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1 | /* |
2 | * AppArmor security module |
3 | * |
4 | * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks. |
5 | * |
6 | * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE |
7 | * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. |
8 | * |
9 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or |
10 | * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as |
11 | * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the |
12 | * License. |
13 | */ |
14 | |
15 | #include <linux/security.h> |
16 | #include <linux/moduleparam.h> |
17 | #include <linux/mm.h> |
18 | #include <linux/mman.h> |
19 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
20 | #include <linux/namei.h> |
21 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> |
22 | #include <linux/ctype.h> |
23 | #include <linux/sysctl.h> |
24 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
25 | #include <net/sock.h> |
26 | |
27 | #include "include/apparmor.h" |
28 | #include "include/apparmorfs.h" |
29 | #include "include/audit.h" |
30 | #include "include/capability.h" |
31 | #include "include/context.h" |
32 | #include "include/file.h" |
33 | #include "include/ipc.h" |
34 | #include "include/path.h" |
35 | #include "include/policy.h" |
36 | #include "include/procattr.h" |
37 | |
38 | /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */ |
39 | int apparmor_initialized __initdata; |
40 | |
41 | /* |
42 | * LSM hook functions |
43 | */ |
44 | |
45 | /* |
46 | * free the associated aa_task_cxt and put its profiles |
47 | */ |
48 | static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred) |
49 | { |
50 | aa_free_task_context(cred->security); |
51 | cred->security = NULL; |
52 | } |
53 | |
54 | /* |
55 | * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials |
56 | */ |
57 | static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) |
58 | { |
59 | /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */ |
60 | struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp); |
61 | if (!cxt) |
62 | return -ENOMEM; |
63 | |
64 | cred->security = cxt; |
65 | return 0; |
66 | } |
67 | |
68 | /* |
69 | * prepare new aa_task_cxt for modification by prepare_cred block |
70 | */ |
71 | static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, |
72 | gfp_t gfp) |
73 | { |
74 | /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */ |
75 | struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp); |
76 | if (!cxt) |
77 | return -ENOMEM; |
78 | |
79 | aa_dup_task_context(cxt, old->security); |
80 | new->security = cxt; |
81 | return 0; |
82 | } |
83 | |
84 | /* |
85 | * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds |
86 | */ |
87 | static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
88 | { |
89 | const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = old->security; |
90 | struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = new->security; |
91 | |
92 | aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt); |
93 | } |
94 | |
95 | static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, |
96 | unsigned int mode) |
97 | { |
98 | int error = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode); |
99 | if (error) |
100 | return error; |
101 | |
102 | return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode); |
103 | } |
104 | |
105 | static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) |
106 | { |
107 | int error = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent); |
108 | if (error) |
109 | return error; |
110 | |
111 | return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH); |
112 | } |
113 | |
114 | /* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */ |
115 | static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, |
116 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) |
117 | { |
118 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
119 | const struct cred *cred; |
120 | |
121 | rcu_read_lock(); |
122 | cred = __task_cred(target); |
123 | profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); |
124 | |
125 | *effective = cred->cap_effective; |
126 | *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable; |
127 | *permitted = cred->cap_permitted; |
128 | |
129 | if (!unconfined(profile)) { |
130 | *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow); |
131 | *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow); |
132 | } |
133 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
134 | |
135 | return 0; |
136 | } |
137 | |
138 | static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, const struct cred *cred, |
139 | int cap, int audit) |
140 | { |
141 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
142 | /* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */ |
143 | int error = cap_capable(task, cred, cap, audit); |
144 | if (!error) { |
145 | profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); |
146 | if (!unconfined(profile)) |
147 | error = aa_capable(task, profile, cap, audit); |
148 | } |
149 | return error; |
150 | } |
151 | |
152 | /** |
153 | * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths |
154 | * @op: operation being checked |
155 | * @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL) |
156 | * @mask: requested permissions mask |
157 | * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) |
158 | * |
159 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
160 | */ |
161 | static int common_perm(int op, struct path *path, u32 mask, |
162 | struct path_cond *cond) |
163 | { |
164 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
165 | int error = 0; |
166 | |
167 | profile = __aa_current_profile(); |
168 | if (!unconfined(profile)) |
169 | error = aa_path_perm(op, profile, path, 0, mask, cond); |
170 | |
171 | return error; |
172 | } |
173 | |
174 | /** |
175 | * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry |
176 | * @op: operation being checked |
177 | * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL) |
178 | * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL) |
179 | * @mask: requested permissions mask |
180 | * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) |
181 | * |
182 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
183 | */ |
184 | static int common_perm_dir_dentry(int op, struct path *dir, |
185 | struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, |
186 | struct path_cond *cond) |
187 | { |
188 | struct path path = { dir->mnt, dentry }; |
189 | |
190 | return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond); |
191 | } |
192 | |
193 | /** |
194 | * common_perm_mnt_dentry - common permission wrapper when mnt, dentry |
195 | * @op: operation being checked |
196 | * @mnt: mount point of dentry (NOT NULL) |
197 | * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL) |
198 | * @mask: requested permissions mask |
199 | * |
200 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
201 | */ |
202 | static int common_perm_mnt_dentry(int op, struct vfsmount *mnt, |
203 | struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask) |
204 | { |
205 | struct path path = { mnt, dentry }; |
206 | struct path_cond cond = { dentry->d_inode->i_uid, |
207 | dentry->d_inode->i_mode |
208 | }; |
209 | |
210 | return common_perm(op, &path, mask, &cond); |
211 | } |
212 | |
213 | /** |
214 | * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm |
215 | * @op: operation being checked |
216 | * @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL) |
217 | * @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL) |
218 | * @mask: requested permission mask |
219 | * |
220 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
221 | */ |
222 | static int common_perm_rm(int op, struct path *dir, |
223 | struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask) |
224 | { |
225 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
226 | struct path_cond cond = { }; |
227 | |
228 | if (!inode || !dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(inode)) |
229 | return 0; |
230 | |
231 | cond.uid = inode->i_uid; |
232 | cond.mode = inode->i_mode; |
233 | |
234 | return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond); |
235 | } |
236 | |
237 | /** |
238 | * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create |
239 | * @op: operation being checked |
240 | * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL) |
241 | * @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL) |
242 | * @mask: request permission mask |
243 | * @mode: created file mode |
244 | * |
245 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
246 | */ |
247 | static int common_perm_create(int op, struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, |
248 | u32 mask, umode_t mode) |
249 | { |
250 | struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode }; |
251 | |
252 | if (!dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dir->dentry->d_inode)) |
253 | return 0; |
254 | |
255 | return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond); |
256 | } |
257 | |
258 | static int apparmor_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) |
259 | { |
260 | return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); |
261 | } |
262 | |
263 | static int apparmor_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, |
264 | int mode) |
265 | { |
266 | return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, |
267 | S_IFDIR); |
268 | } |
269 | |
270 | static int apparmor_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) |
271 | { |
272 | return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); |
273 | } |
274 | |
275 | static int apparmor_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, |
276 | int mode, unsigned int dev) |
277 | { |
278 | return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode); |
279 | } |
280 | |
281 | static int apparmor_path_truncate(struct path *path) |
282 | { |
283 | struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid, |
284 | path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode |
285 | }; |
286 | |
287 | if (!path->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode)) |
288 | return 0; |
289 | |
290 | return common_perm(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE, |
291 | &cond); |
292 | } |
293 | |
294 | static int apparmor_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, |
295 | const char *old_name) |
296 | { |
297 | return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, |
298 | S_IFLNK); |
299 | } |
300 | |
301 | static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir, |
302 | struct dentry *new_dentry) |
303 | { |
304 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
305 | int error = 0; |
306 | |
307 | if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode)) |
308 | return 0; |
309 | |
310 | profile = aa_current_profile(); |
311 | if (!unconfined(profile)) |
312 | error = aa_path_link(profile, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); |
313 | return error; |
314 | } |
315 | |
316 | static int apparmor_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, |
317 | struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) |
318 | { |
319 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
320 | int error = 0; |
321 | |
322 | if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode)) |
323 | return 0; |
324 | |
325 | profile = aa_current_profile(); |
326 | if (!unconfined(profile)) { |
327 | struct path old_path = { old_dir->mnt, old_dentry }; |
328 | struct path new_path = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry }; |
329 | struct path_cond cond = { old_dentry->d_inode->i_uid, |
330 | old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode |
331 | }; |
332 | |
333 | error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, profile, &old_path, 0, |
334 | MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ | MAY_WRITE | |
335 | AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_DELETE, |
336 | &cond); |
337 | if (!error) |
338 | error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, profile, &new_path, |
339 | 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE | |
340 | AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond); |
341 | |
342 | } |
343 | return error; |
344 | } |
345 | |
346 | static int apparmor_path_chmod(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, |
347 | mode_t mode) |
348 | { |
349 | if (!mediated_filesystem(dentry->d_inode)) |
350 | return 0; |
351 | |
352 | return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_CHMOD, mnt, dentry, AA_MAY_CHMOD); |
353 | } |
354 | |
355 | static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) |
356 | { |
357 | struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid, |
358 | path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode |
359 | }; |
360 | |
361 | if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode)) |
362 | return 0; |
363 | |
364 | return common_perm(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN, &cond); |
365 | } |
366 | |
367 | static int apparmor_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) |
368 | { |
369 | if (!mediated_filesystem(dentry->d_inode)) |
370 | return 0; |
371 | |
372 | return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_GETATTR, mnt, dentry, |
373 | AA_MAY_META_READ); |
374 | } |
375 | |
376 | static int apparmor_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) |
377 | { |
378 | struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security; |
379 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
380 | int error = 0; |
381 | |
382 | if (!mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode)) |
383 | return 0; |
384 | |
385 | /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks. |
386 | * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with |
387 | * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to |
388 | * actually execute the image. |
389 | */ |
390 | if (current->in_execve) { |
391 | fcxt->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP; |
392 | return 0; |
393 | } |
394 | |
395 | profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); |
396 | if (!unconfined(profile)) { |
397 | struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; |
398 | struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode }; |
399 | |
400 | error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, profile, &file->f_path, 0, |
401 | aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond); |
402 | /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */ |
403 | fcxt->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file); |
404 | } |
405 | |
406 | return error; |
407 | } |
408 | |
409 | static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) |
410 | { |
411 | /* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */ |
412 | file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_context(GFP_KERNEL); |
413 | if (!file->f_security) |
414 | return -ENOMEM; |
415 | return 0; |
416 | |
417 | } |
418 | |
419 | static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file) |
420 | { |
421 | struct aa_file_cxt *cxt = file->f_security; |
422 | |
423 | aa_free_file_context(cxt); |
424 | } |
425 | |
426 | static int common_file_perm(int op, struct file *file, u32 mask) |
427 | { |
428 | struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security; |
429 | struct aa_profile *profile, *fprofile = aa_cred_profile(file->f_cred); |
430 | int error = 0; |
431 | |
432 | BUG_ON(!fprofile); |
433 | |
434 | if (!file->f_path.mnt || |
435 | !mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode)) |
436 | return 0; |
437 | |
438 | profile = __aa_current_profile(); |
439 | |
440 | /* revalidate access, if task is unconfined, or the cached cred |
441 | * doesn't match or if the request is for more permissions than |
442 | * was granted. |
443 | * |
444 | * Note: the test for !unconfined(fprofile) is to handle file |
445 | * delegation from unconfined tasks |
446 | */ |
447 | if (!unconfined(profile) && !unconfined(fprofile) && |
448 | ((fprofile != profile) || (mask & ~fcxt->allow))) |
449 | error = aa_file_perm(op, profile, file, mask); |
450 | |
451 | return error; |
452 | } |
453 | |
454 | static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) |
455 | { |
456 | return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask); |
457 | } |
458 | |
459 | static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) |
460 | { |
461 | u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK; |
462 | |
463 | if (cmd == F_WRLCK) |
464 | mask |= MAY_WRITE; |
465 | |
466 | return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask); |
467 | } |
468 | |
469 | static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot, |
470 | unsigned long flags) |
471 | { |
472 | struct dentry *dentry; |
473 | int mask = 0; |
474 | |
475 | if (!file || !file->f_security) |
476 | return 0; |
477 | |
478 | if (prot & PROT_READ) |
479 | mask |= MAY_READ; |
480 | /* |
481 | * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't |
482 | * write back to the files |
483 | */ |
484 | if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE)) |
485 | mask |= MAY_WRITE; |
486 | if (prot & PROT_EXEC) |
487 | mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP; |
488 | |
489 | dentry = file->f_path.dentry; |
490 | return common_file_perm(op, file, mask); |
491 | } |
492 | |
493 | static int apparmor_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, |
494 | unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, |
495 | unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) |
496 | { |
497 | int rc = 0; |
498 | |
499 | /* do DAC check */ |
500 | rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); |
501 | if (rc || addr_only) |
502 | return rc; |
503 | |
504 | return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags); |
505 | } |
506 | |
507 | static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, |
508 | unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) |
509 | { |
510 | return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot, |
511 | !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0); |
512 | } |
513 | |
514 | static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, |
515 | char **value) |
516 | { |
517 | int error = -ENOENT; |
518 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
519 | /* released below */ |
520 | const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task); |
521 | struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred->security; |
522 | profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); |
523 | |
524 | if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) |
525 | error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile), |
526 | value); |
527 | else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && cxt->previous) |
528 | error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->previous), |
529 | value); |
530 | else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec) |
531 | error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->onexec), |
532 | value); |
533 | else |
534 | error = -EINVAL; |
535 | |
536 | put_cred(cred); |
537 | |
538 | return error; |
539 | } |
540 | |
541 | static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, |
542 | void *value, size_t size) |
543 | { |
544 | char *command, *args = value; |
545 | size_t arg_size; |
546 | int error; |
547 | |
548 | if (size == 0) |
549 | return -EINVAL; |
550 | /* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that |
551 | * the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1 |
552 | * so that AppArmor can null terminate them |
553 | */ |
554 | if (args[size - 1] != '\0') { |
555 | if (size == PAGE_SIZE) |
556 | return -EINVAL; |
557 | args[size] = '\0'; |
558 | } |
559 | |
560 | /* task can only write its own attributes */ |
561 | if (current != task) |
562 | return -EACCES; |
563 | |
564 | args = value; |
565 | args = strim(args); |
566 | command = strsep(&args, " "); |
567 | if (!args) |
568 | return -EINVAL; |
569 | args = skip_spaces(args); |
570 | if (!*args) |
571 | return -EINVAL; |
572 | |
573 | arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value); |
574 | if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) { |
575 | if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) { |
576 | error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, |
577 | !AA_DO_TEST); |
578 | } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) { |
579 | error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, |
580 | AA_DO_TEST); |
581 | } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) { |
582 | error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC, |
583 | !AA_DO_TEST); |
584 | } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) { |
585 | error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC, |
586 | AA_DO_TEST); |
587 | } else if (strcmp(command, "permipc") == 0) { |
588 | error = aa_setprocattr_permipc(args); |
589 | } else { |
590 | struct common_audit_data sa; |
591 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); |
592 | sa.aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR; |
593 | sa.aad.info = name; |
594 | sa.aad.error = -EINVAL; |
595 | return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, NULL, GFP_KERNEL, |
596 | &sa, NULL); |
597 | } |
598 | } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) { |
599 | error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC, |
600 | !AA_DO_TEST); |
601 | } else { |
602 | /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */ |
603 | return -EINVAL; |
604 | } |
605 | if (!error) |
606 | error = size; |
607 | return error; |
608 | } |
609 | |
610 | static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task, |
611 | unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) |
612 | { |
613 | struct aa_profile *profile = aa_current_profile(); |
614 | int error = 0; |
615 | |
616 | if (!unconfined(profile)) |
617 | error = aa_task_setrlimit(profile, task, resource, new_rlim); |
618 | |
619 | return error; |
620 | } |
621 | |
622 | static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = { |
623 | .name = "apparmor", |
624 | |
625 | .ptrace_access_check = apparmor_ptrace_access_check, |
626 | .ptrace_traceme = apparmor_ptrace_traceme, |
627 | .capget = apparmor_capget, |
628 | .capable = apparmor_capable, |
629 | |
630 | .path_link = apparmor_path_link, |
631 | .path_unlink = apparmor_path_unlink, |
632 | .path_symlink = apparmor_path_symlink, |
633 | .path_mkdir = apparmor_path_mkdir, |
634 | .path_rmdir = apparmor_path_rmdir, |
635 | .path_mknod = apparmor_path_mknod, |
636 | .path_rename = apparmor_path_rename, |
637 | .path_chmod = apparmor_path_chmod, |
638 | .path_chown = apparmor_path_chown, |
639 | .path_truncate = apparmor_path_truncate, |
640 | .dentry_open = apparmor_dentry_open, |
641 | .inode_getattr = apparmor_inode_getattr, |
642 | |
643 | .file_permission = apparmor_file_permission, |
644 | .file_alloc_security = apparmor_file_alloc_security, |
645 | .file_free_security = apparmor_file_free_security, |
646 | .file_mmap = apparmor_file_mmap, |
647 | .file_mprotect = apparmor_file_mprotect, |
648 | .file_lock = apparmor_file_lock, |
649 | |
650 | .getprocattr = apparmor_getprocattr, |
651 | .setprocattr = apparmor_setprocattr, |
652 | |
653 | .cred_alloc_blank = apparmor_cred_alloc_blank, |
654 | .cred_free = apparmor_cred_free, |
655 | .cred_prepare = apparmor_cred_prepare, |
656 | .cred_transfer = apparmor_cred_transfer, |
657 | |
658 | .bprm_set_creds = apparmor_bprm_set_creds, |
659 | .bprm_committing_creds = apparmor_bprm_committing_creds, |
660 | .bprm_committed_creds = apparmor_bprm_committed_creds, |
661 | .bprm_secureexec = apparmor_bprm_secureexec, |
662 | |
663 | .task_setrlimit = apparmor_task_setrlimit, |
664 | }; |
665 | |
666 | /* |
667 | * AppArmor sysfs module parameters |
668 | */ |
669 | |
670 | static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
671 | static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
672 | #define param_check_aabool(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int) |
673 | static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = { |
674 | .set = param_set_aabool, |
675 | .get = param_get_aabool |
676 | }; |
677 | |
678 | static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
679 | static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
680 | #define param_check_aauint(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int) |
681 | static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = { |
682 | .set = param_set_aauint, |
683 | .get = param_get_aauint |
684 | }; |
685 | |
686 | static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
687 | static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
688 | #define param_check_aalockpolicy(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int) |
689 | static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = { |
690 | .set = param_set_aalockpolicy, |
691 | .get = param_get_aalockpolicy |
692 | }; |
693 | |
694 | static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp); |
695 | static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp); |
696 | #define param_check_audit(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int) |
697 | |
698 | static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp); |
699 | static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp); |
700 | #define param_check_mode(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int) |
701 | |
702 | /* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters |
703 | * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation. |
704 | */ |
705 | |
706 | /* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */ |
707 | enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE; |
708 | module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode, |
709 | &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
710 | |
711 | /* Debug mode */ |
712 | int aa_g_debug; |
713 | module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
714 | |
715 | /* Audit mode */ |
716 | enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; |
717 | module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit, |
718 | &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
719 | |
720 | /* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This |
721 | * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running |
722 | */ |
723 | int aa_g_audit_header = 1; |
724 | module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool, |
725 | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
726 | |
727 | /* lock out loading/removal of policy |
728 | * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to |
729 | * load policy, if lock_policy is set |
730 | */ |
731 | int aa_g_lock_policy; |
732 | module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy, |
733 | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
734 | |
735 | /* Syscall logging mode */ |
736 | int aa_g_logsyscall; |
737 | module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
738 | |
739 | /* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */ |
740 | unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX; |
741 | module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
742 | |
743 | /* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification |
744 | * on the loaded policy is done. |
745 | */ |
746 | int aa_g_paranoid_load = 1; |
747 | module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, |
748 | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
749 | |
750 | /* Boot time disable flag */ |
751 | static unsigned int apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; |
752 | module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aabool, S_IRUSR); |
753 | |
754 | static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str) |
755 | { |
756 | unsigned long enabled; |
757 | int error = strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled); |
758 | if (!error) |
759 | apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; |
760 | return 1; |
761 | } |
762 | |
763 | __setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup); |
764 | |
765 | /* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */ |
766 | static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
767 | { |
768 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
769 | return -EPERM; |
770 | if (aa_g_lock_policy) |
771 | return -EACCES; |
772 | return param_set_bool(val, kp); |
773 | } |
774 | |
775 | static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
776 | { |
777 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
778 | return -EPERM; |
779 | return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); |
780 | } |
781 | |
782 | static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
783 | { |
784 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
785 | return -EPERM; |
786 | return param_set_bool(val, kp); |
787 | } |
788 | |
789 | static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
790 | { |
791 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
792 | return -EPERM; |
793 | return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); |
794 | } |
795 | |
796 | static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
797 | { |
798 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
799 | return -EPERM; |
800 | return param_set_uint(val, kp); |
801 | } |
802 | |
803 | static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
804 | { |
805 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
806 | return -EPERM; |
807 | return param_get_uint(buffer, kp); |
808 | } |
809 | |
810 | static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) |
811 | { |
812 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
813 | return -EPERM; |
814 | |
815 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
816 | return -EINVAL; |
817 | |
818 | return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]); |
819 | } |
820 | |
821 | static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) |
822 | { |
823 | int i; |
824 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
825 | return -EPERM; |
826 | |
827 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
828 | return -EINVAL; |
829 | |
830 | if (!val) |
831 | return -EINVAL; |
832 | |
833 | for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_MAX_INDEX; i++) { |
834 | if (strcmp(val, audit_mode_names[i]) == 0) { |
835 | aa_g_audit = i; |
836 | return 0; |
837 | } |
838 | } |
839 | |
840 | return -EINVAL; |
841 | } |
842 | |
843 | static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) |
844 | { |
845 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
846 | return -EPERM; |
847 | |
848 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
849 | return -EINVAL; |
850 | |
851 | return sprintf(buffer, "%s", profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]); |
852 | } |
853 | |
854 | static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) |
855 | { |
856 | int i; |
857 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
858 | return -EPERM; |
859 | |
860 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
861 | return -EINVAL; |
862 | |
863 | if (!val) |
864 | return -EINVAL; |
865 | |
866 | for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) { |
867 | if (strcmp(val, profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) { |
868 | aa_g_profile_mode = i; |
869 | return 0; |
870 | } |
871 | } |
872 | |
873 | return -EINVAL; |
874 | } |
875 | |
876 | /* |
877 | * AppArmor init functions |
878 | */ |
879 | |
880 | /** |
881 | * set_init_cxt - set a task context and profile on the first task. |
882 | * |
883 | * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined |
884 | */ |
885 | static int __init set_init_cxt(void) |
886 | { |
887 | struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred; |
888 | struct aa_task_cxt *cxt; |
889 | |
890 | cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL); |
891 | if (!cxt) |
892 | return -ENOMEM; |
893 | |
894 | cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined); |
895 | cred->security = cxt; |
896 | |
897 | return 0; |
898 | } |
899 | |
900 | static int __init apparmor_init(void) |
901 | { |
902 | int error; |
903 | |
904 | if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable(&apparmor_ops)) { |
905 | aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter"); |
906 | apparmor_enabled = 0; |
907 | return 0; |
908 | } |
909 | |
910 | error = aa_alloc_root_ns(); |
911 | if (error) { |
912 | AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n"); |
913 | goto alloc_out; |
914 | } |
915 | |
916 | error = set_init_cxt(); |
917 | if (error) { |
918 | AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n"); |
919 | goto register_security_out; |
920 | } |
921 | |
922 | error = register_security(&apparmor_ops); |
923 | if (error) { |
924 | AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n"); |
925 | goto register_security_out; |
926 | } |
927 | |
928 | /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */ |
929 | apparmor_initialized = 1; |
930 | if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN) |
931 | aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled"); |
932 | else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL) |
933 | aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled"); |
934 | else |
935 | aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized"); |
936 | |
937 | return error; |
938 | |
939 | register_security_out: |
940 | aa_free_root_ns(); |
941 | |
942 | alloc_out: |
943 | aa_destroy_aafs(); |
944 | |
945 | apparmor_enabled = 0; |
946 | return error; |
947 | |
948 | } |
949 | |
950 | security_initcall(apparmor_init); |
951 |
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