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1 | /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support |
2 | * Handles all system-call specific auditing features. |
3 | * |
4 | * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina. |
5 | * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. |
6 | * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation |
7 | * All Rights Reserved. |
8 | * |
9 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
10 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by |
11 | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or |
12 | * (at your option) any later version. |
13 | * |
14 | * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, |
15 | * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of |
16 | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the |
17 | * GNU General Public License for more details. |
18 | * |
19 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License |
20 | * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software |
21 | * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA |
22 | * |
23 | * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com> |
24 | * |
25 | * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie, |
26 | * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname. |
27 | * |
28 | * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in |
29 | * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by |
30 | * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG. |
31 | * |
32 | * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>, |
33 | * 2006. |
34 | * |
35 | * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was |
36 | * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005. |
37 | * |
38 | * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional |
39 | * filesystem information. |
40 | * |
41 | * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com> |
42 | * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance. |
43 | */ |
44 | |
45 | #include <linux/init.h> |
46 | #include <asm/types.h> |
47 | #include <asm/atomic.h> |
48 | #include <linux/fs.h> |
49 | #include <linux/namei.h> |
50 | #include <linux/mm.h> |
51 | #include <linux/module.h> |
52 | #include <linux/slab.h> |
53 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
54 | #include <linux/socket.h> |
55 | #include <linux/mqueue.h> |
56 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
57 | #include <linux/personality.h> |
58 | #include <linux/time.h> |
59 | #include <linux/netlink.h> |
60 | #include <linux/compiler.h> |
61 | #include <asm/unistd.h> |
62 | #include <linux/security.h> |
63 | #include <linux/list.h> |
64 | #include <linux/tty.h> |
65 | #include <linux/binfmts.h> |
66 | #include <linux/highmem.h> |
67 | #include <linux/syscalls.h> |
68 | #include <linux/capability.h> |
69 | #include <linux/fs_struct.h> |
70 | |
71 | #include "audit.h" |
72 | |
73 | /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context |
74 | * for saving names from getname(). */ |
75 | #define AUDIT_NAMES 20 |
76 | |
77 | /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */ |
78 | #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1 |
79 | |
80 | /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */ |
81 | #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500 |
82 | |
83 | /* number of audit rules */ |
84 | int audit_n_rules; |
85 | |
86 | /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */ |
87 | int audit_signals; |
88 | |
89 | struct audit_cap_data { |
90 | kernel_cap_t permitted; |
91 | kernel_cap_t inheritable; |
92 | union { |
93 | unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of a file capability */ |
94 | kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of a process */ |
95 | }; |
96 | }; |
97 | |
98 | /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and |
99 | * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved |
100 | * pointers at syscall exit time). |
101 | * |
102 | * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */ |
103 | struct audit_names { |
104 | const char *name; |
105 | int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */ |
106 | unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */ |
107 | unsigned long ino; |
108 | dev_t dev; |
109 | umode_t mode; |
110 | uid_t uid; |
111 | gid_t gid; |
112 | dev_t rdev; |
113 | u32 osid; |
114 | struct audit_cap_data fcap; |
115 | unsigned int fcap_ver; |
116 | }; |
117 | |
118 | struct audit_aux_data { |
119 | struct audit_aux_data *next; |
120 | int type; |
121 | }; |
122 | |
123 | #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0 |
124 | |
125 | /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */ |
126 | #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16 |
127 | |
128 | struct audit_aux_data_execve { |
129 | struct audit_aux_data d; |
130 | int argc; |
131 | int envc; |
132 | struct mm_struct *mm; |
133 | }; |
134 | |
135 | struct audit_aux_data_pids { |
136 | struct audit_aux_data d; |
137 | pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
138 | uid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
139 | uid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
140 | unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
141 | u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
142 | char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN]; |
143 | int pid_count; |
144 | }; |
145 | |
146 | struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps { |
147 | struct audit_aux_data d; |
148 | struct audit_cap_data fcap; |
149 | unsigned int fcap_ver; |
150 | struct audit_cap_data old_pcap; |
151 | struct audit_cap_data new_pcap; |
152 | }; |
153 | |
154 | struct audit_aux_data_capset { |
155 | struct audit_aux_data d; |
156 | pid_t pid; |
157 | struct audit_cap_data cap; |
158 | }; |
159 | |
160 | struct audit_tree_refs { |
161 | struct audit_tree_refs *next; |
162 | struct audit_chunk *c[31]; |
163 | }; |
164 | |
165 | /* The per-task audit context. */ |
166 | struct audit_context { |
167 | int dummy; /* must be the first element */ |
168 | int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */ |
169 | enum audit_state state, current_state; |
170 | unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */ |
171 | int major; /* syscall number */ |
172 | struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */ |
173 | unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */ |
174 | long return_code;/* syscall return code */ |
175 | u64 prio; |
176 | int return_valid; /* return code is valid */ |
177 | int name_count; |
178 | struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES]; |
179 | char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */ |
180 | struct path pwd; |
181 | struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */ |
182 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; |
183 | struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids; |
184 | struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr; |
185 | size_t sockaddr_len; |
186 | /* Save things to print about task_struct */ |
187 | pid_t pid, ppid; |
188 | uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid; |
189 | gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid; |
190 | unsigned long personality; |
191 | int arch; |
192 | |
193 | pid_t target_pid; |
194 | uid_t target_auid; |
195 | uid_t target_uid; |
196 | unsigned int target_sessionid; |
197 | u32 target_sid; |
198 | char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; |
199 | |
200 | struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees; |
201 | struct list_head killed_trees; |
202 | int tree_count; |
203 | |
204 | int type; |
205 | union { |
206 | struct { |
207 | int nargs; |
208 | long args[6]; |
209 | } socketcall; |
210 | struct { |
211 | uid_t uid; |
212 | gid_t gid; |
213 | mode_t mode; |
214 | u32 osid; |
215 | int has_perm; |
216 | uid_t perm_uid; |
217 | gid_t perm_gid; |
218 | mode_t perm_mode; |
219 | unsigned long qbytes; |
220 | } ipc; |
221 | struct { |
222 | mqd_t mqdes; |
223 | struct mq_attr mqstat; |
224 | } mq_getsetattr; |
225 | struct { |
226 | mqd_t mqdes; |
227 | int sigev_signo; |
228 | } mq_notify; |
229 | struct { |
230 | mqd_t mqdes; |
231 | size_t msg_len; |
232 | unsigned int msg_prio; |
233 | struct timespec abs_timeout; |
234 | } mq_sendrecv; |
235 | struct { |
236 | int oflag; |
237 | mode_t mode; |
238 | struct mq_attr attr; |
239 | } mq_open; |
240 | struct { |
241 | pid_t pid; |
242 | struct audit_cap_data cap; |
243 | } capset; |
244 | }; |
245 | int fds[2]; |
246 | |
247 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
248 | int put_count; |
249 | int ino_count; |
250 | #endif |
251 | }; |
252 | |
253 | static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask) |
254 | { |
255 | int n = ACC_MODE(flags); |
256 | if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT)) |
257 | n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE; |
258 | return n & mask; |
259 | } |
260 | |
261 | static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask) |
262 | { |
263 | unsigned n; |
264 | if (unlikely(!ctx)) |
265 | return 0; |
266 | n = ctx->major; |
267 | |
268 | switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) { |
269 | case 0: /* native */ |
270 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && |
271 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n)) |
272 | return 1; |
273 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && |
274 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n)) |
275 | return 1; |
276 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && |
277 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n)) |
278 | return 1; |
279 | return 0; |
280 | case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */ |
281 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && |
282 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n)) |
283 | return 1; |
284 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && |
285 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n)) |
286 | return 1; |
287 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && |
288 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n)) |
289 | return 1; |
290 | return 0; |
291 | case 2: /* open */ |
292 | return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]); |
293 | case 3: /* openat */ |
294 | return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]); |
295 | case 4: /* socketcall */ |
296 | return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND); |
297 | case 5: /* execve */ |
298 | return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC; |
299 | default: |
300 | return 0; |
301 | } |
302 | } |
303 | |
304 | static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int which) |
305 | { |
306 | unsigned index = which & ~S_IFMT; |
307 | mode_t mode = which & S_IFMT; |
308 | |
309 | if (unlikely(!ctx)) |
310 | return 0; |
311 | |
312 | if (index >= ctx->name_count) |
313 | return 0; |
314 | if (ctx->names[index].ino == -1) |
315 | return 0; |
316 | if ((ctx->names[index].mode ^ mode) & S_IFMT) |
317 | return 0; |
318 | return 1; |
319 | } |
320 | |
321 | /* |
322 | * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *; |
323 | * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data. |
324 | * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees. |
325 | * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL, |
326 | * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously, |
327 | * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself. |
328 | * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff. |
329 | */ |
330 | |
331 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
332 | static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx) |
333 | { |
334 | if (!ctx->prio) { |
335 | ctx->prio = 1; |
336 | ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; |
337 | } |
338 | } |
339 | |
340 | static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk) |
341 | { |
342 | struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; |
343 | int left = ctx->tree_count; |
344 | if (likely(left)) { |
345 | p->c[--left] = chunk; |
346 | ctx->tree_count = left; |
347 | return 1; |
348 | } |
349 | if (!p) |
350 | return 0; |
351 | p = p->next; |
352 | if (p) { |
353 | p->c[30] = chunk; |
354 | ctx->trees = p; |
355 | ctx->tree_count = 30; |
356 | return 1; |
357 | } |
358 | return 0; |
359 | } |
360 | |
361 | static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) |
362 | { |
363 | struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; |
364 | ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL); |
365 | if (!ctx->trees) { |
366 | ctx->trees = p; |
367 | return 0; |
368 | } |
369 | if (p) |
370 | p->next = ctx->trees; |
371 | else |
372 | ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees; |
373 | ctx->tree_count = 31; |
374 | return 1; |
375 | } |
376 | #endif |
377 | |
378 | static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, |
379 | struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count) |
380 | { |
381 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
382 | struct audit_tree_refs *q; |
383 | int n; |
384 | if (!p) { |
385 | /* we started with empty chain */ |
386 | p = ctx->first_trees; |
387 | count = 31; |
388 | /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */ |
389 | if (!p) |
390 | return; |
391 | } |
392 | n = count; |
393 | for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) { |
394 | while (n--) { |
395 | audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); |
396 | q->c[n] = NULL; |
397 | } |
398 | } |
399 | while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) { |
400 | audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); |
401 | q->c[n] = NULL; |
402 | } |
403 | ctx->trees = p; |
404 | ctx->tree_count = count; |
405 | #endif |
406 | } |
407 | |
408 | static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) |
409 | { |
410 | struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q; |
411 | for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) { |
412 | q = p->next; |
413 | kfree(p); |
414 | } |
415 | } |
416 | |
417 | static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree) |
418 | { |
419 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
420 | struct audit_tree_refs *p; |
421 | int n; |
422 | if (!tree) |
423 | return 0; |
424 | /* full ones */ |
425 | for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) { |
426 | for (n = 0; n < 31; n++) |
427 | if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) |
428 | return 1; |
429 | } |
430 | /* partial */ |
431 | if (p) { |
432 | for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++) |
433 | if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) |
434 | return 1; |
435 | } |
436 | #endif |
437 | return 0; |
438 | } |
439 | |
440 | /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */ |
441 | /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 |
442 | * otherwise. */ |
443 | static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, |
444 | struct audit_krule *rule, |
445 | struct audit_context *ctx, |
446 | struct audit_names *name, |
447 | enum audit_state *state) |
448 | { |
449 | const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tsk); |
450 | int i, j, need_sid = 1; |
451 | u32 sid; |
452 | |
453 | for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { |
454 | struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; |
455 | int result = 0; |
456 | |
457 | switch (f->type) { |
458 | case AUDIT_PID: |
459 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val); |
460 | break; |
461 | case AUDIT_PPID: |
462 | if (ctx) { |
463 | if (!ctx->ppid) |
464 | ctx->ppid = sys_getppid(); |
465 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val); |
466 | } |
467 | break; |
468 | case AUDIT_UID: |
469 | result = audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->val); |
470 | break; |
471 | case AUDIT_EUID: |
472 | result = audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->val); |
473 | break; |
474 | case AUDIT_SUID: |
475 | result = audit_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->val); |
476 | break; |
477 | case AUDIT_FSUID: |
478 | result = audit_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->val); |
479 | break; |
480 | case AUDIT_GID: |
481 | result = audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->val); |
482 | break; |
483 | case AUDIT_EGID: |
484 | result = audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->val); |
485 | break; |
486 | case AUDIT_SGID: |
487 | result = audit_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->val); |
488 | break; |
489 | case AUDIT_FSGID: |
490 | result = audit_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->val); |
491 | break; |
492 | case AUDIT_PERS: |
493 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val); |
494 | break; |
495 | case AUDIT_ARCH: |
496 | if (ctx) |
497 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val); |
498 | break; |
499 | |
500 | case AUDIT_EXIT: |
501 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) |
502 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val); |
503 | break; |
504 | case AUDIT_SUCCESS: |
505 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) { |
506 | if (f->val) |
507 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS); |
508 | else |
509 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE); |
510 | } |
511 | break; |
512 | case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: |
513 | if (name) |
514 | result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), |
515 | f->op, f->val); |
516 | else if (ctx) { |
517 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { |
518 | if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) { |
519 | ++result; |
520 | break; |
521 | } |
522 | } |
523 | } |
524 | break; |
525 | case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: |
526 | if (name) |
527 | result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), |
528 | f->op, f->val); |
529 | else if (ctx) { |
530 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { |
531 | if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) { |
532 | ++result; |
533 | break; |
534 | } |
535 | } |
536 | } |
537 | break; |
538 | case AUDIT_INODE: |
539 | if (name) |
540 | result = (name->ino == f->val); |
541 | else if (ctx) { |
542 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { |
543 | if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) { |
544 | ++result; |
545 | break; |
546 | } |
547 | } |
548 | } |
549 | break; |
550 | case AUDIT_WATCH: |
551 | if (name) |
552 | result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev); |
553 | break; |
554 | case AUDIT_DIR: |
555 | if (ctx) |
556 | result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree); |
557 | break; |
558 | case AUDIT_LOGINUID: |
559 | result = 0; |
560 | if (ctx) |
561 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val); |
562 | break; |
563 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: |
564 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: |
565 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: |
566 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: |
567 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: |
568 | /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating |
569 | a temporary error. We simply treat this as a |
570 | match for now to avoid losing information that |
571 | may be wanted. An error message will also be |
572 | logged upon error */ |
573 | if (f->lsm_rule) { |
574 | if (need_sid) { |
575 | security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); |
576 | need_sid = 0; |
577 | } |
578 | result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, |
579 | f->op, |
580 | f->lsm_rule, |
581 | ctx); |
582 | } |
583 | break; |
584 | case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: |
585 | case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: |
586 | case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: |
587 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: |
588 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: |
589 | /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR |
590 | also applies here */ |
591 | if (f->lsm_rule) { |
592 | /* Find files that match */ |
593 | if (name) { |
594 | result = security_audit_rule_match( |
595 | name->osid, f->type, f->op, |
596 | f->lsm_rule, ctx); |
597 | } else if (ctx) { |
598 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { |
599 | if (security_audit_rule_match( |
600 | ctx->names[j].osid, |
601 | f->type, f->op, |
602 | f->lsm_rule, ctx)) { |
603 | ++result; |
604 | break; |
605 | } |
606 | } |
607 | } |
608 | /* Find ipc objects that match */ |
609 | if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) |
610 | break; |
611 | if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, |
612 | f->type, f->op, |
613 | f->lsm_rule, ctx)) |
614 | ++result; |
615 | } |
616 | break; |
617 | case AUDIT_ARG0: |
618 | case AUDIT_ARG1: |
619 | case AUDIT_ARG2: |
620 | case AUDIT_ARG3: |
621 | if (ctx) |
622 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val); |
623 | break; |
624 | case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: |
625 | /* ignore this field for filtering */ |
626 | result = 1; |
627 | break; |
628 | case AUDIT_PERM: |
629 | result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val); |
630 | break; |
631 | case AUDIT_FILETYPE: |
632 | result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val); |
633 | break; |
634 | } |
635 | |
636 | if (!result) { |
637 | put_cred(cred); |
638 | return 0; |
639 | } |
640 | } |
641 | |
642 | if (ctx) { |
643 | if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio) |
644 | return 0; |
645 | if (rule->filterkey) { |
646 | kfree(ctx->filterkey); |
647 | ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); |
648 | } |
649 | ctx->prio = rule->prio; |
650 | } |
651 | switch (rule->action) { |
652 | case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; |
653 | case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; |
654 | } |
655 | put_cred(cred); |
656 | return 1; |
657 | } |
658 | |
659 | /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is |
660 | * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task |
661 | * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid. |
662 | */ |
663 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key) |
664 | { |
665 | struct audit_entry *e; |
666 | enum audit_state state; |
667 | |
668 | rcu_read_lock(); |
669 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) { |
670 | if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) { |
671 | if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) |
672 | *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); |
673 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
674 | return state; |
675 | } |
676 | } |
677 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
678 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; |
679 | } |
680 | |
681 | /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the |
682 | * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is |
683 | * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit |
684 | * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT). |
685 | */ |
686 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, |
687 | struct audit_context *ctx, |
688 | struct list_head *list) |
689 | { |
690 | struct audit_entry *e; |
691 | enum audit_state state; |
692 | |
693 | if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid) |
694 | return AUDIT_DISABLED; |
695 | |
696 | rcu_read_lock(); |
697 | if (!list_empty(list)) { |
698 | int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); |
699 | int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); |
700 | |
701 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { |
702 | if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && |
703 | audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL, |
704 | &state)) { |
705 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
706 | ctx->current_state = state; |
707 | return state; |
708 | } |
709 | } |
710 | } |
711 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
712 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; |
713 | } |
714 | |
715 | /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been |
716 | * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash |
717 | * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[]. |
718 | * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall(). |
719 | */ |
720 | void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx) |
721 | { |
722 | int i; |
723 | struct audit_entry *e; |
724 | enum audit_state state; |
725 | |
726 | if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid) |
727 | return; |
728 | |
729 | rcu_read_lock(); |
730 | for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) { |
731 | int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); |
732 | int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); |
733 | struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i]; |
734 | int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino); |
735 | struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h]; |
736 | |
737 | if (list_empty(list)) |
738 | continue; |
739 | |
740 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { |
741 | if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && |
742 | audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) { |
743 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
744 | ctx->current_state = state; |
745 | return; |
746 | } |
747 | } |
748 | } |
749 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
750 | } |
751 | |
752 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk, |
753 | int return_valid, |
754 | long return_code) |
755 | { |
756 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; |
757 | |
758 | if (likely(!context)) |
759 | return NULL; |
760 | context->return_valid = return_valid; |
761 | |
762 | /* |
763 | * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual |
764 | * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific |
765 | * signal handlers |
766 | * |
767 | * This is actually a test for: |
768 | * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) || |
769 | * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) |
770 | * |
771 | * but is faster than a bunch of || |
772 | */ |
773 | if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) && |
774 | (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) && |
775 | (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD)) |
776 | context->return_code = -EINTR; |
777 | else |
778 | context->return_code = return_code; |
779 | |
780 | if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) { |
781 | audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]); |
782 | audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context); |
783 | } |
784 | |
785 | tsk->audit_context = NULL; |
786 | return context; |
787 | } |
788 | |
789 | static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) |
790 | { |
791 | int i; |
792 | |
793 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 |
794 | if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) { |
795 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d" |
796 | " name_count=%d put_count=%d" |
797 | " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n", |
798 | __FILE__, __LINE__, |
799 | context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall, |
800 | context->name_count, context->put_count, |
801 | context->ino_count); |
802 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { |
803 | printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, |
804 | context->names[i].name, |
805 | context->names[i].name ?: "(null)"); |
806 | } |
807 | dump_stack(); |
808 | return; |
809 | } |
810 | #endif |
811 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
812 | context->put_count = 0; |
813 | context->ino_count = 0; |
814 | #endif |
815 | |
816 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { |
817 | if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put) |
818 | __putname(context->names[i].name); |
819 | } |
820 | context->name_count = 0; |
821 | path_put(&context->pwd); |
822 | context->pwd.dentry = NULL; |
823 | context->pwd.mnt = NULL; |
824 | } |
825 | |
826 | static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) |
827 | { |
828 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; |
829 | |
830 | while ((aux = context->aux)) { |
831 | context->aux = aux->next; |
832 | kfree(aux); |
833 | } |
834 | while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) { |
835 | context->aux_pids = aux->next; |
836 | kfree(aux); |
837 | } |
838 | } |
839 | |
840 | static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context, |
841 | enum audit_state state) |
842 | { |
843 | memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context)); |
844 | context->state = state; |
845 | context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0; |
846 | } |
847 | |
848 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state) |
849 | { |
850 | struct audit_context *context; |
851 | |
852 | if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL))) |
853 | return NULL; |
854 | audit_zero_context(context, state); |
855 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees); |
856 | return context; |
857 | } |
858 | |
859 | /** |
860 | * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task |
861 | * @tsk: task |
862 | * |
863 | * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context |
864 | * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the |
865 | * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is |
866 | * needed. |
867 | */ |
868 | int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) |
869 | { |
870 | struct audit_context *context; |
871 | enum audit_state state; |
872 | char *key = NULL; |
873 | |
874 | if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled)) |
875 | return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */ |
876 | |
877 | state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key); |
878 | if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) |
879 | return 0; |
880 | |
881 | if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) { |
882 | kfree(key); |
883 | audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc"); |
884 | return -ENOMEM; |
885 | } |
886 | context->filterkey = key; |
887 | |
888 | tsk->audit_context = context; |
889 | set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); |
890 | return 0; |
891 | } |
892 | |
893 | static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) |
894 | { |
895 | struct audit_context *previous; |
896 | int count = 0; |
897 | |
898 | do { |
899 | previous = context->previous; |
900 | if (previous || (count && count < 10)) { |
901 | ++count; |
902 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:" |
903 | " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n", |
904 | context->serial, context->major, |
905 | context->name_count, count); |
906 | } |
907 | audit_free_names(context); |
908 | unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); |
909 | free_tree_refs(context); |
910 | audit_free_aux(context); |
911 | kfree(context->filterkey); |
912 | kfree(context->sockaddr); |
913 | kfree(context); |
914 | context = previous; |
915 | } while (context); |
916 | if (count >= 10) |
917 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count); |
918 | } |
919 | |
920 | void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) |
921 | { |
922 | char *ctx = NULL; |
923 | unsigned len; |
924 | int error; |
925 | u32 sid; |
926 | |
927 | security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); |
928 | if (!sid) |
929 | return; |
930 | |
931 | error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len); |
932 | if (error) { |
933 | if (error != -EINVAL) |
934 | goto error_path; |
935 | return; |
936 | } |
937 | |
938 | audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx); |
939 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); |
940 | return; |
941 | |
942 | error_path: |
943 | audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context"); |
944 | return; |
945 | } |
946 | |
947 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context); |
948 | |
949 | static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk) |
950 | { |
951 | char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)]; |
952 | struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm; |
953 | struct vm_area_struct *vma; |
954 | |
955 | /* tsk == current */ |
956 | |
957 | get_task_comm(name, tsk); |
958 | audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); |
959 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name); |
960 | |
961 | if (mm) { |
962 | down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); |
963 | vma = mm->mmap; |
964 | while (vma) { |
965 | if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && |
966 | vma->vm_file) { |
967 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=", |
968 | &vma->vm_file->f_path); |
969 | break; |
970 | } |
971 | vma = vma->vm_next; |
972 | } |
973 | up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); |
974 | } |
975 | audit_log_task_context(ab); |
976 | } |
977 | |
978 | static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, |
979 | uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid, |
980 | u32 sid, char *comm) |
981 | { |
982 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
983 | char *ctx = NULL; |
984 | u32 len; |
985 | int rc = 0; |
986 | |
987 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID); |
988 | if (!ab) |
989 | return rc; |
990 | |
991 | audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid, |
992 | uid, sessionid); |
993 | if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) { |
994 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)"); |
995 | rc = 1; |
996 | } else { |
997 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); |
998 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); |
999 | } |
1000 | audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm="); |
1001 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm); |
1002 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1003 | |
1004 | return rc; |
1005 | } |
1006 | |
1007 | /* |
1008 | * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't |
1009 | * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being |
1010 | * within about 500 bytes (next page boundry) |
1011 | * |
1012 | * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when |
1013 | * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting |
1014 | * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to |
1015 | * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space |
1016 | * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was. |
1017 | */ |
1018 | static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context, |
1019 | struct audit_buffer **ab, |
1020 | int arg_num, |
1021 | size_t *len_sent, |
1022 | const char __user *p, |
1023 | char *buf) |
1024 | { |
1025 | char arg_num_len_buf[12]; |
1026 | const char __user *tmp_p = p; |
1027 | /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */ |
1028 | size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5; |
1029 | size_t len, len_left, to_send; |
1030 | size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN; |
1031 | unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0; |
1032 | int ret; |
1033 | |
1034 | /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */ |
1035 | len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1; |
1036 | |
1037 | /* |
1038 | * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings |
1039 | * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar |
1040 | * for strings that are too long, we should not have created |
1041 | * any. |
1042 | */ |
1043 | if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) { |
1044 | WARN_ON(1); |
1045 | send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); |
1046 | return -1; |
1047 | } |
1048 | |
1049 | /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */ |
1050 | do { |
1051 | if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN) |
1052 | to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN; |
1053 | else |
1054 | to_send = len_left; |
1055 | ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send); |
1056 | /* |
1057 | * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just |
1058 | * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user- |
1059 | * space yet. |
1060 | */ |
1061 | if (ret) { |
1062 | WARN_ON(1); |
1063 | send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); |
1064 | return -1; |
1065 | } |
1066 | buf[to_send] = '\0'; |
1067 | has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send); |
1068 | if (has_cntl) { |
1069 | /* |
1070 | * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only |
1071 | * send half as much in each message |
1072 | */ |
1073 | max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2; |
1074 | break; |
1075 | } |
1076 | len_left -= to_send; |
1077 | tmp_p += to_send; |
1078 | } while (len_left > 0); |
1079 | |
1080 | len_left = len; |
1081 | |
1082 | if (len > max_execve_audit_len) |
1083 | too_long = 1; |
1084 | |
1085 | /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */ |
1086 | for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) { |
1087 | int room_left; |
1088 | |
1089 | if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len) |
1090 | to_send = max_execve_audit_len; |
1091 | else |
1092 | to_send = len_left; |
1093 | |
1094 | /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */ |
1095 | room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent; |
1096 | if (has_cntl) |
1097 | room_left -= (to_send * 2); |
1098 | else |
1099 | room_left -= to_send; |
1100 | if (room_left < 0) { |
1101 | *len_sent = 0; |
1102 | audit_log_end(*ab); |
1103 | *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE); |
1104 | if (!*ab) |
1105 | return 0; |
1106 | } |
1107 | |
1108 | /* |
1109 | * first record needs to say how long the original string was |
1110 | * so we can be sure nothing was lost. |
1111 | */ |
1112 | if ((i == 0) && (too_long)) |
1113 | audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num, |
1114 | has_cntl ? 2*len : len); |
1115 | |
1116 | /* |
1117 | * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already |
1118 | * filled buf above when we checked for control characters |
1119 | * so don't bother with another copy_from_user |
1120 | */ |
1121 | if (len >= max_execve_audit_len) |
1122 | ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send); |
1123 | else |
1124 | ret = 0; |
1125 | if (ret) { |
1126 | WARN_ON(1); |
1127 | send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); |
1128 | return -1; |
1129 | } |
1130 | buf[to_send] = '\0'; |
1131 | |
1132 | /* actually log it */ |
1133 | audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num); |
1134 | if (too_long) |
1135 | audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i); |
1136 | audit_log_format(*ab, "="); |
1137 | if (has_cntl) |
1138 | audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send); |
1139 | else |
1140 | audit_log_string(*ab, buf); |
1141 | |
1142 | p += to_send; |
1143 | len_left -= to_send; |
1144 | *len_sent += arg_num_len; |
1145 | if (has_cntl) |
1146 | *len_sent += to_send * 2; |
1147 | else |
1148 | *len_sent += to_send; |
1149 | } |
1150 | /* include the null we didn't log */ |
1151 | return len + 1; |
1152 | } |
1153 | |
1154 | static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context, |
1155 | struct audit_buffer **ab, |
1156 | struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi) |
1157 | { |
1158 | int i; |
1159 | size_t len, len_sent = 0; |
1160 | const char __user *p; |
1161 | char *buf; |
1162 | |
1163 | if (axi->mm != current->mm) |
1164 | return; /* execve failed, no additional info */ |
1165 | |
1166 | p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start; |
1167 | |
1168 | audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", axi->argc); |
1169 | |
1170 | /* |
1171 | * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just |
1172 | * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size |
1173 | * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg() |
1174 | * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe. |
1175 | */ |
1176 | buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL); |
1177 | if (!buf) { |
1178 | audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n"); |
1179 | return; |
1180 | } |
1181 | |
1182 | for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) { |
1183 | len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i, |
1184 | &len_sent, p, buf); |
1185 | if (len <= 0) |
1186 | break; |
1187 | p += len; |
1188 | } |
1189 | kfree(buf); |
1190 | } |
1191 | |
1192 | static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap) |
1193 | { |
1194 | int i; |
1195 | |
1196 | audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix); |
1197 | CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) { |
1198 | audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]); |
1199 | } |
1200 | } |
1201 | |
1202 | static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name) |
1203 | { |
1204 | kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted; |
1205 | kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable; |
1206 | int log = 0; |
1207 | |
1208 | if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) { |
1209 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm); |
1210 | log = 1; |
1211 | } |
1212 | if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) { |
1213 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh); |
1214 | log = 1; |
1215 | } |
1216 | |
1217 | if (log) |
1218 | audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver); |
1219 | } |
1220 | |
1221 | static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) |
1222 | { |
1223 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
1224 | int i; |
1225 | |
1226 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type); |
1227 | if (!ab) |
1228 | return; |
1229 | |
1230 | switch (context->type) { |
1231 | case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: { |
1232 | int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs; |
1233 | audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs); |
1234 | for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) |
1235 | audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, |
1236 | context->socketcall.args[i]); |
1237 | break; } |
1238 | case AUDIT_IPC: { |
1239 | u32 osid = context->ipc.osid; |
1240 | |
1241 | audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o", |
1242 | context->ipc.uid, context->ipc.gid, context->ipc.mode); |
1243 | if (osid) { |
1244 | char *ctx = NULL; |
1245 | u32 len; |
1246 | if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) { |
1247 | audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid); |
1248 | *call_panic = 1; |
1249 | } else { |
1250 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); |
1251 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); |
1252 | } |
1253 | } |
1254 | if (context->ipc.has_perm) { |
1255 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1256 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, |
1257 | AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM); |
1258 | audit_log_format(ab, |
1259 | "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o", |
1260 | context->ipc.qbytes, |
1261 | context->ipc.perm_uid, |
1262 | context->ipc.perm_gid, |
1263 | context->ipc.perm_mode); |
1264 | if (!ab) |
1265 | return; |
1266 | } |
1267 | break; } |
1268 | case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: { |
1269 | audit_log_format(ab, |
1270 | "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld " |
1271 | "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld", |
1272 | context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode, |
1273 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags, |
1274 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg, |
1275 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize, |
1276 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs); |
1277 | break; } |
1278 | case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: { |
1279 | audit_log_format(ab, |
1280 | "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u " |
1281 | "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld", |
1282 | context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes, |
1283 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len, |
1284 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio, |
1285 | context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec, |
1286 | context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec); |
1287 | break; } |
1288 | case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: { |
1289 | audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d", |
1290 | context->mq_notify.mqdes, |
1291 | context->mq_notify.sigev_signo); |
1292 | break; } |
1293 | case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: { |
1294 | struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat; |
1295 | audit_log_format(ab, |
1296 | "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld " |
1297 | "mq_curmsgs=%ld ", |
1298 | context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes, |
1299 | attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg, |
1300 | attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs); |
1301 | break; } |
1302 | case AUDIT_CAPSET: { |
1303 | audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid); |
1304 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable); |
1305 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted); |
1306 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective); |
1307 | break; } |
1308 | } |
1309 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1310 | } |
1311 | |
1312 | static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk) |
1313 | { |
1314 | const struct cred *cred; |
1315 | int i, call_panic = 0; |
1316 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
1317 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; |
1318 | const char *tty; |
1319 | |
1320 | /* tsk == current */ |
1321 | context->pid = tsk->pid; |
1322 | if (!context->ppid) |
1323 | context->ppid = sys_getppid(); |
1324 | cred = current_cred(); |
1325 | context->uid = cred->uid; |
1326 | context->gid = cred->gid; |
1327 | context->euid = cred->euid; |
1328 | context->suid = cred->suid; |
1329 | context->fsuid = cred->fsuid; |
1330 | context->egid = cred->egid; |
1331 | context->sgid = cred->sgid; |
1332 | context->fsgid = cred->fsgid; |
1333 | context->personality = tsk->personality; |
1334 | |
1335 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL); |
1336 | if (!ab) |
1337 | return; /* audit_panic has been called */ |
1338 | audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d", |
1339 | context->arch, context->major); |
1340 | if (context->personality != PER_LINUX) |
1341 | audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality); |
1342 | if (context->return_valid) |
1343 | audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", |
1344 | (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no", |
1345 | context->return_code); |
1346 | |
1347 | spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock); |
1348 | if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name) |
1349 | tty = tsk->signal->tty->name; |
1350 | else |
1351 | tty = "(none)"; |
1352 | spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock); |
1353 | |
1354 | audit_log_format(ab, |
1355 | " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d" |
1356 | " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u" |
1357 | " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u" |
1358 | " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u", |
1359 | context->argv[0], |
1360 | context->argv[1], |
1361 | context->argv[2], |
1362 | context->argv[3], |
1363 | context->name_count, |
1364 | context->ppid, |
1365 | context->pid, |
1366 | tsk->loginuid, |
1367 | context->uid, |
1368 | context->gid, |
1369 | context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid, |
1370 | context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty, |
1371 | tsk->sessionid); |
1372 | |
1373 | |
1374 | audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk); |
1375 | audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey); |
1376 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1377 | |
1378 | for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) { |
1379 | |
1380 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type); |
1381 | if (!ab) |
1382 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ |
1383 | |
1384 | switch (aux->type) { |
1385 | |
1386 | case AUDIT_EXECVE: { |
1387 | struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux; |
1388 | audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi); |
1389 | break; } |
1390 | |
1391 | case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: { |
1392 | struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux; |
1393 | audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver); |
1394 | audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted); |
1395 | audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable); |
1396 | audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE); |
1397 | audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted); |
1398 | audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable); |
1399 | audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective); |
1400 | audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted); |
1401 | audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable); |
1402 | audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective); |
1403 | break; } |
1404 | |
1405 | } |
1406 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1407 | } |
1408 | |
1409 | if (context->type) |
1410 | show_special(context, &call_panic); |
1411 | |
1412 | if (context->fds[0] >= 0) { |
1413 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR); |
1414 | if (ab) { |
1415 | audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", |
1416 | context->fds[0], context->fds[1]); |
1417 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1418 | } |
1419 | } |
1420 | |
1421 | if (context->sockaddr_len) { |
1422 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR); |
1423 | if (ab) { |
1424 | audit_log_format(ab, "saddr="); |
1425 | audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr, |
1426 | context->sockaddr_len); |
1427 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1428 | } |
1429 | } |
1430 | |
1431 | for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) { |
1432 | struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; |
1433 | |
1434 | for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) |
1435 | if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], |
1436 | axs->target_auid[i], |
1437 | axs->target_uid[i], |
1438 | axs->target_sessionid[i], |
1439 | axs->target_sid[i], |
1440 | axs->target_comm[i])) |
1441 | call_panic = 1; |
1442 | } |
1443 | |
1444 | if (context->target_pid && |
1445 | audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, |
1446 | context->target_auid, context->target_uid, |
1447 | context->target_sessionid, |
1448 | context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) |
1449 | call_panic = 1; |
1450 | |
1451 | if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { |
1452 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); |
1453 | if (ab) { |
1454 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd); |
1455 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1456 | } |
1457 | } |
1458 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { |
1459 | struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i]; |
1460 | |
1461 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH); |
1462 | if (!ab) |
1463 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ |
1464 | |
1465 | audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i); |
1466 | |
1467 | if (n->name) { |
1468 | switch(n->name_len) { |
1469 | case AUDIT_NAME_FULL: |
1470 | /* log the full path */ |
1471 | audit_log_format(ab, " name="); |
1472 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name); |
1473 | break; |
1474 | case 0: |
1475 | /* name was specified as a relative path and the |
1476 | * directory component is the cwd */ |
1477 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "name=", &context->pwd); |
1478 | break; |
1479 | default: |
1480 | /* log the name's directory component */ |
1481 | audit_log_format(ab, " name="); |
1482 | audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name, |
1483 | n->name_len); |
1484 | } |
1485 | } else |
1486 | audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)"); |
1487 | |
1488 | if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) { |
1489 | audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu" |
1490 | " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o" |
1491 | " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", |
1492 | n->ino, |
1493 | MAJOR(n->dev), |
1494 | MINOR(n->dev), |
1495 | n->mode, |
1496 | n->uid, |
1497 | n->gid, |
1498 | MAJOR(n->rdev), |
1499 | MINOR(n->rdev)); |
1500 | } |
1501 | if (n->osid != 0) { |
1502 | char *ctx = NULL; |
1503 | u32 len; |
1504 | if (security_secid_to_secctx( |
1505 | n->osid, &ctx, &len)) { |
1506 | audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid); |
1507 | call_panic = 2; |
1508 | } else { |
1509 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); |
1510 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); |
1511 | } |
1512 | } |
1513 | |
1514 | audit_log_fcaps(ab, n); |
1515 | |
1516 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1517 | } |
1518 | |
1519 | /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ |
1520 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE); |
1521 | if (ab) |
1522 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1523 | if (call_panic) |
1524 | audit_panic("error converting sid to string"); |
1525 | } |
1526 | |
1527 | /** |
1528 | * audit_free - free a per-task audit context |
1529 | * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free |
1530 | * |
1531 | * Called from copy_process and do_exit |
1532 | */ |
1533 | void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) |
1534 | { |
1535 | struct audit_context *context; |
1536 | |
1537 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0); |
1538 | if (likely(!context)) |
1539 | return; |
1540 | |
1541 | /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit |
1542 | * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. |
1543 | * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this |
1544 | * in the context of the idle thread */ |
1545 | /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */ |
1546 | if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) |
1547 | audit_log_exit(context, tsk); |
1548 | if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) |
1549 | audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees); |
1550 | |
1551 | audit_free_context(context); |
1552 | } |
1553 | |
1554 | /** |
1555 | * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry |
1556 | * @arch: architecture type |
1557 | * @major: major syscall type (function) |
1558 | * @a1: additional syscall register 1 |
1559 | * @a2: additional syscall register 2 |
1560 | * @a3: additional syscall register 3 |
1561 | * @a4: additional syscall register 4 |
1562 | * |
1563 | * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the |
1564 | * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or |
1565 | * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the |
1566 | * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT, |
1567 | * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it |
1568 | * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it |
1569 | * be written). |
1570 | */ |
1571 | void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major, |
1572 | unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, |
1573 | unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4) |
1574 | { |
1575 | struct task_struct *tsk = current; |
1576 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; |
1577 | enum audit_state state; |
1578 | |
1579 | if (unlikely(!context)) |
1580 | return; |
1581 | |
1582 | /* |
1583 | * This happens only on certain architectures that make system |
1584 | * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of |
1585 | * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new |
1586 | * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you |
1587 | * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.) |
1588 | * |
1589 | * i386 no |
1590 | * x86_64 no |
1591 | * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S) |
1592 | * |
1593 | * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner |
1594 | * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught. |
1595 | */ |
1596 | if (context->in_syscall) { |
1597 | struct audit_context *newctx; |
1598 | |
1599 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
1600 | printk(KERN_ERR |
1601 | "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;" |
1602 | " entering syscall=%d\n", |
1603 | context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major); |
1604 | #endif |
1605 | newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state); |
1606 | if (newctx) { |
1607 | newctx->previous = context; |
1608 | context = newctx; |
1609 | tsk->audit_context = newctx; |
1610 | } else { |
1611 | /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we |
1612 | * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname |
1613 | * will be lost). The only other alternative is |
1614 | * to abandon auditing. */ |
1615 | audit_zero_context(context, context->state); |
1616 | } |
1617 | } |
1618 | BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count); |
1619 | |
1620 | if (!audit_enabled) |
1621 | return; |
1622 | |
1623 | context->arch = arch; |
1624 | context->major = major; |
1625 | context->argv[0] = a1; |
1626 | context->argv[1] = a2; |
1627 | context->argv[2] = a3; |
1628 | context->argv[3] = a4; |
1629 | |
1630 | state = context->state; |
1631 | context->dummy = !audit_n_rules; |
1632 | if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) { |
1633 | context->prio = 0; |
1634 | state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]); |
1635 | } |
1636 | if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) |
1637 | return; |
1638 | |
1639 | context->serial = 0; |
1640 | context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME; |
1641 | context->in_syscall = 1; |
1642 | context->current_state = state; |
1643 | context->ppid = 0; |
1644 | } |
1645 | |
1646 | void audit_finish_fork(struct task_struct *child) |
1647 | { |
1648 | struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; |
1649 | struct audit_context *p = child->audit_context; |
1650 | if (!p || !ctx) |
1651 | return; |
1652 | if (!ctx->in_syscall || ctx->current_state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) |
1653 | return; |
1654 | p->arch = ctx->arch; |
1655 | p->major = ctx->major; |
1656 | memcpy(p->argv, ctx->argv, sizeof(ctx->argv)); |
1657 | p->ctime = ctx->ctime; |
1658 | p->dummy = ctx->dummy; |
1659 | p->in_syscall = ctx->in_syscall; |
1660 | p->filterkey = kstrdup(ctx->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL); |
1661 | p->ppid = current->pid; |
1662 | p->prio = ctx->prio; |
1663 | p->current_state = ctx->current_state; |
1664 | } |
1665 | |
1666 | /** |
1667 | * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call |
1668 | * @valid: success/failure flag |
1669 | * @return_code: syscall return value |
1670 | * |
1671 | * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as |
1672 | * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from |
1673 | * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit |
1674 | * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, |
1675 | * free the names stored from getname(). |
1676 | */ |
1677 | void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code) |
1678 | { |
1679 | struct task_struct *tsk = current; |
1680 | struct audit_context *context; |
1681 | |
1682 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code); |
1683 | |
1684 | if (likely(!context)) |
1685 | return; |
1686 | |
1687 | if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) |
1688 | audit_log_exit(context, tsk); |
1689 | |
1690 | context->in_syscall = 0; |
1691 | context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0; |
1692 | |
1693 | if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) |
1694 | audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees); |
1695 | |
1696 | if (context->previous) { |
1697 | struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous; |
1698 | context->previous = NULL; |
1699 | audit_free_context(context); |
1700 | tsk->audit_context = new_context; |
1701 | } else { |
1702 | audit_free_names(context); |
1703 | unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); |
1704 | audit_free_aux(context); |
1705 | context->aux = NULL; |
1706 | context->aux_pids = NULL; |
1707 | context->target_pid = 0; |
1708 | context->target_sid = 0; |
1709 | context->sockaddr_len = 0; |
1710 | context->type = 0; |
1711 | context->fds[0] = -1; |
1712 | if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) { |
1713 | kfree(context->filterkey); |
1714 | context->filterkey = NULL; |
1715 | } |
1716 | tsk->audit_context = context; |
1717 | } |
1718 | } |
1719 | |
1720 | static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode) |
1721 | { |
1722 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
1723 | struct audit_context *context; |
1724 | struct audit_tree_refs *p; |
1725 | struct audit_chunk *chunk; |
1726 | int count; |
1727 | if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) |
1728 | return; |
1729 | context = current->audit_context; |
1730 | p = context->trees; |
1731 | count = context->tree_count; |
1732 | rcu_read_lock(); |
1733 | chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); |
1734 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1735 | if (!chunk) |
1736 | return; |
1737 | if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) |
1738 | return; |
1739 | if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) { |
1740 | printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); |
1741 | audit_set_auditable(context); |
1742 | audit_put_chunk(chunk); |
1743 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
1744 | return; |
1745 | } |
1746 | put_tree_ref(context, chunk); |
1747 | #endif |
1748 | } |
1749 | |
1750 | static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry) |
1751 | { |
1752 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
1753 | struct audit_context *context; |
1754 | struct audit_tree_refs *p; |
1755 | const struct dentry *d, *parent; |
1756 | struct audit_chunk *drop; |
1757 | unsigned long seq; |
1758 | int count; |
1759 | |
1760 | context = current->audit_context; |
1761 | p = context->trees; |
1762 | count = context->tree_count; |
1763 | retry: |
1764 | drop = NULL; |
1765 | d = dentry; |
1766 | rcu_read_lock(); |
1767 | seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock); |
1768 | for(;;) { |
1769 | struct inode *inode = d->d_inode; |
1770 | if (inode && unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) { |
1771 | struct audit_chunk *chunk; |
1772 | chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); |
1773 | if (chunk) { |
1774 | if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) { |
1775 | drop = chunk; |
1776 | break; |
1777 | } |
1778 | } |
1779 | } |
1780 | parent = d->d_parent; |
1781 | if (parent == d) |
1782 | break; |
1783 | d = parent; |
1784 | } |
1785 | if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */ |
1786 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1787 | if (!drop) { |
1788 | /* just a race with rename */ |
1789 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
1790 | goto retry; |
1791 | } |
1792 | audit_put_chunk(drop); |
1793 | if (grow_tree_refs(context)) { |
1794 | /* OK, got more space */ |
1795 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
1796 | goto retry; |
1797 | } |
1798 | /* too bad */ |
1799 | printk(KERN_WARNING |
1800 | "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); |
1801 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
1802 | audit_set_auditable(context); |
1803 | return; |
1804 | } |
1805 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1806 | #endif |
1807 | } |
1808 | |
1809 | /** |
1810 | * audit_getname - add a name to the list |
1811 | * @name: name to add |
1812 | * |
1813 | * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context. |
1814 | * Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). |
1815 | */ |
1816 | void __audit_getname(const char *name) |
1817 | { |
1818 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
1819 | |
1820 | if (IS_ERR(name) || !name) |
1821 | return; |
1822 | |
1823 | if (!context->in_syscall) { |
1824 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 |
1825 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n", |
1826 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); |
1827 | dump_stack(); |
1828 | #endif |
1829 | return; |
1830 | } |
1831 | BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES); |
1832 | context->names[context->name_count].name = name; |
1833 | context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; |
1834 | context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1; |
1835 | context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1; |
1836 | context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0; |
1837 | ++context->name_count; |
1838 | if (!context->pwd.dentry) |
1839 | get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd); |
1840 | } |
1841 | |
1842 | /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request |
1843 | * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname |
1844 | * |
1845 | * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context, |
1846 | * then we delay the putname until syscall exit. |
1847 | * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname(). |
1848 | */ |
1849 | void audit_putname(const char *name) |
1850 | { |
1851 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
1852 | |
1853 | BUG_ON(!context); |
1854 | if (!context->in_syscall) { |
1855 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 |
1856 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n", |
1857 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); |
1858 | if (context->name_count) { |
1859 | int i; |
1860 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) |
1861 | printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, |
1862 | context->names[i].name, |
1863 | context->names[i].name ?: "(null)"); |
1864 | } |
1865 | #endif |
1866 | __putname(name); |
1867 | } |
1868 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
1869 | else { |
1870 | ++context->put_count; |
1871 | if (context->put_count > context->name_count) { |
1872 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d" |
1873 | " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d" |
1874 | " put_count=%d\n", |
1875 | __FILE__, __LINE__, |
1876 | context->serial, context->major, |
1877 | context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count, |
1878 | context->put_count); |
1879 | dump_stack(); |
1880 | } |
1881 | } |
1882 | #endif |
1883 | } |
1884 | |
1885 | static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context, |
1886 | const struct inode *inode) |
1887 | { |
1888 | if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) { |
1889 | if (inode) |
1890 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "audit: name_count maxed, losing inode data: " |
1891 | "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu\n", |
1892 | MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev), |
1893 | MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev), |
1894 | inode->i_ino); |
1895 | |
1896 | else |
1897 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data\n"); |
1898 | return 1; |
1899 | } |
1900 | context->name_count++; |
1901 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
1902 | context->ino_count++; |
1903 | #endif |
1904 | return 0; |
1905 | } |
1906 | |
1907 | |
1908 | static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry) |
1909 | { |
1910 | struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps; |
1911 | int rc; |
1912 | |
1913 | memset(&name->fcap.permitted, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t)); |
1914 | memset(&name->fcap.inheritable, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t)); |
1915 | name->fcap.fE = 0; |
1916 | name->fcap_ver = 0; |
1917 | |
1918 | if (!dentry) |
1919 | return 0; |
1920 | |
1921 | rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps); |
1922 | if (rc) |
1923 | return rc; |
1924 | |
1925 | name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted; |
1926 | name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable; |
1927 | name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); |
1928 | name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; |
1929 | |
1930 | return 0; |
1931 | } |
1932 | |
1933 | |
1934 | /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */ |
1935 | static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry, |
1936 | const struct inode *inode) |
1937 | { |
1938 | name->ino = inode->i_ino; |
1939 | name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; |
1940 | name->mode = inode->i_mode; |
1941 | name->uid = inode->i_uid; |
1942 | name->gid = inode->i_gid; |
1943 | name->rdev = inode->i_rdev; |
1944 | security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid); |
1945 | audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry); |
1946 | } |
1947 | |
1948 | /** |
1949 | * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup |
1950 | * @name: name being audited |
1951 | * @dentry: dentry being audited |
1952 | * |
1953 | * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). |
1954 | */ |
1955 | void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry) |
1956 | { |
1957 | int idx; |
1958 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
1959 | const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
1960 | |
1961 | if (!context->in_syscall) |
1962 | return; |
1963 | if (context->name_count |
1964 | && context->names[context->name_count-1].name |
1965 | && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name) |
1966 | idx = context->name_count - 1; |
1967 | else if (context->name_count > 1 |
1968 | && context->names[context->name_count-2].name |
1969 | && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name) |
1970 | idx = context->name_count - 2; |
1971 | else { |
1972 | /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no |
1973 | * associated name? */ |
1974 | if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode)) |
1975 | return; |
1976 | idx = context->name_count - 1; |
1977 | context->names[idx].name = NULL; |
1978 | } |
1979 | handle_path(dentry); |
1980 | audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], dentry, inode); |
1981 | } |
1982 | |
1983 | /** |
1984 | * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects |
1985 | * @dentry: dentry being audited |
1986 | * @parent: inode of dentry parent |
1987 | * |
1988 | * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode |
1989 | * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent. |
1990 | * This call updates the audit context with the child's information. |
1991 | * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after |
1992 | * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object |
1993 | * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during |
1994 | * unsuccessful attempts. |
1995 | */ |
1996 | void __audit_inode_child(const struct dentry *dentry, |
1997 | const struct inode *parent) |
1998 | { |
1999 | int idx; |
2000 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2001 | const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL; |
2002 | const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
2003 | const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name; |
2004 | int dirlen = 0; |
2005 | |
2006 | if (!context->in_syscall) |
2007 | return; |
2008 | |
2009 | if (inode) |
2010 | handle_one(inode); |
2011 | |
2012 | /* parent is more likely, look for it first */ |
2013 | for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) { |
2014 | struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx]; |
2015 | |
2016 | if (!n->name) |
2017 | continue; |
2018 | |
2019 | if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && |
2020 | !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) { |
2021 | n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */ |
2022 | found_parent = n->name; |
2023 | goto add_names; |
2024 | } |
2025 | } |
2026 | |
2027 | /* no matching parent, look for matching child */ |
2028 | for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) { |
2029 | struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx]; |
2030 | |
2031 | if (!n->name) |
2032 | continue; |
2033 | |
2034 | /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */ |
2035 | if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) || |
2036 | !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) { |
2037 | if (inode) |
2038 | audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode); |
2039 | else |
2040 | n->ino = (unsigned long)-1; |
2041 | found_child = n->name; |
2042 | goto add_names; |
2043 | } |
2044 | } |
2045 | |
2046 | add_names: |
2047 | if (!found_parent) { |
2048 | if (audit_inc_name_count(context, parent)) |
2049 | return; |
2050 | idx = context->name_count - 1; |
2051 | context->names[idx].name = NULL; |
2052 | audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, parent); |
2053 | } |
2054 | |
2055 | if (!found_child) { |
2056 | if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode)) |
2057 | return; |
2058 | idx = context->name_count - 1; |
2059 | |
2060 | /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent |
2061 | * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in |
2062 | * audit_free_names() */ |
2063 | if (found_parent) { |
2064 | context->names[idx].name = found_parent; |
2065 | context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; |
2066 | /* don't call __putname() */ |
2067 | context->names[idx].name_put = 0; |
2068 | } else { |
2069 | context->names[idx].name = NULL; |
2070 | } |
2071 | |
2072 | if (inode) |
2073 | audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, inode); |
2074 | else |
2075 | context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1; |
2076 | } |
2077 | } |
2078 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child); |
2079 | |
2080 | /** |
2081 | * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values |
2082 | * @ctx: audit_context for the task |
2083 | * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context |
2084 | * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context |
2085 | * |
2086 | * Also sets the context as auditable. |
2087 | */ |
2088 | int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, |
2089 | struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial) |
2090 | { |
2091 | if (!ctx->in_syscall) |
2092 | return 0; |
2093 | if (!ctx->serial) |
2094 | ctx->serial = audit_serial(); |
2095 | t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec; |
2096 | t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec; |
2097 | *serial = ctx->serial; |
2098 | if (!ctx->prio) { |
2099 | ctx->prio = 1; |
2100 | ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; |
2101 | } |
2102 | return 1; |
2103 | } |
2104 | |
2105 | /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */ |
2106 | static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0); |
2107 | |
2108 | /** |
2109 | * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid |
2110 | * @task: task whose audit context is being modified |
2111 | * @loginuid: loginuid value |
2112 | * |
2113 | * Returns 0. |
2114 | * |
2115 | * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write(). |
2116 | */ |
2117 | int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid) |
2118 | { |
2119 | unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id); |
2120 | struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context; |
2121 | |
2122 | if (context && context->in_syscall) { |
2123 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
2124 | |
2125 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN); |
2126 | if (ab) { |
2127 | audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u " |
2128 | "old auid=%u new auid=%u" |
2129 | " old ses=%u new ses=%u", |
2130 | task->pid, task_uid(task), |
2131 | task->loginuid, loginuid, |
2132 | task->sessionid, sessionid); |
2133 | audit_log_end(ab); |
2134 | } |
2135 | } |
2136 | task->sessionid = sessionid; |
2137 | task->loginuid = loginuid; |
2138 | return 0; |
2139 | } |
2140 | |
2141 | /** |
2142 | * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open |
2143 | * @oflag: open flag |
2144 | * @mode: mode bits |
2145 | * @attr: queue attributes |
2146 | * |
2147 | */ |
2148 | void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr) |
2149 | { |
2150 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2151 | |
2152 | if (attr) |
2153 | memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); |
2154 | else |
2155 | memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); |
2156 | |
2157 | context->mq_open.oflag = oflag; |
2158 | context->mq_open.mode = mode; |
2159 | |
2160 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN; |
2161 | } |
2162 | |
2163 | /** |
2164 | * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive |
2165 | * @mqdes: MQ descriptor |
2166 | * @msg_len: Message length |
2167 | * @msg_prio: Message priority |
2168 | * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time |
2169 | * |
2170 | */ |
2171 | void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio, |
2172 | const struct timespec *abs_timeout) |
2173 | { |
2174 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2175 | struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout; |
2176 | |
2177 | if (abs_timeout) |
2178 | memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec)); |
2179 | else |
2180 | memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec)); |
2181 | |
2182 | context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes; |
2183 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len; |
2184 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio; |
2185 | |
2186 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV; |
2187 | } |
2188 | |
2189 | /** |
2190 | * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify |
2191 | * @mqdes: MQ descriptor |
2192 | * @notification: Notification event |
2193 | * |
2194 | */ |
2195 | |
2196 | void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification) |
2197 | { |
2198 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2199 | |
2200 | if (notification) |
2201 | context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo; |
2202 | else |
2203 | context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0; |
2204 | |
2205 | context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes; |
2206 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY; |
2207 | } |
2208 | |
2209 | /** |
2210 | * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute |
2211 | * @mqdes: MQ descriptor |
2212 | * @mqstat: MQ flags |
2213 | * |
2214 | */ |
2215 | void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat) |
2216 | { |
2217 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2218 | context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes; |
2219 | context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat; |
2220 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR; |
2221 | } |
2222 | |
2223 | /** |
2224 | * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object |
2225 | * @ipcp: ipc permissions |
2226 | * |
2227 | */ |
2228 | void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) |
2229 | { |
2230 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2231 | context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid; |
2232 | context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid; |
2233 | context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode; |
2234 | context->ipc.has_perm = 0; |
2235 | security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid); |
2236 | context->type = AUDIT_IPC; |
2237 | } |
2238 | |
2239 | /** |
2240 | * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions |
2241 | * @qbytes: msgq bytes |
2242 | * @uid: msgq user id |
2243 | * @gid: msgq group id |
2244 | * @mode: msgq mode (permissions) |
2245 | * |
2246 | * Called only after audit_ipc_obj(). |
2247 | */ |
2248 | void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) |
2249 | { |
2250 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2251 | |
2252 | context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes; |
2253 | context->ipc.perm_uid = uid; |
2254 | context->ipc.perm_gid = gid; |
2255 | context->ipc.perm_mode = mode; |
2256 | context->ipc.has_perm = 1; |
2257 | } |
2258 | |
2259 | int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
2260 | { |
2261 | struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax; |
2262 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2263 | |
2264 | if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy)) |
2265 | return 0; |
2266 | |
2267 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); |
2268 | if (!ax) |
2269 | return -ENOMEM; |
2270 | |
2271 | ax->argc = bprm->argc; |
2272 | ax->envc = bprm->envc; |
2273 | ax->mm = bprm->mm; |
2274 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE; |
2275 | ax->d.next = context->aux; |
2276 | context->aux = (void *)ax; |
2277 | return 0; |
2278 | } |
2279 | |
2280 | |
2281 | /** |
2282 | * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall |
2283 | * @nargs: number of args |
2284 | * @args: args array |
2285 | * |
2286 | */ |
2287 | void audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) |
2288 | { |
2289 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2290 | |
2291 | if (likely(!context || context->dummy)) |
2292 | return; |
2293 | |
2294 | context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL; |
2295 | context->socketcall.nargs = nargs; |
2296 | memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long)); |
2297 | } |
2298 | |
2299 | /** |
2300 | * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair |
2301 | * @fd1: the first file descriptor |
2302 | * @fd2: the second file descriptor |
2303 | * |
2304 | */ |
2305 | void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2) |
2306 | { |
2307 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2308 | context->fds[0] = fd1; |
2309 | context->fds[1] = fd2; |
2310 | } |
2311 | |
2312 | /** |
2313 | * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto |
2314 | * @len: data length in user space |
2315 | * @a: data address in kernel space |
2316 | * |
2317 | * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. |
2318 | */ |
2319 | int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) |
2320 | { |
2321 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2322 | |
2323 | if (likely(!context || context->dummy)) |
2324 | return 0; |
2325 | |
2326 | if (!context->sockaddr) { |
2327 | void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL); |
2328 | if (!p) |
2329 | return -ENOMEM; |
2330 | context->sockaddr = p; |
2331 | } |
2332 | |
2333 | context->sockaddr_len = len; |
2334 | memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len); |
2335 | return 0; |
2336 | } |
2337 | |
2338 | void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) |
2339 | { |
2340 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2341 | |
2342 | context->target_pid = t->pid; |
2343 | context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); |
2344 | context->target_uid = task_uid(t); |
2345 | context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); |
2346 | security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); |
2347 | memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); |
2348 | } |
2349 | |
2350 | /** |
2351 | * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem |
2352 | * @sig: signal value |
2353 | * @t: task being signaled |
2354 | * |
2355 | * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid) |
2356 | * and uid that is doing that. |
2357 | */ |
2358 | int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) |
2359 | { |
2360 | struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp; |
2361 | struct task_struct *tsk = current; |
2362 | struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context; |
2363 | uid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t); |
2364 | |
2365 | if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) { |
2366 | if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) { |
2367 | audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid; |
2368 | if (tsk->loginuid != -1) |
2369 | audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid; |
2370 | else |
2371 | audit_sig_uid = uid; |
2372 | security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid); |
2373 | } |
2374 | if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) |
2375 | return 0; |
2376 | } |
2377 | |
2378 | /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly |
2379 | * in audit_context */ |
2380 | if (!ctx->target_pid) { |
2381 | ctx->target_pid = t->tgid; |
2382 | ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); |
2383 | ctx->target_uid = t_uid; |
2384 | ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); |
2385 | security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); |
2386 | memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); |
2387 | return 0; |
2388 | } |
2389 | |
2390 | axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids; |
2391 | if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) { |
2392 | axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC); |
2393 | if (!axp) |
2394 | return -ENOMEM; |
2395 | |
2396 | axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID; |
2397 | axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids; |
2398 | ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp; |
2399 | } |
2400 | BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS); |
2401 | |
2402 | axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid; |
2403 | axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); |
2404 | axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; |
2405 | axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); |
2406 | security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); |
2407 | memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); |
2408 | axp->pid_count++; |
2409 | |
2410 | return 0; |
2411 | } |
2412 | |
2413 | /** |
2414 | * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps |
2415 | * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed |
2416 | * @new: the proposed new credentials |
2417 | * @old: the old credentials |
2418 | * |
2419 | * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not |
2420 | * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall |
2421 | * |
2422 | * -Eric |
2423 | */ |
2424 | int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, |
2425 | const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
2426 | { |
2427 | struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax; |
2428 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2429 | struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps; |
2430 | struct dentry *dentry; |
2431 | |
2432 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); |
2433 | if (!ax) |
2434 | return -ENOMEM; |
2435 | |
2436 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS; |
2437 | ax->d.next = context->aux; |
2438 | context->aux = (void *)ax; |
2439 | |
2440 | dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry); |
2441 | get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps); |
2442 | dput(dentry); |
2443 | |
2444 | ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted; |
2445 | ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable; |
2446 | ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); |
2447 | ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; |
2448 | |
2449 | ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted; |
2450 | ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable; |
2451 | ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective; |
2452 | |
2453 | ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; |
2454 | ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable; |
2455 | ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective; |
2456 | return 0; |
2457 | } |
2458 | |
2459 | /** |
2460 | * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall |
2461 | * @pid: target pid of the capset call |
2462 | * @new: the new credentials |
2463 | * @old: the old (current) credentials |
2464 | * |
2465 | * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the |
2466 | * audit system if applicable |
2467 | */ |
2468 | void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid, |
2469 | const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
2470 | { |
2471 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2472 | context->capset.pid = pid; |
2473 | context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective; |
2474 | context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective; |
2475 | context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; |
2476 | context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET; |
2477 | } |
2478 | |
2479 | /** |
2480 | * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally |
2481 | * @signr: signal value |
2482 | * |
2483 | * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we |
2484 | * should record the event for investigation. |
2485 | */ |
2486 | void audit_core_dumps(long signr) |
2487 | { |
2488 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
2489 | u32 sid; |
2490 | uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current), uid; |
2491 | gid_t gid; |
2492 | unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); |
2493 | |
2494 | if (!audit_enabled) |
2495 | return; |
2496 | |
2497 | if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */ |
2498 | return; |
2499 | |
2500 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND); |
2501 | current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid); |
2502 | audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u", |
2503 | auid, uid, gid, sessionid); |
2504 | security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); |
2505 | if (sid) { |
2506 | char *ctx = NULL; |
2507 | u32 len; |
2508 | |
2509 | if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) |
2510 | audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid); |
2511 | else { |
2512 | audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx); |
2513 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); |
2514 | } |
2515 | } |
2516 | audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid); |
2517 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm); |
2518 | audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr); |
2519 | audit_log_end(ab); |
2520 | } |
2521 | |
2522 | struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void) |
2523 | { |
2524 | struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; |
2525 | if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall)) |
2526 | return NULL; |
2527 | return &ctx->killed_trees; |
2528 | } |
2529 |
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Tags:
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od-2011-09-18
v2.6.34-rc5
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