: |
1496 | error = GET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); |
1497 | break; |
1498 | case PR_SET_ENDIAN: |
1499 | error = SET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); |
1500 | break; |
1501 | |
1502 | case PR_GET_SECCOMP: |
1503 | error = prctl_get_seccomp(); |
1504 | break; |
1505 | case PR_SET_SECCOMP: |
1506 | error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2); |
1507 | break; |
1508 | case PR_GET_TSC: |
1509 | error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2); |
1510 | break; |
1511 | case PR_SET_TSC: |
1512 | error = SET_TSC_CTL(arg2); |
1513 | break; |
1514 | case PR_TASK_PERF_COUNTERS_DISABLE: |
1515 | error = perf_counter_task_disable(); |
1516 | break; |
1517 | case PR_TASK_PERF_COUNTERS_ENABLE: |
1518 | error = perf_counter_task_enable(); |
1519 | break; |
1520 | case PR_GET_TIMERSLACK: |
1521 | error = current->timer_slack_ns; |
1522 | break; |
1523 | case PR_SET_TIMERSLACK: |
1524 | if (arg2 <= 0) |
1525 | current->timer_slack_ns = |
1526 | current->default_timer_slack_ns; |
1527 | else |
1528 | current->timer_slack_ns = arg2; |
1529 | error = 0; |
1530 | break; |
1531 | default: |
1532 | error = -EINVAL; |
1533 | break; |
1534 | } |
1535 | return error; |
1536 | } |
1537 | |
1538 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getcpu, unsigned __user *, cpup, unsigned __user *, nodep, |
1539 | struct getcpu_cache __user *, unused) |
1540 | { |
1541 | int err = 0; |
1542 | int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(); |
1543 | if (cpup) |
1544 | err |= put_user(cpu, cpup); |
1545 | if (nodep) |
1546 | err |= put_user(cpu_to_node(cpu), nodep); |
1547 | return err ? -EFAULT : 0; |
1548 | } |
1549 | |
1550 | char poweroff_cmd[POWEROFF_CMD_PATH_LEN] = "/sbin/poweroff"; |
1551 | |
1552 | static void argv_cleanup(char **argv, char **envp) |
1553 | { |
1554 | argv_free(argv); |
1555 | } |
1556 | |
1557 | /** |
1558 | * orderly_poweroff - Trigger an orderly system poweroff |
1559 | * @force: force poweroff if command execution fails |
1560 | * |
1561 | * This may be called from any context to trigger a system shutdown. |
1562 | * If the orderly shutdown fails, it will force an immediate shutdown. |
1563 | */ |
1564 | int orderly_poweroff(bool force) |
1565 | { |
1566 | int argc; |
1567 | char **argv = argv_split(GFP_ATOMIC, poweroff_cmd, &argc); |
1568 | static char *envp[] = { |
1569 | "HOME=/", |
1570 | "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin", |
1571 | NULL |
1572 | }; |
1573 | int ret = -ENOMEM; |
1574 | struct subprocess_info *info; |
1575 | |
1576 | if (argv == NULL) { |
1577 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s failed to allocate memory for \"%s\"\n", |
1578 | __func__, poweroff_cmd); |
1579 | goto out; |
1580 | } |
1581 | |
1582 | info = call_usermodehelper_setup(argv[0], argv, envp, GFP_ATOMIC); |
1583 | if (info == NULL) { |
1584 | argv_free(argv); |
1585 | goto out; |
1586 | } |
1587 | |
1588 | call_usermodehelper_setcleanup(info, argv_cleanup); |
1589 | |
1590 | ret = call_usermodehelper_exec(info, UMH_NO_WAIT); |
1591 | |
1592 | out: |
1593 | if (ret && force) { |
1594 | printk(KERN_WARNING "Failed to start orderly shutdown: " |
1595 | "forcing the issue\n"); |
1596 | |
1597 | /* I guess this should try to kick off some daemon to |
1598 | sync and poweroff asap. Or not even bother syncing |
1599 | if we're doing an emergency shutdown? */ |
1600 | emergency_sync(); |
1601 | kernel_power_off(); |
1602 | } |
1603 | |
1604 | return ret; |
1605 | } |
1606 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(orderly_poweroff); |
1607 |
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Tags:
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v2.6.34-rc5
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