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1 | /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support |
2 | * Handles all system-call specific auditing features. |
3 | * |
4 | * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina. |
5 | * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. |
6 | * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation |
7 | * All Rights Reserved. |
8 | * |
9 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
10 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by |
11 | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or |
12 | * (at your option) any later version. |
13 | * |
14 | * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, |
15 | * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of |
16 | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the |
17 | * GNU General Public License for more details. |
18 | * |
19 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License |
20 | * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software |
21 | * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA |
22 | * |
23 | * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com> |
24 | * |
25 | * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie, |
26 | * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname. |
27 | * |
28 | * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in |
29 | * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by |
30 | * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG. |
31 | * |
32 | * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>, |
33 | * 2006. |
34 | * |
35 | * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was |
36 | * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005. |
37 | * |
38 | * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional |
39 | * filesystem information. |
40 | * |
41 | * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com> |
42 | * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance. |
43 | */ |
44 | |
45 | #include <linux/init.h> |
46 | #include <asm/types.h> |
47 | #include <asm/atomic.h> |
48 | #include <linux/fs.h> |
49 | #include <linux/namei.h> |
50 | #include <linux/mm.h> |
51 | #include <linux/module.h> |
52 | #include <linux/slab.h> |
53 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
54 | #include <linux/socket.h> |
55 | #include <linux/mqueue.h> |
56 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
57 | #include <linux/personality.h> |
58 | #include <linux/time.h> |
59 | #include <linux/netlink.h> |
60 | #include <linux/compiler.h> |
61 | #include <asm/unistd.h> |
62 | #include <linux/security.h> |
63 | #include <linux/list.h> |
64 | #include <linux/tty.h> |
65 | #include <linux/binfmts.h> |
66 | #include <linux/highmem.h> |
67 | #include <linux/syscalls.h> |
68 | #include <linux/inotify.h> |
69 | #include <linux/capability.h> |
70 | #include <linux/fs_struct.h> |
71 | |
72 | #include "audit.h" |
73 | |
74 | /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context |
75 | * for saving names from getname(). */ |
76 | #define AUDIT_NAMES 20 |
77 | |
78 | /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */ |
79 | #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1 |
80 | |
81 | /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */ |
82 | #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500 |
83 | |
84 | /* number of audit rules */ |
85 | int audit_n_rules; |
86 | |
87 | /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */ |
88 | int audit_signals; |
89 | |
90 | struct audit_cap_data { |
91 | kernel_cap_t permitted; |
92 | kernel_cap_t inheritable; |
93 | union { |
94 | unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of a file capability */ |
95 | kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of a process */ |
96 | }; |
97 | }; |
98 | |
99 | /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and |
100 | * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved |
101 | * pointers at syscall exit time). |
102 | * |
103 | * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */ |
104 | struct audit_names { |
105 | const char *name; |
106 | int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */ |
107 | unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */ |
108 | unsigned long ino; |
109 | dev_t dev; |
110 | umode_t mode; |
111 | uid_t uid; |
112 | gid_t gid; |
113 | dev_t rdev; |
114 | u32 osid; |
115 | struct audit_cap_data fcap; |
116 | unsigned int fcap_ver; |
117 | }; |
118 | |
119 | struct audit_aux_data { |
120 | struct audit_aux_data *next; |
121 | int type; |
122 | }; |
123 | |
124 | #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0 |
125 | |
126 | /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */ |
127 | #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16 |
128 | |
129 | struct audit_aux_data_execve { |
130 | struct audit_aux_data d; |
131 | int argc; |
132 | int envc; |
133 | struct mm_struct *mm; |
134 | }; |
135 | |
136 | struct audit_aux_data_pids { |
137 | struct audit_aux_data d; |
138 | pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
139 | uid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
140 | uid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
141 | unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
142 | u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
143 | char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN]; |
144 | int pid_count; |
145 | }; |
146 | |
147 | struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps { |
148 | struct audit_aux_data d; |
149 | struct audit_cap_data fcap; |
150 | unsigned int fcap_ver; |
151 | struct audit_cap_data old_pcap; |
152 | struct audit_cap_data new_pcap; |
153 | }; |
154 | |
155 | struct audit_aux_data_capset { |
156 | struct audit_aux_data d; |
157 | pid_t pid; |
158 | struct audit_cap_data cap; |
159 | }; |
160 | |
161 | struct audit_tree_refs { |
162 | struct audit_tree_refs *next; |
163 | struct audit_chunk *c[31]; |
164 | }; |
165 | |
166 | /* The per-task audit context. */ |
167 | struct audit_context { |
168 | int dummy; /* must be the first element */ |
169 | int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */ |
170 | enum audit_state state, current_state; |
171 | unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */ |
172 | int major; /* syscall number */ |
173 | struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */ |
174 | unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */ |
175 | long return_code;/* syscall return code */ |
176 | u64 prio; |
177 | int return_valid; /* return code is valid */ |
178 | int name_count; |
179 | struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES]; |
180 | char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */ |
181 | struct path pwd; |
182 | struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */ |
183 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; |
184 | struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids; |
185 | struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr; |
186 | size_t sockaddr_len; |
187 | /* Save things to print about task_struct */ |
188 | pid_t pid, ppid; |
189 | uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid; |
190 | gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid; |
191 | unsigned long personality; |
192 | int arch; |
193 | |
194 | pid_t target_pid; |
195 | uid_t target_auid; |
196 | uid_t target_uid; |
197 | unsigned int target_sessionid; |
198 | u32 target_sid; |
199 | char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; |
200 | |
201 | struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees; |
202 | struct list_head killed_trees; |
203 | int tree_count; |
204 | |
205 | int type; |
206 | union { |
207 | struct { |
208 | int nargs; |
209 | long args[6]; |
210 | } socketcall; |
211 | struct { |
212 | uid_t uid; |
213 | gid_t gid; |
214 | mode_t mode; |
215 | u32 osid; |
216 | int has_perm; |
217 | uid_t perm_uid; |
218 | gid_t perm_gid; |
219 | mode_t perm_mode; |
220 | unsigned long qbytes; |
221 | } ipc; |
222 | struct { |
223 | mqd_t mqdes; |
224 | struct mq_attr mqstat; |
225 | } mq_getsetattr; |
226 | struct { |
227 | mqd_t mqdes; |
228 | int sigev_signo; |
229 | } mq_notify; |
230 | struct { |
231 | mqd_t mqdes; |
232 | size_t msg_len; |
233 | unsigned int msg_prio; |
234 | struct timespec abs_timeout; |
235 | } mq_sendrecv; |
236 | struct { |
237 | int oflag; |
238 | mode_t mode; |
239 | struct mq_attr attr; |
240 | } mq_open; |
241 | struct { |
242 | pid_t pid; |
243 | struct audit_cap_data cap; |
244 | } capset; |
245 | }; |
246 | int fds[2]; |
247 | |
248 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
249 | int put_count; |
250 | int ino_count; |
251 | #endif |
252 | }; |
253 | |
254 | static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask) |
255 | { |
256 | int n = ACC_MODE(flags); |
257 | if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT)) |
258 | n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE; |
259 | return n & mask; |
260 | } |
261 | |
262 | static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask) |
263 | { |
264 | unsigned n; |
265 | if (unlikely(!ctx)) |
266 | return 0; |
267 | n = ctx->major; |
268 | |
269 | switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) { |
270 | case 0: /* native */ |
271 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && |
272 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n)) |
273 | return 1; |
274 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && |
275 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n)) |
276 | return 1; |
277 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && |
278 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n)) |
279 | return 1; |
280 | return 0; |
281 | case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */ |
282 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && |
283 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n)) |
284 | return 1; |
285 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && |
286 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n)) |
287 | return 1; |
288 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && |
289 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n)) |
290 | return 1; |
291 | return 0; |
292 | case 2: /* open */ |
293 | return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]); |
294 | case 3: /* openat */ |
295 | return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]); |
296 | case 4: /* socketcall */ |
297 | return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND); |
298 | case 5: /* execve */ |
299 | return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC; |
300 | default: |
301 | return 0; |
302 | } |
303 | } |
304 | |
305 | static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int which) |
306 | { |
307 | unsigned index = which & ~S_IFMT; |
308 | mode_t mode = which & S_IFMT; |
309 | |
310 | if (unlikely(!ctx)) |
311 | return 0; |
312 | |
313 | if (index >= ctx->name_count) |
314 | return 0; |
315 | if (ctx->names[index].ino == -1) |
316 | return 0; |
317 | if ((ctx->names[index].mode ^ mode) & S_IFMT) |
318 | return 0; |
319 | return 1; |
320 | } |
321 | |
322 | /* |
323 | * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *; |
324 | * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data. |
325 | * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees. |
326 | * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL, |
327 | * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously, |
328 | * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself. |
329 | * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff. |
330 | */ |
331 | |
332 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
333 | static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx) |
334 | { |
335 | if (!ctx->prio) { |
336 | ctx->prio = 1; |
337 | ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; |
338 | } |
339 | } |
340 | |
341 | static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk) |
342 | { |
343 | struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; |
344 | int left = ctx->tree_count; |
345 | if (likely(left)) { |
346 | p->c[--left] = chunk; |
347 | ctx->tree_count = left; |
348 | return 1; |
349 | } |
350 | if (!p) |
351 | return 0; |
352 | p = p->next; |
353 | if (p) { |
354 | p->c[30] = chunk; |
355 | ctx->trees = p; |
356 | ctx->tree_count = 30; |
357 | return 1; |
358 | } |
359 | return 0; |
360 | } |
361 | |
362 | static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) |
363 | { |
364 | struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; |
365 | ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL); |
366 | if (!ctx->trees) { |
367 | ctx->trees = p; |
368 | return 0; |
369 | } |
370 | if (p) |
371 | p->next = ctx->trees; |
372 | else |
373 | ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees; |
374 | ctx->tree_count = 31; |
375 | return 1; |
376 | } |
377 | #endif |
378 | |
379 | static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, |
380 | struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count) |
381 | { |
382 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
383 | struct audit_tree_refs *q; |
384 | int n; |
385 | if (!p) { |
386 | /* we started with empty chain */ |
387 | p = ctx->first_trees; |
388 | count = 31; |
389 | /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */ |
390 | if (!p) |
391 | return; |
392 | } |
393 | n = count; |
394 | for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) { |
395 | while (n--) { |
396 | audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); |
397 | q->c[n] = NULL; |
398 | } |
399 | } |
400 | while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) { |
401 | audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); |
402 | q->c[n] = NULL; |
403 | } |
404 | ctx->trees = p; |
405 | ctx->tree_count = count; |
406 | #endif |
407 | } |
408 | |
409 | static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) |
410 | { |
411 | struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q; |
412 | for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) { |
413 | q = p->next; |
414 | kfree(p); |
415 | } |
416 | } |
417 | |
418 | static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree) |
419 | { |
420 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
421 | struct audit_tree_refs *p; |
422 | int n; |
423 | if (!tree) |
424 | return 0; |
425 | /* full ones */ |
426 | for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) { |
427 | for (n = 0; n < 31; n++) |
428 | if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) |
429 | return 1; |
430 | } |
431 | /* partial */ |
432 | if (p) { |
433 | for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++) |
434 | if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) |
435 | return 1; |
436 | } |
437 | #endif |
438 | return 0; |
439 | } |
440 | |
441 | /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */ |
442 | /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 |
443 | * otherwise. */ |
444 | static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, |
445 | struct audit_krule *rule, |
446 | struct audit_context *ctx, |
447 | struct audit_names *name, |
448 | enum audit_state *state) |
449 | { |
450 | const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tsk); |
451 | int i, j, need_sid = 1; |
452 | u32 sid; |
453 | |
454 | for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { |
455 | struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; |
456 | int result = 0; |
457 | |
458 | switch (f->type) { |
459 | case AUDIT_PID: |
460 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val); |
461 | break; |
462 | case AUDIT_PPID: |
463 | if (ctx) { |
464 | if (!ctx->ppid) |
465 | ctx->ppid = sys_getppid(); |
466 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val); |
467 | } |
468 | break; |
469 | case AUDIT_UID: |
470 | result = audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->val); |
471 | break; |
472 | case AUDIT_EUID: |
473 | result = audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->val); |
474 | break; |
475 | case AUDIT_SUID: |
476 | result = audit_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->val); |
477 | break; |
478 | case AUDIT_FSUID: |
479 | result = audit_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->val); |
480 | break; |
481 | case AUDIT_GID: |
482 | result = audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->val); |
483 | break; |
484 | case AUDIT_EGID: |
485 | result = audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->val); |
486 | break; |
487 | case AUDIT_SGID: |
488 | result = audit_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->val); |
489 | break; |
490 | case AUDIT_FSGID: |
491 | result = audit_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->val); |
492 | break; |
493 | case AUDIT_PERS: |
494 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val); |
495 | break; |
496 | case AUDIT_ARCH: |
497 | if (ctx) |
498 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val); |
499 | break; |
500 | |
501 | case AUDIT_EXIT: |
502 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) |
503 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val); |
504 | break; |
505 | case AUDIT_SUCCESS: |
506 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) { |
507 | if (f->val) |
508 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS); |
509 | else |
510 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE); |
511 | } |
512 | break; |
513 | case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: |
514 | if (name) |
515 | result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), |
516 | f->op, f->val); |
517 | else if (ctx) { |
518 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { |
519 | if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) { |
520 | ++result; |
521 | break; |
522 | } |
523 | } |
524 | } |
525 | break; |
526 | case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: |
527 | if (name) |
528 | result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), |
529 | f->op, f->val); |
530 | else if (ctx) { |
531 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { |
532 | if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) { |
533 | ++result; |
534 | break; |
535 | } |
536 | } |
537 | } |
538 | break; |
539 | case AUDIT_INODE: |
540 | if (name) |
541 | result = (name->ino == f->val); |
542 | else if (ctx) { |
543 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { |
544 | if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) { |
545 | ++result; |
546 | break; |
547 | } |
548 | } |
549 | } |
550 | break; |
551 | case AUDIT_WATCH: |
552 | if (name && audit_watch_inode(rule->watch) != (unsigned long)-1) |
553 | result = (name->dev == audit_watch_dev(rule->watch) && |
554 | name->ino == audit_watch_inode(rule->watch)); |
555 | break; |
556 | case AUDIT_DIR: |
557 | if (ctx) |
558 | result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree); |
559 | break; |
560 | case AUDIT_LOGINUID: |
561 | result = 0; |
562 | if (ctx) |
563 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val); |
564 | break; |
565 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: |
566 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: |
567 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: |
568 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: |
569 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: |
570 | /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating |
571 | a temporary error. We simply treat this as a |
572 | match for now to avoid losing information that |
573 | may be wanted. An error message will also be |
574 | logged upon error */ |
575 | if (f->lsm_rule) { |
576 | if (need_sid) { |
577 | security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); |
578 | need_sid = 0; |
579 | } |
580 | result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, |
581 | f->op, |
582 | f->lsm_rule, |
583 | ctx); |
584 | } |
585 | break; |
586 | case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: |
587 | case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: |
588 | case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: |
589 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: |
590 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: |
591 | /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR |
592 | also applies here */ |
593 | if (f->lsm_rule) { |
594 | /* Find files that match */ |
595 | if (name) { |
596 | result = security_audit_rule_match( |
597 | name->osid, f->type, f->op, |
598 | f->lsm_rule, ctx); |
599 | } else if (ctx) { |
600 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { |
601 | if (security_audit_rule_match( |
602 | ctx->names[j].osid, |
603 | f->type, f->op, |
604 | f->lsm_rule, ctx)) { |
605 | ++result; |
606 | break; |
607 | } |
608 | } |
609 | } |
610 | /* Find ipc objects that match */ |
611 | if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) |
612 | break; |
613 | if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, |
614 | f->type, f->op, |
615 | f->lsm_rule, ctx)) |
616 | ++result; |
617 | } |
618 | break; |
619 | case AUDIT_ARG0: |
620 | case AUDIT_ARG1: |
621 | case AUDIT_ARG2: |
622 | case AUDIT_ARG3: |
623 | if (ctx) |
624 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val); |
625 | break; |
626 | case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: |
627 | /* ignore this field for filtering */ |
628 | result = 1; |
629 | break; |
630 | case AUDIT_PERM: |
631 | result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val); |
632 | break; |
633 | case AUDIT_FILETYPE: |
634 | result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val); |
635 | break; |
636 | } |
637 | |
638 | if (!result) { |
639 | put_cred(cred); |
640 | return 0; |
641 | } |
642 | } |
643 | |
644 | if (ctx) { |
645 | if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio) |
646 | return 0; |
647 | if (rule->filterkey) { |
648 | kfree(ctx->filterkey); |
649 | ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); |
650 | } |
651 | ctx->prio = rule->prio; |
652 | } |
653 | switch (rule->action) { |
654 | case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; |
655 | case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; |
656 | } |
657 | put_cred(cred); |
658 | return 1; |
659 | } |
660 | |
661 | /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is |
662 | * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task |
663 | * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid. |
664 | */ |
665 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key) |
666 | { |
667 | struct audit_entry *e; |
668 | enum audit_state state; |
669 | |
670 | rcu_read_lock(); |
671 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) { |
672 | if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) { |
673 | if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) |
674 | *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); |
675 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
676 | return state; |
677 | } |
678 | } |
679 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
680 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; |
681 | } |
682 | |
683 | /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the |
684 | * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is |
685 | * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit |
686 | * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT). |
687 | */ |
688 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, |
689 | struct audit_context *ctx, |
690 | struct list_head *list) |
691 | { |
692 | struct audit_entry *e; |
693 | enum audit_state state; |
694 | |
695 | if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid) |
696 | return AUDIT_DISABLED; |
697 | |
698 | rcu_read_lock(); |
699 | if (!list_empty(list)) { |
700 | int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); |
701 | int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); |
702 | |
703 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { |
704 | if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && |
705 | audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL, |
706 | &state)) { |
707 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
708 | ctx->current_state = state; |
709 | return state; |
710 | } |
711 | } |
712 | } |
713 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
714 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; |
715 | } |
716 | |
717 | /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been |
718 | * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash |
719 | * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[]. |
720 | * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall(). |
721 | */ |
722 | void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx) |
723 | { |
724 | int i; |
725 | struct audit_entry *e; |
726 | enum audit_state state; |
727 | |
728 | if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid) |
729 | return; |
730 | |
731 | rcu_read_lock(); |
732 | for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) { |
733 | int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); |
734 | int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); |
735 | struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i]; |
736 | int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino); |
737 | struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h]; |
738 | |
739 | if (list_empty(list)) |
740 | continue; |
741 | |
742 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { |
743 | if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && |
744 | audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) { |
745 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
746 | ctx->current_state = state; |
747 | return; |
748 | } |
749 | } |
750 | } |
751 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
752 | } |
753 | |
754 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk, |
755 | int return_valid, |
756 | long return_code) |
757 | { |
758 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; |
759 | |
760 | if (likely(!context)) |
761 | return NULL; |
762 | context->return_valid = return_valid; |
763 | |
764 | /* |
765 | * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual |
766 | * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific |
767 | * signal handlers |
768 | * |
769 | * This is actually a test for: |
770 | * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) || |
771 | * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) |
772 | * |
773 | * but is faster than a bunch of || |
774 | */ |
775 | if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) && |
776 | (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) && |
777 | (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD)) |
778 | context->return_code = -EINTR; |
779 | else |
780 | context->return_code = return_code; |
781 | |
782 | if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) { |
783 | audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]); |
784 | audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context); |
785 | } |
786 | |
787 | tsk->audit_context = NULL; |
788 | return context; |
789 | } |
790 | |
791 | static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) |
792 | { |
793 | int i; |
794 | |
795 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 |
796 | if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) { |
797 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d" |
798 | " name_count=%d put_count=%d" |
799 | " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n", |
800 | __FILE__, __LINE__, |
801 | context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall, |
802 | context->name_count, context->put_count, |
803 | context->ino_count); |
804 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { |
805 | printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, |
806 | context->names[i].name, |
807 | context->names[i].name ?: "(null)"); |
808 | } |
809 | dump_stack(); |
810 | return; |
811 | } |
812 | #endif |
813 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
814 | context->put_count = 0; |
815 | context->ino_count = 0; |
816 | #endif |
817 | |
818 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { |
819 | if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put) |
820 | __putname(context->names[i].name); |
821 | } |
822 | context->name_count = 0; |
823 | path_put(&context->pwd); |
824 | context->pwd.dentry = NULL; |
825 | context->pwd.mnt = NULL; |
826 | } |
827 | |
828 | static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) |
829 | { |
830 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; |
831 | |
832 | while ((aux = context->aux)) { |
833 | context->aux = aux->next; |
834 | kfree(aux); |
835 | } |
836 | while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) { |
837 | context->aux_pids = aux->next; |
838 | kfree(aux); |
839 | } |
840 | } |
841 | |
842 | static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context, |
843 | enum audit_state state) |
844 | { |
845 | memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context)); |
846 | context->state = state; |
847 | context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0; |
848 | } |
849 | |
850 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state) |
851 | { |
852 | struct audit_context *context; |
853 | |
854 | if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL))) |
855 | return NULL; |
856 | audit_zero_context(context, state); |
857 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees); |
858 | return context; |
859 | } |
860 | |
861 | /** |
862 | * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task |
863 | * @tsk: task |
864 | * |
865 | * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context |
866 | * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the |
867 | * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is |
868 | * needed. |
869 | */ |
870 | int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) |
871 | { |
872 | struct audit_context *context; |
873 | enum audit_state state; |
874 | char *key = NULL; |
875 | |
876 | if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled)) |
877 | return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */ |
878 | |
879 | state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key); |
880 | if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) |
881 | return 0; |
882 | |
883 | if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) { |
884 | kfree(key); |
885 | audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc"); |
886 | return -ENOMEM; |
887 | } |
888 | context->filterkey = key; |
889 | |
890 | tsk->audit_context = context; |
891 | set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); |
892 | return 0; |
893 | } |
894 | |
895 | static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) |
896 | { |
897 | struct audit_context *previous; |
898 | int count = 0; |
899 | |
900 | do { |
901 | previous = context->previous; |
902 | if (previous || (count && count < 10)) { |
903 | ++count; |
904 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:" |
905 | " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n", |
906 | context->serial, context->major, |
907 | context->name_count, count); |
908 | } |
909 | audit_free_names(context); |
910 | unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); |
911 | free_tree_refs(context); |
912 | audit_free_aux(context); |
913 | kfree(context->filterkey); |
914 | kfree(context->sockaddr); |
915 | kfree(context); |
916 | context = previous; |
917 | } while (context); |
918 | if (count >= 10) |
919 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count); |
920 | } |
921 | |
922 | void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) |
923 | { |
924 | char *ctx = NULL; |
925 | unsigned len; |
926 | int error; |
927 | u32 sid; |
928 | |
929 | security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); |
930 | if (!sid) |
931 | return; |
932 | |
933 | error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len); |
934 | if (error) { |
935 | if (error != -EINVAL) |
936 | goto error_path; |
937 | return; |
938 | } |
939 | |
940 | audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx); |
941 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); |
942 | return; |
943 | |
944 | error_path: |
945 | audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context"); |
946 | return; |
947 | } |
948 | |
949 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context); |
950 | |
951 | static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk) |
952 | { |
953 | char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)]; |
954 | struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm; |
955 | struct vm_area_struct *vma; |
956 | |
957 | /* tsk == current */ |
958 | |
959 | get_task_comm(name, tsk); |
960 | audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); |
961 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name); |
962 | |
963 | if (mm) { |
964 | down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); |
965 | vma = mm->mmap; |
966 | while (vma) { |
967 | if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && |
968 | vma->vm_file) { |
969 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=", |
970 | &vma->vm_file->f_path); |
971 | break; |
972 | } |
973 | vma = vma->vm_next; |
974 | } |
975 | up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); |
976 | } |
977 | audit_log_task_context(ab); |
978 | } |
979 | |
980 | static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, |
981 | uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid, |
982 | u32 sid, char *comm) |
983 | { |
984 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
985 | char *ctx = NULL; |
986 | u32 len; |
987 | int rc = 0; |
988 | |
989 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID); |
990 | if (!ab) |
991 | return rc; |
992 | |
993 | audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid, |
994 | uid, sessionid); |
995 | if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) { |
996 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)"); |
997 | rc = 1; |
998 | } else { |
999 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); |
1000 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); |
1001 | } |
1002 | audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm="); |
1003 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm); |
1004 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1005 | |
1006 | return rc; |
1007 | } |
1008 | |
1009 | /* |
1010 | * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't |
1011 | * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being |
1012 | * within about 500 bytes (next page boundry) |
1013 | * |
1014 | * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when |
1015 | * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting |
1016 | * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to |
1017 | * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space |
1018 | * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was. |
1019 | */ |
1020 | static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context, |
1021 | struct audit_buffer **ab, |
1022 | int arg_num, |
1023 | size_t *len_sent, |
1024 | const char __user *p, |
1025 | char *buf) |
1026 | { |
1027 | char arg_num_len_buf[12]; |
1028 | const char __user *tmp_p = p; |
1029 | /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */ |
1030 | size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5; |
1031 | size_t len, len_left, to_send; |
1032 | size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN; |
1033 | unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0; |
1034 | int ret; |
1035 | |
1036 | /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */ |
1037 | len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1; |
1038 | |
1039 | /* |
1040 | * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings |
1041 | * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar |
1042 | * for strings that are too long, we should not have created |
1043 | * any. |
1044 | */ |
1045 | if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) { |
1046 | WARN_ON(1); |
1047 | send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); |
1048 | return -1; |
1049 | } |
1050 | |
1051 | /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */ |
1052 | do { |
1053 | if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN) |
1054 | to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN; |
1055 | else |
1056 | to_send = len_left; |
1057 | ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send); |
1058 | /* |
1059 | * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just |
1060 | * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user- |
1061 | * space yet. |
1062 | */ |
1063 | if (ret) { |
1064 | WARN_ON(1); |
1065 | send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); |
1066 | return -1; |
1067 | } |
1068 | buf[to_send] = '\0'; |
1069 | has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send); |
1070 | if (has_cntl) { |
1071 | /* |
1072 | * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only |
1073 | * send half as much in each message |
1074 | */ |
1075 | max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2; |
1076 | break; |
1077 | } |
1078 | len_left -= to_send; |
1079 | tmp_p += to_send; |
1080 | } while (len_left > 0); |
1081 | |
1082 | len_left = len; |
1083 | |
1084 | if (len > max_execve_audit_len) |
1085 | too_long = 1; |
1086 | |
1087 | /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */ |
1088 | for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) { |
1089 | int room_left; |
1090 | |
1091 | if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len) |
1092 | to_send = max_execve_audit_len; |
1093 | else |
1094 | to_send = len_left; |
1095 | |
1096 | /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */ |
1097 | room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent; |
1098 | if (has_cntl) |
1099 | room_left -= (to_send * 2); |
1100 | else |
1101 | room_left -= to_send; |
1102 | if (room_left < 0) { |
1103 | *len_sent = 0; |
1104 | audit_log_end(*ab); |
1105 | *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE); |
1106 | if (!*ab) |
1107 | return 0; |
1108 | } |
1109 | |
1110 | /* |
1111 | * first record needs to say how long the original string was |
1112 | * so we can be sure nothing was lost. |
1113 | */ |
1114 | if ((i == 0) && (too_long)) |
1115 | audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num, |
1116 | has_cntl ? 2*len : len); |
1117 | |
1118 | /* |
1119 | * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already |
1120 | * filled buf above when we checked for control characters |
1121 | * so don't bother with another copy_from_user |
1122 | */ |
1123 | if (len >= max_execve_audit_len) |
1124 | ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send); |
1125 | else |
1126 | ret = 0; |
1127 | if (ret) { |
1128 | WARN_ON(1); |
1129 | send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); |
1130 | return -1; |
1131 | } |
1132 | buf[to_send] = '\0'; |
1133 | |
1134 | /* actually log it */ |
1135 | audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num); |
1136 | if (too_long) |
1137 | audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i); |
1138 | audit_log_format(*ab, "="); |
1139 | if (has_cntl) |
1140 | audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send); |
1141 | else |
1142 | audit_log_string(*ab, buf); |
1143 | |
1144 | p += to_send; |
1145 | len_left -= to_send; |
1146 | *len_sent += arg_num_len; |
1147 | if (has_cntl) |
1148 | *len_sent += to_send * 2; |
1149 | else |
1150 | *len_sent += to_send; |
1151 | } |
1152 | /* include the null we didn't log */ |
1153 | return len + 1; |
1154 | } |
1155 | |
1156 | static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context, |
1157 | struct audit_buffer **ab, |
1158 | struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi) |
1159 | { |
1160 | int i; |
1161 | size_t len, len_sent = 0; |
1162 | const char __user *p; |
1163 | char *buf; |
1164 | |
1165 | if (axi->mm != current->mm) |
1166 | return; /* execve failed, no additional info */ |
1167 | |
1168 | p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start; |
1169 | |
1170 | audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", axi->argc); |
1171 | |
1172 | /* |
1173 | * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just |
1174 | * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size |
1175 | * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg() |
1176 | * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe. |
1177 | */ |
1178 | buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL); |
1179 | if (!buf) { |
1180 | audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n"); |
1181 | return; |
1182 | } |
1183 | |
1184 | for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) { |
1185 | len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i, |
1186 | &len_sent, p, buf); |
1187 | if (len <= 0) |
1188 | break; |
1189 | p += len; |
1190 | } |
1191 | kfree(buf); |
1192 | } |
1193 | |
1194 | static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap) |
1195 | { |
1196 | int i; |
1197 | |
1198 | audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix); |
1199 | CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) { |
1200 | audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]); |
1201 | } |
1202 | } |
1203 | |
1204 | static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name) |
1205 | { |
1206 | kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted; |
1207 | kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable; |
1208 | int log = 0; |
1209 | |
1210 | if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) { |
1211 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm); |
1212 | log = 1; |
1213 | } |
1214 | if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) { |
1215 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh); |
1216 | log = 1; |
1217 | } |
1218 | |
1219 | if (log) |
1220 | audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver); |
1221 | } |
1222 | |
1223 | static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) |
1224 | { |
1225 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
1226 | int i; |
1227 | |
1228 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type); |
1229 | if (!ab) |
1230 | return; |
1231 | |
1232 | switch (context->type) { |
1233 | case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: { |
1234 | int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs; |
1235 | audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs); |
1236 | for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) |
1237 | audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, |
1238 | context->socketcall.args[i]); |
1239 | break; } |
1240 | case AUDIT_IPC: { |
1241 | u32 osid = context->ipc.osid; |
1242 | |
1243 | audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o", |
1244 | context->ipc.uid, context->ipc.gid, context->ipc.mode); |
1245 | if (osid) { |
1246 | char *ctx = NULL; |
1247 | u32 len; |
1248 | if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) { |
1249 | audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid); |
1250 | *call_panic = 1; |
1251 | } else { |
1252 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); |
1253 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); |
1254 | } |
1255 | } |
1256 | if (context->ipc.has_perm) { |
1257 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1258 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, |
1259 | AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM); |
1260 | audit_log_format(ab, |
1261 | "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o", |
1262 | context->ipc.qbytes, |
1263 | context->ipc.perm_uid, |
1264 | context->ipc.perm_gid, |
1265 | context->ipc.perm_mode); |
1266 | if (!ab) |
1267 | return; |
1268 | } |
1269 | break; } |
1270 | case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: { |
1271 | audit_log_format(ab, |
1272 | "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld " |
1273 | "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld", |
1274 | context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode, |
1275 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags, |
1276 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg, |
1277 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize, |
1278 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs); |
1279 | break; } |
1280 | case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: { |
1281 | audit_log_format(ab, |
1282 | "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u " |
1283 | "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld", |
1284 | context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes, |
1285 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len, |
1286 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio, |
1287 | context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec, |
1288 | context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec); |
1289 | break; } |
1290 | case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: { |
1291 | audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d", |
1292 | context->mq_notify.mqdes, |
1293 | context->mq_notify.sigev_signo); |
1294 | break; } |
1295 | case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: { |
1296 | struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat; |
1297 | audit_log_format(ab, |
1298 | "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld " |
1299 | "mq_curmsgs=%ld ", |
1300 | context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes, |
1301 | attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg, |
1302 | attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs); |
1303 | break; } |
1304 | case AUDIT_CAPSET: { |
1305 | audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid); |
1306 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable); |
1307 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted); |
1308 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective); |
1309 | break; } |
1310 | } |
1311 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1312 | } |
1313 | |
1314 | static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk) |
1315 | { |
1316 | const struct cred *cred; |
1317 | int i, call_panic = 0; |
1318 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
1319 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; |
1320 | const char *tty; |
1321 | |
1322 | /* tsk == current */ |
1323 | context->pid = tsk->pid; |
1324 | if (!context->ppid) |
1325 | context->ppid = sys_getppid(); |
1326 | cred = current_cred(); |
1327 | context->uid = cred->uid; |
1328 | context->gid = cred->gid; |
1329 | context->euid = cred->euid; |
1330 | context->suid = cred->suid; |
1331 | context->fsuid = cred->fsuid; |
1332 | context->egid = cred->egid; |
1333 | context->sgid = cred->sgid; |
1334 | context->fsgid = cred->fsgid; |
1335 | context->personality = tsk->personality; |
1336 | |
1337 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL); |
1338 | if (!ab) |
1339 | return; /* audit_panic has been called */ |
1340 | audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d", |
1341 | context->arch, context->major); |
1342 | if (context->personality != PER_LINUX) |
1343 | audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality); |
1344 | if (context->return_valid) |
1345 | audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", |
1346 | (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no", |
1347 | context->return_code); |
1348 | |
1349 | spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock); |
1350 | if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name) |
1351 | tty = tsk->signal->tty->name; |
1352 | else |
1353 | tty = "(none)"; |
1354 | spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock); |
1355 | |
1356 | audit_log_format(ab, |
1357 | " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d" |
1358 | " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u" |
1359 | " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u" |
1360 | " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u", |
1361 | context->argv[0], |
1362 | context->argv[1], |
1363 | context->argv[2], |
1364 | context->argv[3], |
1365 | context->name_count, |
1366 | context->ppid, |
1367 | context->pid, |
1368 | tsk->loginuid, |
1369 | context->uid, |
1370 | context->gid, |
1371 | context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid, |
1372 | context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty, |
1373 | tsk->sessionid); |
1374 | |
1375 | |
1376 | audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk); |
1377 | audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey); |
1378 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1379 | |
1380 | for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) { |
1381 | |
1382 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type); |
1383 | if (!ab) |
1384 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ |
1385 | |
1386 | switch (aux->type) { |
1387 | |
1388 | case AUDIT_EXECVE: { |
1389 | struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux; |
1390 | audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi); |
1391 | break; } |
1392 | |
1393 | case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: { |
1394 | struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux; |
1395 | audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver); |
1396 | audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted); |
1397 | audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable); |
1398 | audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE); |
1399 | audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted); |
1400 | audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable); |
1401 | audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective); |
1402 | audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted); |
1403 | audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable); |
1404 | audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective); |
1405 | break; } |
1406 | |
1407 | } |
1408 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1409 | } |
1410 | |
1411 | if (context->type) |
1412 | show_special(context, &call_panic); |
1413 | |
1414 | if (context->fds[0] >= 0) { |
1415 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR); |
1416 | if (ab) { |
1417 | audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", |
1418 | context->fds[0], context->fds[1]); |
1419 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1420 | } |
1421 | } |
1422 | |
1423 | if (context->sockaddr_len) { |
1424 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR); |
1425 | if (ab) { |
1426 | audit_log_format(ab, "saddr="); |
1427 | audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr, |
1428 | context->sockaddr_len); |
1429 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1430 | } |
1431 | } |
1432 | |
1433 | for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) { |
1434 | struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; |
1435 | |
1436 | for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) |
1437 | if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], |
1438 | axs->target_auid[i], |
1439 | axs->target_uid[i], |
1440 | axs->target_sessionid[i], |
1441 | axs->target_sid[i], |
1442 | axs->target_comm[i])) |
1443 | call_panic = 1; |
1444 | } |
1445 | |
1446 | if (context->target_pid && |
1447 | audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, |
1448 | context->target_auid, context->target_uid, |
1449 | context->target_sessionid, |
1450 | context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) |
1451 | call_panic = 1; |
1452 | |
1453 | if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { |
1454 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); |
1455 | if (ab) { |
1456 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd); |
1457 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1458 | } |
1459 | } |
1460 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { |
1461 | struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i]; |
1462 | |
1463 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH); |
1464 | if (!ab) |
1465 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ |
1466 | |
1467 | audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i); |
1468 | |
1469 | if (n->name) { |
1470 | switch(n->name_len) { |
1471 | case AUDIT_NAME_FULL: |
1472 | /* log the full path */ |
1473 | audit_log_format(ab, " name="); |
1474 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name); |
1475 | break; |
1476 | case 0: |
1477 | /* name was specified as a relative path and the |
1478 | * directory component is the cwd */ |
1479 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "name=", &context->pwd); |
1480 | break; |
1481 | default: |
1482 | /* log the name's directory component */ |
1483 | audit_log_format(ab, " name="); |
1484 | audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name, |
1485 | n->name_len); |
1486 | } |
1487 | } else |
1488 | audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)"); |
1489 | |
1490 | if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) { |
1491 | audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu" |
1492 | " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o" |
1493 | " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", |
1494 | n->ino, |
1495 | MAJOR(n->dev), |
1496 | MINOR(n->dev), |
1497 | n->mode, |
1498 | n->uid, |
1499 | n->gid, |
1500 | MAJOR(n->rdev), |
1501 | MINOR(n->rdev)); |
1502 | } |
1503 | if (n->osid != 0) { |
1504 | char *ctx = NULL; |
1505 | u32 len; |
1506 | if (security_secid_to_secctx( |
1507 | n->osid, &ctx, &len)) { |
1508 | audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid); |
1509 | call_panic = 2; |
1510 | } else { |
1511 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); |
1512 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); |
1513 | } |
1514 | } |
1515 | |
1516 | audit_log_fcaps(ab, n); |
1517 | |
1518 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1519 | } |
1520 | |
1521 | /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ |
1522 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE); |
1523 | if (ab) |
1524 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1525 | if (call_panic) |
1526 | audit_panic("error converting sid to string"); |
1527 | } |
1528 | |
1529 | /** |
1530 | * audit_free - free a per-task audit context |
1531 | * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free |
1532 | * |
1533 | * Called from copy_process and do_exit |
1534 | */ |
1535 | void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) |
1536 | { |
1537 | struct audit_context *context; |
1538 | |
1539 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0); |
1540 | if (likely(!context)) |
1541 | return; |
1542 | |
1543 | /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit |
1544 | * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. |
1545 | * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this |
1546 | * in the context of the idle thread */ |
1547 | /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */ |
1548 | if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) |
1549 | audit_log_exit(context, tsk); |
1550 | if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) |
1551 | audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees); |
1552 | |
1553 | audit_free_context(context); |
1554 | } |
1555 | |
1556 | /** |
1557 | * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry |
1558 | * @arch: architecture type |
1559 | * @major: major syscall type (function) |
1560 | * @a1: additional syscall register 1 |
1561 | * @a2: additional syscall register 2 |
1562 | * @a3: additional syscall register 3 |
1563 | * @a4: additional syscall register 4 |
1564 | * |
1565 | * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the |
1566 | * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or |
1567 | * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the |
1568 | * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT, |
1569 | * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it |
1570 | * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it |
1571 | * be written). |
1572 | */ |
1573 | void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major, |
1574 | unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, |
1575 | unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4) |
1576 | { |
1577 | struct task_struct *tsk = current; |
1578 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; |
1579 | enum audit_state state; |
1580 | |
1581 | if (unlikely(!context)) |
1582 | return; |
1583 | |
1584 | /* |
1585 | * This happens only on certain architectures that make system |
1586 | * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of |
1587 | * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new |
1588 | * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you |
1589 | * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.) |
1590 | * |
1591 | * i386 no |
1592 | * x86_64 no |
1593 | * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S) |
1594 | * |
1595 | * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner |
1596 | * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught. |
1597 | */ |
1598 | if (context->in_syscall) { |
1599 | struct audit_context *newctx; |
1600 | |
1601 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
1602 | printk(KERN_ERR |
1603 | "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;" |
1604 | " entering syscall=%d\n", |
1605 | context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major); |
1606 | #endif |
1607 | newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state); |
1608 | if (newctx) { |
1609 | newctx->previous = context; |
1610 | context = newctx; |
1611 | tsk->audit_context = newctx; |
1612 | } else { |
1613 | /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we |
1614 | * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname |
1615 | * will be lost). The only other alternative is |
1616 | * to abandon auditing. */ |
1617 | audit_zero_context(context, context->state); |
1618 | } |
1619 | } |
1620 | BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count); |
1621 | |
1622 | if (!audit_enabled) |
1623 | return; |
1624 | |
1625 | context->arch = arch; |
1626 | context->major = major; |
1627 | context->argv[0] = a1; |
1628 | context->argv[1] = a2; |
1629 | context->argv[2] = a3; |
1630 | context->argv[3] = a4; |
1631 | |
1632 | state = context->state; |
1633 | context->dummy = !audit_n_rules; |
1634 | if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) { |
1635 | context->prio = 0; |
1636 | state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]); |
1637 | } |
1638 | if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) |
1639 | return; |
1640 | |
1641 | context->serial = 0; |
1642 | context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME; |
1643 | context->in_syscall = 1; |
1644 | context->current_state = state; |
1645 | context->ppid = 0; |
1646 | } |
1647 | |
1648 | void audit_finish_fork(struct task_struct *child) |
1649 | { |
1650 | struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; |
1651 | struct audit_context *p = child->audit_context; |
1652 | if (!p || !ctx) |
1653 | return; |
1654 | if (!ctx->in_syscall || ctx->current_state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) |
1655 | return; |
1656 | p->arch = ctx->arch; |
1657 | p->major = ctx->major; |
1658 | memcpy(p->argv, ctx->argv, sizeof(ctx->argv)); |
1659 | p->ctime = ctx->ctime; |
1660 | p->dummy = ctx->dummy; |
1661 | p->in_syscall = ctx->in_syscall; |
1662 | p->filterkey = kstrdup(ctx->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL); |
1663 | p->ppid = current->pid; |
1664 | p->prio = ctx->prio; |
1665 | p->current_state = ctx->current_state; |
1666 | } |
1667 | |
1668 | /** |
1669 | * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call |
1670 | * @valid: success/failure flag |
1671 | * @return_code: syscall return value |
1672 | * |
1673 | * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as |
1674 | * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from |
1675 | * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit |
1676 | * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, |
1677 | * free the names stored from getname(). |
1678 | */ |
1679 | void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code) |
1680 | { |
1681 | struct task_struct *tsk = current; |
1682 | struct audit_context *context; |
1683 | |
1684 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code); |
1685 | |
1686 | if (likely(!context)) |
1687 | return; |
1688 | |
1689 | if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) |
1690 | audit_log_exit(context, tsk); |
1691 | |
1692 | context->in_syscall = 0; |
1693 | context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0; |
1694 | |
1695 | if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) |
1696 | audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees); |
1697 | |
1698 | if (context->previous) { |
1699 | struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous; |
1700 | context->previous = NULL; |
1701 | audit_free_context(context); |
1702 | tsk->audit_context = new_context; |
1703 | } else { |
1704 | audit_free_names(context); |
1705 | unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); |
1706 | audit_free_aux(context); |
1707 | context->aux = NULL; |
1708 | context->aux_pids = NULL; |
1709 | context->target_pid = 0; |
1710 | context->target_sid = 0; |
1711 | context->sockaddr_len = 0; |
1712 | context->type = 0; |
1713 | context->fds[0] = -1; |
1714 | if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) { |
1715 | kfree(context->filterkey); |
1716 | context->filterkey = NULL; |
1717 | } |
1718 | tsk->audit_context = context; |
1719 | } |
1720 | } |
1721 | |
1722 | static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode) |
1723 | { |
1724 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
1725 | struct audit_context *context; |
1726 | struct audit_tree_refs *p; |
1727 | struct audit_chunk *chunk; |
1728 | int count; |
1729 | if (likely(list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches))) |
1730 | return; |
1731 | context = current->audit_context; |
1732 | p = context->trees; |
1733 | count = context->tree_count; |
1734 | rcu_read_lock(); |
1735 | chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); |
1736 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1737 | if (!chunk) |
1738 | return; |
1739 | if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) |
1740 | return; |
1741 | if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) { |
1742 | printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); |
1743 | audit_set_auditable(context); |
1744 | audit_put_chunk(chunk); |
1745 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
1746 | return; |
1747 | } |
1748 | put_tree_ref(context, chunk); |
1749 | #endif |
1750 | } |
1751 | |
1752 | static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry) |
1753 | { |
1754 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
1755 | struct audit_context *context; |
1756 | struct audit_tree_refs *p; |
1757 | const struct dentry *d, *parent; |
1758 | struct audit_chunk *drop; |
1759 | unsigned long seq; |
1760 | int count; |
1761 | |
1762 | context = current->audit_context; |
1763 | p = context->trees; |
1764 | count = context->tree_count; |
1765 | retry: |
1766 | drop = NULL; |
1767 | d = dentry; |
1768 | rcu_read_lock(); |
1769 | seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock); |
1770 | for(;;) { |
1771 | struct inode *inode = d->d_inode; |
1772 | if (inode && unlikely(!list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches))) { |
1773 | struct audit_chunk *chunk; |
1774 | chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); |
1775 | if (chunk) { |
1776 | if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) { |
1777 | drop = chunk; |
1778 | break; |
1779 | } |
1780 | } |
1781 | } |
1782 | parent = d->d_parent; |
1783 | if (parent == d) |
1784 | break; |
1785 | d = parent; |
1786 | } |
1787 | if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */ |
1788 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1789 | if (!drop) { |
1790 | /* just a race with rename */ |
1791 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
1792 | goto retry; |
1793 | } |
1794 | audit_put_chunk(drop); |
1795 | if (grow_tree_refs(context)) { |
1796 | /* OK, got more space */ |
1797 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
1798 | goto retry; |
1799 | } |
1800 | /* too bad */ |
1801 | printk(KERN_WARNING |
1802 | "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); |
1803 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
1804 | audit_set_auditable(context); |
1805 | return; |
1806 | } |
1807 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1808 | #endif |
1809 | } |
1810 | |
1811 | /** |
1812 | * audit_getname - add a name to the list |
1813 | * @name: name to add |
1814 | * |
1815 | * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context. |
1816 | * Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). |
1817 | */ |
1818 | void __audit_getname(const char *name) |
1819 | { |
1820 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
1821 | |
1822 | if (IS_ERR(name) || !name) |
1823 | return; |
1824 | |
1825 | if (!context->in_syscall) { |
1826 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 |
1827 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n", |
1828 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); |
1829 | dump_stack(); |
1830 | #endif |
1831 | return; |
1832 | } |
1833 | BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES); |
1834 | context->names[context->name_count].name = name; |
1835 | context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; |
1836 | context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1; |
1837 | context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1; |
1838 | context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0; |
1839 | ++context->name_count; |
1840 | if (!context->pwd.dentry) { |
1841 | read_lock(¤t->fs->lock); |
1842 | context->pwd = current->fs->pwd; |
1843 | path_get(¤t->fs->pwd); |
1844 | read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock); |
1845 | } |
1846 | |
1847 | } |
1848 | |
1849 | /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request |
1850 | * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname |
1851 | * |
1852 | * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context, |
1853 | * then we delay the putname until syscall exit. |
1854 | * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname(). |
1855 | */ |
1856 | void audit_putname(const char *name) |
1857 | { |
1858 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
1859 | |
1860 | BUG_ON(!context); |
1861 | if (!context->in_syscall) { |
1862 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 |
1863 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n", |
1864 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); |
1865 | if (context->name_count) { |
1866 | int i; |
1867 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) |
1868 | printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, |
1869 | context->names[i].name, |
1870 | context->names[i].name ?: "(null)"); |
1871 | } |
1872 | #endif |
1873 | __putname(name); |
1874 | } |
1875 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
1876 | else { |
1877 | ++context->put_count; |
1878 | if (context->put_count > context->name_count) { |
1879 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d" |
1880 | " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d" |
1881 | " put_count=%d\n", |
1882 | __FILE__, __LINE__, |
1883 | context->serial, context->major, |
1884 | context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count, |
1885 | context->put_count); |
1886 | dump_stack(); |
1887 | } |
1888 | } |
1889 | #endif |
1890 | } |
1891 | |
1892 | static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context, |
1893 | const struct inode *inode) |
1894 | { |
1895 | if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) { |
1896 | if (inode) |
1897 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "audit: name_count maxed, losing inode data: " |
1898 | "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu\n", |
1899 | MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev), |
1900 | MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev), |
1901 | inode->i_ino); |
1902 | |
1903 | else |
1904 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data\n"); |
1905 | return 1; |
1906 | } |
1907 | context->name_count++; |
1908 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
1909 | context->ino_count++; |
1910 | #endif |
1911 | return 0; |
1912 | } |
1913 | |
1914 | |
1915 | static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry) |
1916 | { |
1917 | struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps; |
1918 | int rc; |
1919 | |
1920 | memset(&name->fcap.permitted, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t)); |
1921 | memset(&name->fcap.inheritable, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t)); |
1922 | name->fcap.fE = 0; |
1923 | name->fcap_ver = 0; |
1924 | |
1925 | if (!dentry) |
1926 | return 0; |
1927 | |
1928 | rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps); |
1929 | if (rc) |
1930 | return rc; |
1931 | |
1932 | name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted; |
1933 | name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable; |
1934 | name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); |
1935 | name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; |
1936 | |
1937 | return 0; |
1938 | } |
1939 | |
1940 | |
1941 | /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */ |
1942 | static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry, |
1943 | const struct inode *inode) |
1944 | { |
1945 | name->ino = inode->i_ino; |
1946 | name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; |
1947 | name->mode = inode->i_mode; |
1948 | name->uid = inode->i_uid; |
1949 | name->gid = inode->i_gid; |
1950 | name->rdev = inode->i_rdev; |
1951 | security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid); |
1952 | audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry); |
1953 | } |
1954 | |
1955 | /** |
1956 | * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup |
1957 | * @name: name being audited |
1958 | * @dentry: dentry being audited |
1959 | * |
1960 | * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). |
1961 | */ |
1962 | void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry) |
1963 | { |
1964 | int idx; |
1965 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
1966 | const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
1967 | |
1968 | if (!context->in_syscall) |
1969 | return; |
1970 | if (context->name_count |
1971 | && context->names[context->name_count-1].name |
1972 | && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name) |
1973 | idx = context->name_count - 1; |
1974 | else if (context->name_count > 1 |
1975 | && context->names[context->name_count-2].name |
1976 | && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name) |
1977 | idx = context->name_count - 2; |
1978 | else { |
1979 | /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no |
1980 | * associated name? */ |
1981 | if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode)) |
1982 | return; |
1983 | idx = context->name_count - 1; |
1984 | context->names[idx].name = NULL; |
1985 | } |
1986 | handle_path(dentry); |
1987 | audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], dentry, inode); |
1988 | } |
1989 | |
1990 | /** |
1991 | * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects |
1992 | * @dentry: dentry being audited |
1993 | * @parent: inode of dentry parent |
1994 | * |
1995 | * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode |
1996 | * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent. |
1997 | * This call updates the audit context with the child's information. |
1998 | * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after |
1999 | * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object |
2000 | * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during |
2001 | * unsuccessful attempts. |
2002 | */ |
2003 | void __audit_inode_child(const struct dentry *dentry, |
2004 | const struct inode *parent) |
2005 | { |
2006 | int idx; |
2007 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2008 | const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL; |
2009 | const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
2010 | const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name; |
2011 | int dirlen = 0; |
2012 | |
2013 | if (!context->in_syscall) |
2014 | return; |
2015 | |
2016 | if (inode) |
2017 | handle_one(inode); |
2018 | |
2019 | /* parent is more likely, look for it first */ |
2020 | for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) { |
2021 | struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx]; |
2022 | |
2023 | if (!n->name) |
2024 | continue; |
2025 | |
2026 | if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && |
2027 | !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) { |
2028 | n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */ |
2029 | found_parent = n->name; |
2030 | goto add_names; |
2031 | } |
2032 | } |
2033 | |
2034 | /* no matching parent, look for matching child */ |
2035 | for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) { |
2036 | struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx]; |
2037 | |
2038 | if (!n->name) |
2039 | continue; |
2040 | |
2041 | /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */ |
2042 | if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) || |
2043 | !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) { |
2044 | if (inode) |
2045 | audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode); |
2046 | else |
2047 | n->ino = (unsigned long)-1; |
2048 | found_child = n->name; |
2049 | goto add_names; |
2050 | } |
2051 | } |
2052 | |
2053 | add_names: |
2054 | if (!found_parent) { |
2055 | if (audit_inc_name_count(context, parent)) |
2056 | return; |
2057 | idx = context->name_count - 1; |
2058 | context->names[idx].name = NULL; |
2059 | audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, parent); |
2060 | } |
2061 | |
2062 | if (!found_child) { |
2063 | if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode)) |
2064 | return; |
2065 | idx = context->name_count - 1; |
2066 | |
2067 | /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent |
2068 | * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in |
2069 | * audit_free_names() */ |
2070 | if (found_parent) { |
2071 | context->names[idx].name = found_parent; |
2072 | context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; |
2073 | /* don't call __putname() */ |
2074 | context->names[idx].name_put = 0; |
2075 | } else { |
2076 | context->names[idx].name = NULL; |
2077 | } |
2078 | |
2079 | if (inode) |
2080 | audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, inode); |
2081 | else |
2082 | context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1; |
2083 | } |
2084 | } |
2085 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child); |
2086 | |
2087 | /** |
2088 | * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values |
2089 | * @ctx: audit_context for the task |
2090 | * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context |
2091 | * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context |
2092 | * |
2093 | * Also sets the context as auditable. |
2094 | */ |
2095 | int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, |
2096 | struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial) |
2097 | { |
2098 | if (!ctx->in_syscall) |
2099 | return 0; |
2100 | if (!ctx->serial) |
2101 | ctx->serial = audit_serial(); |
2102 | t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec; |
2103 | t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec; |
2104 | *serial = ctx->serial; |
2105 | if (!ctx->prio) { |
2106 | ctx->prio = 1; |
2107 | ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; |
2108 | } |
2109 | return 1; |
2110 | } |
2111 | |
2112 | /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */ |
2113 | static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0); |
2114 | |
2115 | /** |
2116 | * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid |
2117 | * @task: task whose audit context is being modified |
2118 | * @loginuid: loginuid value |
2119 | * |
2120 | * Returns 0. |
2121 | * |
2122 | * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write(). |
2123 | */ |
2124 | int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid) |
2125 | { |
2126 | unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id); |
2127 | struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context; |
2128 | |
2129 | if (context && context->in_syscall) { |
2130 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
2131 | |
2132 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN); |
2133 | if (ab) { |
2134 | audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u " |
2135 | "old auid=%u new auid=%u" |
2136 | " old ses=%u new ses=%u", |
2137 | task->pid, task_uid(task), |
2138 | task->loginuid, loginuid, |
2139 | task->sessionid, sessionid); |
2140 | audit_log_end(ab); |
2141 | } |
2142 | } |
2143 | task->sessionid = sessionid; |
2144 | task->loginuid = loginuid; |
2145 | return 0; |
2146 | } |
2147 | |
2148 | /** |
2149 | * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open |
2150 | * @oflag: open flag |
2151 | * @mode: mode bits |
2152 | * @attr: queue attributes |
2153 | * |
2154 | */ |
2155 | void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr) |
2156 | { |
2157 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2158 | |
2159 | if (attr) |
2160 | memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); |
2161 | else |
2162 | memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); |
2163 | |
2164 | context->mq_open.oflag = oflag; |
2165 | context->mq_open.mode = mode; |
2166 | |
2167 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN; |
2168 | } |
2169 | |
2170 | /** |
2171 | * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive |
2172 | * @mqdes: MQ descriptor |
2173 | * @msg_len: Message length |
2174 | * @msg_prio: Message priority |
2175 | * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time |
2176 | * |
2177 | */ |
2178 | void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio, |
2179 | const struct timespec *abs_timeout) |
2180 | { |
2181 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2182 | struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout; |
2183 | |
2184 | if (abs_timeout) |
2185 | memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec)); |
2186 | else |
2187 | memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec)); |
2188 | |
2189 | context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes; |
2190 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len; |
2191 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio; |
2192 | |
2193 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV; |
2194 | } |
2195 | |
2196 | /** |
2197 | * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify |
2198 | * @mqdes: MQ descriptor |
2199 | * @notification: Notification event |
2200 | * |
2201 | */ |
2202 | |
2203 | void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification) |
2204 | { |
2205 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2206 | |
2207 | if (notification) |
2208 | context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo; |
2209 | else |
2210 | context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0; |
2211 | |
2212 | context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes; |
2213 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY; |
2214 | } |
2215 | |
2216 | /** |
2217 | * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute |
2218 | * @mqdes: MQ descriptor |
2219 | * @mqstat: MQ flags |
2220 | * |
2221 | */ |
2222 | void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat) |
2223 | { |
2224 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2225 | context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes; |
2226 | context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat; |
2227 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR; |
2228 | } |
2229 | |
2230 | /** |
2231 | * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object |
2232 | * @ipcp: ipc permissions |
2233 | * |
2234 | */ |
2235 | void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) |
2236 | { |
2237 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2238 | context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid; |
2239 | context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid; |
2240 | context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode; |
2241 | context->ipc.has_perm = 0; |
2242 | security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid); |
2243 | context->type = AUDIT_IPC; |
2244 | } |
2245 | |
2246 | /** |
2247 | * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions |
2248 | * @qbytes: msgq bytes |
2249 | * @uid: msgq user id |
2250 | * @gid: msgq group id |
2251 | * @mode: msgq mode (permissions) |
2252 | * |
2253 | * Called only after audit_ipc_obj(). |
2254 | */ |
2255 | void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) |
2256 | { |
2257 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2258 | |
2259 | context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes; |
2260 | context->ipc.perm_uid = uid; |
2261 | context->ipc.perm_gid = gid; |
2262 | context->ipc.perm_mode = mode; |
2263 | context->ipc.has_perm = 1; |
2264 | } |
2265 | |
2266 | int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
2267 | { |
2268 | struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax; |
2269 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2270 | |
2271 | if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy)) |
2272 | return 0; |
2273 | |
2274 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); |
2275 | if (!ax) |
2276 | return -ENOMEM; |
2277 | |
2278 | ax->argc = bprm->argc; |
2279 | ax->envc = bprm->envc; |
2280 | ax->mm = bprm->mm; |
2281 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE; |
2282 | ax->d.next = context->aux; |
2283 | context->aux = (void *)ax; |
2284 | return 0; |
2285 | } |
2286 | |
2287 | |
2288 | /** |
2289 | * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall |
2290 | * @nargs: number of args |
2291 | * @args: args array |
2292 | * |
2293 | */ |
2294 | void audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) |
2295 | { |
2296 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2297 | |
2298 | if (likely(!context || context->dummy)) |
2299 | return; |
2300 | |
2301 | context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL; |
2302 | context->socketcall.nargs = nargs; |
2303 | memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long)); |
2304 | } |
2305 | |
2306 | /** |
2307 | * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair |
2308 | * @fd1: the first file descriptor |
2309 | * @fd2: the second file descriptor |
2310 | * |
2311 | */ |
2312 | void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2) |
2313 | { |
2314 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2315 | context->fds[0] = fd1; |
2316 | context->fds[1] = fd2; |
2317 | } |
2318 | |
2319 | /** |
2320 | * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto |
2321 | * @len: data length in user space |
2322 | * @a: data address in kernel space |
2323 | * |
2324 | * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. |
2325 | */ |
2326 | int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) |
2327 | { |
2328 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2329 | |
2330 | if (likely(!context || context->dummy)) |
2331 | return 0; |
2332 | |
2333 | if (!context->sockaddr) { |
2334 | void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL); |
2335 | if (!p) |
2336 | return -ENOMEM; |
2337 | context->sockaddr = p; |
2338 | } |
2339 | |
2340 | context->sockaddr_len = len; |
2341 | memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len); |
2342 | return 0; |
2343 | } |
2344 | |
2345 | void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) |
2346 | { |
2347 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2348 | |
2349 | context->target_pid = t->pid; |
2350 | context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); |
2351 | context->target_uid = task_uid(t); |
2352 | context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); |
2353 | security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); |
2354 | memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); |
2355 | } |
2356 | |
2357 | /** |
2358 | * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem |
2359 | * @sig: signal value |
2360 | * @t: task being signaled |
2361 | * |
2362 | * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid) |
2363 | * and uid that is doing that. |
2364 | */ |
2365 | int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) |
2366 | { |
2367 | struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp; |
2368 | struct task_struct *tsk = current; |
2369 | struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context; |
2370 | uid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t); |
2371 | |
2372 | if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) { |
2373 | if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) { |
2374 | audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid; |
2375 | if (tsk->loginuid != -1) |
2376 | audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid; |
2377 | else |
2378 | audit_sig_uid = uid; |
2379 | security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid); |
2380 | } |
2381 | if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) |
2382 | return 0; |
2383 | } |
2384 | |
2385 | /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly |
2386 | * in audit_context */ |
2387 | if (!ctx->target_pid) { |
2388 | ctx->target_pid = t->tgid; |
2389 | ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); |
2390 | ctx->target_uid = t_uid; |
2391 | ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); |
2392 | security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); |
2393 | memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); |
2394 | return 0; |
2395 | } |
2396 | |
2397 | axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids; |
2398 | if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) { |
2399 | axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC); |
2400 | if (!axp) |
2401 | return -ENOMEM; |
2402 | |
2403 | axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID; |
2404 | axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids; |
2405 | ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp; |
2406 | } |
2407 | BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS); |
2408 | |
2409 | axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid; |
2410 | axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); |
2411 | axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; |
2412 | axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); |
2413 | security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); |
2414 | memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); |
2415 | axp->pid_count++; |
2416 | |
2417 | return 0; |
2418 | } |
2419 | |
2420 | /** |
2421 | * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps |
2422 | * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed |
2423 | * @new: the proposed new credentials |
2424 | * @old: the old credentials |
2425 | * |
2426 | * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not |
2427 | * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall |
2428 | * |
2429 | * -Eric |
2430 | */ |
2431 | int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, |
2432 | const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
2433 | { |
2434 | struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax; |
2435 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2436 | struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps; |
2437 | struct dentry *dentry; |
2438 | |
2439 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); |
2440 | if (!ax) |
2441 | return -ENOMEM; |
2442 | |
2443 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS; |
2444 | ax->d.next = context->aux; |
2445 | context->aux = (void *)ax; |
2446 | |
2447 | dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry); |
2448 | get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps); |
2449 | dput(dentry); |
2450 | |
2451 | ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted; |
2452 | ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable; |
2453 | ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); |
2454 | ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; |
2455 | |
2456 | ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted; |
2457 | ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable; |
2458 | ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective; |
2459 | |
2460 | ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; |
2461 | ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable; |
2462 | ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective; |
2463 | return 0; |
2464 | } |
2465 | |
2466 | /** |
2467 | * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall |
2468 | * @pid: target pid of the capset call |
2469 | * @new: the new credentials |
2470 | * @old: the old (current) credentials |
2471 | * |
2472 | * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the |
2473 | * audit system if applicable |
2474 | */ |
2475 | void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid, |
2476 | const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
2477 | { |
2478 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2479 | context->capset.pid = pid; |
2480 | context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective; |
2481 | context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective; |
2482 | context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; |
2483 | context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET; |
2484 | } |
2485 | |
2486 | /** |
2487 | * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally |
2488 | * @signr: signal value |
2489 | * |
2490 | * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we |
2491 | * should record the event for investigation. |
2492 | */ |
2493 | void audit_core_dumps(long signr) |
2494 | { |
2495 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
2496 | u32 sid; |
2497 | uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current), uid; |
2498 | gid_t gid; |
2499 | unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); |
2500 | |
2501 | if (!audit_enabled) |
2502 | return; |
2503 | |
2504 | if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */ |
2505 | return; |
2506 | |
2507 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND); |
2508 | current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid); |
2509 | audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u", |
2510 | auid, uid, gid, sessionid); |
2511 | security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); |
2512 | if (sid) { |
2513 | char *ctx = NULL; |
2514 | u32 len; |
2515 | |
2516 | if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) |
2517 | audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid); |
2518 | else { |
2519 | audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx); |
2520 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); |
2521 | } |
2522 | } |
2523 | audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid); |
2524 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm); |
2525 | audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr); |
2526 | audit_log_end(ab); |
2527 | } |
2528 | |
2529 | struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void) |
2530 | { |
2531 | struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; |
2532 | if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall)) |
2533 | return NULL; |
2534 | return &ctx->killed_trees; |
2535 | } |
2536 |
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v2.6.34-rc5
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