Root/Documentation/keys-request-key.txt

1                  ===================
2                  KEY REQUEST SERVICE
3                  ===================
4
5The key request service is part of the key retention service (refer to
6Documentation/keys.txt). This document explains more fully how the requesting
7algorithm works.
8
9The process starts by either the kernel requesting a service by calling
10request_key*():
11
12    struct key *request_key(const struct key_type *type,
13                const char *description,
14                const char *callout_info);
15
16or:
17
18    struct key *request_key_with_auxdata(const struct key_type *type,
19                         const char *description,
20                         const char *callout_info,
21                         size_t callout_len,
22                         void *aux);
23
24or:
25
26    struct key *request_key_async(const struct key_type *type,
27                      const char *description,
28                      const char *callout_info,
29                      size_t callout_len);
30
31or:
32
33    struct key *request_key_async_with_auxdata(const struct key_type *type,
34                           const char *description,
35                           const char *callout_info,
36                                size_t callout_len,
37                           void *aux);
38
39Or by userspace invoking the request_key system call:
40
41    key_serial_t request_key(const char *type,
42                 const char *description,
43                 const char *callout_info,
44                 key_serial_t dest_keyring);
45
46The main difference between the access points is that the in-kernel interface
47does not need to link the key to a keyring to prevent it from being immediately
48destroyed. The kernel interface returns a pointer directly to the key, and
49it's up to the caller to destroy the key.
50
51The request_key*_with_auxdata() calls are like the in-kernel request_key*()
52calls, except that they permit auxiliary data to be passed to the upcaller (the
53default is NULL). This is only useful for those key types that define their
54own upcall mechanism rather than using /sbin/request-key.
55
56The two async in-kernel calls may return keys that are still in the process of
57being constructed. The two non-async ones will wait for construction to
58complete first.
59
60The userspace interface links the key to a keyring associated with the process
61to prevent the key from going away, and returns the serial number of the key to
62the caller.
63
64
65The following example assumes that the key types involved don't define their
66own upcall mechanisms. If they do, then those should be substituted for the
67forking and execution of /sbin/request-key.
68
69
70===========
71THE PROCESS
72===========
73
74A request proceeds in the following manner:
75
76 (1) Process A calls request_key() [the userspace syscall calls the kernel
77     interface].
78
79 (2) request_key() searches the process's subscribed keyrings to see if there's
80     a suitable key there. If there is, it returns the key. If there isn't,
81     and callout_info is not set, an error is returned. Otherwise the process
82     proceeds to the next step.
83
84 (3) request_key() sees that A doesn't have the desired key yet, so it creates
85     two things:
86
87     (a) An uninstantiated key U of requested type and description.
88
89     (b) An authorisation key V that refers to key U and notes that process A
90          is the context in which key U should be instantiated and secured, and
91          from which associated key requests may be satisfied.
92
93 (4) request_key() then forks and executes /sbin/request-key with a new session
94     keyring that contains a link to auth key V.
95
96 (5) /sbin/request-key assumes the authority associated with key U.
97
98 (6) /sbin/request-key execs an appropriate program to perform the actual
99     instantiation.
100
101 (7) The program may want to access another key from A's context (say a
102     Kerberos TGT key). It just requests the appropriate key, and the keyring
103     search notes that the session keyring has auth key V in its bottom level.
104
105     This will permit it to then search the keyrings of process A with the
106     UID, GID, groups and security info of process A as if it was process A,
107     and come up with key W.
108
109 (8) The program then does what it must to get the data with which to
110     instantiate key U, using key W as a reference (perhaps it contacts a
111     Kerberos server using the TGT) and then instantiates key U.
112
113 (9) Upon instantiating key U, auth key V is automatically revoked so that it
114     may not be used again.
115
116(10) The program then exits 0 and request_key() deletes key V and returns key
117     U to the caller.
118
119This also extends further. If key W (step 7 above) didn't exist, key W would
120be created uninstantiated, another auth key (X) would be created (as per step
1213) and another copy of /sbin/request-key spawned (as per step 4); but the
122context specified by auth key X will still be process A, as it was in auth key
123V.
124
125This is because process A's keyrings can't simply be attached to
126/sbin/request-key at the appropriate places because (a) execve will discard two
127of them, and (b) it requires the same UID/GID/Groups all the way through.
128
129
130======================
131NEGATIVE INSTANTIATION
132======================
133
134Rather than instantiating a key, it is possible for the possessor of an
135authorisation key to negatively instantiate a key that's under construction.
136This is a short duration placeholder that causes any attempt at re-requesting
137the key whilst it exists to fail with error ENOKEY.
138
139This is provided to prevent excessive repeated spawning of /sbin/request-key
140processes for a key that will never be obtainable.
141
142Should the /sbin/request-key process exit anything other than 0 or die on a
143signal, the key under construction will be automatically negatively
144instantiated for a short amount of time.
145
146
147====================
148THE SEARCH ALGORITHM
149====================
150
151A search of any particular keyring proceeds in the following fashion:
152
153 (1) When the key management code searches for a key (keyring_search_aux) it
154     firstly calls key_permission(SEARCH) on the keyring it's starting with,
155     if this denies permission, it doesn't search further.
156
157 (2) It considers all the non-keyring keys within that keyring and, if any key
158     matches the criteria specified, calls key_permission(SEARCH) on it to see
159     if the key is allowed to be found. If it is, that key is returned; if
160     not, the search continues, and the error code is retained if of higher
161     priority than the one currently set.
162
163 (3) It then considers all the keyring-type keys in the keyring it's currently
164     searching. It calls key_permission(SEARCH) on each keyring, and if this
165     grants permission, it recurses, executing steps (2) and (3) on that
166     keyring.
167
168The process stops immediately a valid key is found with permission granted to
169use it. Any error from a previous match attempt is discarded and the key is
170returned.
171
172When search_process_keyrings() is invoked, it performs the following searches
173until one succeeds:
174
175 (1) If extant, the process's thread keyring is searched.
176
177 (2) If extant, the process's process keyring is searched.
178
179 (3) The process's session keyring is searched.
180
181 (4) If the process has assumed the authority associated with a request_key()
182     authorisation key then:
183
184     (a) If extant, the calling process's thread keyring is searched.
185
186     (b) If extant, the calling process's process keyring is searched.
187
188     (c) The calling process's session keyring is searched.
189
190The moment one succeeds, all pending errors are discarded and the found key is
191returned.
192
193Only if all these fail does the whole thing fail with the highest priority
194error. Note that several errors may have come from LSM.
195
196The error priority is:
197
198    EKEYREVOKED > EKEYEXPIRED > ENOKEY
199
200EACCES/EPERM are only returned on a direct search of a specific keyring where
201the basal keyring does not grant Search permission.
202

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