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Source at commit be977234bfb4a6dca8a39e7c52165e4cd536ad71 created 12 years 9 months ago. By Lars-Peter Clausen, jz4740: Fix compile error | |
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1 | /* |
2 | * AppArmor security module |
3 | * |
4 | * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks. |
5 | * |
6 | * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE |
7 | * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. |
8 | * |
9 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or |
10 | * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as |
11 | * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the |
12 | * License. |
13 | */ |
14 | |
15 | #include <linux/security.h> |
16 | #include <linux/moduleparam.h> |
17 | #include <linux/mm.h> |
18 | #include <linux/mman.h> |
19 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
20 | #include <linux/namei.h> |
21 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> |
22 | #include <linux/ctype.h> |
23 | #include <linux/sysctl.h> |
24 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
25 | #include <linux/user_namespace.h> |
26 | #include <net/sock.h> |
27 | |
28 | #include "include/apparmor.h" |
29 | #include "include/apparmorfs.h" |
30 | #include "include/audit.h" |
31 | #include "include/capability.h" |
32 | #include "include/context.h" |
33 | #include "include/file.h" |
34 | #include "include/ipc.h" |
35 | #include "include/path.h" |
36 | #include "include/policy.h" |
37 | #include "include/procattr.h" |
38 | |
39 | /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */ |
40 | int apparmor_initialized __initdata; |
41 | |
42 | /* |
43 | * LSM hook functions |
44 | */ |
45 | |
46 | /* |
47 | * free the associated aa_task_cxt and put its profiles |
48 | */ |
49 | static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred) |
50 | { |
51 | aa_free_task_context(cred->security); |
52 | cred->security = NULL; |
53 | } |
54 | |
55 | /* |
56 | * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials |
57 | */ |
58 | static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) |
59 | { |
60 | /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */ |
61 | struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp); |
62 | if (!cxt) |
63 | return -ENOMEM; |
64 | |
65 | cred->security = cxt; |
66 | return 0; |
67 | } |
68 | |
69 | /* |
70 | * prepare new aa_task_cxt for modification by prepare_cred block |
71 | */ |
72 | static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, |
73 | gfp_t gfp) |
74 | { |
75 | /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */ |
76 | struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp); |
77 | if (!cxt) |
78 | return -ENOMEM; |
79 | |
80 | aa_dup_task_context(cxt, old->security); |
81 | new->security = cxt; |
82 | return 0; |
83 | } |
84 | |
85 | /* |
86 | * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds |
87 | */ |
88 | static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
89 | { |
90 | const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = old->security; |
91 | struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = new->security; |
92 | |
93 | aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt); |
94 | } |
95 | |
96 | static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, |
97 | unsigned int mode) |
98 | { |
99 | int error = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode); |
100 | if (error) |
101 | return error; |
102 | |
103 | return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode); |
104 | } |
105 | |
106 | static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) |
107 | { |
108 | int error = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent); |
109 | if (error) |
110 | return error; |
111 | |
112 | return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH); |
113 | } |
114 | |
115 | /* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */ |
116 | static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, |
117 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) |
118 | { |
119 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
120 | const struct cred *cred; |
121 | |
122 | rcu_read_lock(); |
123 | cred = __task_cred(target); |
124 | profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); |
125 | |
126 | *effective = cred->cap_effective; |
127 | *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable; |
128 | *permitted = cred->cap_permitted; |
129 | |
130 | if (!unconfined(profile)) { |
131 | *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow); |
132 | *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow); |
133 | } |
134 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
135 | |
136 | return 0; |
137 | } |
138 | |
139 | static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, const struct cred *cred, |
140 | struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit) |
141 | { |
142 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
143 | /* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */ |
144 | int error = cap_capable(task, cred, ns, cap, audit); |
145 | if (!error) { |
146 | profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); |
147 | if (!unconfined(profile)) |
148 | error = aa_capable(task, profile, cap, audit); |
149 | } |
150 | return error; |
151 | } |
152 | |
153 | /** |
154 | * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths |
155 | * @op: operation being checked |
156 | * @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL) |
157 | * @mask: requested permissions mask |
158 | * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) |
159 | * |
160 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
161 | */ |
162 | static int common_perm(int op, struct path *path, u32 mask, |
163 | struct path_cond *cond) |
164 | { |
165 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
166 | int error = 0; |
167 | |
168 | profile = __aa_current_profile(); |
169 | if (!unconfined(profile)) |
170 | error = aa_path_perm(op, profile, path, 0, mask, cond); |
171 | |
172 | return error; |
173 | } |
174 | |
175 | /** |
176 | * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry |
177 | * @op: operation being checked |
178 | * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL) |
179 | * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL) |
180 | * @mask: requested permissions mask |
181 | * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) |
182 | * |
183 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
184 | */ |
185 | static int common_perm_dir_dentry(int op, struct path *dir, |
186 | struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, |
187 | struct path_cond *cond) |
188 | { |
189 | struct path path = { dir->mnt, dentry }; |
190 | |
191 | return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond); |
192 | } |
193 | |
194 | /** |
195 | * common_perm_mnt_dentry - common permission wrapper when mnt, dentry |
196 | * @op: operation being checked |
197 | * @mnt: mount point of dentry (NOT NULL) |
198 | * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL) |
199 | * @mask: requested permissions mask |
200 | * |
201 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
202 | */ |
203 | static int common_perm_mnt_dentry(int op, struct vfsmount *mnt, |
204 | struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask) |
205 | { |
206 | struct path path = { mnt, dentry }; |
207 | struct path_cond cond = { dentry->d_inode->i_uid, |
208 | dentry->d_inode->i_mode |
209 | }; |
210 | |
211 | return common_perm(op, &path, mask, &cond); |
212 | } |
213 | |
214 | /** |
215 | * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm |
216 | * @op: operation being checked |
217 | * @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL) |
218 | * @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL) |
219 | * @mask: requested permission mask |
220 | * |
221 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
222 | */ |
223 | static int common_perm_rm(int op, struct path *dir, |
224 | struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask) |
225 | { |
226 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
227 | struct path_cond cond = { }; |
228 | |
229 | if (!inode || !dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(inode)) |
230 | return 0; |
231 | |
232 | cond.uid = inode->i_uid; |
233 | cond.mode = inode->i_mode; |
234 | |
235 | return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond); |
236 | } |
237 | |
238 | /** |
239 | * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create |
240 | * @op: operation being checked |
241 | * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL) |
242 | * @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL) |
243 | * @mask: request permission mask |
244 | * @mode: created file mode |
245 | * |
246 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
247 | */ |
248 | static int common_perm_create(int op, struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, |
249 | u32 mask, umode_t mode) |
250 | { |
251 | struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode }; |
252 | |
253 | if (!dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dir->dentry->d_inode)) |
254 | return 0; |
255 | |
256 | return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond); |
257 | } |
258 | |
259 | static int apparmor_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) |
260 | { |
261 | return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); |
262 | } |
263 | |
264 | static int apparmor_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, |
265 | int mode) |
266 | { |
267 | return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, |
268 | S_IFDIR); |
269 | } |
270 | |
271 | static int apparmor_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) |
272 | { |
273 | return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); |
274 | } |
275 | |
276 | static int apparmor_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, |
277 | int mode, unsigned int dev) |
278 | { |
279 | return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode); |
280 | } |
281 | |
282 | static int apparmor_path_truncate(struct path *path) |
283 | { |
284 | struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid, |
285 | path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode |
286 | }; |
287 | |
288 | if (!path->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode)) |
289 | return 0; |
290 | |
291 | return common_perm(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE, |
292 | &cond); |
293 | } |
294 | |
295 | static int apparmor_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, |
296 | const char *old_name) |
297 | { |
298 | return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, |
299 | S_IFLNK); |
300 | } |
301 | |
302 | static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir, |
303 | struct dentry *new_dentry) |
304 | { |
305 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
306 | int error = 0; |
307 | |
308 | if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode)) |
309 | return 0; |
310 | |
311 | profile = aa_current_profile(); |
312 | if (!unconfined(profile)) |
313 | error = aa_path_link(profile, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); |
314 | return error; |
315 | } |
316 | |
317 | static int apparmor_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, |
318 | struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) |
319 | { |
320 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
321 | int error = 0; |
322 | |
323 | if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode)) |
324 | return 0; |
325 | |
326 | profile = aa_current_profile(); |
327 | if (!unconfined(profile)) { |
328 | struct path old_path = { old_dir->mnt, old_dentry }; |
329 | struct path new_path = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry }; |
330 | struct path_cond cond = { old_dentry->d_inode->i_uid, |
331 | old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode |
332 | }; |
333 | |
334 | error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, profile, &old_path, 0, |
335 | MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ | MAY_WRITE | |
336 | AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_DELETE, |
337 | &cond); |
338 | if (!error) |
339 | error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, profile, &new_path, |
340 | 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE | |
341 | AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond); |
342 | |
343 | } |
344 | return error; |
345 | } |
346 | |
347 | static int apparmor_path_chmod(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, |
348 | mode_t mode) |
349 | { |
350 | if (!mediated_filesystem(dentry->d_inode)) |
351 | return 0; |
352 | |
353 | return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_CHMOD, mnt, dentry, AA_MAY_CHMOD); |
354 | } |
355 | |
356 | static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) |
357 | { |
358 | struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid, |
359 | path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode |
360 | }; |
361 | |
362 | if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode)) |
363 | return 0; |
364 | |
365 | return common_perm(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN, &cond); |
366 | } |
367 | |
368 | static int apparmor_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) |
369 | { |
370 | if (!mediated_filesystem(dentry->d_inode)) |
371 | return 0; |
372 | |
373 | return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_GETATTR, mnt, dentry, |
374 | AA_MAY_META_READ); |
375 | } |
376 | |
377 | static int apparmor_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) |
378 | { |
379 | struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security; |
380 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
381 | int error = 0; |
382 | |
383 | if (!mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode)) |
384 | return 0; |
385 | |
386 | /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks. |
387 | * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with |
388 | * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to |
389 | * actually execute the image. |
390 | */ |
391 | if (current->in_execve) { |
392 | fcxt->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP; |
393 | return 0; |
394 | } |
395 | |
396 | profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); |
397 | if (!unconfined(profile)) { |
398 | struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; |
399 | struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode }; |
400 | |
401 | error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, profile, &file->f_path, 0, |
402 | aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond); |
403 | /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */ |
404 | fcxt->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file); |
405 | } |
406 | |
407 | return error; |
408 | } |
409 | |
410 | static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) |
411 | { |
412 | /* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */ |
413 | file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_context(GFP_KERNEL); |
414 | if (!file->f_security) |
415 | return -ENOMEM; |
416 | return 0; |
417 | |
418 | } |
419 | |
420 | static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file) |
421 | { |
422 | struct aa_file_cxt *cxt = file->f_security; |
423 | |
424 | aa_free_file_context(cxt); |
425 | } |
426 | |
427 | static int common_file_perm(int op, struct file *file, u32 mask) |
428 | { |
429 | struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security; |
430 | struct aa_profile *profile, *fprofile = aa_cred_profile(file->f_cred); |
431 | int error = 0; |
432 | |
433 | BUG_ON(!fprofile); |
434 | |
435 | if (!file->f_path.mnt || |
436 | !mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode)) |
437 | return 0; |
438 | |
439 | profile = __aa_current_profile(); |
440 | |
441 | /* revalidate access, if task is unconfined, or the cached cred |
442 | * doesn't match or if the request is for more permissions than |
443 | * was granted. |
444 | * |
445 | * Note: the test for !unconfined(fprofile) is to handle file |
446 | * delegation from unconfined tasks |
447 | */ |
448 | if (!unconfined(profile) && !unconfined(fprofile) && |
449 | ((fprofile != profile) || (mask & ~fcxt->allow))) |
450 | error = aa_file_perm(op, profile, file, mask); |
451 | |
452 | return error; |
453 | } |
454 | |
455 | static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) |
456 | { |
457 | return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask); |
458 | } |
459 | |
460 | static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) |
461 | { |
462 | u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK; |
463 | |
464 | if (cmd == F_WRLCK) |
465 | mask |= MAY_WRITE; |
466 | |
467 | return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask); |
468 | } |
469 | |
470 | static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot, |
471 | unsigned long flags) |
472 | { |
473 | struct dentry *dentry; |
474 | int mask = 0; |
475 | |
476 | if (!file || !file->f_security) |
477 | return 0; |
478 | |
479 | if (prot & PROT_READ) |
480 | mask |= MAY_READ; |
481 | /* |
482 | * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't |
483 | * write back to the files |
484 | */ |
485 | if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE)) |
486 | mask |= MAY_WRITE; |
487 | if (prot & PROT_EXEC) |
488 | mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP; |
489 | |
490 | dentry = file->f_path.dentry; |
491 | return common_file_perm(op, file, mask); |
492 | } |
493 | |
494 | static int apparmor_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, |
495 | unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, |
496 | unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) |
497 | { |
498 | int rc = 0; |
499 | |
500 | /* do DAC check */ |
501 | rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); |
502 | if (rc || addr_only) |
503 | return rc; |
504 | |
505 | return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags); |
506 | } |
507 | |
508 | static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, |
509 | unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) |
510 | { |
511 | return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot, |
512 | !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0); |
513 | } |
514 | |
515 | static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, |
516 | char **value) |
517 | { |
518 | int error = -ENOENT; |
519 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
520 | /* released below */ |
521 | const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task); |
522 | struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred->security; |
523 | profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); |
524 | |
525 | if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) |
526 | error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile), |
527 | value); |
528 | else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && cxt->previous) |
529 | error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->previous), |
530 | value); |
531 | else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec) |
532 | error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->onexec), |
533 | value); |
534 | else |
535 | error = -EINVAL; |
536 | |
537 | put_cred(cred); |
538 | |
539 | return error; |
540 | } |
541 | |
542 | static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, |
543 | void *value, size_t size) |
544 | { |
545 | char *command, *args = value; |
546 | size_t arg_size; |
547 | int error; |
548 | |
549 | if (size == 0) |
550 | return -EINVAL; |
551 | /* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that |
552 | * the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1 |
553 | * so that AppArmor can null terminate them |
554 | */ |
555 | if (args[size - 1] != '\0') { |
556 | if (size == PAGE_SIZE) |
557 | return -EINVAL; |
558 | args[size] = '\0'; |
559 | } |
560 | |
561 | /* task can only write its own attributes */ |
562 | if (current != task) |
563 | return -EACCES; |
564 | |
565 | args = value; |
566 | args = strim(args); |
567 | command = strsep(&args, " "); |
568 | if (!args) |
569 | return -EINVAL; |
570 | args = skip_spaces(args); |
571 | if (!*args) |
572 | return -EINVAL; |
573 | |
574 | arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value); |
575 | if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) { |
576 | if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) { |
577 | error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, |
578 | !AA_DO_TEST); |
579 | } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) { |
580 | error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, |
581 | AA_DO_TEST); |
582 | } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) { |
583 | error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC, |
584 | !AA_DO_TEST); |
585 | } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) { |
586 | error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC, |
587 | AA_DO_TEST); |
588 | } else if (strcmp(command, "permipc") == 0) { |
589 | error = aa_setprocattr_permipc(args); |
590 | } else { |
591 | struct common_audit_data sa; |
592 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); |
593 | sa.aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR; |
594 | sa.aad.info = name; |
595 | sa.aad.error = -EINVAL; |
596 | return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, NULL, GFP_KERNEL, |
597 | &sa, NULL); |
598 | } |
599 | } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) { |
600 | error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC, |
601 | !AA_DO_TEST); |
602 | } else { |
603 | /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */ |
604 | return -EINVAL; |
605 | } |
606 | if (!error) |
607 | error = size; |
608 | return error; |
609 | } |
610 | |
611 | static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task, |
612 | unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) |
613 | { |
614 | struct aa_profile *profile = aa_current_profile(); |
615 | int error = 0; |
616 | |
617 | if (!unconfined(profile)) |
618 | error = aa_task_setrlimit(profile, task, resource, new_rlim); |
619 | |
620 | return error; |
621 | } |
622 | |
623 | static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = { |
624 | .name = "apparmor", |
625 | |
626 | .ptrace_access_check = apparmor_ptrace_access_check, |
627 | .ptrace_traceme = apparmor_ptrace_traceme, |
628 | .capget = apparmor_capget, |
629 | .capable = apparmor_capable, |
630 | |
631 | .path_link = apparmor_path_link, |
632 | .path_unlink = apparmor_path_unlink, |
633 | .path_symlink = apparmor_path_symlink, |
634 | .path_mkdir = apparmor_path_mkdir, |
635 | .path_rmdir = apparmor_path_rmdir, |
636 | .path_mknod = apparmor_path_mknod, |
637 | .path_rename = apparmor_path_rename, |
638 | .path_chmod = apparmor_path_chmod, |
639 | .path_chown = apparmor_path_chown, |
640 | .path_truncate = apparmor_path_truncate, |
641 | .dentry_open = apparmor_dentry_open, |
642 | .inode_getattr = apparmor_inode_getattr, |
643 | |
644 | .file_permission = apparmor_file_permission, |
645 | .file_alloc_security = apparmor_file_alloc_security, |
646 | .file_free_security = apparmor_file_free_security, |
647 | .file_mmap = apparmor_file_mmap, |
648 | .file_mprotect = apparmor_file_mprotect, |
649 | .file_lock = apparmor_file_lock, |
650 | |
651 | .getprocattr = apparmor_getprocattr, |
652 | .setprocattr = apparmor_setprocattr, |
653 | |
654 | .cred_alloc_blank = apparmor_cred_alloc_blank, |
655 | .cred_free = apparmor_cred_free, |
656 | .cred_prepare = apparmor_cred_prepare, |
657 | .cred_transfer = apparmor_cred_transfer, |
658 | |
659 | .bprm_set_creds = apparmor_bprm_set_creds, |
660 | .bprm_committing_creds = apparmor_bprm_committing_creds, |
661 | .bprm_committed_creds = apparmor_bprm_committed_creds, |
662 | .bprm_secureexec = apparmor_bprm_secureexec, |
663 | |
664 | .task_setrlimit = apparmor_task_setrlimit, |
665 | }; |
666 | |
667 | /* |
668 | * AppArmor sysfs module parameters |
669 | */ |
670 | |
671 | static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
672 | static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
673 | #define param_check_aabool(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int) |
674 | static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = { |
675 | .set = param_set_aabool, |
676 | .get = param_get_aabool |
677 | }; |
678 | |
679 | static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
680 | static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
681 | #define param_check_aauint(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int) |
682 | static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = { |
683 | .set = param_set_aauint, |
684 | .get = param_get_aauint |
685 | }; |
686 | |
687 | static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
688 | static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
689 | #define param_check_aalockpolicy(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int) |
690 | static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = { |
691 | .set = param_set_aalockpolicy, |
692 | .get = param_get_aalockpolicy |
693 | }; |
694 | |
695 | static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp); |
696 | static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp); |
697 | |
698 | static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp); |
699 | static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp); |
700 | |
701 | /* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters |
702 | * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation. |
703 | */ |
704 | |
705 | /* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */ |
706 | enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE; |
707 | module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode, |
708 | &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
709 | |
710 | /* Debug mode */ |
711 | int aa_g_debug; |
712 | module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
713 | |
714 | /* Audit mode */ |
715 | enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; |
716 | module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit, |
717 | &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
718 | |
719 | /* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This |
720 | * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running |
721 | */ |
722 | int aa_g_audit_header = 1; |
723 | module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool, |
724 | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
725 | |
726 | /* lock out loading/removal of policy |
727 | * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to |
728 | * load policy, if lock_policy is set |
729 | */ |
730 | int aa_g_lock_policy; |
731 | module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy, |
732 | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
733 | |
734 | /* Syscall logging mode */ |
735 | int aa_g_logsyscall; |
736 | module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
737 | |
738 | /* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */ |
739 | unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX; |
740 | module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
741 | |
742 | /* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification |
743 | * on the loaded policy is done. |
744 | */ |
745 | int aa_g_paranoid_load = 1; |
746 | module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, |
747 | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
748 | |
749 | /* Boot time disable flag */ |
750 | static unsigned int apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; |
751 | module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aabool, S_IRUSR); |
752 | |
753 | static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str) |
754 | { |
755 | unsigned long enabled; |
756 | int error = strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled); |
757 | if (!error) |
758 | apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; |
759 | return 1; |
760 | } |
761 | |
762 | __setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup); |
763 | |
764 | /* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */ |
765 | static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
766 | { |
767 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
768 | return -EPERM; |
769 | if (aa_g_lock_policy) |
770 | return -EACCES; |
771 | return param_set_bool(val, kp); |
772 | } |
773 | |
774 | static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
775 | { |
776 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
777 | return -EPERM; |
778 | return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); |
779 | } |
780 | |
781 | static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
782 | { |
783 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
784 | return -EPERM; |
785 | return param_set_bool(val, kp); |
786 | } |
787 | |
788 | static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
789 | { |
790 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
791 | return -EPERM; |
792 | return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); |
793 | } |
794 | |
795 | static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
796 | { |
797 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
798 | return -EPERM; |
799 | return param_set_uint(val, kp); |
800 | } |
801 | |
802 | static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
803 | { |
804 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
805 | return -EPERM; |
806 | return param_get_uint(buffer, kp); |
807 | } |
808 | |
809 | static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) |
810 | { |
811 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
812 | return -EPERM; |
813 | |
814 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
815 | return -EINVAL; |
816 | |
817 | return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]); |
818 | } |
819 | |
820 | static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) |
821 | { |
822 | int i; |
823 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
824 | return -EPERM; |
825 | |
826 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
827 | return -EINVAL; |
828 | |
829 | if (!val) |
830 | return -EINVAL; |
831 | |
832 | for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_MAX_INDEX; i++) { |
833 | if (strcmp(val, audit_mode_names[i]) == 0) { |
834 | aa_g_audit = i; |
835 | return 0; |
836 | } |
837 | } |
838 | |
839 | return -EINVAL; |
840 | } |
841 | |
842 | static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) |
843 | { |
844 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
845 | return -EPERM; |
846 | |
847 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
848 | return -EINVAL; |
849 | |
850 | return sprintf(buffer, "%s", profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]); |
851 | } |
852 | |
853 | static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) |
854 | { |
855 | int i; |
856 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
857 | return -EPERM; |
858 | |
859 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
860 | return -EINVAL; |
861 | |
862 | if (!val) |
863 | return -EINVAL; |
864 | |
865 | for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) { |
866 | if (strcmp(val, profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) { |
867 | aa_g_profile_mode = i; |
868 | return 0; |
869 | } |
870 | } |
871 | |
872 | return -EINVAL; |
873 | } |
874 | |
875 | /* |
876 | * AppArmor init functions |
877 | */ |
878 | |
879 | /** |
880 | * set_init_cxt - set a task context and profile on the first task. |
881 | * |
882 | * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined |
883 | */ |
884 | static int __init set_init_cxt(void) |
885 | { |
886 | struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred; |
887 | struct aa_task_cxt *cxt; |
888 | |
889 | cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL); |
890 | if (!cxt) |
891 | return -ENOMEM; |
892 | |
893 | cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined); |
894 | cred->security = cxt; |
895 | |
896 | return 0; |
897 | } |
898 | |
899 | static int __init apparmor_init(void) |
900 | { |
901 | int error; |
902 | |
903 | if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable(&apparmor_ops)) { |
904 | aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter"); |
905 | apparmor_enabled = 0; |
906 | return 0; |
907 | } |
908 | |
909 | error = aa_alloc_root_ns(); |
910 | if (error) { |
911 | AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n"); |
912 | goto alloc_out; |
913 | } |
914 | |
915 | error = set_init_cxt(); |
916 | if (error) { |
917 | AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n"); |
918 | goto register_security_out; |
919 | } |
920 | |
921 | error = register_security(&apparmor_ops); |
922 | if (error) { |
923 | AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n"); |
924 | goto set_init_cxt_out; |
925 | } |
926 | |
927 | /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */ |
928 | apparmor_initialized = 1; |
929 | if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN) |
930 | aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled"); |
931 | else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL) |
932 | aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled"); |
933 | else |
934 | aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized"); |
935 | |
936 | return error; |
937 | |
938 | set_init_cxt_out: |
939 | aa_free_task_context(current->real_cred->security); |
940 | |
941 | register_security_out: |
942 | aa_free_root_ns(); |
943 | |
944 | alloc_out: |
945 | aa_destroy_aafs(); |
946 | |
947 | apparmor_enabled = 0; |
948 | return error; |
949 | } |
950 | |
951 | security_initcall(apparmor_init); |
952 |
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