Root/
1 | /* |
2 | * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module |
3 | * |
4 | * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations. |
5 | * |
6 | * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> |
7 | * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com> |
8 | * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com> |
9 | * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> |
10 | * |
11 | * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. |
12 | * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> |
13 | * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
14 | * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. |
15 | * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> |
16 | * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. |
17 | * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
18 | * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd. |
19 | * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp> |
20 | * |
21 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
22 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, |
23 | * as published by the Free Software Foundation. |
24 | */ |
25 | |
26 | #include <linux/init.h> |
27 | #include <linux/kernel.h> |
28 | #include <linux/tracehook.h> |
29 | #include <linux/errno.h> |
30 | #include <linux/sched.h> |
31 | #include <linux/security.h> |
32 | #include <linux/xattr.h> |
33 | #include <linux/capability.h> |
34 | #include <linux/unistd.h> |
35 | #include <linux/mm.h> |
36 | #include <linux/mman.h> |
37 | #include <linux/slab.h> |
38 | #include <linux/pagemap.h> |
39 | #include <linux/swap.h> |
40 | #include <linux/spinlock.h> |
41 | #include <linux/syscalls.h> |
42 | #include <linux/file.h> |
43 | #include <linux/fdtable.h> |
44 | #include <linux/namei.h> |
45 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
46 | #include <linux/proc_fs.h> |
47 | #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h> |
48 | #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> |
49 | #include <linux/tty.h> |
50 | #include <net/icmp.h> |
51 | #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */ |
52 | #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */ |
53 | #include <net/net_namespace.h> |
54 | #include <net/netlabel.h> |
55 | #include <linux/uaccess.h> |
56 | #include <asm/ioctls.h> |
57 | #include <asm/atomic.h> |
58 | #include <linux/bitops.h> |
59 | #include <linux/interrupt.h> |
60 | #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */ |
61 | #include <linux/netlink.h> |
62 | #include <linux/tcp.h> |
63 | #include <linux/udp.h> |
64 | #include <linux/dccp.h> |
65 | #include <linux/quota.h> |
66 | #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */ |
67 | #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */ |
68 | #include <linux/parser.h> |
69 | #include <linux/nfs_mount.h> |
70 | #include <net/ipv6.h> |
71 | #include <linux/hugetlb.h> |
72 | #include <linux/personality.h> |
73 | #include <linux/sysctl.h> |
74 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
75 | #include <linux/string.h> |
76 | #include <linux/selinux.h> |
77 | #include <linux/mutex.h> |
78 | #include <linux/posix-timers.h> |
79 | #include <linux/syslog.h> |
80 | |
81 | #include "avc.h" |
82 | #include "objsec.h" |
83 | #include "netif.h" |
84 | #include "netnode.h" |
85 | #include "netport.h" |
86 | #include "xfrm.h" |
87 | #include "netlabel.h" |
88 | #include "audit.h" |
89 | |
90 | #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5 |
91 | |
92 | extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm); |
93 | extern struct security_operations *security_ops; |
94 | |
95 | /* SECMARK reference count */ |
96 | atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0); |
97 | |
98 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP |
99 | int selinux_enforcing; |
100 | |
101 | static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str) |
102 | { |
103 | unsigned long enforcing; |
104 | if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing)) |
105 | selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0; |
106 | return 1; |
107 | } |
108 | __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup); |
109 | #endif |
110 | |
111 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM |
112 | int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; |
113 | |
114 | static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str) |
115 | { |
116 | unsigned long enabled; |
117 | if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled)) |
118 | selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; |
119 | return 1; |
120 | } |
121 | __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup); |
122 | #else |
123 | int selinux_enabled = 1; |
124 | #endif |
125 | |
126 | static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache; |
127 | |
128 | /** |
129 | * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled |
130 | * |
131 | * Description: |
132 | * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK |
133 | * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than |
134 | * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is |
135 | * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. |
136 | * |
137 | */ |
138 | static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void) |
139 | { |
140 | return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0); |
141 | } |
142 | |
143 | /* |
144 | * initialise the security for the init task |
145 | */ |
146 | static void cred_init_security(void) |
147 | { |
148 | struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred; |
149 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
150 | |
151 | tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
152 | if (!tsec) |
153 | panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n"); |
154 | |
155 | tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; |
156 | cred->security = tsec; |
157 | } |
158 | |
159 | /* |
160 | * get the security ID of a set of credentials |
161 | */ |
162 | static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred) |
163 | { |
164 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
165 | |
166 | tsec = cred->security; |
167 | return tsec->sid; |
168 | } |
169 | |
170 | /* |
171 | * get the objective security ID of a task |
172 | */ |
173 | static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task) |
174 | { |
175 | u32 sid; |
176 | |
177 | rcu_read_lock(); |
178 | sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task)); |
179 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
180 | return sid; |
181 | } |
182 | |
183 | /* |
184 | * get the subjective security ID of the current task |
185 | */ |
186 | static inline u32 current_sid(void) |
187 | { |
188 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); |
189 | |
190 | return tsec->sid; |
191 | } |
192 | |
193 | /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */ |
194 | |
195 | static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) |
196 | { |
197 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
198 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
199 | |
200 | isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS); |
201 | if (!isec) |
202 | return -ENOMEM; |
203 | |
204 | mutex_init(&isec->lock); |
205 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list); |
206 | isec->inode = inode; |
207 | isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
208 | isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE; |
209 | isec->task_sid = sid; |
210 | inode->i_security = isec; |
211 | |
212 | return 0; |
213 | } |
214 | |
215 | static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) |
216 | { |
217 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
218 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; |
219 | |
220 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
221 | if (!list_empty(&isec->list)) |
222 | list_del_init(&isec->list); |
223 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
224 | |
225 | inode->i_security = NULL; |
226 | kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec); |
227 | } |
228 | |
229 | static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file) |
230 | { |
231 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; |
232 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
233 | |
234 | fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
235 | if (!fsec) |
236 | return -ENOMEM; |
237 | |
238 | fsec->sid = sid; |
239 | fsec->fown_sid = sid; |
240 | file->f_security = fsec; |
241 | |
242 | return 0; |
243 | } |
244 | |
245 | static void file_free_security(struct file *file) |
246 | { |
247 | struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; |
248 | file->f_security = NULL; |
249 | kfree(fsec); |
250 | } |
251 | |
252 | static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) |
253 | { |
254 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; |
255 | |
256 | sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
257 | if (!sbsec) |
258 | return -ENOMEM; |
259 | |
260 | mutex_init(&sbsec->lock); |
261 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head); |
262 | spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
263 | sbsec->sb = sb; |
264 | sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
265 | sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE; |
266 | sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
267 | sb->s_security = sbsec; |
268 | |
269 | return 0; |
270 | } |
271 | |
272 | static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb) |
273 | { |
274 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; |
275 | sb->s_security = NULL; |
276 | kfree(sbsec); |
277 | } |
278 | |
279 | /* The security server must be initialized before |
280 | any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */ |
281 | extern int ss_initialized; |
282 | |
283 | /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */ |
284 | |
285 | static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = { |
286 | "uses xattr", |
287 | "uses transition SIDs", |
288 | "uses task SIDs", |
289 | "uses genfs_contexts", |
290 | "not configured for labeling", |
291 | "uses mountpoint labeling", |
292 | }; |
293 | |
294 | static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry); |
295 | |
296 | static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode) |
297 | { |
298 | return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL); |
299 | } |
300 | |
301 | enum { |
302 | Opt_error = -1, |
303 | Opt_context = 1, |
304 | Opt_fscontext = 2, |
305 | Opt_defcontext = 3, |
306 | Opt_rootcontext = 4, |
307 | Opt_labelsupport = 5, |
308 | }; |
309 | |
310 | static const match_table_t tokens = { |
311 | {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"}, |
312 | {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"}, |
313 | {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"}, |
314 | {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"}, |
315 | {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR}, |
316 | {Opt_error, NULL}, |
317 | }; |
318 | |
319 | #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n" |
320 | |
321 | static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid, |
322 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, |
323 | const struct cred *cred) |
324 | { |
325 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; |
326 | int rc; |
327 | |
328 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
329 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); |
330 | if (rc) |
331 | return rc; |
332 | |
333 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
334 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL); |
335 | return rc; |
336 | } |
337 | |
338 | static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid, |
339 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, |
340 | const struct cred *cred) |
341 | { |
342 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; |
343 | int rc; |
344 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
345 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); |
346 | if (rc) |
347 | return rc; |
348 | |
349 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
350 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL); |
351 | return rc; |
352 | } |
353 | |
354 | static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) |
355 | { |
356 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; |
357 | struct dentry *root = sb->s_root; |
358 | struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode; |
359 | int rc = 0; |
360 | |
361 | if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { |
362 | /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no |
363 | error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on |
364 | the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be |
365 | the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have |
366 | assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */ |
367 | if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) { |
368 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no " |
369 | "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); |
370 | rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; |
371 | goto out; |
372 | } |
373 | rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); |
374 | if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) { |
375 | if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) |
376 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " |
377 | "%s) has no security xattr handler\n", |
378 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); |
379 | else |
380 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " |
381 | "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id, |
382 | sb->s_type->name, -rc); |
383 | goto out; |
384 | } |
385 | } |
386 | |
387 | sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP); |
388 | |
389 | if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) |
390 | printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n", |
391 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); |
392 | else |
393 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n", |
394 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, |
395 | labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]); |
396 | |
397 | if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS || |
398 | sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT || |
399 | sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE || |
400 | sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) |
401 | sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP; |
402 | |
403 | /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/ |
404 | if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0) |
405 | sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP; |
406 | |
407 | /* Initialize the root inode. */ |
408 | rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root); |
409 | |
410 | /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g. |
411 | inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created |
412 | during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly |
413 | populates itself. */ |
414 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
415 | next_inode: |
416 | if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) { |
417 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = |
418 | list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next, |
419 | struct inode_security_struct, list); |
420 | struct inode *inode = isec->inode; |
421 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
422 | inode = igrab(inode); |
423 | if (inode) { |
424 | if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode)) |
425 | inode_doinit(inode); |
426 | iput(inode); |
427 | } |
428 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
429 | list_del_init(&isec->list); |
430 | goto next_inode; |
431 | } |
432 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
433 | out: |
434 | return rc; |
435 | } |
436 | |
437 | /* |
438 | * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security |
439 | * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying |
440 | * mount options, or whatever. |
441 | */ |
442 | static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb, |
443 | struct security_mnt_opts *opts) |
444 | { |
445 | int rc = 0, i; |
446 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; |
447 | char *context = NULL; |
448 | u32 len; |
449 | char tmp; |
450 | |
451 | security_init_mnt_opts(opts); |
452 | |
453 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) |
454 | return -EINVAL; |
455 | |
456 | if (!ss_initialized) |
457 | return -EINVAL; |
458 | |
459 | tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK; |
460 | /* count the number of mount options for this sb */ |
461 | for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { |
462 | if (tmp & 0x01) |
463 | opts->num_mnt_opts++; |
464 | tmp >>= 1; |
465 | } |
466 | /* Check if the Label support flag is set */ |
467 | if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) |
468 | opts->num_mnt_opts++; |
469 | |
470 | opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC); |
471 | if (!opts->mnt_opts) { |
472 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
473 | goto out_free; |
474 | } |
475 | |
476 | opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC); |
477 | if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) { |
478 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
479 | goto out_free; |
480 | } |
481 | |
482 | i = 0; |
483 | if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) { |
484 | rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len); |
485 | if (rc) |
486 | goto out_free; |
487 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; |
488 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT; |
489 | } |
490 | if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) { |
491 | rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len); |
492 | if (rc) |
493 | goto out_free; |
494 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; |
495 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT; |
496 | } |
497 | if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) { |
498 | rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len); |
499 | if (rc) |
500 | goto out_free; |
501 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; |
502 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT; |
503 | } |
504 | if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) { |
505 | struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode; |
506 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security; |
507 | |
508 | rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len); |
509 | if (rc) |
510 | goto out_free; |
511 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; |
512 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; |
513 | } |
514 | if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) { |
515 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL; |
516 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP; |
517 | } |
518 | |
519 | BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts); |
520 | |
521 | return 0; |
522 | |
523 | out_free: |
524 | security_free_mnt_opts(opts); |
525 | return rc; |
526 | } |
527 | |
528 | static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag, |
529 | u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid) |
530 | { |
531 | char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK; |
532 | |
533 | /* check if the old mount command had the same options */ |
534 | if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) |
535 | if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) || |
536 | (old_sid != new_sid)) |
537 | return 1; |
538 | |
539 | /* check if we were passed the same options twice, |
540 | * aka someone passed context=a,context=b |
541 | */ |
542 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) |
543 | if (mnt_flags & flag) |
544 | return 1; |
545 | return 0; |
546 | } |
547 | |
548 | /* |
549 | * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point |
550 | * labeling information. |
551 | */ |
552 | static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, |
553 | struct security_mnt_opts *opts) |
554 | { |
555 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
556 | int rc = 0, i; |
557 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; |
558 | const char *name = sb->s_type->name; |
559 | struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode; |
560 | struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security; |
561 | u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0; |
562 | u32 defcontext_sid = 0; |
563 | char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts; |
564 | int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags; |
565 | int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts; |
566 | |
567 | mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock); |
568 | |
569 | if (!ss_initialized) { |
570 | if (!num_opts) { |
571 | /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, |
572 | after the initial policy is loaded and the security |
573 | server is ready to handle calls. */ |
574 | goto out; |
575 | } |
576 | rc = -EINVAL; |
577 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options " |
578 | "before the security server is initialized\n"); |
579 | goto out; |
580 | } |
581 | |
582 | /* |
583 | * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once |
584 | * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs. |
585 | * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data |
586 | * we need to skip the double mount verification. |
587 | * |
588 | * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first |
589 | * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using |
590 | * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options |
591 | * will be used for both mounts) |
592 | */ |
593 | if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) |
594 | && (num_opts == 0)) |
595 | goto out; |
596 | |
597 | /* |
598 | * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids. |
599 | * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more |
600 | * than once with different security options. |
601 | */ |
602 | for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) { |
603 | u32 sid; |
604 | |
605 | if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP) |
606 | continue; |
607 | rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], |
608 | strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid); |
609 | if (rc) { |
610 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" |
611 | "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", |
612 | mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc); |
613 | goto out; |
614 | } |
615 | switch (flags[i]) { |
616 | case FSCONTEXT_MNT: |
617 | fscontext_sid = sid; |
618 | |
619 | if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, |
620 | fscontext_sid)) |
621 | goto out_double_mount; |
622 | |
623 | sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT; |
624 | break; |
625 | case CONTEXT_MNT: |
626 | context_sid = sid; |
627 | |
628 | if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, |
629 | context_sid)) |
630 | goto out_double_mount; |
631 | |
632 | sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT; |
633 | break; |
634 | case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: |
635 | rootcontext_sid = sid; |
636 | |
637 | if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, |
638 | rootcontext_sid)) |
639 | goto out_double_mount; |
640 | |
641 | sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; |
642 | |
643 | break; |
644 | case DEFCONTEXT_MNT: |
645 | defcontext_sid = sid; |
646 | |
647 | if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, |
648 | defcontext_sid)) |
649 | goto out_double_mount; |
650 | |
651 | sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT; |
652 | |
653 | break; |
654 | default: |
655 | rc = -EINVAL; |
656 | goto out; |
657 | } |
658 | } |
659 | |
660 | if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { |
661 | /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */ |
662 | if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts) |
663 | goto out_double_mount; |
664 | rc = 0; |
665 | goto out; |
666 | } |
667 | |
668 | if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0) |
669 | sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC; |
670 | |
671 | /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */ |
672 | rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid); |
673 | if (rc) { |
674 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", |
675 | __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc); |
676 | goto out; |
677 | } |
678 | |
679 | /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */ |
680 | if (fscontext_sid) { |
681 | rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred); |
682 | if (rc) |
683 | goto out; |
684 | |
685 | sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid; |
686 | } |
687 | |
688 | /* |
689 | * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior. |
690 | * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set |
691 | * the superblock context if not already set. |
692 | */ |
693 | if (context_sid) { |
694 | if (!fscontext_sid) { |
695 | rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, |
696 | cred); |
697 | if (rc) |
698 | goto out; |
699 | sbsec->sid = context_sid; |
700 | } else { |
701 | rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, |
702 | cred); |
703 | if (rc) |
704 | goto out; |
705 | } |
706 | if (!rootcontext_sid) |
707 | rootcontext_sid = context_sid; |
708 | |
709 | sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid; |
710 | sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT; |
711 | } |
712 | |
713 | if (rootcontext_sid) { |
714 | rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, |
715 | cred); |
716 | if (rc) |
717 | goto out; |
718 | |
719 | root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid; |
720 | root_isec->initialized = 1; |
721 | } |
722 | |
723 | if (defcontext_sid) { |
724 | if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { |
725 | rc = -EINVAL; |
726 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is " |
727 | "invalid for this filesystem type\n"); |
728 | goto out; |
729 | } |
730 | |
731 | if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) { |
732 | rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid, |
733 | sbsec, cred); |
734 | if (rc) |
735 | goto out; |
736 | } |
737 | |
738 | sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid; |
739 | } |
740 | |
741 | rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb); |
742 | out: |
743 | mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock); |
744 | return rc; |
745 | out_double_mount: |
746 | rc = -EINVAL; |
747 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different " |
748 | "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name); |
749 | goto out; |
750 | } |
751 | |
752 | static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, |
753 | struct super_block *newsb) |
754 | { |
755 | const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security; |
756 | struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security; |
757 | |
758 | int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT); |
759 | int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT); |
760 | int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT); |
761 | |
762 | /* |
763 | * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm |
764 | * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later |
765 | */ |
766 | if (!ss_initialized) |
767 | return; |
768 | |
769 | /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */ |
770 | BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)); |
771 | |
772 | /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */ |
773 | if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) |
774 | return; |
775 | |
776 | mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock); |
777 | |
778 | newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags; |
779 | |
780 | newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid; |
781 | newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid; |
782 | newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior; |
783 | |
784 | if (set_context) { |
785 | u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid; |
786 | |
787 | if (!set_fscontext) |
788 | newsbsec->sid = sid; |
789 | if (!set_rootcontext) { |
790 | struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode; |
791 | struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security; |
792 | newisec->sid = sid; |
793 | } |
794 | newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid; |
795 | } |
796 | if (set_rootcontext) { |
797 | const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode; |
798 | const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security; |
799 | struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode; |
800 | struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security; |
801 | |
802 | newisec->sid = oldisec->sid; |
803 | } |
804 | |
805 | sb_finish_set_opts(newsb); |
806 | mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock); |
807 | } |
808 | |
809 | static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options, |
810 | struct security_mnt_opts *opts) |
811 | { |
812 | char *p; |
813 | char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL; |
814 | char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL; |
815 | int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0; |
816 | |
817 | opts->num_mnt_opts = 0; |
818 | |
819 | /* Standard string-based options. */ |
820 | while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) { |
821 | int token; |
822 | substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; |
823 | |
824 | if (!*p) |
825 | continue; |
826 | |
827 | token = match_token(p, tokens, args); |
828 | |
829 | switch (token) { |
830 | case Opt_context: |
831 | if (context || defcontext) { |
832 | rc = -EINVAL; |
833 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); |
834 | goto out_err; |
835 | } |
836 | context = match_strdup(&args[0]); |
837 | if (!context) { |
838 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
839 | goto out_err; |
840 | } |
841 | break; |
842 | |
843 | case Opt_fscontext: |
844 | if (fscontext) { |
845 | rc = -EINVAL; |
846 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); |
847 | goto out_err; |
848 | } |
849 | fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); |
850 | if (!fscontext) { |
851 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
852 | goto out_err; |
853 | } |
854 | break; |
855 | |
856 | case Opt_rootcontext: |
857 | if (rootcontext) { |
858 | rc = -EINVAL; |
859 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); |
860 | goto out_err; |
861 | } |
862 | rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); |
863 | if (!rootcontext) { |
864 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
865 | goto out_err; |
866 | } |
867 | break; |
868 | |
869 | case Opt_defcontext: |
870 | if (context || defcontext) { |
871 | rc = -EINVAL; |
872 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); |
873 | goto out_err; |
874 | } |
875 | defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); |
876 | if (!defcontext) { |
877 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
878 | goto out_err; |
879 | } |
880 | break; |
881 | case Opt_labelsupport: |
882 | break; |
883 | default: |
884 | rc = -EINVAL; |
885 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n"); |
886 | goto out_err; |
887 | |
888 | } |
889 | } |
890 | |
891 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
892 | opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC); |
893 | if (!opts->mnt_opts) |
894 | goto out_err; |
895 | |
896 | opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC); |
897 | if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) { |
898 | kfree(opts->mnt_opts); |
899 | goto out_err; |
900 | } |
901 | |
902 | if (fscontext) { |
903 | opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext; |
904 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT; |
905 | } |
906 | if (context) { |
907 | opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context; |
908 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT; |
909 | } |
910 | if (rootcontext) { |
911 | opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext; |
912 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; |
913 | } |
914 | if (defcontext) { |
915 | opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext; |
916 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT; |
917 | } |
918 | |
919 | opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts; |
920 | return 0; |
921 | |
922 | out_err: |
923 | kfree(context); |
924 | kfree(defcontext); |
925 | kfree(fscontext); |
926 | kfree(rootcontext); |
927 | return rc; |
928 | } |
929 | /* |
930 | * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec |
931 | */ |
932 | static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data) |
933 | { |
934 | int rc = 0; |
935 | char *options = data; |
936 | struct security_mnt_opts opts; |
937 | |
938 | security_init_mnt_opts(&opts); |
939 | |
940 | if (!data) |
941 | goto out; |
942 | |
943 | BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA); |
944 | |
945 | rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts); |
946 | if (rc) |
947 | goto out_err; |
948 | |
949 | out: |
950 | rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts); |
951 | |
952 | out_err: |
953 | security_free_mnt_opts(&opts); |
954 | return rc; |
955 | } |
956 | |
957 | static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m, |
958 | struct security_mnt_opts *opts) |
959 | { |
960 | int i; |
961 | char *prefix; |
962 | |
963 | for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) { |
964 | char *has_comma; |
965 | |
966 | if (opts->mnt_opts[i]) |
967 | has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ','); |
968 | else |
969 | has_comma = NULL; |
970 | |
971 | switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) { |
972 | case CONTEXT_MNT: |
973 | prefix = CONTEXT_STR; |
974 | break; |
975 | case FSCONTEXT_MNT: |
976 | prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR; |
977 | break; |
978 | case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: |
979 | prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR; |
980 | break; |
981 | case DEFCONTEXT_MNT: |
982 | prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR; |
983 | break; |
984 | case SE_SBLABELSUPP: |
985 | seq_putc(m, ','); |
986 | seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR); |
987 | continue; |
988 | default: |
989 | BUG(); |
990 | }; |
991 | /* we need a comma before each option */ |
992 | seq_putc(m, ','); |
993 | seq_puts(m, prefix); |
994 | if (has_comma) |
995 | seq_putc(m, '\"'); |
996 | seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]); |
997 | if (has_comma) |
998 | seq_putc(m, '\"'); |
999 | } |
1000 | } |
1001 | |
1002 | static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) |
1003 | { |
1004 | struct security_mnt_opts opts; |
1005 | int rc; |
1006 | |
1007 | rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts); |
1008 | if (rc) { |
1009 | /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */ |
1010 | if (rc == -EINVAL) |
1011 | rc = 0; |
1012 | return rc; |
1013 | } |
1014 | |
1015 | selinux_write_opts(m, &opts); |
1016 | |
1017 | security_free_mnt_opts(&opts); |
1018 | |
1019 | return rc; |
1020 | } |
1021 | |
1022 | static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode) |
1023 | { |
1024 | switch (mode & S_IFMT) { |
1025 | case S_IFSOCK: |
1026 | return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE; |
1027 | case S_IFLNK: |
1028 | return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE; |
1029 | case S_IFREG: |
1030 | return SECCLASS_FILE; |
1031 | case S_IFBLK: |
1032 | return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE; |
1033 | case S_IFDIR: |
1034 | return SECCLASS_DIR; |
1035 | case S_IFCHR: |
1036 | return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE; |
1037 | case S_IFIFO: |
1038 | return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE; |
1039 | |
1040 | } |
1041 | |
1042 | return SECCLASS_FILE; |
1043 | } |
1044 | |
1045 | static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol) |
1046 | { |
1047 | return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP); |
1048 | } |
1049 | |
1050 | static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol) |
1051 | { |
1052 | return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP); |
1053 | } |
1054 | |
1055 | static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol) |
1056 | { |
1057 | switch (family) { |
1058 | case PF_UNIX: |
1059 | switch (type) { |
1060 | case SOCK_STREAM: |
1061 | case SOCK_SEQPACKET: |
1062 | return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET; |
1063 | case SOCK_DGRAM: |
1064 | return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET; |
1065 | } |
1066 | break; |
1067 | case PF_INET: |
1068 | case PF_INET6: |
1069 | switch (type) { |
1070 | case SOCK_STREAM: |
1071 | if (default_protocol_stream(protocol)) |
1072 | return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET; |
1073 | else |
1074 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; |
1075 | case SOCK_DGRAM: |
1076 | if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol)) |
1077 | return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET; |
1078 | else |
1079 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; |
1080 | case SOCK_DCCP: |
1081 | return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET; |
1082 | default: |
1083 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; |
1084 | } |
1085 | break; |
1086 | case PF_NETLINK: |
1087 | switch (protocol) { |
1088 | case NETLINK_ROUTE: |
1089 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET; |
1090 | case NETLINK_FIREWALL: |
1091 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET; |
1092 | case NETLINK_INET_DIAG: |
1093 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET; |
1094 | case NETLINK_NFLOG: |
1095 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET; |
1096 | case NETLINK_XFRM: |
1097 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET; |
1098 | case NETLINK_SELINUX: |
1099 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET; |
1100 | case NETLINK_AUDIT: |
1101 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET; |
1102 | case NETLINK_IP6_FW: |
1103 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET; |
1104 | case NETLINK_DNRTMSG: |
1105 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET; |
1106 | case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT: |
1107 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET; |
1108 | default: |
1109 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET; |
1110 | } |
1111 | case PF_PACKET: |
1112 | return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET; |
1113 | case PF_KEY: |
1114 | return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET; |
1115 | case PF_APPLETALK: |
1116 | return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET; |
1117 | } |
1118 | |
1119 | return SECCLASS_SOCKET; |
1120 | } |
1121 | |
1122 | #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS |
1123 | static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de, |
1124 | u16 tclass, |
1125 | u32 *sid) |
1126 | { |
1127 | int buflen, rc; |
1128 | char *buffer, *path, *end; |
1129 | |
1130 | buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); |
1131 | if (!buffer) |
1132 | return -ENOMEM; |
1133 | |
1134 | buflen = PAGE_SIZE; |
1135 | end = buffer+buflen; |
1136 | *--end = '\0'; |
1137 | buflen--; |
1138 | path = end-1; |
1139 | *path = '/'; |
1140 | while (de && de != de->parent) { |
1141 | buflen -= de->namelen + 1; |
1142 | if (buflen < 0) |
1143 | break; |
1144 | end -= de->namelen; |
1145 | memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen); |
1146 | *--end = '/'; |
1147 | path = end; |
1148 | de = de->parent; |
1149 | } |
1150 | rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid); |
1151 | free_page((unsigned long)buffer); |
1152 | return rc; |
1153 | } |
1154 | #else |
1155 | static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de, |
1156 | u16 tclass, |
1157 | u32 *sid) |
1158 | { |
1159 | return -EINVAL; |
1160 | } |
1161 | #endif |
1162 | |
1163 | /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */ |
1164 | static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry) |
1165 | { |
1166 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL; |
1167 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
1168 | u32 sid; |
1169 | struct dentry *dentry; |
1170 | #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 |
1171 | char *context = NULL; |
1172 | unsigned len = 0; |
1173 | int rc = 0; |
1174 | |
1175 | if (isec->initialized) |
1176 | goto out; |
1177 | |
1178 | mutex_lock(&isec->lock); |
1179 | if (isec->initialized) |
1180 | goto out_unlock; |
1181 | |
1182 | sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; |
1183 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) { |
1184 | /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, |
1185 | after the initial policy is loaded and the security |
1186 | server is ready to handle calls. */ |
1187 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
1188 | if (list_empty(&isec->list)) |
1189 | list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head); |
1190 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
1191 | goto out_unlock; |
1192 | } |
1193 | |
1194 | switch (sbsec->behavior) { |
1195 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR: |
1196 | if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) { |
1197 | isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid; |
1198 | break; |
1199 | } |
1200 | |
1201 | /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one. |
1202 | Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */ |
1203 | if (opt_dentry) { |
1204 | /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */ |
1205 | dentry = dget(opt_dentry); |
1206 | } else { |
1207 | /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */ |
1208 | dentry = d_find_alias(inode); |
1209 | } |
1210 | if (!dentry) { |
1211 | /* |
1212 | * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed |
1213 | * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we |
1214 | * may find inodes that have no dentry on the |
1215 | * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these |
1216 | * will get fixed up the next time we go through |
1217 | * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could |
1218 | * be used again by userspace. |
1219 | */ |
1220 | goto out_unlock; |
1221 | } |
1222 | |
1223 | len = INITCONTEXTLEN; |
1224 | context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS); |
1225 | if (!context) { |
1226 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
1227 | dput(dentry); |
1228 | goto out_unlock; |
1229 | } |
1230 | context[len] = '\0'; |
1231 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, |
1232 | context, len); |
1233 | if (rc == -ERANGE) { |
1234 | kfree(context); |
1235 | |
1236 | /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ |
1237 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, |
1238 | NULL, 0); |
1239 | if (rc < 0) { |
1240 | dput(dentry); |
1241 | goto out_unlock; |
1242 | } |
1243 | len = rc; |
1244 | context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS); |
1245 | if (!context) { |
1246 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
1247 | dput(dentry); |
1248 | goto out_unlock; |
1249 | } |
1250 | context[len] = '\0'; |
1251 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, |
1252 | XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, |
1253 | context, len); |
1254 | } |
1255 | dput(dentry); |
1256 | if (rc < 0) { |
1257 | if (rc != -ENODATA) { |
1258 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned " |
1259 | "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__, |
1260 | -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); |
1261 | kfree(context); |
1262 | goto out_unlock; |
1263 | } |
1264 | /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */ |
1265 | sid = sbsec->def_sid; |
1266 | rc = 0; |
1267 | } else { |
1268 | rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid, |
1269 | sbsec->def_sid, |
1270 | GFP_NOFS); |
1271 | if (rc) { |
1272 | char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id; |
1273 | unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino; |
1274 | |
1275 | if (rc == -EINVAL) { |
1276 | if (printk_ratelimit()) |
1277 | printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid " |
1278 | "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the " |
1279 | "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context); |
1280 | } else { |
1281 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) " |
1282 | "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", |
1283 | __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino); |
1284 | } |
1285 | kfree(context); |
1286 | /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */ |
1287 | rc = 0; |
1288 | break; |
1289 | } |
1290 | } |
1291 | kfree(context); |
1292 | isec->sid = sid; |
1293 | break; |
1294 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK: |
1295 | isec->sid = isec->task_sid; |
1296 | break; |
1297 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS: |
1298 | /* Default to the fs SID. */ |
1299 | isec->sid = sbsec->sid; |
1300 | |
1301 | /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */ |
1302 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); |
1303 | rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, |
1304 | sbsec->sid, |
1305 | isec->sclass, |
1306 | &sid); |
1307 | if (rc) |
1308 | goto out_unlock; |
1309 | isec->sid = sid; |
1310 | break; |
1311 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT: |
1312 | isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid; |
1313 | break; |
1314 | default: |
1315 | /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */ |
1316 | isec->sid = sbsec->sid; |
1317 | |
1318 | if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { |
1319 | struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode); |
1320 | if (proci->pde) { |
1321 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); |
1322 | rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde, |
1323 | isec->sclass, |
1324 | &sid); |
1325 | if (rc) |
1326 | goto out_unlock; |
1327 | isec->sid = sid; |
1328 | } |
1329 | } |
1330 | break; |
1331 | } |
1332 | |
1333 | isec->initialized = 1; |
1334 | |
1335 | out_unlock: |
1336 | mutex_unlock(&isec->lock); |
1337 | out: |
1338 | if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE) |
1339 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); |
1340 | return rc; |
1341 | } |
1342 | |
1343 | /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */ |
1344 | static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig) |
1345 | { |
1346 | u32 perm = 0; |
1347 | |
1348 | switch (sig) { |
1349 | case SIGCHLD: |
1350 | /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */ |
1351 | perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD; |
1352 | break; |
1353 | case SIGKILL: |
1354 | /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ |
1355 | perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL; |
1356 | break; |
1357 | case SIGSTOP: |
1358 | /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ |
1359 | perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP; |
1360 | break; |
1361 | default: |
1362 | /* All other signals. */ |
1363 | perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL; |
1364 | break; |
1365 | } |
1366 | |
1367 | return perm; |
1368 | } |
1369 | |
1370 | /* |
1371 | * Check permission between a pair of credentials |
1372 | * fork check, ptrace check, etc. |
1373 | */ |
1374 | static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor, |
1375 | const struct cred *target, |
1376 | u32 perms) |
1377 | { |
1378 | u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target); |
1379 | |
1380 | return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL); |
1381 | } |
1382 | |
1383 | /* |
1384 | * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks, |
1385 | * fork check, ptrace check, etc. |
1386 | * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target |
1387 | * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1 |
1388 | */ |
1389 | static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1, |
1390 | const struct task_struct *tsk2, |
1391 | u32 perms) |
1392 | { |
1393 | const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2; |
1394 | u32 sid1, sid2; |
1395 | |
1396 | rcu_read_lock(); |
1397 | __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid; |
1398 | __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid; |
1399 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1400 | return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL); |
1401 | } |
1402 | |
1403 | /* |
1404 | * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks, |
1405 | * fork check, ptrace check, etc. |
1406 | * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target |
1407 | * - this uses current's subjective creds |
1408 | */ |
1409 | static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk, |
1410 | u32 perms) |
1411 | { |
1412 | u32 sid, tsid; |
1413 | |
1414 | sid = current_sid(); |
1415 | tsid = task_sid(tsk); |
1416 | return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL); |
1417 | } |
1418 | |
1419 | #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63 |
1420 | #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63. |
1421 | #endif |
1422 | |
1423 | /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */ |
1424 | static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk, |
1425 | const struct cred *cred, |
1426 | int cap, int audit) |
1427 | { |
1428 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
1429 | struct av_decision avd; |
1430 | u16 sclass; |
1431 | u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); |
1432 | u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap); |
1433 | int rc; |
1434 | |
1435 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP); |
1436 | ad.tsk = tsk; |
1437 | ad.u.cap = cap; |
1438 | |
1439 | switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) { |
1440 | case 0: |
1441 | sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY; |
1442 | break; |
1443 | case 1: |
1444 | sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2; |
1445 | break; |
1446 | default: |
1447 | printk(KERN_ERR |
1448 | "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap); |
1449 | BUG(); |
1450 | } |
1451 | |
1452 | rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd); |
1453 | if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) |
1454 | avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad); |
1455 | return rc; |
1456 | } |
1457 | |
1458 | /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */ |
1459 | static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk, |
1460 | u32 perms) |
1461 | { |
1462 | u32 sid = task_sid(tsk); |
1463 | |
1464 | return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, |
1465 | SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL); |
1466 | } |
1467 | |
1468 | /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode. |
1469 | The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit |
1470 | data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */ |
1471 | static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, |
1472 | struct inode *inode, |
1473 | u32 perms, |
1474 | struct common_audit_data *adp) |
1475 | { |
1476 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
1477 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
1478 | u32 sid; |
1479 | |
1480 | validate_creds(cred); |
1481 | |
1482 | if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) |
1483 | return 0; |
1484 | |
1485 | sid = cred_sid(cred); |
1486 | isec = inode->i_security; |
1487 | |
1488 | if (!adp) { |
1489 | adp = &ad; |
1490 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); |
1491 | ad.u.fs.inode = inode; |
1492 | } |
1493 | |
1494 | return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp); |
1495 | } |
1496 | |
1497 | /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing |
1498 | the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the |
1499 | pathname if needed. */ |
1500 | static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, |
1501 | struct vfsmount *mnt, |
1502 | struct dentry *dentry, |
1503 | u32 av) |
1504 | { |
1505 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
1506 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
1507 | |
1508 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); |
1509 | ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt; |
1510 | ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; |
1511 | return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); |
1512 | } |
1513 | |
1514 | /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to |
1515 | access an inode in a given way. Check access to the |
1516 | descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to |
1517 | check a particular permission to the file. |
1518 | Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it |
1519 | has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then |
1520 | access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases |
1521 | where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */ |
1522 | static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, |
1523 | struct file *file, |
1524 | u32 av) |
1525 | { |
1526 | struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; |
1527 | struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; |
1528 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
1529 | u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); |
1530 | int rc; |
1531 | |
1532 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); |
1533 | ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path; |
1534 | |
1535 | if (sid != fsec->sid) { |
1536 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, |
1537 | SECCLASS_FD, |
1538 | FD__USE, |
1539 | &ad); |
1540 | if (rc) |
1541 | goto out; |
1542 | } |
1543 | |
1544 | /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */ |
1545 | rc = 0; |
1546 | if (av) |
1547 | rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); |
1548 | |
1549 | out: |
1550 | return rc; |
1551 | } |
1552 | |
1553 | /* Check whether a task can create a file. */ |
1554 | static int may_create(struct inode *dir, |
1555 | struct dentry *dentry, |
1556 | u16 tclass) |
1557 | { |
1558 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); |
1559 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec; |
1560 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; |
1561 | u32 sid, newsid; |
1562 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
1563 | int rc; |
1564 | |
1565 | dsec = dir->i_security; |
1566 | sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; |
1567 | |
1568 | sid = tsec->sid; |
1569 | newsid = tsec->create_sid; |
1570 | |
1571 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); |
1572 | ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; |
1573 | |
1574 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, |
1575 | DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, |
1576 | &ad); |
1577 | if (rc) |
1578 | return rc; |
1579 | |
1580 | if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) { |
1581 | rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid); |
1582 | if (rc) |
1583 | return rc; |
1584 | } |
1585 | |
1586 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad); |
1587 | if (rc) |
1588 | return rc; |
1589 | |
1590 | return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid, |
1591 | SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
1592 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); |
1593 | } |
1594 | |
1595 | /* Check whether a task can create a key. */ |
1596 | static int may_create_key(u32 ksid, |
1597 | struct task_struct *ctx) |
1598 | { |
1599 | u32 sid = task_sid(ctx); |
1600 | |
1601 | return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL); |
1602 | } |
1603 | |
1604 | #define MAY_LINK 0 |
1605 | #define MAY_UNLINK 1 |
1606 | #define MAY_RMDIR 2 |
1607 | |
1608 | /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */ |
1609 | static int may_link(struct inode *dir, |
1610 | struct dentry *dentry, |
1611 | int kind) |
1612 | |
1613 | { |
1614 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec; |
1615 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
1616 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
1617 | u32 av; |
1618 | int rc; |
1619 | |
1620 | dsec = dir->i_security; |
1621 | isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security; |
1622 | |
1623 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); |
1624 | ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; |
1625 | |
1626 | av = DIR__SEARCH; |
1627 | av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME); |
1628 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); |
1629 | if (rc) |
1630 | return rc; |
1631 | |
1632 | switch (kind) { |
1633 | case MAY_LINK: |
1634 | av = FILE__LINK; |
1635 | break; |
1636 | case MAY_UNLINK: |
1637 | av = FILE__UNLINK; |
1638 | break; |
1639 | case MAY_RMDIR: |
1640 | av = DIR__RMDIR; |
1641 | break; |
1642 | default: |
1643 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n", |
1644 | __func__, kind); |
1645 | return 0; |
1646 | } |
1647 | |
1648 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad); |
1649 | return rc; |
1650 | } |
1651 | |
1652 | static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, |
1653 | struct dentry *old_dentry, |
1654 | struct inode *new_dir, |
1655 | struct dentry *new_dentry) |
1656 | { |
1657 | struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec; |
1658 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
1659 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
1660 | u32 av; |
1661 | int old_is_dir, new_is_dir; |
1662 | int rc; |
1663 | |
1664 | old_dsec = old_dir->i_security; |
1665 | old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security; |
1666 | old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode); |
1667 | new_dsec = new_dir->i_security; |
1668 | |
1669 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); |
1670 | |
1671 | ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry; |
1672 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, |
1673 | DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad); |
1674 | if (rc) |
1675 | return rc; |
1676 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid, |
1677 | old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad); |
1678 | if (rc) |
1679 | return rc; |
1680 | if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) { |
1681 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid, |
1682 | old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad); |
1683 | if (rc) |
1684 | return rc; |
1685 | } |
1686 | |
1687 | ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry; |
1688 | av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH; |
1689 | if (new_dentry->d_inode) |
1690 | av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME; |
1691 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); |
1692 | if (rc) |
1693 | return rc; |
1694 | if (new_dentry->d_inode) { |
1695 | new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security; |
1696 | new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode); |
1697 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid, |
1698 | new_isec->sclass, |
1699 | (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad); |
1700 | if (rc) |
1701 | return rc; |
1702 | } |
1703 | |
1704 | return 0; |
1705 | } |
1706 | |
1707 | /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */ |
1708 | static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, |
1709 | struct super_block *sb, |
1710 | u32 perms, |
1711 | struct common_audit_data *ad) |
1712 | { |
1713 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; |
1714 | u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); |
1715 | |
1716 | sbsec = sb->s_security; |
1717 | return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad); |
1718 | } |
1719 | |
1720 | /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */ |
1721 | static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask) |
1722 | { |
1723 | u32 av = 0; |
1724 | |
1725 | if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) { |
1726 | if (mask & MAY_EXEC) |
1727 | av |= FILE__EXECUTE; |
1728 | if (mask & MAY_READ) |
1729 | av |= FILE__READ; |
1730 | |
1731 | if (mask & MAY_APPEND) |
1732 | av |= FILE__APPEND; |
1733 | else if (mask & MAY_WRITE) |
1734 | av |= FILE__WRITE; |
1735 | |
1736 | } else { |
1737 | if (mask & MAY_EXEC) |
1738 | av |= DIR__SEARCH; |
1739 | if (mask & MAY_WRITE) |
1740 | av |= DIR__WRITE; |
1741 | if (mask & MAY_READ) |
1742 | av |= DIR__READ; |
1743 | } |
1744 | |
1745 | return av; |
1746 | } |
1747 | |
1748 | /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */ |
1749 | static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file) |
1750 | { |
1751 | u32 av = 0; |
1752 | |
1753 | if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) |
1754 | av |= FILE__READ; |
1755 | if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) { |
1756 | if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND) |
1757 | av |= FILE__APPEND; |
1758 | else |
1759 | av |= FILE__WRITE; |
1760 | } |
1761 | if (!av) { |
1762 | /* |
1763 | * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use. |
1764 | */ |
1765 | av = FILE__IOCTL; |
1766 | } |
1767 | |
1768 | return av; |
1769 | } |
1770 | |
1771 | /* |
1772 | * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open |
1773 | * open permission. |
1774 | */ |
1775 | static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file) |
1776 | { |
1777 | u32 av = file_to_av(file); |
1778 | |
1779 | if (selinux_policycap_openperm) |
1780 | av |= FILE__OPEN; |
1781 | |
1782 | return av; |
1783 | } |
1784 | |
1785 | /* Hook functions begin here. */ |
1786 | |
1787 | static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, |
1788 | unsigned int mode) |
1789 | { |
1790 | int rc; |
1791 | |
1792 | rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode); |
1793 | if (rc) |
1794 | return rc; |
1795 | |
1796 | if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) { |
1797 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
1798 | u32 csid = task_sid(child); |
1799 | return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL); |
1800 | } |
1801 | |
1802 | return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE); |
1803 | } |
1804 | |
1805 | static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) |
1806 | { |
1807 | int rc; |
1808 | |
1809 | rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent); |
1810 | if (rc) |
1811 | return rc; |
1812 | |
1813 | return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE); |
1814 | } |
1815 | |
1816 | static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, |
1817 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) |
1818 | { |
1819 | int error; |
1820 | |
1821 | error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP); |
1822 | if (error) |
1823 | return error; |
1824 | |
1825 | return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); |
1826 | } |
1827 | |
1828 | static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, |
1829 | const kernel_cap_t *effective, |
1830 | const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, |
1831 | const kernel_cap_t *permitted) |
1832 | { |
1833 | int error; |
1834 | |
1835 | error = cap_capset(new, old, |
1836 | effective, inheritable, permitted); |
1837 | if (error) |
1838 | return error; |
1839 | |
1840 | return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP); |
1841 | } |
1842 | |
1843 | /* |
1844 | * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook, |
1845 | * which was removed). |
1846 | * |
1847 | * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux |
1848 | * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not |
1849 | * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of |
1850 | * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook. |
1851 | */ |
1852 | |
1853 | static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, |
1854 | int cap, int audit) |
1855 | { |
1856 | int rc; |
1857 | |
1858 | rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit); |
1859 | if (rc) |
1860 | return rc; |
1861 | |
1862 | return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit); |
1863 | } |
1864 | |
1865 | static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid) |
1866 | { |
1867 | int buflen, rc; |
1868 | char *buffer, *path, *end; |
1869 | |
1870 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
1871 | buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); |
1872 | if (!buffer) |
1873 | goto out; |
1874 | |
1875 | buflen = PAGE_SIZE; |
1876 | end = buffer+buflen; |
1877 | *--end = '\0'; |
1878 | buflen--; |
1879 | path = end-1; |
1880 | *path = '/'; |
1881 | while (table) { |
1882 | const char *name = table->procname; |
1883 | size_t namelen = strlen(name); |
1884 | buflen -= namelen + 1; |
1885 | if (buflen < 0) |
1886 | goto out_free; |
1887 | end -= namelen; |
1888 | memcpy(end, name, namelen); |
1889 | *--end = '/'; |
1890 | path = end; |
1891 | table = table->parent; |
1892 | } |
1893 | buflen -= 4; |
1894 | if (buflen < 0) |
1895 | goto out_free; |
1896 | end -= 4; |
1897 | memcpy(end, "/sys", 4); |
1898 | path = end; |
1899 | rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid); |
1900 | out_free: |
1901 | free_page((unsigned long)buffer); |
1902 | out: |
1903 | return rc; |
1904 | } |
1905 | |
1906 | static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op) |
1907 | { |
1908 | int error = 0; |
1909 | u32 av; |
1910 | u32 tsid, sid; |
1911 | int rc; |
1912 | |
1913 | sid = current_sid(); |
1914 | |
1915 | rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ? |
1916 | SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid); |
1917 | if (rc) { |
1918 | /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */ |
1919 | tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL; |
1920 | } |
1921 | |
1922 | /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating |
1923 | * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */ |
1924 | if (op == 001) { |
1925 | error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, |
1926 | SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL); |
1927 | } else { |
1928 | av = 0; |
1929 | if (op & 004) |
1930 | av |= FILE__READ; |
1931 | if (op & 002) |
1932 | av |= FILE__WRITE; |
1933 | if (av) |
1934 | error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, |
1935 | SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL); |
1936 | } |
1937 | |
1938 | return error; |
1939 | } |
1940 | |
1941 | static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) |
1942 | { |
1943 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
1944 | int rc = 0; |
1945 | |
1946 | if (!sb) |
1947 | return 0; |
1948 | |
1949 | switch (cmds) { |
1950 | case Q_SYNC: |
1951 | case Q_QUOTAON: |
1952 | case Q_QUOTAOFF: |
1953 | case Q_SETINFO: |
1954 | case Q_SETQUOTA: |
1955 | rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL); |
1956 | break; |
1957 | case Q_GETFMT: |
1958 | case Q_GETINFO: |
1959 | case Q_GETQUOTA: |
1960 | rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL); |
1961 | break; |
1962 | default: |
1963 | rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */ |
1964 | break; |
1965 | } |
1966 | return rc; |
1967 | } |
1968 | |
1969 | static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) |
1970 | { |
1971 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
1972 | |
1973 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON); |
1974 | } |
1975 | |
1976 | static int selinux_syslog(int type, bool from_file) |
1977 | { |
1978 | int rc; |
1979 | |
1980 | rc = cap_syslog(type, from_file); |
1981 | if (rc) |
1982 | return rc; |
1983 | |
1984 | switch (type) { |
1985 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */ |
1986 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */ |
1987 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ); |
1988 | break; |
1989 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */ |
1990 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */ |
1991 | /* Set level of messages printed to console */ |
1992 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL: |
1993 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE); |
1994 | break; |
1995 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */ |
1996 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */ |
1997 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */ |
1998 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */ |
1999 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */ |
2000 | default: |
2001 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD); |
2002 | break; |
2003 | } |
2004 | return rc; |
2005 | } |
2006 | |
2007 | /* |
2008 | * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual |
2009 | * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to |
2010 | * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not. |
2011 | * |
2012 | * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all |
2013 | * processes that allocate mappings. |
2014 | */ |
2015 | static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) |
2016 | { |
2017 | int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0; |
2018 | |
2019 | rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, |
2020 | SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); |
2021 | if (rc == 0) |
2022 | cap_sys_admin = 1; |
2023 | |
2024 | return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); |
2025 | } |
2026 | |
2027 | /* binprm security operations */ |
2028 | |
2029 | static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
2030 | { |
2031 | const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec; |
2032 | struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; |
2033 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
2034 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
2035 | struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; |
2036 | int rc; |
2037 | |
2038 | rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm); |
2039 | if (rc) |
2040 | return rc; |
2041 | |
2042 | /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not |
2043 | * the script interpreter */ |
2044 | if (bprm->cred_prepared) |
2045 | return 0; |
2046 | |
2047 | old_tsec = current_security(); |
2048 | new_tsec = bprm->cred->security; |
2049 | isec = inode->i_security; |
2050 | |
2051 | /* Default to the current task SID. */ |
2052 | new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid; |
2053 | new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid; |
2054 | |
2055 | /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */ |
2056 | new_tsec->create_sid = 0; |
2057 | new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0; |
2058 | new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0; |
2059 | |
2060 | if (old_tsec->exec_sid) { |
2061 | new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid; |
2062 | /* Reset exec SID on execve. */ |
2063 | new_tsec->exec_sid = 0; |
2064 | } else { |
2065 | /* Check for a default transition on this program. */ |
2066 | rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, |
2067 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid); |
2068 | if (rc) |
2069 | return rc; |
2070 | } |
2071 | |
2072 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); |
2073 | ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path; |
2074 | |
2075 | if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) |
2076 | new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid; |
2077 | |
2078 | if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) { |
2079 | rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, |
2080 | SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad); |
2081 | if (rc) |
2082 | return rc; |
2083 | } else { |
2084 | /* Check permissions for the transition. */ |
2085 | rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, |
2086 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad); |
2087 | if (rc) |
2088 | return rc; |
2089 | |
2090 | rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid, |
2091 | SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad); |
2092 | if (rc) |
2093 | return rc; |
2094 | |
2095 | /* Check for shared state */ |
2096 | if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) { |
2097 | rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, |
2098 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE, |
2099 | NULL); |
2100 | if (rc) |
2101 | return -EPERM; |
2102 | } |
2103 | |
2104 | /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that |
2105 | * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */ |
2106 | if (bprm->unsafe & |
2107 | (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) { |
2108 | struct task_struct *tracer; |
2109 | struct task_security_struct *sec; |
2110 | u32 ptsid = 0; |
2111 | |
2112 | rcu_read_lock(); |
2113 | tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current); |
2114 | if (likely(tracer != NULL)) { |
2115 | sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security; |
2116 | ptsid = sec->sid; |
2117 | } |
2118 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
2119 | |
2120 | if (ptsid != 0) { |
2121 | rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid, |
2122 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, |
2123 | PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); |
2124 | if (rc) |
2125 | return -EPERM; |
2126 | } |
2127 | } |
2128 | |
2129 | /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */ |
2130 | bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; |
2131 | } |
2132 | |
2133 | return 0; |
2134 | } |
2135 | |
2136 | static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
2137 | { |
2138 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); |
2139 | u32 sid, osid; |
2140 | int atsecure = 0; |
2141 | |
2142 | sid = tsec->sid; |
2143 | osid = tsec->osid; |
2144 | |
2145 | if (osid != sid) { |
2146 | /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless |
2147 | the noatsecure permission is granted between |
2148 | the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */ |
2149 | atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, |
2150 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, |
2151 | PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL); |
2152 | } |
2153 | |
2154 | return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm)); |
2155 | } |
2156 | |
2157 | extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount; |
2158 | extern struct dentry *selinux_null; |
2159 | |
2160 | /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */ |
2161 | static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, |
2162 | struct files_struct *files) |
2163 | { |
2164 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
2165 | struct file *file, *devnull = NULL; |
2166 | struct tty_struct *tty; |
2167 | struct fdtable *fdt; |
2168 | long j = -1; |
2169 | int drop_tty = 0; |
2170 | |
2171 | tty = get_current_tty(); |
2172 | if (tty) { |
2173 | spin_lock(&tty_files_lock); |
2174 | if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) { |
2175 | struct tty_file_private *file_priv; |
2176 | struct inode *inode; |
2177 | |
2178 | /* Revalidate access to controlling tty. |
2179 | Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather |
2180 | than using file_has_perm, as this particular open |
2181 | file may belong to another process and we are only |
2182 | interested in the inode-based check here. */ |
2183 | file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, |
2184 | struct tty_file_private, list); |
2185 | file = file_priv->file; |
2186 | inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; |
2187 | if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode, |
2188 | FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) { |
2189 | drop_tty = 1; |
2190 | } |
2191 | } |
2192 | spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock); |
2193 | tty_kref_put(tty); |
2194 | } |
2195 | /* Reset controlling tty. */ |
2196 | if (drop_tty) |
2197 | no_tty(); |
2198 | |
2199 | /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */ |
2200 | |
2201 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); |
2202 | |
2203 | spin_lock(&files->file_lock); |
2204 | for (;;) { |
2205 | unsigned long set, i; |
2206 | int fd; |
2207 | |
2208 | j++; |
2209 | i = j * __NFDBITS; |
2210 | fdt = files_fdtable(files); |
2211 | if (i >= fdt->max_fds) |
2212 | break; |
2213 | set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j]; |
2214 | if (!set) |
2215 | continue; |
2216 | spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); |
2217 | for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) { |
2218 | if (set & 1) { |
2219 | file = fget(i); |
2220 | if (!file) |
2221 | continue; |
2222 | if (file_has_perm(cred, |
2223 | file, |
2224 | file_to_av(file))) { |
2225 | sys_close(i); |
2226 | fd = get_unused_fd(); |
2227 | if (fd != i) { |
2228 | if (fd >= 0) |
2229 | put_unused_fd(fd); |
2230 | fput(file); |
2231 | continue; |
2232 | } |
2233 | if (devnull) { |
2234 | get_file(devnull); |
2235 | } else { |
2236 | devnull = dentry_open( |
2237 | dget(selinux_null), |
2238 | mntget(selinuxfs_mount), |
2239 | O_RDWR, cred); |
2240 | if (IS_ERR(devnull)) { |
2241 | devnull = NULL; |
2242 | put_unused_fd(fd); |
2243 | fput(file); |
2244 | continue; |
2245 | } |
2246 | } |
2247 | fd_install(fd, devnull); |
2248 | } |
2249 | fput(file); |
2250 | } |
2251 | } |
2252 | spin_lock(&files->file_lock); |
2253 | |
2254 | } |
2255 | spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); |
2256 | } |
2257 | |
2258 | /* |
2259 | * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec |
2260 | */ |
2261 | static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
2262 | { |
2263 | struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; |
2264 | struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim; |
2265 | int rc, i; |
2266 | |
2267 | new_tsec = bprm->cred->security; |
2268 | if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid) |
2269 | return; |
2270 | |
2271 | /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */ |
2272 | flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files); |
2273 | |
2274 | /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */ |
2275 | current->pdeath_signal = 0; |
2276 | |
2277 | /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old |
2278 | * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current |
2279 | * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit. |
2280 | * |
2281 | * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be |
2282 | * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's |
2283 | * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits |
2284 | * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is |
2285 | * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK. |
2286 | */ |
2287 | rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, |
2288 | PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL); |
2289 | if (rc) { |
2290 | /* protect against do_prlimit() */ |
2291 | task_lock(current); |
2292 | for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) { |
2293 | rlim = current->signal->rlim + i; |
2294 | initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i; |
2295 | rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur); |
2296 | } |
2297 | task_unlock(current); |
2298 | update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU)); |
2299 | } |
2300 | } |
2301 | |
2302 | /* |
2303 | * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials |
2304 | * due to exec |
2305 | */ |
2306 | static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
2307 | { |
2308 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); |
2309 | struct itimerval itimer; |
2310 | u32 osid, sid; |
2311 | int rc, i; |
2312 | |
2313 | osid = tsec->osid; |
2314 | sid = tsec->sid; |
2315 | |
2316 | if (sid == osid) |
2317 | return; |
2318 | |
2319 | /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID. |
2320 | * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and |
2321 | * flush and unblock signals. |
2322 | * |
2323 | * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any |
2324 | * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID. |
2325 | */ |
2326 | rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL); |
2327 | if (rc) { |
2328 | memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer); |
2329 | for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) |
2330 | do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL); |
2331 | spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); |
2332 | if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) { |
2333 | __flush_signals(current); |
2334 | flush_signal_handlers(current, 1); |
2335 | sigemptyset(¤t->blocked); |
2336 | } |
2337 | spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); |
2338 | } |
2339 | |
2340 | /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck |
2341 | * wait permission to the new task SID. */ |
2342 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock); |
2343 | __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent); |
2344 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
2345 | } |
2346 | |
2347 | /* superblock security operations */ |
2348 | |
2349 | static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) |
2350 | { |
2351 | return superblock_alloc_security(sb); |
2352 | } |
2353 | |
2354 | static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb) |
2355 | { |
2356 | superblock_free_security(sb); |
2357 | } |
2358 | |
2359 | static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen) |
2360 | { |
2361 | if (plen > olen) |
2362 | return 0; |
2363 | |
2364 | return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen); |
2365 | } |
2366 | |
2367 | static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len) |
2368 | { |
2369 | return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || |
2370 | match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || |
2371 | match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || |
2372 | match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || |
2373 | match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len)); |
2374 | } |
2375 | |
2376 | static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len) |
2377 | { |
2378 | if (!*first) { |
2379 | **to = ','; |
2380 | *to += 1; |
2381 | } else |
2382 | *first = 0; |
2383 | memcpy(*to, from, len); |
2384 | *to += len; |
2385 | } |
2386 | |
2387 | static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, |
2388 | int len) |
2389 | { |
2390 | int current_size = 0; |
2391 | |
2392 | if (!*first) { |
2393 | **to = '|'; |
2394 | *to += 1; |
2395 | } else |
2396 | *first = 0; |
2397 | |
2398 | while (current_size < len) { |
2399 | if (*from != '"') { |
2400 | **to = *from; |
2401 | *to += 1; |
2402 | } |
2403 | from += 1; |
2404 | current_size += 1; |
2405 | } |
2406 | } |
2407 | |
2408 | static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy) |
2409 | { |
2410 | int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0; |
2411 | char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end; |
2412 | char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec; |
2413 | int open_quote = 0; |
2414 | |
2415 | in_curr = orig; |
2416 | sec_curr = copy; |
2417 | |
2418 | nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); |
2419 | if (!nosec) { |
2420 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
2421 | goto out; |
2422 | } |
2423 | |
2424 | nosec_save = nosec; |
2425 | fnosec = fsec = 1; |
2426 | in_save = in_end = orig; |
2427 | |
2428 | do { |
2429 | if (*in_end == '"') |
2430 | open_quote = !open_quote; |
2431 | if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) || |
2432 | *in_end == '\0') { |
2433 | int len = in_end - in_curr; |
2434 | |
2435 | if (selinux_option(in_curr, len)) |
2436 | take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len); |
2437 | else |
2438 | take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len); |
2439 | |
2440 | in_curr = in_end + 1; |
2441 | } |
2442 | } while (*in_end++); |
2443 | |
2444 | strcpy(in_save, nosec_save); |
2445 | free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save); |
2446 | out: |
2447 | return rc; |
2448 | } |
2449 | |
2450 | static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) |
2451 | { |
2452 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2453 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
2454 | int rc; |
2455 | |
2456 | rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data); |
2457 | if (rc) |
2458 | return rc; |
2459 | |
2460 | /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */ |
2461 | if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT) |
2462 | return 0; |
2463 | |
2464 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); |
2465 | ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root; |
2466 | return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad); |
2467 | } |
2468 | |
2469 | static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) |
2470 | { |
2471 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2472 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
2473 | |
2474 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); |
2475 | ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root; |
2476 | return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad); |
2477 | } |
2478 | |
2479 | static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name, |
2480 | struct path *path, |
2481 | char *type, |
2482 | unsigned long flags, |
2483 | void *data) |
2484 | { |
2485 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2486 | |
2487 | if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) |
2488 | return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb, |
2489 | FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL); |
2490 | else |
2491 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry, |
2492 | FILE__MOUNTON); |
2493 | } |
2494 | |
2495 | static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) |
2496 | { |
2497 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2498 | |
2499 | return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb, |
2500 | FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL); |
2501 | } |
2502 | |
2503 | /* inode security operations */ |
2504 | |
2505 | static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) |
2506 | { |
2507 | return inode_alloc_security(inode); |
2508 | } |
2509 | |
2510 | static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) |
2511 | { |
2512 | inode_free_security(inode); |
2513 | } |
2514 | |
2515 | static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, |
2516 | char **name, void **value, |
2517 | size_t *len) |
2518 | { |
2519 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); |
2520 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec; |
2521 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; |
2522 | u32 sid, newsid, clen; |
2523 | int rc; |
2524 | char *namep = NULL, *context; |
2525 | |
2526 | dsec = dir->i_security; |
2527 | sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; |
2528 | |
2529 | sid = tsec->sid; |
2530 | newsid = tsec->create_sid; |
2531 | |
2532 | if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) { |
2533 | rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, |
2534 | inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode), |
2535 | &newsid); |
2536 | if (rc) { |
2537 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: " |
2538 | "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s " |
2539 | "ino=%ld)\n", |
2540 | __func__, |
2541 | -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); |
2542 | return rc; |
2543 | } |
2544 | } |
2545 | |
2546 | /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */ |
2547 | if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { |
2548 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
2549 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); |
2550 | isec->sid = newsid; |
2551 | isec->initialized = 1; |
2552 | } |
2553 | |
2554 | if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) |
2555 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
2556 | |
2557 | if (name) { |
2558 | namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS); |
2559 | if (!namep) |
2560 | return -ENOMEM; |
2561 | *name = namep; |
2562 | } |
2563 | |
2564 | if (value && len) { |
2565 | rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen); |
2566 | if (rc) { |
2567 | kfree(namep); |
2568 | return rc; |
2569 | } |
2570 | *value = context; |
2571 | *len = clen; |
2572 | } |
2573 | |
2574 | return 0; |
2575 | } |
2576 | |
2577 | static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask) |
2578 | { |
2579 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE); |
2580 | } |
2581 | |
2582 | static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) |
2583 | { |
2584 | return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK); |
2585 | } |
2586 | |
2587 | static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) |
2588 | { |
2589 | return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK); |
2590 | } |
2591 | |
2592 | static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) |
2593 | { |
2594 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE); |
2595 | } |
2596 | |
2597 | static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask) |
2598 | { |
2599 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR); |
2600 | } |
2601 | |
2602 | static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) |
2603 | { |
2604 | return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR); |
2605 | } |
2606 | |
2607 | static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev) |
2608 | { |
2609 | return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode)); |
2610 | } |
2611 | |
2612 | static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry, |
2613 | struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry) |
2614 | { |
2615 | return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry); |
2616 | } |
2617 | |
2618 | static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) |
2619 | { |
2620 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2621 | |
2622 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ); |
2623 | } |
2624 | |
2625 | static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata) |
2626 | { |
2627 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2628 | |
2629 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ); |
2630 | } |
2631 | |
2632 | static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) |
2633 | { |
2634 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2635 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
2636 | u32 perms; |
2637 | bool from_access; |
2638 | |
2639 | from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS; |
2640 | mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND); |
2641 | |
2642 | /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ |
2643 | if (!mask) |
2644 | return 0; |
2645 | |
2646 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); |
2647 | ad.u.fs.inode = inode; |
2648 | |
2649 | if (from_access) |
2650 | ad.selinux_audit_data.auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS; |
2651 | |
2652 | perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask); |
2653 | |
2654 | return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad); |
2655 | } |
2656 | |
2657 | static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) |
2658 | { |
2659 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2660 | unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid; |
2661 | |
2662 | /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */ |
2663 | if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) { |
2664 | ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE | |
2665 | ATTR_FORCE); |
2666 | if (!ia_valid) |
2667 | return 0; |
2668 | } |
2669 | |
2670 | if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID | |
2671 | ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) |
2672 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); |
2673 | |
2674 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE); |
2675 | } |
2676 | |
2677 | static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) |
2678 | { |
2679 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2680 | |
2681 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); |
2682 | } |
2683 | |
2684 | static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) |
2685 | { |
2686 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2687 | |
2688 | if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, |
2689 | sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) { |
2690 | if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) { |
2691 | if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP)) |
2692 | return -EPERM; |
2693 | } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { |
2694 | /* A different attribute in the security namespace. |
2695 | Restrict to administrator. */ |
2696 | return -EPERM; |
2697 | } |
2698 | } |
2699 | |
2700 | /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the |
2701 | ordinary setattr permission. */ |
2702 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); |
2703 | } |
2704 | |
2705 | static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, |
2706 | const void *value, size_t size, int flags) |
2707 | { |
2708 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
2709 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
2710 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; |
2711 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
2712 | u32 newsid, sid = current_sid(); |
2713 | int rc = 0; |
2714 | |
2715 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) |
2716 | return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name); |
2717 | |
2718 | sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; |
2719 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) |
2720 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
2721 | |
2722 | if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode)) |
2723 | return -EPERM; |
2724 | |
2725 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); |
2726 | ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; |
2727 | |
2728 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, |
2729 | FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad); |
2730 | if (rc) |
2731 | return rc; |
2732 | |
2733 | rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid); |
2734 | if (rc == -EINVAL) { |
2735 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
2736 | return rc; |
2737 | rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid); |
2738 | } |
2739 | if (rc) |
2740 | return rc; |
2741 | |
2742 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass, |
2743 | FILE__RELABELTO, &ad); |
2744 | if (rc) |
2745 | return rc; |
2746 | |
2747 | rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid, |
2748 | isec->sclass); |
2749 | if (rc) |
2750 | return rc; |
2751 | |
2752 | return avc_has_perm(newsid, |
2753 | sbsec->sid, |
2754 | SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
2755 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, |
2756 | &ad); |
2757 | } |
2758 | |
2759 | static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, |
2760 | const void *value, size_t size, |
2761 | int flags) |
2762 | { |
2763 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
2764 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
2765 | u32 newsid; |
2766 | int rc; |
2767 | |
2768 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { |
2769 | /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */ |
2770 | return; |
2771 | } |
2772 | |
2773 | rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid); |
2774 | if (rc) { |
2775 | printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID" |
2776 | "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n", |
2777 | inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc); |
2778 | return; |
2779 | } |
2780 | |
2781 | isec->sid = newsid; |
2782 | return; |
2783 | } |
2784 | |
2785 | static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) |
2786 | { |
2787 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2788 | |
2789 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); |
2790 | } |
2791 | |
2792 | static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) |
2793 | { |
2794 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2795 | |
2796 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); |
2797 | } |
2798 | |
2799 | static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) |
2800 | { |
2801 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) |
2802 | return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name); |
2803 | |
2804 | /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label. |
2805 | You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */ |
2806 | return -EACCES; |
2807 | } |
2808 | |
2809 | /* |
2810 | * Copy the inode security context value to the user. |
2811 | * |
2812 | * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook. |
2813 | */ |
2814 | static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) |
2815 | { |
2816 | u32 size; |
2817 | int error; |
2818 | char *context = NULL; |
2819 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
2820 | |
2821 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) |
2822 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
2823 | |
2824 | /* |
2825 | * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context |
2826 | * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise, |
2827 | * use the in-core value under current policy. |
2828 | * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since |
2829 | * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly |
2830 | * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the |
2831 | * in-core context value, not a denial. |
2832 | */ |
2833 | error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN, |
2834 | SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); |
2835 | if (!error) |
2836 | error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context, |
2837 | &size); |
2838 | else |
2839 | error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size); |
2840 | if (error) |
2841 | return error; |
2842 | error = size; |
2843 | if (alloc) { |
2844 | *buffer = context; |
2845 | goto out_nofree; |
2846 | } |
2847 | kfree(context); |
2848 | out_nofree: |
2849 | return error; |
2850 | } |
2851 | |
2852 | static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, |
2853 | const void *value, size_t size, int flags) |
2854 | { |
2855 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
2856 | u32 newsid; |
2857 | int rc; |
2858 | |
2859 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) |
2860 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
2861 | |
2862 | if (!value || !size) |
2863 | return -EACCES; |
2864 | |
2865 | rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid); |
2866 | if (rc) |
2867 | return rc; |
2868 | |
2869 | isec->sid = newsid; |
2870 | isec->initialized = 1; |
2871 | return 0; |
2872 | } |
2873 | |
2874 | static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) |
2875 | { |
2876 | const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX); |
2877 | if (buffer && len <= buffer_size) |
2878 | memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len); |
2879 | return len; |
2880 | } |
2881 | |
2882 | static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) |
2883 | { |
2884 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
2885 | *secid = isec->sid; |
2886 | } |
2887 | |
2888 | /* file security operations */ |
2889 | |
2890 | static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) |
2891 | { |
2892 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2893 | struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; |
2894 | |
2895 | /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */ |
2896 | if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE)) |
2897 | mask |= MAY_APPEND; |
2898 | |
2899 | return file_has_perm(cred, file, |
2900 | file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask)); |
2901 | } |
2902 | |
2903 | static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) |
2904 | { |
2905 | struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; |
2906 | struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; |
2907 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
2908 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
2909 | |
2910 | if (!mask) |
2911 | /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ |
2912 | return 0; |
2913 | |
2914 | if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid && |
2915 | fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno()) |
2916 | /* No change since dentry_open check. */ |
2917 | return 0; |
2918 | |
2919 | return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask); |
2920 | } |
2921 | |
2922 | static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) |
2923 | { |
2924 | return file_alloc_security(file); |
2925 | } |
2926 | |
2927 | static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file) |
2928 | { |
2929 | file_free_security(file); |
2930 | } |
2931 | |
2932 | static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, |
2933 | unsigned long arg) |
2934 | { |
2935 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2936 | u32 av = 0; |
2937 | |
2938 | if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) |
2939 | av |= FILE__WRITE; |
2940 | if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ) |
2941 | av |= FILE__READ; |
2942 | if (!av) |
2943 | av = FILE__IOCTL; |
2944 | |
2945 | return file_has_perm(cred, file, av); |
2946 | } |
2947 | |
2948 | static int default_noexec; |
2949 | |
2950 | static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared) |
2951 | { |
2952 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2953 | int rc = 0; |
2954 | |
2955 | if (default_noexec && |
2956 | (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) { |
2957 | /* |
2958 | * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a |
2959 | * private file mapping that will also be writable. |
2960 | * This has an additional check. |
2961 | */ |
2962 | rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM); |
2963 | if (rc) |
2964 | goto error; |
2965 | } |
2966 | |
2967 | if (file) { |
2968 | /* read access is always possible with a mapping */ |
2969 | u32 av = FILE__READ; |
2970 | |
2971 | /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */ |
2972 | if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)) |
2973 | av |= FILE__WRITE; |
2974 | |
2975 | if (prot & PROT_EXEC) |
2976 | av |= FILE__EXECUTE; |
2977 | |
2978 | return file_has_perm(cred, file, av); |
2979 | } |
2980 | |
2981 | error: |
2982 | return rc; |
2983 | } |
2984 | |
2985 | static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, |
2986 | unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, |
2987 | unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) |
2988 | { |
2989 | int rc = 0; |
2990 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
2991 | |
2992 | /* |
2993 | * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before |
2994 | * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt |
2995 | * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even |
2996 | * if DAC would have also denied the operation. |
2997 | */ |
2998 | if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) { |
2999 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, |
3000 | MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL); |
3001 | if (rc) |
3002 | return rc; |
3003 | } |
3004 | |
3005 | /* do DAC check on address space usage */ |
3006 | rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); |
3007 | if (rc || addr_only) |
3008 | return rc; |
3009 | |
3010 | if (selinux_checkreqprot) |
3011 | prot = reqprot; |
3012 | |
3013 | return file_map_prot_check(file, prot, |
3014 | (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED); |
3015 | } |
3016 | |
3017 | static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, |
3018 | unsigned long reqprot, |
3019 | unsigned long prot) |
3020 | { |
3021 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
3022 | |
3023 | if (selinux_checkreqprot) |
3024 | prot = reqprot; |
3025 | |
3026 | if (default_noexec && |
3027 | (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { |
3028 | int rc = 0; |
3029 | if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk && |
3030 | vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) { |
3031 | rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP); |
3032 | } else if (!vma->vm_file && |
3033 | vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack && |
3034 | vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) { |
3035 | rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK); |
3036 | } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) { |
3037 | /* |
3038 | * We are making executable a file mapping that has |
3039 | * had some COW done. Since pages might have been |
3040 | * written, check ability to execute the possibly |
3041 | * modified content. This typically should only |
3042 | * occur for text relocations. |
3043 | */ |
3044 | rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD); |
3045 | } |
3046 | if (rc) |
3047 | return rc; |
3048 | } |
3049 | |
3050 | return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED); |
3051 | } |
3052 | |
3053 | static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) |
3054 | { |
3055 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
3056 | |
3057 | return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK); |
3058 | } |
3059 | |
3060 | static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, |
3061 | unsigned long arg) |
3062 | { |
3063 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
3064 | int err = 0; |
3065 | |
3066 | switch (cmd) { |
3067 | case F_SETFL: |
3068 | if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) { |
3069 | err = -EINVAL; |
3070 | break; |
3071 | } |
3072 | |
3073 | if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) { |
3074 | err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE); |
3075 | break; |
3076 | } |
3077 | /* fall through */ |
3078 | case F_SETOWN: |
3079 | case F_SETSIG: |
3080 | case F_GETFL: |
3081 | case F_GETOWN: |
3082 | case F_GETSIG: |
3083 | /* Just check FD__USE permission */ |
3084 | err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0); |
3085 | break; |
3086 | case F_GETLK: |
3087 | case F_SETLK: |
3088 | case F_SETLKW: |
3089 | #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 |
3090 | case F_GETLK64: |
3091 | case F_SETLK64: |
3092 | case F_SETLKW64: |
3093 | #endif |
3094 | if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) { |
3095 | err = -EINVAL; |
3096 | break; |
3097 | } |
3098 | err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK); |
3099 | break; |
3100 | } |
3101 | |
3102 | return err; |
3103 | } |
3104 | |
3105 | static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) |
3106 | { |
3107 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; |
3108 | |
3109 | fsec = file->f_security; |
3110 | fsec->fown_sid = current_sid(); |
3111 | |
3112 | return 0; |
3113 | } |
3114 | |
3115 | static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, |
3116 | struct fown_struct *fown, int signum) |
3117 | { |
3118 | struct file *file; |
3119 | u32 sid = task_sid(tsk); |
3120 | u32 perm; |
3121 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; |
3122 | |
3123 | /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */ |
3124 | file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner); |
3125 | |
3126 | fsec = file->f_security; |
3127 | |
3128 | if (!signum) |
3129 | perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */ |
3130 | else |
3131 | perm = signal_to_av(signum); |
3132 | |
3133 | return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid, |
3134 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); |
3135 | } |
3136 | |
3137 | static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file) |
3138 | { |
3139 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
3140 | |
3141 | return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file)); |
3142 | } |
3143 | |
3144 | static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) |
3145 | { |
3146 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; |
3147 | struct inode *inode; |
3148 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
3149 | |
3150 | inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; |
3151 | fsec = file->f_security; |
3152 | isec = inode->i_security; |
3153 | /* |
3154 | * Save inode label and policy sequence number |
3155 | * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission |
3156 | * can determine whether revalidation is necessary. |
3157 | * Task label is already saved in the file security |
3158 | * struct as its SID. |
3159 | */ |
3160 | fsec->isid = isec->sid; |
3161 | fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(); |
3162 | /* |
3163 | * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed |
3164 | * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving |
3165 | * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted. |
3166 | * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the |
3167 | * new inode label or new policy. |
3168 | * This check is not redundant - do not remove. |
3169 | */ |
3170 | return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL); |
3171 | } |
3172 | |
3173 | /* task security operations */ |
3174 | |
3175 | static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags) |
3176 | { |
3177 | return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK); |
3178 | } |
3179 | |
3180 | /* |
3181 | * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials |
3182 | */ |
3183 | static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) |
3184 | { |
3185 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
3186 | |
3187 | tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp); |
3188 | if (!tsec) |
3189 | return -ENOMEM; |
3190 | |
3191 | cred->security = tsec; |
3192 | return 0; |
3193 | } |
3194 | |
3195 | /* |
3196 | * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials |
3197 | */ |
3198 | static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred) |
3199 | { |
3200 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; |
3201 | |
3202 | BUG_ON((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE); |
3203 | cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL; |
3204 | kfree(tsec); |
3205 | } |
3206 | |
3207 | /* |
3208 | * prepare a new set of credentials for modification |
3209 | */ |
3210 | static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, |
3211 | gfp_t gfp) |
3212 | { |
3213 | const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec; |
3214 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
3215 | |
3216 | old_tsec = old->security; |
3217 | |
3218 | tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp); |
3219 | if (!tsec) |
3220 | return -ENOMEM; |
3221 | |
3222 | new->security = tsec; |
3223 | return 0; |
3224 | } |
3225 | |
3226 | /* |
3227 | * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds |
3228 | */ |
3229 | static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
3230 | { |
3231 | const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security; |
3232 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security; |
3233 | |
3234 | *tsec = *old_tsec; |
3235 | } |
3236 | |
3237 | /* |
3238 | * set the security data for a kernel service |
3239 | * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled |
3240 | */ |
3241 | static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) |
3242 | { |
3243 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security; |
3244 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
3245 | int ret; |
3246 | |
3247 | ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid, |
3248 | SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, |
3249 | KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE, |
3250 | NULL); |
3251 | if (ret == 0) { |
3252 | tsec->sid = secid; |
3253 | tsec->create_sid = 0; |
3254 | tsec->keycreate_sid = 0; |
3255 | tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0; |
3256 | } |
3257 | return ret; |
3258 | } |
3259 | |
3260 | /* |
3261 | * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the |
3262 | * objective context of the specified inode |
3263 | */ |
3264 | static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) |
3265 | { |
3266 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
3267 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security; |
3268 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
3269 | int ret; |
3270 | |
3271 | ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, |
3272 | SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, |
3273 | KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS, |
3274 | NULL); |
3275 | |
3276 | if (ret == 0) |
3277 | tsec->create_sid = isec->sid; |
3278 | return ret; |
3279 | } |
3280 | |
3281 | static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) |
3282 | { |
3283 | u32 sid; |
3284 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
3285 | |
3286 | sid = task_sid(current); |
3287 | |
3288 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD); |
3289 | ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name; |
3290 | |
3291 | return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, |
3292 | SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad); |
3293 | } |
3294 | |
3295 | static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) |
3296 | { |
3297 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID); |
3298 | } |
3299 | |
3300 | static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) |
3301 | { |
3302 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID); |
3303 | } |
3304 | |
3305 | static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) |
3306 | { |
3307 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION); |
3308 | } |
3309 | |
3310 | static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) |
3311 | { |
3312 | *secid = task_sid(p); |
3313 | } |
3314 | |
3315 | static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) |
3316 | { |
3317 | int rc; |
3318 | |
3319 | rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice); |
3320 | if (rc) |
3321 | return rc; |
3322 | |
3323 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); |
3324 | } |
3325 | |
3326 | static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) |
3327 | { |
3328 | int rc; |
3329 | |
3330 | rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio); |
3331 | if (rc) |
3332 | return rc; |
3333 | |
3334 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); |
3335 | } |
3336 | |
3337 | static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) |
3338 | { |
3339 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED); |
3340 | } |
3341 | |
3342 | static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, |
3343 | struct rlimit *new_rlim) |
3344 | { |
3345 | struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource; |
3346 | |
3347 | /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether |
3348 | lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can |
3349 | later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit |
3350 | upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */ |
3351 | if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max) |
3352 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT); |
3353 | |
3354 | return 0; |
3355 | } |
3356 | |
3357 | static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp) |
3358 | { |
3359 | int rc; |
3360 | |
3361 | rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp); |
3362 | if (rc) |
3363 | return rc; |
3364 | |
3365 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); |
3366 | } |
3367 | |
3368 | static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) |
3369 | { |
3370 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED); |
3371 | } |
3372 | |
3373 | static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) |
3374 | { |
3375 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); |
3376 | } |
3377 | |
3378 | static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, |
3379 | int sig, u32 secid) |
3380 | { |
3381 | u32 perm; |
3382 | int rc; |
3383 | |
3384 | if (!sig) |
3385 | perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */ |
3386 | else |
3387 | perm = signal_to_av(sig); |
3388 | if (secid) |
3389 | rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p), |
3390 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); |
3391 | else |
3392 | rc = current_has_perm(p, perm); |
3393 | return rc; |
3394 | } |
3395 | |
3396 | static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) |
3397 | { |
3398 | return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD); |
3399 | } |
3400 | |
3401 | static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, |
3402 | struct inode *inode) |
3403 | { |
3404 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
3405 | u32 sid = task_sid(p); |
3406 | |
3407 | isec->sid = sid; |
3408 | isec->initialized = 1; |
3409 | } |
3410 | |
3411 | /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ |
3412 | static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, |
3413 | struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) |
3414 | { |
3415 | int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL; |
3416 | struct iphdr _iph, *ih; |
3417 | |
3418 | offset = skb_network_offset(skb); |
3419 | ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph); |
3420 | if (ih == NULL) |
3421 | goto out; |
3422 | |
3423 | ihlen = ih->ihl * 4; |
3424 | if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph)) |
3425 | goto out; |
3426 | |
3427 | ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr; |
3428 | ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr; |
3429 | ret = 0; |
3430 | |
3431 | if (proto) |
3432 | *proto = ih->protocol; |
3433 | |
3434 | switch (ih->protocol) { |
3435 | case IPPROTO_TCP: { |
3436 | struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; |
3437 | |
3438 | if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) |
3439 | break; |
3440 | |
3441 | offset += ihlen; |
3442 | th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); |
3443 | if (th == NULL) |
3444 | break; |
3445 | |
3446 | ad->u.net.sport = th->source; |
3447 | ad->u.net.dport = th->dest; |
3448 | break; |
3449 | } |
3450 | |
3451 | case IPPROTO_UDP: { |
3452 | struct udphdr _udph, *uh; |
3453 | |
3454 | if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) |
3455 | break; |
3456 | |
3457 | offset += ihlen; |
3458 | uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); |
3459 | if (uh == NULL) |
3460 | break; |
3461 | |
3462 | ad->u.net.sport = uh->source; |
3463 | ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest; |
3464 | break; |
3465 | } |
3466 | |
3467 | case IPPROTO_DCCP: { |
3468 | struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh; |
3469 | |
3470 | if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) |
3471 | break; |
3472 | |
3473 | offset += ihlen; |
3474 | dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph); |
3475 | if (dh == NULL) |
3476 | break; |
3477 | |
3478 | ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport; |
3479 | ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport; |
3480 | break; |
3481 | } |
3482 | |
3483 | default: |
3484 | break; |
3485 | } |
3486 | out: |
3487 | return ret; |
3488 | } |
3489 | |
3490 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
3491 | |
3492 | /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ |
3493 | static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, |
3494 | struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) |
3495 | { |
3496 | u8 nexthdr; |
3497 | int ret = -EINVAL, offset; |
3498 | struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6; |
3499 | |
3500 | offset = skb_network_offset(skb); |
3501 | ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h); |
3502 | if (ip6 == NULL) |
3503 | goto out; |
3504 | |
3505 | ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr); |
3506 | ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr); |
3507 | ret = 0; |
3508 | |
3509 | nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr; |
3510 | offset += sizeof(_ipv6h); |
3511 | offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr); |
3512 | if (offset < 0) |
3513 | goto out; |
3514 | |
3515 | if (proto) |
3516 | *proto = nexthdr; |
3517 | |
3518 | switch (nexthdr) { |
3519 | case IPPROTO_TCP: { |
3520 | struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; |
3521 | |
3522 | th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); |
3523 | if (th == NULL) |
3524 | break; |
3525 | |
3526 | ad->u.net.sport = th->source; |
3527 | ad->u.net.dport = th->dest; |
3528 | break; |
3529 | } |
3530 | |
3531 | case IPPROTO_UDP: { |
3532 | struct udphdr _udph, *uh; |
3533 | |
3534 | uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); |
3535 | if (uh == NULL) |
3536 | break; |
3537 | |
3538 | ad->u.net.sport = uh->source; |
3539 | ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest; |
3540 | break; |
3541 | } |
3542 | |
3543 | case IPPROTO_DCCP: { |
3544 | struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh; |
3545 | |
3546 | dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph); |
3547 | if (dh == NULL) |
3548 | break; |
3549 | |
3550 | ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport; |
3551 | ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport; |
3552 | break; |
3553 | } |
3554 | |
3555 | /* includes fragments */ |
3556 | default: |
3557 | break; |
3558 | } |
3559 | out: |
3560 | return ret; |
3561 | } |
3562 | |
3563 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
3564 | |
3565 | static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, |
3566 | char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto) |
3567 | { |
3568 | char *addrp; |
3569 | int ret; |
3570 | |
3571 | switch (ad->u.net.family) { |
3572 | case PF_INET: |
3573 | ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto); |
3574 | if (ret) |
3575 | goto parse_error; |
3576 | addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr : |
3577 | &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr); |
3578 | goto okay; |
3579 | |
3580 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
3581 | case PF_INET6: |
3582 | ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto); |
3583 | if (ret) |
3584 | goto parse_error; |
3585 | addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr : |
3586 | &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr); |
3587 | goto okay; |
3588 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
3589 | default: |
3590 | addrp = NULL; |
3591 | goto okay; |
3592 | } |
3593 | |
3594 | parse_error: |
3595 | printk(KERN_WARNING |
3596 | "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb()," |
3597 | " unable to parse packet\n"); |
3598 | return ret; |
3599 | |
3600 | okay: |
3601 | if (_addrp) |
3602 | *_addrp = addrp; |
3603 | return 0; |
3604 | } |
3605 | |
3606 | /** |
3607 | * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet |
3608 | * @skb: the packet |
3609 | * @family: protocol family |
3610 | * @sid: the packet's peer label SID |
3611 | * |
3612 | * Description: |
3613 | * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine |
3614 | * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in |
3615 | * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function |
3616 | * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL) |
3617 | * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different |
3618 | * peer labels. |
3619 | * |
3620 | */ |
3621 | static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid) |
3622 | { |
3623 | int err; |
3624 | u32 xfrm_sid; |
3625 | u32 nlbl_sid; |
3626 | u32 nlbl_type; |
3627 | |
3628 | selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid); |
3629 | selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid); |
3630 | |
3631 | err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid); |
3632 | if (unlikely(err)) { |
3633 | printk(KERN_WARNING |
3634 | "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid()," |
3635 | " unable to determine packet's peer label\n"); |
3636 | return -EACCES; |
3637 | } |
3638 | |
3639 | return 0; |
3640 | } |
3641 | |
3642 | /* socket security operations */ |
3643 | |
3644 | static u32 socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec) |
3645 | { |
3646 | return tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid; |
3647 | } |
3648 | |
3649 | static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms) |
3650 | { |
3651 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
3652 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
3653 | u32 tsid = task_sid(task); |
3654 | |
3655 | if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) |
3656 | return 0; |
3657 | |
3658 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); |
3659 | ad.u.net.sk = sk; |
3660 | |
3661 | return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad); |
3662 | } |
3663 | |
3664 | static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type, |
3665 | int protocol, int kern) |
3666 | { |
3667 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); |
3668 | u32 newsid; |
3669 | u16 secclass; |
3670 | |
3671 | if (kern) |
3672 | return 0; |
3673 | |
3674 | newsid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec); |
3675 | secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); |
3676 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); |
3677 | } |
3678 | |
3679 | static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, |
3680 | int type, int protocol, int kern) |
3681 | { |
3682 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); |
3683 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; |
3684 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec; |
3685 | int err = 0; |
3686 | |
3687 | if (kern) |
3688 | isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; |
3689 | else |
3690 | isec->sid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec); |
3691 | |
3692 | isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); |
3693 | isec->initialized = 1; |
3694 | |
3695 | if (sock->sk) { |
3696 | sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; |
3697 | sksec->sid = isec->sid; |
3698 | sksec->sclass = isec->sclass; |
3699 | err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family); |
3700 | } |
3701 | |
3702 | return err; |
3703 | } |
3704 | |
3705 | /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind. |
3706 | Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind |
3707 | permission check between the socket and the port number. */ |
3708 | |
3709 | static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) |
3710 | { |
3711 | struct sock *sk = sock->sk; |
3712 | u16 family; |
3713 | int err; |
3714 | |
3715 | err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND); |
3716 | if (err) |
3717 | goto out; |
3718 | |
3719 | /* |
3720 | * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. |
3721 | * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just |
3722 | * check the first address now. |
3723 | */ |
3724 | family = sk->sk_family; |
3725 | if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) { |
3726 | char *addrp; |
3727 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
3728 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
3729 | struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; |
3730 | struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; |
3731 | unsigned short snum; |
3732 | u32 sid, node_perm; |
3733 | |
3734 | if (family == PF_INET) { |
3735 | addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; |
3736 | snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); |
3737 | addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; |
3738 | } else { |
3739 | addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; |
3740 | snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); |
3741 | addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr; |
3742 | } |
3743 | |
3744 | if (snum) { |
3745 | int low, high; |
3746 | |
3747 | inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high); |
3748 | |
3749 | if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) { |
3750 | err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, |
3751 | snum, &sid); |
3752 | if (err) |
3753 | goto out; |
3754 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); |
3755 | ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum); |
3756 | ad.u.net.family = family; |
3757 | err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, |
3758 | sksec->sclass, |
3759 | SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad); |
3760 | if (err) |
3761 | goto out; |
3762 | } |
3763 | } |
3764 | |
3765 | switch (sksec->sclass) { |
3766 | case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: |
3767 | node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; |
3768 | break; |
3769 | |
3770 | case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET: |
3771 | node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; |
3772 | break; |
3773 | |
3774 | case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET: |
3775 | node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; |
3776 | break; |
3777 | |
3778 | default: |
3779 | node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; |
3780 | break; |
3781 | } |
3782 | |
3783 | err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid); |
3784 | if (err) |
3785 | goto out; |
3786 | |
3787 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); |
3788 | ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum); |
3789 | ad.u.net.family = family; |
3790 | |
3791 | if (family == PF_INET) |
3792 | ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; |
3793 | else |
3794 | ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr); |
3795 | |
3796 | err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, |
3797 | sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad); |
3798 | if (err) |
3799 | goto out; |
3800 | } |
3801 | out: |
3802 | return err; |
3803 | } |
3804 | |
3805 | static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) |
3806 | { |
3807 | struct sock *sk = sock->sk; |
3808 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
3809 | int err; |
3810 | |
3811 | err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT); |
3812 | if (err) |
3813 | return err; |
3814 | |
3815 | /* |
3816 | * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port. |
3817 | */ |
3818 | if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET || |
3819 | sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) { |
3820 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
3821 | struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; |
3822 | struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; |
3823 | unsigned short snum; |
3824 | u32 sid, perm; |
3825 | |
3826 | if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) { |
3827 | addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; |
3828 | if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) |
3829 | return -EINVAL; |
3830 | snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); |
3831 | } else { |
3832 | addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; |
3833 | if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) |
3834 | return -EINVAL; |
3835 | snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); |
3836 | } |
3837 | |
3838 | err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid); |
3839 | if (err) |
3840 | goto out; |
3841 | |
3842 | perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ? |
3843 | TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; |
3844 | |
3845 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); |
3846 | ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum); |
3847 | ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family; |
3848 | err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad); |
3849 | if (err) |
3850 | goto out; |
3851 | } |
3852 | |
3853 | err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address); |
3854 | |
3855 | out: |
3856 | return err; |
3857 | } |
3858 | |
3859 | static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) |
3860 | { |
3861 | return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN); |
3862 | } |
3863 | |
3864 | static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) |
3865 | { |
3866 | int err; |
3867 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
3868 | struct inode_security_struct *newisec; |
3869 | |
3870 | err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT); |
3871 | if (err) |
3872 | return err; |
3873 | |
3874 | newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security; |
3875 | |
3876 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; |
3877 | newisec->sclass = isec->sclass; |
3878 | newisec->sid = isec->sid; |
3879 | newisec->initialized = 1; |
3880 | |
3881 | return 0; |
3882 | } |
3883 | |
3884 | static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, |
3885 | int size) |
3886 | { |
3887 | return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE); |
3888 | } |
3889 | |
3890 | static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, |
3891 | int size, int flags) |
3892 | { |
3893 | return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ); |
3894 | } |
3895 | |
3896 | static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) |
3897 | { |
3898 | return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR); |
3899 | } |
3900 | |
3901 | static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) |
3902 | { |
3903 | return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR); |
3904 | } |
3905 | |
3906 | static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) |
3907 | { |
3908 | int err; |
3909 | |
3910 | err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT); |
3911 | if (err) |
3912 | return err; |
3913 | |
3914 | return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname); |
3915 | } |
3916 | |
3917 | static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, |
3918 | int optname) |
3919 | { |
3920 | return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT); |
3921 | } |
3922 | |
3923 | static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) |
3924 | { |
3925 | return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN); |
3926 | } |
3927 | |
3928 | static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, |
3929 | struct socket *other, |
3930 | struct sock *newsk) |
3931 | { |
3932 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk->sk_security; |
3933 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk->sk_security; |
3934 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security; |
3935 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
3936 | int err; |
3937 | |
3938 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); |
3939 | ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; |
3940 | |
3941 | err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid, |
3942 | sksec_other->sclass, |
3943 | UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad); |
3944 | if (err) |
3945 | return err; |
3946 | |
3947 | /* server child socket */ |
3948 | sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid; |
3949 | err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid, |
3950 | &sksec_new->sid); |
3951 | if (err) |
3952 | return err; |
3953 | |
3954 | /* connecting socket */ |
3955 | sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid; |
3956 | |
3957 | return 0; |
3958 | } |
3959 | |
3960 | static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, |
3961 | struct socket *other) |
3962 | { |
3963 | struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; |
3964 | struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security; |
3965 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
3966 | |
3967 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); |
3968 | ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; |
3969 | |
3970 | return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, |
3971 | &ad); |
3972 | } |
3973 | |
3974 | static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family, |
3975 | u32 peer_sid, |
3976 | struct common_audit_data *ad) |
3977 | { |
3978 | int err; |
3979 | u32 if_sid; |
3980 | u32 node_sid; |
3981 | |
3982 | err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid); |
3983 | if (err) |
3984 | return err; |
3985 | err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid, |
3986 | SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad); |
3987 | if (err) |
3988 | return err; |
3989 | |
3990 | err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid); |
3991 | if (err) |
3992 | return err; |
3993 | return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid, |
3994 | SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad); |
3995 | } |
3996 | |
3997 | static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, |
3998 | u16 family) |
3999 | { |
4000 | int err = 0; |
4001 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4002 | u32 peer_sid; |
4003 | u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; |
4004 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4005 | char *addrp; |
4006 | |
4007 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); |
4008 | ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif; |
4009 | ad.u.net.family = family; |
4010 | err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); |
4011 | if (err) |
4012 | return err; |
4013 | |
4014 | if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) { |
4015 | err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, |
4016 | PACKET__RECV, &ad); |
4017 | if (err) |
4018 | return err; |
4019 | } |
4020 | |
4021 | if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) { |
4022 | err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid); |
4023 | if (err) |
4024 | return err; |
4025 | err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, |
4026 | SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad); |
4027 | if (err) |
4028 | selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0); |
4029 | } else { |
4030 | err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad); |
4031 | if (err) |
4032 | return err; |
4033 | err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad); |
4034 | } |
4035 | |
4036 | return err; |
4037 | } |
4038 | |
4039 | static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) |
4040 | { |
4041 | int err; |
4042 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4043 | u16 family = sk->sk_family; |
4044 | u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; |
4045 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4046 | char *addrp; |
4047 | u8 secmark_active; |
4048 | u8 peerlbl_active; |
4049 | |
4050 | if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6) |
4051 | return 0; |
4052 | |
4053 | /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ |
4054 | if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) |
4055 | family = PF_INET; |
4056 | |
4057 | /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing |
4058 | * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the |
4059 | * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function |
4060 | * as fast and as clean as possible. */ |
4061 | if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer) |
4062 | return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family); |
4063 | |
4064 | secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); |
4065 | peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled(); |
4066 | if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) |
4067 | return 0; |
4068 | |
4069 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); |
4070 | ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif; |
4071 | ad.u.net.family = family; |
4072 | err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); |
4073 | if (err) |
4074 | return err; |
4075 | |
4076 | if (peerlbl_active) { |
4077 | u32 peer_sid; |
4078 | |
4079 | err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid); |
4080 | if (err) |
4081 | return err; |
4082 | err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family, |
4083 | peer_sid, &ad); |
4084 | if (err) { |
4085 | selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0); |
4086 | return err; |
4087 | } |
4088 | err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER, |
4089 | PEER__RECV, &ad); |
4090 | if (err) |
4091 | selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0); |
4092 | } |
4093 | |
4094 | if (secmark_active) { |
4095 | err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, |
4096 | PACKET__RECV, &ad); |
4097 | if (err) |
4098 | return err; |
4099 | } |
4100 | |
4101 | return err; |
4102 | } |
4103 | |
4104 | static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, |
4105 | int __user *optlen, unsigned len) |
4106 | { |
4107 | int err = 0; |
4108 | char *scontext; |
4109 | u32 scontext_len; |
4110 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; |
4111 | u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL; |
4112 | |
4113 | if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET || |
4114 | sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) |
4115 | peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid; |
4116 | if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) |
4117 | return -ENOPROTOOPT; |
4118 | |
4119 | err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len); |
4120 | if (err) |
4121 | return err; |
4122 | |
4123 | if (scontext_len > len) { |
4124 | err = -ERANGE; |
4125 | goto out_len; |
4126 | } |
4127 | |
4128 | if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len)) |
4129 | err = -EFAULT; |
4130 | |
4131 | out_len: |
4132 | if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen)) |
4133 | err = -EFAULT; |
4134 | kfree(scontext); |
4135 | return err; |
4136 | } |
4137 | |
4138 | static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) |
4139 | { |
4140 | u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL; |
4141 | u16 family; |
4142 | |
4143 | if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) |
4144 | family = PF_INET; |
4145 | else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) |
4146 | family = PF_INET6; |
4147 | else if (sock) |
4148 | family = sock->sk->sk_family; |
4149 | else |
4150 | goto out; |
4151 | |
4152 | if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) |
4153 | selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid); |
4154 | else if (skb) |
4155 | selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid); |
4156 | |
4157 | out: |
4158 | *secid = peer_secid; |
4159 | if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL) |
4160 | return -EINVAL; |
4161 | return 0; |
4162 | } |
4163 | |
4164 | static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) |
4165 | { |
4166 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec; |
4167 | |
4168 | sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority); |
4169 | if (!sksec) |
4170 | return -ENOMEM; |
4171 | |
4172 | sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
4173 | sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
4174 | selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec); |
4175 | sk->sk_security = sksec; |
4176 | |
4177 | return 0; |
4178 | } |
4179 | |
4180 | static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) |
4181 | { |
4182 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4183 | |
4184 | sk->sk_security = NULL; |
4185 | selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec); |
4186 | kfree(sksec); |
4187 | } |
4188 | |
4189 | static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) |
4190 | { |
4191 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4192 | struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; |
4193 | |
4194 | newsksec->sid = sksec->sid; |
4195 | newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid; |
4196 | newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass; |
4197 | |
4198 | selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec); |
4199 | } |
4200 | |
4201 | static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid) |
4202 | { |
4203 | if (!sk) |
4204 | *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET; |
4205 | else { |
4206 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4207 | |
4208 | *secid = sksec->sid; |
4209 | } |
4210 | } |
4211 | |
4212 | static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) |
4213 | { |
4214 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security; |
4215 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4216 | |
4217 | if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 || |
4218 | sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) |
4219 | isec->sid = sksec->sid; |
4220 | sksec->sclass = isec->sclass; |
4221 | } |
4222 | |
4223 | static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, |
4224 | struct request_sock *req) |
4225 | { |
4226 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4227 | int err; |
4228 | u16 family = sk->sk_family; |
4229 | u32 newsid; |
4230 | u32 peersid; |
4231 | |
4232 | /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ |
4233 | if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) |
4234 | family = PF_INET; |
4235 | |
4236 | err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid); |
4237 | if (err) |
4238 | return err; |
4239 | if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) { |
4240 | req->secid = sksec->sid; |
4241 | req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL; |
4242 | } else { |
4243 | err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid); |
4244 | if (err) |
4245 | return err; |
4246 | req->secid = newsid; |
4247 | req->peer_secid = peersid; |
4248 | } |
4249 | |
4250 | return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family); |
4251 | } |
4252 | |
4253 | static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, |
4254 | const struct request_sock *req) |
4255 | { |
4256 | struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; |
4257 | |
4258 | newsksec->sid = req->secid; |
4259 | newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid; |
4260 | /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the |
4261 | new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet. |
4262 | So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which |
4263 | time it will have been created and available. */ |
4264 | |
4265 | /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only |
4266 | * thread with access to newsksec */ |
4267 | selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family); |
4268 | } |
4269 | |
4270 | static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) |
4271 | { |
4272 | u16 family = sk->sk_family; |
4273 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4274 | |
4275 | /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ |
4276 | if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) |
4277 | family = PF_INET; |
4278 | |
4279 | selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid); |
4280 | } |
4281 | |
4282 | static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, |
4283 | struct flowi *fl) |
4284 | { |
4285 | fl->secid = req->secid; |
4286 | } |
4287 | |
4288 | static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void) |
4289 | { |
4290 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
4291 | |
4292 | /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket |
4293 | * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense, |
4294 | * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and |
4295 | * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple |
4296 | * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to |
4297 | * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */ |
4298 | |
4299 | return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE, |
4300 | NULL); |
4301 | } |
4302 | |
4303 | static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk) |
4304 | { |
4305 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4306 | |
4307 | /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it |
4308 | * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply |
4309 | * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled |
4310 | * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly |
4311 | * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling |
4312 | * protocols were being used */ |
4313 | |
4314 | /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use |
4315 | * the sockcreate SID here */ |
4316 | |
4317 | sksec->sid = current_sid(); |
4318 | sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET; |
4319 | } |
4320 | |
4321 | static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk) |
4322 | { |
4323 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4324 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
4325 | int err; |
4326 | |
4327 | err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, |
4328 | TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL); |
4329 | if (err) |
4330 | return err; |
4331 | err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, |
4332 | TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL); |
4333 | if (err) |
4334 | return err; |
4335 | |
4336 | sksec->sid = sid; |
4337 | |
4338 | return 0; |
4339 | } |
4340 | |
4341 | static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) |
4342 | { |
4343 | int err = 0; |
4344 | u32 perm; |
4345 | struct nlmsghdr *nlh; |
4346 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4347 | |
4348 | if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) { |
4349 | err = -EINVAL; |
4350 | goto out; |
4351 | } |
4352 | nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb); |
4353 | |
4354 | err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm); |
4355 | if (err) { |
4356 | if (err == -EINVAL) { |
4357 | audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, |
4358 | "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message" |
4359 | " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n", |
4360 | nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass); |
4361 | if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown()) |
4362 | err = 0; |
4363 | } |
4364 | |
4365 | /* Ignore */ |
4366 | if (err == -ENOENT) |
4367 | err = 0; |
4368 | goto out; |
4369 | } |
4370 | |
4371 | err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm); |
4372 | out: |
4373 | return err; |
4374 | } |
4375 | |
4376 | #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER |
4377 | |
4378 | static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, |
4379 | u16 family) |
4380 | { |
4381 | int err; |
4382 | char *addrp; |
4383 | u32 peer_sid; |
4384 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4385 | u8 secmark_active; |
4386 | u8 netlbl_active; |
4387 | u8 peerlbl_active; |
4388 | |
4389 | if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer) |
4390 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4391 | |
4392 | secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); |
4393 | netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled(); |
4394 | peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled(); |
4395 | if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) |
4396 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4397 | |
4398 | if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0) |
4399 | return NF_DROP; |
4400 | |
4401 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); |
4402 | ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; |
4403 | ad.u.net.family = family; |
4404 | if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0) |
4405 | return NF_DROP; |
4406 | |
4407 | if (peerlbl_active) { |
4408 | err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family, |
4409 | peer_sid, &ad); |
4410 | if (err) { |
4411 | selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1); |
4412 | return NF_DROP; |
4413 | } |
4414 | } |
4415 | |
4416 | if (secmark_active) |
4417 | if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark, |
4418 | SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad)) |
4419 | return NF_DROP; |
4420 | |
4421 | if (netlbl_active) |
4422 | /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING |
4423 | * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary |
4424 | * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH |
4425 | * protection */ |
4426 | if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0) |
4427 | return NF_DROP; |
4428 | |
4429 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4430 | } |
4431 | |
4432 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum, |
4433 | struct sk_buff *skb, |
4434 | const struct net_device *in, |
4435 | const struct net_device *out, |
4436 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) |
4437 | { |
4438 | return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET); |
4439 | } |
4440 | |
4441 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
4442 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum, |
4443 | struct sk_buff *skb, |
4444 | const struct net_device *in, |
4445 | const struct net_device *out, |
4446 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) |
4447 | { |
4448 | return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6); |
4449 | } |
4450 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
4451 | |
4452 | static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb, |
4453 | u16 family) |
4454 | { |
4455 | u32 sid; |
4456 | |
4457 | if (!netlbl_enabled()) |
4458 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4459 | |
4460 | /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path |
4461 | * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling |
4462 | * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */ |
4463 | if (skb->sk) { |
4464 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security; |
4465 | sid = sksec->sid; |
4466 | } else |
4467 | sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; |
4468 | if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0) |
4469 | return NF_DROP; |
4470 | |
4471 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4472 | } |
4473 | |
4474 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum, |
4475 | struct sk_buff *skb, |
4476 | const struct net_device *in, |
4477 | const struct net_device *out, |
4478 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) |
4479 | { |
4480 | return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET); |
4481 | } |
4482 | |
4483 | static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, |
4484 | int ifindex, |
4485 | u16 family) |
4486 | { |
4487 | struct sock *sk = skb->sk; |
4488 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec; |
4489 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4490 | char *addrp; |
4491 | u8 proto; |
4492 | |
4493 | if (sk == NULL) |
4494 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4495 | sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4496 | |
4497 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); |
4498 | ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; |
4499 | ad.u.net.family = family; |
4500 | if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto)) |
4501 | return NF_DROP; |
4502 | |
4503 | if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) |
4504 | if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, |
4505 | SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad)) |
4506 | return NF_DROP; |
4507 | |
4508 | if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) |
4509 | if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto)) |
4510 | return NF_DROP; |
4511 | |
4512 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4513 | } |
4514 | |
4515 | static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, |
4516 | u16 family) |
4517 | { |
4518 | u32 secmark_perm; |
4519 | u32 peer_sid; |
4520 | struct sock *sk; |
4521 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4522 | char *addrp; |
4523 | u8 secmark_active; |
4524 | u8 peerlbl_active; |
4525 | |
4526 | /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing |
4527 | * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the |
4528 | * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function |
4529 | * as fast and as clean as possible. */ |
4530 | if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer) |
4531 | return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family); |
4532 | #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM |
4533 | /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec |
4534 | * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks |
4535 | * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks |
4536 | * when the packet is on it's final way out. |
4537 | * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst |
4538 | * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */ |
4539 | if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL) |
4540 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4541 | #endif |
4542 | secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); |
4543 | peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled(); |
4544 | if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) |
4545 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4546 | |
4547 | /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the |
4548 | * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local |
4549 | * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label |
4550 | * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */ |
4551 | sk = skb->sk; |
4552 | if (sk == NULL) { |
4553 | switch (family) { |
4554 | case PF_INET: |
4555 | if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED) |
4556 | secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT; |
4557 | else |
4558 | secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; |
4559 | break; |
4560 | case PF_INET6: |
4561 | if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED) |
4562 | secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT; |
4563 | else |
4564 | secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; |
4565 | break; |
4566 | default: |
4567 | return NF_DROP; |
4568 | } |
4569 | if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) { |
4570 | if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid)) |
4571 | return NF_DROP; |
4572 | } else |
4573 | peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; |
4574 | } else { |
4575 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4576 | peer_sid = sksec->sid; |
4577 | secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; |
4578 | } |
4579 | |
4580 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); |
4581 | ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; |
4582 | ad.u.net.family = family; |
4583 | if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL)) |
4584 | return NF_DROP; |
4585 | |
4586 | if (secmark_active) |
4587 | if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark, |
4588 | SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad)) |
4589 | return NF_DROP; |
4590 | |
4591 | if (peerlbl_active) { |
4592 | u32 if_sid; |
4593 | u32 node_sid; |
4594 | |
4595 | if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid)) |
4596 | return NF_DROP; |
4597 | if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid, |
4598 | SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad)) |
4599 | return NF_DROP; |
4600 | |
4601 | if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid)) |
4602 | return NF_DROP; |
4603 | if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid, |
4604 | SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad)) |
4605 | return NF_DROP; |
4606 | } |
4607 | |
4608 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4609 | } |
4610 | |
4611 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum, |
4612 | struct sk_buff *skb, |
4613 | const struct net_device *in, |
4614 | const struct net_device *out, |
4615 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) |
4616 | { |
4617 | return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET); |
4618 | } |
4619 | |
4620 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
4621 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum, |
4622 | struct sk_buff *skb, |
4623 | const struct net_device *in, |
4624 | const struct net_device *out, |
4625 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) |
4626 | { |
4627 | return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6); |
4628 | } |
4629 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
4630 | |
4631 | #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ |
4632 | |
4633 | static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) |
4634 | { |
4635 | int err; |
4636 | |
4637 | err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb); |
4638 | if (err) |
4639 | return err; |
4640 | |
4641 | return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb); |
4642 | } |
4643 | |
4644 | static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability) |
4645 | { |
4646 | int err; |
4647 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4648 | |
4649 | err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability); |
4650 | if (err) |
4651 | return err; |
4652 | |
4653 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP); |
4654 | ad.u.cap = capability; |
4655 | |
4656 | return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, |
4657 | SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad); |
4658 | } |
4659 | |
4660 | static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task, |
4661 | struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, |
4662 | u16 sclass) |
4663 | { |
4664 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
4665 | u32 sid; |
4666 | |
4667 | isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
4668 | if (!isec) |
4669 | return -ENOMEM; |
4670 | |
4671 | sid = task_sid(task); |
4672 | isec->sclass = sclass; |
4673 | isec->sid = sid; |
4674 | perm->security = isec; |
4675 | |
4676 | return 0; |
4677 | } |
4678 | |
4679 | static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm) |
4680 | { |
4681 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security; |
4682 | perm->security = NULL; |
4683 | kfree(isec); |
4684 | } |
4685 | |
4686 | static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) |
4687 | { |
4688 | struct msg_security_struct *msec; |
4689 | |
4690 | msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
4691 | if (!msec) |
4692 | return -ENOMEM; |
4693 | |
4694 | msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
4695 | msg->security = msec; |
4696 | |
4697 | return 0; |
4698 | } |
4699 | |
4700 | static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg) |
4701 | { |
4702 | struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security; |
4703 | |
4704 | msg->security = NULL; |
4705 | kfree(msec); |
4706 | } |
4707 | |
4708 | static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms, |
4709 | u32 perms) |
4710 | { |
4711 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
4712 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4713 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
4714 | |
4715 | isec = ipc_perms->security; |
4716 | |
4717 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); |
4718 | ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key; |
4719 | |
4720 | return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad); |
4721 | } |
4722 | |
4723 | static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) |
4724 | { |
4725 | return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg); |
4726 | } |
4727 | |
4728 | static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg) |
4729 | { |
4730 | msg_msg_free_security(msg); |
4731 | } |
4732 | |
4733 | /* message queue security operations */ |
4734 | static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq) |
4735 | { |
4736 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
4737 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4738 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
4739 | int rc; |
4740 | |
4741 | rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ); |
4742 | if (rc) |
4743 | return rc; |
4744 | |
4745 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; |
4746 | |
4747 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); |
4748 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; |
4749 | |
4750 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, |
4751 | MSGQ__CREATE, &ad); |
4752 | if (rc) { |
4753 | ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm); |
4754 | return rc; |
4755 | } |
4756 | return 0; |
4757 | } |
4758 | |
4759 | static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq) |
4760 | { |
4761 | ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm); |
4762 | } |
4763 | |
4764 | static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg) |
4765 | { |
4766 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
4767 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4768 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
4769 | |
4770 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; |
4771 | |
4772 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); |
4773 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; |
4774 | |
4775 | return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, |
4776 | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad); |
4777 | } |
4778 | |
4779 | static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd) |
4780 | { |
4781 | int err; |
4782 | int perms; |
4783 | |
4784 | switch (cmd) { |
4785 | case IPC_INFO: |
4786 | case MSG_INFO: |
4787 | /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ |
4788 | return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO); |
4789 | case IPC_STAT: |
4790 | case MSG_STAT: |
4791 | perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE; |
4792 | break; |
4793 | case IPC_SET: |
4794 | perms = MSGQ__SETATTR; |
4795 | break; |
4796 | case IPC_RMID: |
4797 | perms = MSGQ__DESTROY; |
4798 | break; |
4799 | default: |
4800 | return 0; |
4801 | } |
4802 | |
4803 | err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms); |
4804 | return err; |
4805 | } |
4806 | |
4807 | static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) |
4808 | { |
4809 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
4810 | struct msg_security_struct *msec; |
4811 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4812 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
4813 | int rc; |
4814 | |
4815 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; |
4816 | msec = msg->security; |
4817 | |
4818 | /* |
4819 | * First time through, need to assign label to the message |
4820 | */ |
4821 | if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) { |
4822 | /* |
4823 | * Compute new sid based on current process and |
4824 | * message queue this message will be stored in |
4825 | */ |
4826 | rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, |
4827 | &msec->sid); |
4828 | if (rc) |
4829 | return rc; |
4830 | } |
4831 | |
4832 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); |
4833 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; |
4834 | |
4835 | /* Can this process write to the queue? */ |
4836 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, |
4837 | MSGQ__WRITE, &ad); |
4838 | if (!rc) |
4839 | /* Can this process send the message */ |
4840 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, |
4841 | MSG__SEND, &ad); |
4842 | if (!rc) |
4843 | /* Can the message be put in the queue? */ |
4844 | rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, |
4845 | MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad); |
4846 | |
4847 | return rc; |
4848 | } |
4849 | |
4850 | static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, |
4851 | struct task_struct *target, |
4852 | long type, int mode) |
4853 | { |
4854 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
4855 | struct msg_security_struct *msec; |
4856 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4857 | u32 sid = task_sid(target); |
4858 | int rc; |
4859 | |
4860 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; |
4861 | msec = msg->security; |
4862 | |
4863 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); |
4864 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; |
4865 | |
4866 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, |
4867 | SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad); |
4868 | if (!rc) |
4869 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, |
4870 | SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad); |
4871 | return rc; |
4872 | } |
4873 | |
4874 | /* Shared Memory security operations */ |
4875 | static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) |
4876 | { |
4877 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
4878 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4879 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
4880 | int rc; |
4881 | |
4882 | rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM); |
4883 | if (rc) |
4884 | return rc; |
4885 | |
4886 | isec = shp->shm_perm.security; |
4887 | |
4888 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); |
4889 | ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key; |
4890 | |
4891 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, |
4892 | SHM__CREATE, &ad); |
4893 | if (rc) { |
4894 | ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm); |
4895 | return rc; |
4896 | } |
4897 | return 0; |
4898 | } |
4899 | |
4900 | static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) |
4901 | { |
4902 | ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm); |
4903 | } |
4904 | |
4905 | static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg) |
4906 | { |
4907 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
4908 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4909 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
4910 | |
4911 | isec = shp->shm_perm.security; |
4912 | |
4913 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); |
4914 | ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key; |
4915 | |
4916 | return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, |
4917 | SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); |
4918 | } |
4919 | |
4920 | /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */ |
4921 | static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd) |
4922 | { |
4923 | int perms; |
4924 | int err; |
4925 | |
4926 | switch (cmd) { |
4927 | case IPC_INFO: |
4928 | case SHM_INFO: |
4929 | /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ |
4930 | return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO); |
4931 | case IPC_STAT: |
4932 | case SHM_STAT: |
4933 | perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE; |
4934 | break; |
4935 | case IPC_SET: |
4936 | perms = SHM__SETATTR; |
4937 | break; |
4938 | case SHM_LOCK: |
4939 | case SHM_UNLOCK: |
4940 | perms = SHM__LOCK; |
4941 | break; |
4942 | case IPC_RMID: |
4943 | perms = SHM__DESTROY; |
4944 | break; |
4945 | default: |
4946 | return 0; |
4947 | } |
4948 | |
4949 | err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms); |
4950 | return err; |
4951 | } |
4952 | |
4953 | static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, |
4954 | char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) |
4955 | { |
4956 | u32 perms; |
4957 | |
4958 | if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY) |
4959 | perms = SHM__READ; |
4960 | else |
4961 | perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE; |
4962 | |
4963 | return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms); |
4964 | } |
4965 | |
4966 | /* Semaphore security operations */ |
4967 | static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma) |
4968 | { |
4969 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
4970 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4971 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
4972 | int rc; |
4973 | |
4974 | rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM); |
4975 | if (rc) |
4976 | return rc; |
4977 | |
4978 | isec = sma->sem_perm.security; |
4979 | |
4980 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); |
4981 | ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key; |
4982 | |
4983 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, |
4984 | SEM__CREATE, &ad); |
4985 | if (rc) { |
4986 | ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm); |
4987 | return rc; |
4988 | } |
4989 | return 0; |
4990 | } |
4991 | |
4992 | static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma) |
4993 | { |
4994 | ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm); |
4995 | } |
4996 | |
4997 | static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg) |
4998 | { |
4999 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
5000 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
5001 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
5002 | |
5003 | isec = sma->sem_perm.security; |
5004 | |
5005 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); |
5006 | ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key; |
5007 | |
5008 | return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, |
5009 | SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); |
5010 | } |
5011 | |
5012 | /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */ |
5013 | static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd) |
5014 | { |
5015 | int err; |
5016 | u32 perms; |
5017 | |
5018 | switch (cmd) { |
5019 | case IPC_INFO: |
5020 | case SEM_INFO: |
5021 | /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ |
5022 | return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO); |
5023 | case GETPID: |
5024 | case GETNCNT: |
5025 | case GETZCNT: |
5026 | perms = SEM__GETATTR; |
5027 | break; |
5028 | case GETVAL: |
5029 | case GETALL: |
5030 | perms = SEM__READ; |
5031 | break; |
5032 | case SETVAL: |
5033 | case SETALL: |
5034 | perms = SEM__WRITE; |
5035 | break; |
5036 | case IPC_RMID: |
5037 | perms = SEM__DESTROY; |
5038 | break; |
5039 | case IPC_SET: |
5040 | perms = SEM__SETATTR; |
5041 | break; |
5042 | case IPC_STAT: |
5043 | case SEM_STAT: |
5044 | perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE; |
5045 | break; |
5046 | default: |
5047 | return 0; |
5048 | } |
5049 | |
5050 | err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms); |
5051 | return err; |
5052 | } |
5053 | |
5054 | static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, |
5055 | struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter) |
5056 | { |
5057 | u32 perms; |
5058 | |
5059 | if (alter) |
5060 | perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE; |
5061 | else |
5062 | perms = SEM__READ; |
5063 | |
5064 | return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms); |
5065 | } |
5066 | |
5067 | static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) |
5068 | { |
5069 | u32 av = 0; |
5070 | |
5071 | av = 0; |
5072 | if (flag & S_IRUGO) |
5073 | av |= IPC__UNIX_READ; |
5074 | if (flag & S_IWUGO) |
5075 | av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE; |
5076 | |
5077 | if (av == 0) |
5078 | return 0; |
5079 | |
5080 | return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av); |
5081 | } |
5082 | |
5083 | static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) |
5084 | { |
5085 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security; |
5086 | *secid = isec->sid; |
5087 | } |
5088 | |
5089 | static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) |
5090 | { |
5091 | if (inode) |
5092 | inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry); |
5093 | } |
5094 | |
5095 | static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, |
5096 | char *name, char **value) |
5097 | { |
5098 | const struct task_security_struct *__tsec; |
5099 | u32 sid; |
5100 | int error; |
5101 | unsigned len; |
5102 | |
5103 | if (current != p) { |
5104 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR); |
5105 | if (error) |
5106 | return error; |
5107 | } |
5108 | |
5109 | rcu_read_lock(); |
5110 | __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security; |
5111 | |
5112 | if (!strcmp(name, "current")) |
5113 | sid = __tsec->sid; |
5114 | else if (!strcmp(name, "prev")) |
5115 | sid = __tsec->osid; |
5116 | else if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) |
5117 | sid = __tsec->exec_sid; |
5118 | else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) |
5119 | sid = __tsec->create_sid; |
5120 | else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) |
5121 | sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid; |
5122 | else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) |
5123 | sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid; |
5124 | else |
5125 | goto invalid; |
5126 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
5127 | |
5128 | if (!sid) |
5129 | return 0; |
5130 | |
5131 | error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len); |
5132 | if (error) |
5133 | return error; |
5134 | return len; |
5135 | |
5136 | invalid: |
5137 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
5138 | return -EINVAL; |
5139 | } |
5140 | |
5141 | static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, |
5142 | char *name, void *value, size_t size) |
5143 | { |
5144 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
5145 | struct task_struct *tracer; |
5146 | struct cred *new; |
5147 | u32 sid = 0, ptsid; |
5148 | int error; |
5149 | char *str = value; |
5150 | |
5151 | if (current != p) { |
5152 | /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own |
5153 | security attributes. */ |
5154 | return -EACCES; |
5155 | } |
5156 | |
5157 | /* |
5158 | * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all. |
5159 | * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the |
5160 | * above restriction is ever removed. |
5161 | */ |
5162 | if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) |
5163 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC); |
5164 | else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) |
5165 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE); |
5166 | else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) |
5167 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE); |
5168 | else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) |
5169 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE); |
5170 | else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) |
5171 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT); |
5172 | else |
5173 | error = -EINVAL; |
5174 | if (error) |
5175 | return error; |
5176 | |
5177 | /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */ |
5178 | if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') { |
5179 | if (str[size-1] == '\n') { |
5180 | str[size-1] = 0; |
5181 | size--; |
5182 | } |
5183 | error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid); |
5184 | if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { |
5185 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
5186 | return error; |
5187 | error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, |
5188 | &sid); |
5189 | } |
5190 | if (error) |
5191 | return error; |
5192 | } |
5193 | |
5194 | new = prepare_creds(); |
5195 | if (!new) |
5196 | return -ENOMEM; |
5197 | |
5198 | /* Permission checking based on the specified context is |
5199 | performed during the actual operation (execve, |
5200 | open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the |
5201 | operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve |
5202 | checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The |
5203 | operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */ |
5204 | tsec = new->security; |
5205 | if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) { |
5206 | tsec->exec_sid = sid; |
5207 | } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { |
5208 | tsec->create_sid = sid; |
5209 | } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) { |
5210 | error = may_create_key(sid, p); |
5211 | if (error) |
5212 | goto abort_change; |
5213 | tsec->keycreate_sid = sid; |
5214 | } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) { |
5215 | tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid; |
5216 | } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) { |
5217 | error = -EINVAL; |
5218 | if (sid == 0) |
5219 | goto abort_change; |
5220 | |
5221 | /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */ |
5222 | error = -EPERM; |
5223 | if (!current_is_single_threaded()) { |
5224 | error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid); |
5225 | if (error) |
5226 | goto abort_change; |
5227 | } |
5228 | |
5229 | /* Check permissions for the transition. */ |
5230 | error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, |
5231 | PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL); |
5232 | if (error) |
5233 | goto abort_change; |
5234 | |
5235 | /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok. |
5236 | Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */ |
5237 | ptsid = 0; |
5238 | task_lock(p); |
5239 | tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p); |
5240 | if (tracer) |
5241 | ptsid = task_sid(tracer); |
5242 | task_unlock(p); |
5243 | |
5244 | if (tracer) { |
5245 | error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, |
5246 | PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); |
5247 | if (error) |
5248 | goto abort_change; |
5249 | } |
5250 | |
5251 | tsec->sid = sid; |
5252 | } else { |
5253 | error = -EINVAL; |
5254 | goto abort_change; |
5255 | } |
5256 | |
5257 | commit_creds(new); |
5258 | return size; |
5259 | |
5260 | abort_change: |
5261 | abort_creds(new); |
5262 | return error; |
5263 | } |
5264 | |
5265 | static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) |
5266 | { |
5267 | return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen); |
5268 | } |
5269 | |
5270 | static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) |
5271 | { |
5272 | return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid); |
5273 | } |
5274 | |
5275 | static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) |
5276 | { |
5277 | kfree(secdata); |
5278 | } |
5279 | |
5280 | /* |
5281 | * called with inode->i_mutex locked |
5282 | */ |
5283 | static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) |
5284 | { |
5285 | return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0); |
5286 | } |
5287 | |
5288 | /* |
5289 | * called with inode->i_mutex locked |
5290 | */ |
5291 | static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) |
5292 | { |
5293 | return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0); |
5294 | } |
5295 | |
5296 | static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) |
5297 | { |
5298 | int len = 0; |
5299 | len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, |
5300 | ctx, true); |
5301 | if (len < 0) |
5302 | return len; |
5303 | *ctxlen = len; |
5304 | return 0; |
5305 | } |
5306 | #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS |
5307 | |
5308 | static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred, |
5309 | unsigned long flags) |
5310 | { |
5311 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
5312 | struct key_security_struct *ksec; |
5313 | |
5314 | ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
5315 | if (!ksec) |
5316 | return -ENOMEM; |
5317 | |
5318 | tsec = cred->security; |
5319 | if (tsec->keycreate_sid) |
5320 | ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid; |
5321 | else |
5322 | ksec->sid = tsec->sid; |
5323 | |
5324 | k->security = ksec; |
5325 | return 0; |
5326 | } |
5327 | |
5328 | static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k) |
5329 | { |
5330 | struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security; |
5331 | |
5332 | k->security = NULL; |
5333 | kfree(ksec); |
5334 | } |
5335 | |
5336 | static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, |
5337 | const struct cred *cred, |
5338 | key_perm_t perm) |
5339 | { |
5340 | struct key *key; |
5341 | struct key_security_struct *ksec; |
5342 | u32 sid; |
5343 | |
5344 | /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the |
5345 | permission check. No serious, additional covert channels |
5346 | appear to be created. */ |
5347 | if (perm == 0) |
5348 | return 0; |
5349 | |
5350 | sid = cred_sid(cred); |
5351 | |
5352 | key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); |
5353 | ksec = key->security; |
5354 | |
5355 | return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL); |
5356 | } |
5357 | |
5358 | static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) |
5359 | { |
5360 | struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security; |
5361 | char *context = NULL; |
5362 | unsigned len; |
5363 | int rc; |
5364 | |
5365 | rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len); |
5366 | if (!rc) |
5367 | rc = len; |
5368 | *_buffer = context; |
5369 | return rc; |
5370 | } |
5371 | |
5372 | #endif |
5373 | |
5374 | static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { |
5375 | .name = "selinux", |
5376 | |
5377 | .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check, |
5378 | .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme, |
5379 | .capget = selinux_capget, |
5380 | .capset = selinux_capset, |
5381 | .sysctl = selinux_sysctl, |
5382 | .capable = selinux_capable, |
5383 | .quotactl = selinux_quotactl, |
5384 | .quota_on = selinux_quota_on, |
5385 | .syslog = selinux_syslog, |
5386 | .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory, |
5387 | |
5388 | .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send, |
5389 | .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv, |
5390 | |
5391 | .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds, |
5392 | .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds, |
5393 | .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds, |
5394 | .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec, |
5395 | |
5396 | .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security, |
5397 | .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security, |
5398 | .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data, |
5399 | .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount, |
5400 | .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options, |
5401 | .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs, |
5402 | .sb_mount = selinux_mount, |
5403 | .sb_umount = selinux_umount, |
5404 | .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts, |
5405 | .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts, |
5406 | .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str, |
5407 | |
5408 | |
5409 | .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security, |
5410 | .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security, |
5411 | .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security, |
5412 | .inode_create = selinux_inode_create, |
5413 | .inode_link = selinux_inode_link, |
5414 | .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink, |
5415 | .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink, |
5416 | .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir, |
5417 | .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir, |
5418 | .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod, |
5419 | .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename, |
5420 | .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink, |
5421 | .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link, |
5422 | .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission, |
5423 | .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr, |
5424 | .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr, |
5425 | .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr, |
5426 | .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr, |
5427 | .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr, |
5428 | .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr, |
5429 | .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr, |
5430 | .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity, |
5431 | .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity, |
5432 | .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity, |
5433 | .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid, |
5434 | |
5435 | .file_permission = selinux_file_permission, |
5436 | .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security, |
5437 | .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security, |
5438 | .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl, |
5439 | .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap, |
5440 | .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect, |
5441 | .file_lock = selinux_file_lock, |
5442 | .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl, |
5443 | .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner, |
5444 | .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask, |
5445 | .file_receive = selinux_file_receive, |
5446 | |
5447 | .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open, |
5448 | |
5449 | .task_create = selinux_task_create, |
5450 | .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank, |
5451 | .cred_free = selinux_cred_free, |
5452 | .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare, |
5453 | .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer, |
5454 | .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as, |
5455 | .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as, |
5456 | .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request, |
5457 | .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid, |
5458 | .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid, |
5459 | .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid, |
5460 | .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid, |
5461 | .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice, |
5462 | .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio, |
5463 | .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio, |
5464 | .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit, |
5465 | .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler, |
5466 | .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler, |
5467 | .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory, |
5468 | .task_kill = selinux_task_kill, |
5469 | .task_wait = selinux_task_wait, |
5470 | .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode, |
5471 | |
5472 | .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission, |
5473 | .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid, |
5474 | |
5475 | .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security, |
5476 | .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security, |
5477 | |
5478 | .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security, |
5479 | .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security, |
5480 | .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate, |
5481 | .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl, |
5482 | .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd, |
5483 | .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv, |
5484 | |
5485 | .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security, |
5486 | .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security, |
5487 | .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate, |
5488 | .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl, |
5489 | .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat, |
5490 | |
5491 | .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security, |
5492 | .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security, |
5493 | .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate, |
5494 | .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl, |
5495 | .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop, |
5496 | |
5497 | .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate, |
5498 | |
5499 | .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr, |
5500 | .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr, |
5501 | |
5502 | .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx, |
5503 | .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid, |
5504 | .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx, |
5505 | .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx, |
5506 | .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx, |
5507 | .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx, |
5508 | |
5509 | .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect, |
5510 | .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send, |
5511 | |
5512 | .socket_create = selinux_socket_create, |
5513 | .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create, |
5514 | .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind, |
5515 | .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect, |
5516 | .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen, |
5517 | .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept, |
5518 | .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg, |
5519 | .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg, |
5520 | .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname, |
5521 | .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername, |
5522 | .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt, |
5523 | .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt, |
5524 | .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown, |
5525 | .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb, |
5526 | .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream, |
5527 | .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram, |
5528 | .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security, |
5529 | .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security, |
5530 | .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security, |
5531 | .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid, |
5532 | .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft, |
5533 | .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request, |
5534 | .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone, |
5535 | .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established, |
5536 | .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow, |
5537 | .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create, |
5538 | .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create, |
5539 | .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach, |
5540 | |
5541 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM |
5542 | .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc, |
5543 | .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone, |
5544 | .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free, |
5545 | .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete, |
5546 | .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc, |
5547 | .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free, |
5548 | .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete, |
5549 | .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup, |
5550 | .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, |
5551 | .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session, |
5552 | #endif |
5553 | |
5554 | #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS |
5555 | .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc, |
5556 | .key_free = selinux_key_free, |
5557 | .key_permission = selinux_key_permission, |
5558 | .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity, |
5559 | #endif |
5560 | |
5561 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT |
5562 | .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init, |
5563 | .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known, |
5564 | .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match, |
5565 | .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free, |
5566 | #endif |
5567 | }; |
5568 | |
5569 | static __init int selinux_init(void) |
5570 | { |
5571 | if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) { |
5572 | selinux_enabled = 0; |
5573 | return 0; |
5574 | } |
5575 | |
5576 | if (!selinux_enabled) { |
5577 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n"); |
5578 | return 0; |
5579 | } |
5580 | |
5581 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n"); |
5582 | |
5583 | /* Set the security state for the initial task. */ |
5584 | cred_init_security(); |
5585 | |
5586 | default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC); |
5587 | |
5588 | sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security", |
5589 | sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), |
5590 | 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); |
5591 | avc_init(); |
5592 | |
5593 | if (register_security(&selinux_ops)) |
5594 | panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n"); |
5595 | |
5596 | if (selinux_enforcing) |
5597 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n"); |
5598 | else |
5599 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n"); |
5600 | |
5601 | return 0; |
5602 | } |
5603 | |
5604 | static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused) |
5605 | { |
5606 | superblock_doinit(sb, NULL); |
5607 | } |
5608 | |
5609 | void selinux_complete_init(void) |
5610 | { |
5611 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n"); |
5612 | |
5613 | /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */ |
5614 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n"); |
5615 | iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL); |
5616 | } |
5617 | |
5618 | /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label |
5619 | all processes and objects when they are created. */ |
5620 | security_initcall(selinux_init); |
5621 | |
5622 | #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) |
5623 | |
5624 | static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = { |
5625 | { |
5626 | .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute, |
5627 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, |
5628 | .pf = PF_INET, |
5629 | .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, |
5630 | .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, |
5631 | }, |
5632 | { |
5633 | .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward, |
5634 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, |
5635 | .pf = PF_INET, |
5636 | .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD, |
5637 | .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, |
5638 | }, |
5639 | { |
5640 | .hook = selinux_ipv4_output, |
5641 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, |
5642 | .pf = PF_INET, |
5643 | .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, |
5644 | .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, |
5645 | } |
5646 | }; |
5647 | |
5648 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
5649 | |
5650 | static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = { |
5651 | { |
5652 | .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute, |
5653 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, |
5654 | .pf = PF_INET6, |
5655 | .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, |
5656 | .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, |
5657 | }, |
5658 | { |
5659 | .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward, |
5660 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, |
5661 | .pf = PF_INET6, |
5662 | .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD, |
5663 | .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, |
5664 | } |
5665 | }; |
5666 | |
5667 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
5668 | |
5669 | static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void) |
5670 | { |
5671 | int err = 0; |
5672 | |
5673 | if (!selinux_enabled) |
5674 | goto out; |
5675 | |
5676 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n"); |
5677 | |
5678 | err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops)); |
5679 | if (err) |
5680 | panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err); |
5681 | |
5682 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
5683 | err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops)); |
5684 | if (err) |
5685 | panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err); |
5686 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
5687 | |
5688 | out: |
5689 | return err; |
5690 | } |
5691 | |
5692 | __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init); |
5693 | |
5694 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE |
5695 | static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void) |
5696 | { |
5697 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n"); |
5698 | |
5699 | nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops)); |
5700 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
5701 | nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops)); |
5702 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
5703 | } |
5704 | #endif |
5705 | |
5706 | #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ |
5707 | |
5708 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE |
5709 | #define selinux_nf_ip_exit() |
5710 | #endif |
5711 | |
5712 | #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ |
5713 | |
5714 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE |
5715 | static int selinux_disabled; |
5716 | |
5717 | int selinux_disable(void) |
5718 | { |
5719 | extern void exit_sel_fs(void); |
5720 | |
5721 | if (ss_initialized) { |
5722 | /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */ |
5723 | return -EINVAL; |
5724 | } |
5725 | |
5726 | if (selinux_disabled) { |
5727 | /* Only do this once. */ |
5728 | return -EINVAL; |
5729 | } |
5730 | |
5731 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n"); |
5732 | |
5733 | selinux_disabled = 1; |
5734 | selinux_enabled = 0; |
5735 | |
5736 | reset_security_ops(); |
5737 | |
5738 | /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */ |
5739 | avc_disable(); |
5740 | |
5741 | /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */ |
5742 | selinux_nf_ip_exit(); |
5743 | |
5744 | /* Unregister selinuxfs. */ |
5745 | exit_sel_fs(); |
5746 | |
5747 | return 0; |
5748 | } |
5749 | #endif |
5750 |
Branches:
ben-wpan
ben-wpan-stefan
javiroman/ks7010
jz-2.6.34
jz-2.6.34-rc5
jz-2.6.34-rc6
jz-2.6.34-rc7
jz-2.6.35
jz-2.6.36
jz-2.6.37
jz-2.6.38
jz-2.6.39
jz-3.0
jz-3.1
jz-3.11
jz-3.12
jz-3.13
jz-3.15
jz-3.16
jz-3.18-dt
jz-3.2
jz-3.3
jz-3.4
jz-3.5
jz-3.6
jz-3.6-rc2-pwm
jz-3.9
jz-3.9-clk
jz-3.9-rc8
jz47xx
jz47xx-2.6.38
master
Tags:
od-2011-09-04
od-2011-09-18
v2.6.34-rc5
v2.6.34-rc6
v2.6.34-rc7
v3.9