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1 | /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support |
2 | * Handles all system-call specific auditing features. |
3 | * |
4 | * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina. |
5 | * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. |
6 | * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation |
7 | * All Rights Reserved. |
8 | * |
9 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
10 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by |
11 | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or |
12 | * (at your option) any later version. |
13 | * |
14 | * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, |
15 | * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of |
16 | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the |
17 | * GNU General Public License for more details. |
18 | * |
19 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License |
20 | * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software |
21 | * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA |
22 | * |
23 | * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com> |
24 | * |
25 | * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie, |
26 | * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname. |
27 | * |
28 | * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in |
29 | * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by |
30 | * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG. |
31 | * |
32 | * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>, |
33 | * 2006. |
34 | * |
35 | * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was |
36 | * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005. |
37 | * |
38 | * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional |
39 | * filesystem information. |
40 | * |
41 | * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com> |
42 | * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance. |
43 | */ |
44 | |
45 | #include <linux/init.h> |
46 | #include <asm/types.h> |
47 | #include <linux/atomic.h> |
48 | #include <linux/fs.h> |
49 | #include <linux/namei.h> |
50 | #include <linux/mm.h> |
51 | #include <linux/export.h> |
52 | #include <linux/slab.h> |
53 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
54 | #include <linux/socket.h> |
55 | #include <linux/mqueue.h> |
56 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
57 | #include <linux/personality.h> |
58 | #include <linux/time.h> |
59 | #include <linux/netlink.h> |
60 | #include <linux/compiler.h> |
61 | #include <asm/unistd.h> |
62 | #include <linux/security.h> |
63 | #include <linux/list.h> |
64 | #include <linux/tty.h> |
65 | #include <linux/binfmts.h> |
66 | #include <linux/highmem.h> |
67 | #include <linux/syscalls.h> |
68 | #include <linux/capability.h> |
69 | #include <linux/fs_struct.h> |
70 | #include <linux/compat.h> |
71 | |
72 | #include "audit.h" |
73 | |
74 | /* flags stating the success for a syscall */ |
75 | #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0 |
76 | #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1 |
77 | #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2 |
78 | |
79 | /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */ |
80 | #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500 |
81 | |
82 | /* number of audit rules */ |
83 | int audit_n_rules; |
84 | |
85 | /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */ |
86 | int audit_signals; |
87 | |
88 | struct audit_aux_data { |
89 | struct audit_aux_data *next; |
90 | int type; |
91 | }; |
92 | |
93 | #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0 |
94 | |
95 | /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */ |
96 | #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16 |
97 | |
98 | struct audit_aux_data_execve { |
99 | struct audit_aux_data d; |
100 | int argc; |
101 | int envc; |
102 | struct mm_struct *mm; |
103 | }; |
104 | |
105 | struct audit_aux_data_pids { |
106 | struct audit_aux_data d; |
107 | pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
108 | kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
109 | kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
110 | unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
111 | u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
112 | char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN]; |
113 | int pid_count; |
114 | }; |
115 | |
116 | struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps { |
117 | struct audit_aux_data d; |
118 | struct audit_cap_data fcap; |
119 | unsigned int fcap_ver; |
120 | struct audit_cap_data old_pcap; |
121 | struct audit_cap_data new_pcap; |
122 | }; |
123 | |
124 | struct audit_aux_data_capset { |
125 | struct audit_aux_data d; |
126 | pid_t pid; |
127 | struct audit_cap_data cap; |
128 | }; |
129 | |
130 | struct audit_tree_refs { |
131 | struct audit_tree_refs *next; |
132 | struct audit_chunk *c[31]; |
133 | }; |
134 | |
135 | static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask) |
136 | { |
137 | int n = ACC_MODE(flags); |
138 | if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT)) |
139 | n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE; |
140 | return n & mask; |
141 | } |
142 | |
143 | static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask) |
144 | { |
145 | unsigned n; |
146 | if (unlikely(!ctx)) |
147 | return 0; |
148 | n = ctx->major; |
149 | |
150 | switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) { |
151 | case 0: /* native */ |
152 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && |
153 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n)) |
154 | return 1; |
155 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && |
156 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n)) |
157 | return 1; |
158 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && |
159 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n)) |
160 | return 1; |
161 | return 0; |
162 | case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */ |
163 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && |
164 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n)) |
165 | return 1; |
166 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && |
167 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n)) |
168 | return 1; |
169 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && |
170 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n)) |
171 | return 1; |
172 | return 0; |
173 | case 2: /* open */ |
174 | return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]); |
175 | case 3: /* openat */ |
176 | return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]); |
177 | case 4: /* socketcall */ |
178 | return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND); |
179 | case 5: /* execve */ |
180 | return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC; |
181 | default: |
182 | return 0; |
183 | } |
184 | } |
185 | |
186 | static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val) |
187 | { |
188 | struct audit_names *n; |
189 | umode_t mode = (umode_t)val; |
190 | |
191 | if (unlikely(!ctx)) |
192 | return 0; |
193 | |
194 | list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
195 | if ((n->ino != -1) && |
196 | ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode)) |
197 | return 1; |
198 | } |
199 | |
200 | return 0; |
201 | } |
202 | |
203 | /* |
204 | * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *; |
205 | * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data. |
206 | * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees. |
207 | * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL, |
208 | * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously, |
209 | * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself. |
210 | * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff. |
211 | */ |
212 | |
213 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
214 | static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx) |
215 | { |
216 | if (!ctx->prio) { |
217 | ctx->prio = 1; |
218 | ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; |
219 | } |
220 | } |
221 | |
222 | static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk) |
223 | { |
224 | struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; |
225 | int left = ctx->tree_count; |
226 | if (likely(left)) { |
227 | p->c[--left] = chunk; |
228 | ctx->tree_count = left; |
229 | return 1; |
230 | } |
231 | if (!p) |
232 | return 0; |
233 | p = p->next; |
234 | if (p) { |
235 | p->c[30] = chunk; |
236 | ctx->trees = p; |
237 | ctx->tree_count = 30; |
238 | return 1; |
239 | } |
240 | return 0; |
241 | } |
242 | |
243 | static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) |
244 | { |
245 | struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; |
246 | ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL); |
247 | if (!ctx->trees) { |
248 | ctx->trees = p; |
249 | return 0; |
250 | } |
251 | if (p) |
252 | p->next = ctx->trees; |
253 | else |
254 | ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees; |
255 | ctx->tree_count = 31; |
256 | return 1; |
257 | } |
258 | #endif |
259 | |
260 | static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, |
261 | struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count) |
262 | { |
263 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
264 | struct audit_tree_refs *q; |
265 | int n; |
266 | if (!p) { |
267 | /* we started with empty chain */ |
268 | p = ctx->first_trees; |
269 | count = 31; |
270 | /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */ |
271 | if (!p) |
272 | return; |
273 | } |
274 | n = count; |
275 | for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) { |
276 | while (n--) { |
277 | audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); |
278 | q->c[n] = NULL; |
279 | } |
280 | } |
281 | while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) { |
282 | audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); |
283 | q->c[n] = NULL; |
284 | } |
285 | ctx->trees = p; |
286 | ctx->tree_count = count; |
287 | #endif |
288 | } |
289 | |
290 | static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) |
291 | { |
292 | struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q; |
293 | for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) { |
294 | q = p->next; |
295 | kfree(p); |
296 | } |
297 | } |
298 | |
299 | static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree) |
300 | { |
301 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
302 | struct audit_tree_refs *p; |
303 | int n; |
304 | if (!tree) |
305 | return 0; |
306 | /* full ones */ |
307 | for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) { |
308 | for (n = 0; n < 31; n++) |
309 | if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) |
310 | return 1; |
311 | } |
312 | /* partial */ |
313 | if (p) { |
314 | for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++) |
315 | if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) |
316 | return 1; |
317 | } |
318 | #endif |
319 | return 0; |
320 | } |
321 | |
322 | static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid, |
323 | struct audit_names *name, |
324 | struct audit_field *f, |
325 | struct audit_context *ctx) |
326 | { |
327 | struct audit_names *n; |
328 | int rc; |
329 | |
330 | if (name) { |
331 | rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid); |
332 | if (rc) |
333 | return rc; |
334 | } |
335 | |
336 | if (ctx) { |
337 | list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
338 | rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid); |
339 | if (rc) |
340 | return rc; |
341 | } |
342 | } |
343 | return 0; |
344 | } |
345 | |
346 | static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid, |
347 | struct audit_names *name, |
348 | struct audit_field *f, |
349 | struct audit_context *ctx) |
350 | { |
351 | struct audit_names *n; |
352 | int rc; |
353 | |
354 | if (name) { |
355 | rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid); |
356 | if (rc) |
357 | return rc; |
358 | } |
359 | |
360 | if (ctx) { |
361 | list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
362 | rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid); |
363 | if (rc) |
364 | return rc; |
365 | } |
366 | } |
367 | return 0; |
368 | } |
369 | |
370 | static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, |
371 | const struct cred *cred, |
372 | struct audit_field *f, |
373 | struct audit_context *ctx, |
374 | struct audit_names *name) |
375 | { |
376 | switch (f->val) { |
377 | /* process to file object comparisons */ |
378 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID: |
379 | return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx); |
380 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID: |
381 | return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx); |
382 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID: |
383 | return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx); |
384 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID: |
385 | return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx); |
386 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID: |
387 | return audit_compare_uid(tsk->loginuid, name, f, ctx); |
388 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID: |
389 | return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx); |
390 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID: |
391 | return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx); |
392 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID: |
393 | return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx); |
394 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID: |
395 | return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx); |
396 | /* uid comparisons */ |
397 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID: |
398 | return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, tsk->loginuid); |
399 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID: |
400 | return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid); |
401 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID: |
402 | return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid); |
403 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID: |
404 | return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid); |
405 | /* auid comparisons */ |
406 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID: |
407 | return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->euid); |
408 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID: |
409 | return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->suid); |
410 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID: |
411 | return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->fsuid); |
412 | /* euid comparisons */ |
413 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID: |
414 | return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid); |
415 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID: |
416 | return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid); |
417 | /* suid comparisons */ |
418 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID: |
419 | return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid); |
420 | /* gid comparisons */ |
421 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID: |
422 | return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid); |
423 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID: |
424 | return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid); |
425 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID: |
426 | return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid); |
427 | /* egid comparisons */ |
428 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID: |
429 | return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid); |
430 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID: |
431 | return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid); |
432 | /* sgid comparison */ |
433 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID: |
434 | return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid); |
435 | default: |
436 | WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n"); |
437 | return 0; |
438 | } |
439 | return 0; |
440 | } |
441 | |
442 | /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */ |
443 | /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 |
444 | * otherwise. |
445 | * |
446 | * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are |
447 | * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are |
448 | * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock. |
449 | */ |
450 | static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, |
451 | struct audit_krule *rule, |
452 | struct audit_context *ctx, |
453 | struct audit_names *name, |
454 | enum audit_state *state, |
455 | bool task_creation) |
456 | { |
457 | const struct cred *cred; |
458 | int i, need_sid = 1; |
459 | u32 sid; |
460 | |
461 | cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation); |
462 | |
463 | for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { |
464 | struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; |
465 | struct audit_names *n; |
466 | int result = 0; |
467 | |
468 | switch (f->type) { |
469 | case AUDIT_PID: |
470 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val); |
471 | break; |
472 | case AUDIT_PPID: |
473 | if (ctx) { |
474 | if (!ctx->ppid) |
475 | ctx->ppid = sys_getppid(); |
476 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val); |
477 | } |
478 | break; |
479 | case AUDIT_UID: |
480 | result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid); |
481 | break; |
482 | case AUDIT_EUID: |
483 | result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid); |
484 | break; |
485 | case AUDIT_SUID: |
486 | result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid); |
487 | break; |
488 | case AUDIT_FSUID: |
489 | result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid); |
490 | break; |
491 | case AUDIT_GID: |
492 | result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid); |
493 | if (f->op == Audit_equal) { |
494 | if (!result) |
495 | result = in_group_p(f->gid); |
496 | } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) { |
497 | if (result) |
498 | result = !in_group_p(f->gid); |
499 | } |
500 | break; |
501 | case AUDIT_EGID: |
502 | result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid); |
503 | if (f->op == Audit_equal) { |
504 | if (!result) |
505 | result = in_egroup_p(f->gid); |
506 | } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) { |
507 | if (result) |
508 | result = !in_egroup_p(f->gid); |
509 | } |
510 | break; |
511 | case AUDIT_SGID: |
512 | result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid); |
513 | break; |
514 | case AUDIT_FSGID: |
515 | result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid); |
516 | break; |
517 | case AUDIT_PERS: |
518 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val); |
519 | break; |
520 | case AUDIT_ARCH: |
521 | if (ctx) |
522 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val); |
523 | break; |
524 | |
525 | case AUDIT_EXIT: |
526 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) |
527 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val); |
528 | break; |
529 | case AUDIT_SUCCESS: |
530 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) { |
531 | if (f->val) |
532 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS); |
533 | else |
534 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE); |
535 | } |
536 | break; |
537 | case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: |
538 | if (name) { |
539 | if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) || |
540 | audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val)) |
541 | ++result; |
542 | } else if (ctx) { |
543 | list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
544 | if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) || |
545 | audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) { |
546 | ++result; |
547 | break; |
548 | } |
549 | } |
550 | } |
551 | break; |
552 | case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: |
553 | if (name) { |
554 | if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) || |
555 | audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val)) |
556 | ++result; |
557 | } else if (ctx) { |
558 | list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
559 | if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) || |
560 | audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) { |
561 | ++result; |
562 | break; |
563 | } |
564 | } |
565 | } |
566 | break; |
567 | case AUDIT_INODE: |
568 | if (name) |
569 | result = (name->ino == f->val); |
570 | else if (ctx) { |
571 | list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
572 | if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) { |
573 | ++result; |
574 | break; |
575 | } |
576 | } |
577 | } |
578 | break; |
579 | case AUDIT_OBJ_UID: |
580 | if (name) { |
581 | result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid); |
582 | } else if (ctx) { |
583 | list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
584 | if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) { |
585 | ++result; |
586 | break; |
587 | } |
588 | } |
589 | } |
590 | break; |
591 | case AUDIT_OBJ_GID: |
592 | if (name) { |
593 | result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid); |
594 | } else if (ctx) { |
595 | list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
596 | if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) { |
597 | ++result; |
598 | break; |
599 | } |
600 | } |
601 | } |
602 | break; |
603 | case AUDIT_WATCH: |
604 | if (name) |
605 | result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev); |
606 | break; |
607 | case AUDIT_DIR: |
608 | if (ctx) |
609 | result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree); |
610 | break; |
611 | case AUDIT_LOGINUID: |
612 | result = 0; |
613 | if (ctx) |
614 | result = audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->uid); |
615 | break; |
616 | case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: |
617 | result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val); |
618 | break; |
619 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: |
620 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: |
621 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: |
622 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: |
623 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: |
624 | /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating |
625 | a temporary error. We simply treat this as a |
626 | match for now to avoid losing information that |
627 | may be wanted. An error message will also be |
628 | logged upon error */ |
629 | if (f->lsm_rule) { |
630 | if (need_sid) { |
631 | security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); |
632 | need_sid = 0; |
633 | } |
634 | result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, |
635 | f->op, |
636 | f->lsm_rule, |
637 | ctx); |
638 | } |
639 | break; |
640 | case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: |
641 | case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: |
642 | case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: |
643 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: |
644 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: |
645 | /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR |
646 | also applies here */ |
647 | if (f->lsm_rule) { |
648 | /* Find files that match */ |
649 | if (name) { |
650 | result = security_audit_rule_match( |
651 | name->osid, f->type, f->op, |
652 | f->lsm_rule, ctx); |
653 | } else if (ctx) { |
654 | list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
655 | if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type, |
656 | f->op, f->lsm_rule, |
657 | ctx)) { |
658 | ++result; |
659 | break; |
660 | } |
661 | } |
662 | } |
663 | /* Find ipc objects that match */ |
664 | if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) |
665 | break; |
666 | if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, |
667 | f->type, f->op, |
668 | f->lsm_rule, ctx)) |
669 | ++result; |
670 | } |
671 | break; |
672 | case AUDIT_ARG0: |
673 | case AUDIT_ARG1: |
674 | case AUDIT_ARG2: |
675 | case AUDIT_ARG3: |
676 | if (ctx) |
677 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val); |
678 | break; |
679 | case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: |
680 | /* ignore this field for filtering */ |
681 | result = 1; |
682 | break; |
683 | case AUDIT_PERM: |
684 | result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val); |
685 | break; |
686 | case AUDIT_FILETYPE: |
687 | result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val); |
688 | break; |
689 | case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE: |
690 | result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name); |
691 | break; |
692 | } |
693 | if (!result) |
694 | return 0; |
695 | } |
696 | |
697 | if (ctx) { |
698 | if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio) |
699 | return 0; |
700 | if (rule->filterkey) { |
701 | kfree(ctx->filterkey); |
702 | ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); |
703 | } |
704 | ctx->prio = rule->prio; |
705 | } |
706 | switch (rule->action) { |
707 | case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; |
708 | case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; |
709 | } |
710 | return 1; |
711 | } |
712 | |
713 | /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is |
714 | * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task |
715 | * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid. |
716 | */ |
717 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key) |
718 | { |
719 | struct audit_entry *e; |
720 | enum audit_state state; |
721 | |
722 | rcu_read_lock(); |
723 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) { |
724 | if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, |
725 | &state, true)) { |
726 | if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) |
727 | *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); |
728 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
729 | return state; |
730 | } |
731 | } |
732 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
733 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; |
734 | } |
735 | |
736 | /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the |
737 | * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is |
738 | * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit |
739 | * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT). |
740 | */ |
741 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, |
742 | struct audit_context *ctx, |
743 | struct list_head *list) |
744 | { |
745 | struct audit_entry *e; |
746 | enum audit_state state; |
747 | |
748 | if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid) |
749 | return AUDIT_DISABLED; |
750 | |
751 | rcu_read_lock(); |
752 | if (!list_empty(list)) { |
753 | int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); |
754 | int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); |
755 | |
756 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { |
757 | if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && |
758 | audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL, |
759 | &state, false)) { |
760 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
761 | ctx->current_state = state; |
762 | return state; |
763 | } |
764 | } |
765 | } |
766 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
767 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; |
768 | } |
769 | |
770 | /* |
771 | * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match. |
772 | * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash |
773 | */ |
774 | static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk, |
775 | struct audit_names *n, |
776 | struct audit_context *ctx) { |
777 | int word, bit; |
778 | int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino); |
779 | struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h]; |
780 | struct audit_entry *e; |
781 | enum audit_state state; |
782 | |
783 | word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); |
784 | bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); |
785 | |
786 | if (list_empty(list)) |
787 | return 0; |
788 | |
789 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { |
790 | if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && |
791 | audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) { |
792 | ctx->current_state = state; |
793 | return 1; |
794 | } |
795 | } |
796 | |
797 | return 0; |
798 | } |
799 | |
800 | /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been |
801 | * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash |
802 | * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names. |
803 | * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall(). |
804 | */ |
805 | void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx) |
806 | { |
807 | struct audit_names *n; |
808 | |
809 | if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid) |
810 | return; |
811 | |
812 | rcu_read_lock(); |
813 | |
814 | list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
815 | if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx)) |
816 | break; |
817 | } |
818 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
819 | } |
820 | |
821 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk, |
822 | int return_valid, |
823 | long return_code) |
824 | { |
825 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; |
826 | |
827 | if (!context) |
828 | return NULL; |
829 | context->return_valid = return_valid; |
830 | |
831 | /* |
832 | * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual |
833 | * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific |
834 | * signal handlers |
835 | * |
836 | * This is actually a test for: |
837 | * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) || |
838 | * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) |
839 | * |
840 | * but is faster than a bunch of || |
841 | */ |
842 | if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) && |
843 | (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) && |
844 | (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD)) |
845 | context->return_code = -EINTR; |
846 | else |
847 | context->return_code = return_code; |
848 | |
849 | if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) { |
850 | audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]); |
851 | audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context); |
852 | } |
853 | |
854 | tsk->audit_context = NULL; |
855 | return context; |
856 | } |
857 | |
858 | static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) |
859 | { |
860 | struct audit_names *n, *next; |
861 | |
862 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 |
863 | if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) { |
864 | int i = 0; |
865 | |
866 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d" |
867 | " name_count=%d put_count=%d" |
868 | " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n", |
869 | __FILE__, __LINE__, |
870 | context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall, |
871 | context->name_count, context->put_count, |
872 | context->ino_count); |
873 | list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { |
874 | printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i++, |
875 | n->name, n->name->name ?: "(null)"); |
876 | } |
877 | dump_stack(); |
878 | return; |
879 | } |
880 | #endif |
881 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
882 | context->put_count = 0; |
883 | context->ino_count = 0; |
884 | #endif |
885 | |
886 | list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) { |
887 | list_del(&n->list); |
888 | if (n->name && n->name_put) |
889 | final_putname(n->name); |
890 | if (n->should_free) |
891 | kfree(n); |
892 | } |
893 | context->name_count = 0; |
894 | path_put(&context->pwd); |
895 | context->pwd.dentry = NULL; |
896 | context->pwd.mnt = NULL; |
897 | } |
898 | |
899 | static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) |
900 | { |
901 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; |
902 | |
903 | while ((aux = context->aux)) { |
904 | context->aux = aux->next; |
905 | kfree(aux); |
906 | } |
907 | while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) { |
908 | context->aux_pids = aux->next; |
909 | kfree(aux); |
910 | } |
911 | } |
912 | |
913 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state) |
914 | { |
915 | struct audit_context *context; |
916 | |
917 | context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL); |
918 | if (!context) |
919 | return NULL; |
920 | context->state = state; |
921 | context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0; |
922 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees); |
923 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list); |
924 | return context; |
925 | } |
926 | |
927 | /** |
928 | * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task |
929 | * @tsk: task |
930 | * |
931 | * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context |
932 | * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the |
933 | * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is |
934 | * needed. |
935 | */ |
936 | int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) |
937 | { |
938 | struct audit_context *context; |
939 | enum audit_state state; |
940 | char *key = NULL; |
941 | |
942 | if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled)) |
943 | return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */ |
944 | |
945 | state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key); |
946 | if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) |
947 | return 0; |
948 | |
949 | if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) { |
950 | kfree(key); |
951 | audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc"); |
952 | return -ENOMEM; |
953 | } |
954 | context->filterkey = key; |
955 | |
956 | tsk->audit_context = context; |
957 | set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); |
958 | return 0; |
959 | } |
960 | |
961 | static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) |
962 | { |
963 | audit_free_names(context); |
964 | unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); |
965 | free_tree_refs(context); |
966 | audit_free_aux(context); |
967 | kfree(context->filterkey); |
968 | kfree(context->sockaddr); |
969 | kfree(context); |
970 | } |
971 | |
972 | static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, |
973 | kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid, |
974 | u32 sid, char *comm) |
975 | { |
976 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
977 | char *ctx = NULL; |
978 | u32 len; |
979 | int rc = 0; |
980 | |
981 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID); |
982 | if (!ab) |
983 | return rc; |
984 | |
985 | audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, |
986 | from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid), |
987 | from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid); |
988 | if (sid) { |
989 | if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) { |
990 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)"); |
991 | rc = 1; |
992 | } else { |
993 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); |
994 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); |
995 | } |
996 | } |
997 | audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm="); |
998 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm); |
999 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1000 | |
1001 | return rc; |
1002 | } |
1003 | |
1004 | /* |
1005 | * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't |
1006 | * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being |
1007 | * within about 500 bytes (next page boundary) |
1008 | * |
1009 | * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when |
1010 | * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting |
1011 | * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to |
1012 | * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space |
1013 | * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was. |
1014 | */ |
1015 | static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context, |
1016 | struct audit_buffer **ab, |
1017 | int arg_num, |
1018 | size_t *len_sent, |
1019 | const char __user *p, |
1020 | char *buf) |
1021 | { |
1022 | char arg_num_len_buf[12]; |
1023 | const char __user *tmp_p = p; |
1024 | /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */ |
1025 | size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5; |
1026 | size_t len, len_left, to_send; |
1027 | size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN; |
1028 | unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0; |
1029 | int ret; |
1030 | |
1031 | /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */ |
1032 | len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1; |
1033 | |
1034 | /* |
1035 | * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings |
1036 | * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar |
1037 | * for strings that are too long, we should not have created |
1038 | * any. |
1039 | */ |
1040 | if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) { |
1041 | WARN_ON(1); |
1042 | send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); |
1043 | return -1; |
1044 | } |
1045 | |
1046 | /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */ |
1047 | do { |
1048 | if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN) |
1049 | to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN; |
1050 | else |
1051 | to_send = len_left; |
1052 | ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send); |
1053 | /* |
1054 | * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just |
1055 | * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user- |
1056 | * space yet. |
1057 | */ |
1058 | if (ret) { |
1059 | WARN_ON(1); |
1060 | send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); |
1061 | return -1; |
1062 | } |
1063 | buf[to_send] = '\0'; |
1064 | has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send); |
1065 | if (has_cntl) { |
1066 | /* |
1067 | * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only |
1068 | * send half as much in each message |
1069 | */ |
1070 | max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2; |
1071 | break; |
1072 | } |
1073 | len_left -= to_send; |
1074 | tmp_p += to_send; |
1075 | } while (len_left > 0); |
1076 | |
1077 | len_left = len; |
1078 | |
1079 | if (len > max_execve_audit_len) |
1080 | too_long = 1; |
1081 | |
1082 | /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */ |
1083 | for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) { |
1084 | int room_left; |
1085 | |
1086 | if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len) |
1087 | to_send = max_execve_audit_len; |
1088 | else |
1089 | to_send = len_left; |
1090 | |
1091 | /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */ |
1092 | room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent; |
1093 | if (has_cntl) |
1094 | room_left -= (to_send * 2); |
1095 | else |
1096 | room_left -= to_send; |
1097 | if (room_left < 0) { |
1098 | *len_sent = 0; |
1099 | audit_log_end(*ab); |
1100 | *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE); |
1101 | if (!*ab) |
1102 | return 0; |
1103 | } |
1104 | |
1105 | /* |
1106 | * first record needs to say how long the original string was |
1107 | * so we can be sure nothing was lost. |
1108 | */ |
1109 | if ((i == 0) && (too_long)) |
1110 | audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num, |
1111 | has_cntl ? 2*len : len); |
1112 | |
1113 | /* |
1114 | * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already |
1115 | * filled buf above when we checked for control characters |
1116 | * so don't bother with another copy_from_user |
1117 | */ |
1118 | if (len >= max_execve_audit_len) |
1119 | ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send); |
1120 | else |
1121 | ret = 0; |
1122 | if (ret) { |
1123 | WARN_ON(1); |
1124 | send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); |
1125 | return -1; |
1126 | } |
1127 | buf[to_send] = '\0'; |
1128 | |
1129 | /* actually log it */ |
1130 | audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num); |
1131 | if (too_long) |
1132 | audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i); |
1133 | audit_log_format(*ab, "="); |
1134 | if (has_cntl) |
1135 | audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send); |
1136 | else |
1137 | audit_log_string(*ab, buf); |
1138 | |
1139 | p += to_send; |
1140 | len_left -= to_send; |
1141 | *len_sent += arg_num_len; |
1142 | if (has_cntl) |
1143 | *len_sent += to_send * 2; |
1144 | else |
1145 | *len_sent += to_send; |
1146 | } |
1147 | /* include the null we didn't log */ |
1148 | return len + 1; |
1149 | } |
1150 | |
1151 | static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context, |
1152 | struct audit_buffer **ab, |
1153 | struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi) |
1154 | { |
1155 | int i, len; |
1156 | size_t len_sent = 0; |
1157 | const char __user *p; |
1158 | char *buf; |
1159 | |
1160 | if (axi->mm != current->mm) |
1161 | return; /* execve failed, no additional info */ |
1162 | |
1163 | p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start; |
1164 | |
1165 | audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", axi->argc); |
1166 | |
1167 | /* |
1168 | * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just |
1169 | * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size |
1170 | * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg() |
1171 | * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe. |
1172 | */ |
1173 | buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL); |
1174 | if (!buf) { |
1175 | audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n"); |
1176 | return; |
1177 | } |
1178 | |
1179 | for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) { |
1180 | len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i, |
1181 | &len_sent, p, buf); |
1182 | if (len <= 0) |
1183 | break; |
1184 | p += len; |
1185 | } |
1186 | kfree(buf); |
1187 | } |
1188 | |
1189 | static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) |
1190 | { |
1191 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
1192 | int i; |
1193 | |
1194 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type); |
1195 | if (!ab) |
1196 | return; |
1197 | |
1198 | switch (context->type) { |
1199 | case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: { |
1200 | int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs; |
1201 | audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs); |
1202 | for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) |
1203 | audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, |
1204 | context->socketcall.args[i]); |
1205 | break; } |
1206 | case AUDIT_IPC: { |
1207 | u32 osid = context->ipc.osid; |
1208 | |
1209 | audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho", |
1210 | from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid), |
1211 | from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid), |
1212 | context->ipc.mode); |
1213 | if (osid) { |
1214 | char *ctx = NULL; |
1215 | u32 len; |
1216 | if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) { |
1217 | audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid); |
1218 | *call_panic = 1; |
1219 | } else { |
1220 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); |
1221 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); |
1222 | } |
1223 | } |
1224 | if (context->ipc.has_perm) { |
1225 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1226 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, |
1227 | AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM); |
1228 | if (unlikely(!ab)) |
1229 | return; |
1230 | audit_log_format(ab, |
1231 | "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho", |
1232 | context->ipc.qbytes, |
1233 | context->ipc.perm_uid, |
1234 | context->ipc.perm_gid, |
1235 | context->ipc.perm_mode); |
1236 | } |
1237 | break; } |
1238 | case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: { |
1239 | audit_log_format(ab, |
1240 | "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld " |
1241 | "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld", |
1242 | context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode, |
1243 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags, |
1244 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg, |
1245 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize, |
1246 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs); |
1247 | break; } |
1248 | case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: { |
1249 | audit_log_format(ab, |
1250 | "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u " |
1251 | "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld", |
1252 | context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes, |
1253 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len, |
1254 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio, |
1255 | context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec, |
1256 | context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec); |
1257 | break; } |
1258 | case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: { |
1259 | audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d", |
1260 | context->mq_notify.mqdes, |
1261 | context->mq_notify.sigev_signo); |
1262 | break; } |
1263 | case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: { |
1264 | struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat; |
1265 | audit_log_format(ab, |
1266 | "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld " |
1267 | "mq_curmsgs=%ld ", |
1268 | context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes, |
1269 | attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg, |
1270 | attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs); |
1271 | break; } |
1272 | case AUDIT_CAPSET: { |
1273 | audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid); |
1274 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable); |
1275 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted); |
1276 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective); |
1277 | break; } |
1278 | case AUDIT_MMAP: { |
1279 | audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd, |
1280 | context->mmap.flags); |
1281 | break; } |
1282 | } |
1283 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1284 | } |
1285 | |
1286 | static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk) |
1287 | { |
1288 | int i, call_panic = 0; |
1289 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
1290 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; |
1291 | struct audit_names *n; |
1292 | |
1293 | /* tsk == current */ |
1294 | context->personality = tsk->personality; |
1295 | |
1296 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL); |
1297 | if (!ab) |
1298 | return; /* audit_panic has been called */ |
1299 | audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d", |
1300 | context->arch, context->major); |
1301 | if (context->personality != PER_LINUX) |
1302 | audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality); |
1303 | if (context->return_valid) |
1304 | audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", |
1305 | (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no", |
1306 | context->return_code); |
1307 | |
1308 | audit_log_format(ab, |
1309 | " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d", |
1310 | context->argv[0], |
1311 | context->argv[1], |
1312 | context->argv[2], |
1313 | context->argv[3], |
1314 | context->name_count); |
1315 | |
1316 | audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk); |
1317 | audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey); |
1318 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1319 | |
1320 | for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) { |
1321 | |
1322 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type); |
1323 | if (!ab) |
1324 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ |
1325 | |
1326 | switch (aux->type) { |
1327 | |
1328 | case AUDIT_EXECVE: { |
1329 | struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux; |
1330 | audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi); |
1331 | break; } |
1332 | |
1333 | case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: { |
1334 | struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux; |
1335 | audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver); |
1336 | audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted); |
1337 | audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable); |
1338 | audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE); |
1339 | audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted); |
1340 | audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable); |
1341 | audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective); |
1342 | audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted); |
1343 | audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable); |
1344 | audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective); |
1345 | break; } |
1346 | |
1347 | } |
1348 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1349 | } |
1350 | |
1351 | if (context->type) |
1352 | show_special(context, &call_panic); |
1353 | |
1354 | if (context->fds[0] >= 0) { |
1355 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR); |
1356 | if (ab) { |
1357 | audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", |
1358 | context->fds[0], context->fds[1]); |
1359 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1360 | } |
1361 | } |
1362 | |
1363 | if (context->sockaddr_len) { |
1364 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR); |
1365 | if (ab) { |
1366 | audit_log_format(ab, "saddr="); |
1367 | audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr, |
1368 | context->sockaddr_len); |
1369 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1370 | } |
1371 | } |
1372 | |
1373 | for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) { |
1374 | struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; |
1375 | |
1376 | for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) |
1377 | if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], |
1378 | axs->target_auid[i], |
1379 | axs->target_uid[i], |
1380 | axs->target_sessionid[i], |
1381 | axs->target_sid[i], |
1382 | axs->target_comm[i])) |
1383 | call_panic = 1; |
1384 | } |
1385 | |
1386 | if (context->target_pid && |
1387 | audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, |
1388 | context->target_auid, context->target_uid, |
1389 | context->target_sessionid, |
1390 | context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) |
1391 | call_panic = 1; |
1392 | |
1393 | if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { |
1394 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); |
1395 | if (ab) { |
1396 | audit_log_d_path(ab, " cwd=", &context->pwd); |
1397 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1398 | } |
1399 | } |
1400 | |
1401 | i = 0; |
1402 | list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { |
1403 | if (n->hidden) |
1404 | continue; |
1405 | audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic); |
1406 | } |
1407 | |
1408 | /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ |
1409 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE); |
1410 | if (ab) |
1411 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1412 | if (call_panic) |
1413 | audit_panic("error converting sid to string"); |
1414 | } |
1415 | |
1416 | /** |
1417 | * audit_free - free a per-task audit context |
1418 | * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free |
1419 | * |
1420 | * Called from copy_process and do_exit |
1421 | */ |
1422 | void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) |
1423 | { |
1424 | struct audit_context *context; |
1425 | |
1426 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0); |
1427 | if (!context) |
1428 | return; |
1429 | |
1430 | /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit |
1431 | * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. |
1432 | * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this |
1433 | * in the context of the idle thread */ |
1434 | /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */ |
1435 | if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) |
1436 | audit_log_exit(context, tsk); |
1437 | if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) |
1438 | audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees); |
1439 | |
1440 | audit_free_context(context); |
1441 | } |
1442 | |
1443 | /** |
1444 | * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry |
1445 | * @arch: architecture type |
1446 | * @major: major syscall type (function) |
1447 | * @a1: additional syscall register 1 |
1448 | * @a2: additional syscall register 2 |
1449 | * @a3: additional syscall register 3 |
1450 | * @a4: additional syscall register 4 |
1451 | * |
1452 | * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the |
1453 | * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or |
1454 | * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the |
1455 | * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT, |
1456 | * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it |
1457 | * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it |
1458 | * be written). |
1459 | */ |
1460 | void __audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major, |
1461 | unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, |
1462 | unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4) |
1463 | { |
1464 | struct task_struct *tsk = current; |
1465 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; |
1466 | enum audit_state state; |
1467 | |
1468 | if (!context) |
1469 | return; |
1470 | |
1471 | BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count); |
1472 | |
1473 | if (!audit_enabled) |
1474 | return; |
1475 | |
1476 | context->arch = arch; |
1477 | context->major = major; |
1478 | context->argv[0] = a1; |
1479 | context->argv[1] = a2; |
1480 | context->argv[2] = a3; |
1481 | context->argv[3] = a4; |
1482 | |
1483 | state = context->state; |
1484 | context->dummy = !audit_n_rules; |
1485 | if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) { |
1486 | context->prio = 0; |
1487 | state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]); |
1488 | } |
1489 | if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) |
1490 | return; |
1491 | |
1492 | context->serial = 0; |
1493 | context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME; |
1494 | context->in_syscall = 1; |
1495 | context->current_state = state; |
1496 | context->ppid = 0; |
1497 | } |
1498 | |
1499 | /** |
1500 | * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call |
1501 | * @success: success value of the syscall |
1502 | * @return_code: return value of the syscall |
1503 | * |
1504 | * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as |
1505 | * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from |
1506 | * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit |
1507 | * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, |
1508 | * free the names stored from getname(). |
1509 | */ |
1510 | void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) |
1511 | { |
1512 | struct task_struct *tsk = current; |
1513 | struct audit_context *context; |
1514 | |
1515 | if (success) |
1516 | success = AUDITSC_SUCCESS; |
1517 | else |
1518 | success = AUDITSC_FAILURE; |
1519 | |
1520 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, success, return_code); |
1521 | if (!context) |
1522 | return; |
1523 | |
1524 | if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) |
1525 | audit_log_exit(context, tsk); |
1526 | |
1527 | context->in_syscall = 0; |
1528 | context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0; |
1529 | |
1530 | if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) |
1531 | audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees); |
1532 | |
1533 | audit_free_names(context); |
1534 | unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); |
1535 | audit_free_aux(context); |
1536 | context->aux = NULL; |
1537 | context->aux_pids = NULL; |
1538 | context->target_pid = 0; |
1539 | context->target_sid = 0; |
1540 | context->sockaddr_len = 0; |
1541 | context->type = 0; |
1542 | context->fds[0] = -1; |
1543 | if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) { |
1544 | kfree(context->filterkey); |
1545 | context->filterkey = NULL; |
1546 | } |
1547 | tsk->audit_context = context; |
1548 | } |
1549 | |
1550 | static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode) |
1551 | { |
1552 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
1553 | struct audit_context *context; |
1554 | struct audit_tree_refs *p; |
1555 | struct audit_chunk *chunk; |
1556 | int count; |
1557 | if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) |
1558 | return; |
1559 | context = current->audit_context; |
1560 | p = context->trees; |
1561 | count = context->tree_count; |
1562 | rcu_read_lock(); |
1563 | chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); |
1564 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1565 | if (!chunk) |
1566 | return; |
1567 | if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) |
1568 | return; |
1569 | if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) { |
1570 | printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); |
1571 | audit_set_auditable(context); |
1572 | audit_put_chunk(chunk); |
1573 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
1574 | return; |
1575 | } |
1576 | put_tree_ref(context, chunk); |
1577 | #endif |
1578 | } |
1579 | |
1580 | static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry) |
1581 | { |
1582 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
1583 | struct audit_context *context; |
1584 | struct audit_tree_refs *p; |
1585 | const struct dentry *d, *parent; |
1586 | struct audit_chunk *drop; |
1587 | unsigned long seq; |
1588 | int count; |
1589 | |
1590 | context = current->audit_context; |
1591 | p = context->trees; |
1592 | count = context->tree_count; |
1593 | retry: |
1594 | drop = NULL; |
1595 | d = dentry; |
1596 | rcu_read_lock(); |
1597 | seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock); |
1598 | for(;;) { |
1599 | struct inode *inode = d->d_inode; |
1600 | if (inode && unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) { |
1601 | struct audit_chunk *chunk; |
1602 | chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); |
1603 | if (chunk) { |
1604 | if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) { |
1605 | drop = chunk; |
1606 | break; |
1607 | } |
1608 | } |
1609 | } |
1610 | parent = d->d_parent; |
1611 | if (parent == d) |
1612 | break; |
1613 | d = parent; |
1614 | } |
1615 | if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */ |
1616 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1617 | if (!drop) { |
1618 | /* just a race with rename */ |
1619 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
1620 | goto retry; |
1621 | } |
1622 | audit_put_chunk(drop); |
1623 | if (grow_tree_refs(context)) { |
1624 | /* OK, got more space */ |
1625 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
1626 | goto retry; |
1627 | } |
1628 | /* too bad */ |
1629 | printk(KERN_WARNING |
1630 | "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); |
1631 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
1632 | audit_set_auditable(context); |
1633 | return; |
1634 | } |
1635 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1636 | #endif |
1637 | } |
1638 | |
1639 | static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context, |
1640 | unsigned char type) |
1641 | { |
1642 | struct audit_names *aname; |
1643 | |
1644 | if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) { |
1645 | aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count]; |
1646 | memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname)); |
1647 | } else { |
1648 | aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS); |
1649 | if (!aname) |
1650 | return NULL; |
1651 | aname->should_free = true; |
1652 | } |
1653 | |
1654 | aname->ino = (unsigned long)-1; |
1655 | aname->type = type; |
1656 | list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list); |
1657 | |
1658 | context->name_count++; |
1659 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
1660 | context->ino_count++; |
1661 | #endif |
1662 | return aname; |
1663 | } |
1664 | |
1665 | /** |
1666 | * audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry |
1667 | * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname |
1668 | * |
1669 | * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an |
1670 | * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename |
1671 | * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL. |
1672 | */ |
1673 | struct filename * |
1674 | __audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr) |
1675 | { |
1676 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
1677 | struct audit_names *n; |
1678 | |
1679 | list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { |
1680 | if (!n->name) |
1681 | continue; |
1682 | if (n->name->uptr == uptr) |
1683 | return n->name; |
1684 | } |
1685 | return NULL; |
1686 | } |
1687 | |
1688 | /** |
1689 | * audit_getname - add a name to the list |
1690 | * @name: name to add |
1691 | * |
1692 | * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context. |
1693 | * Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). |
1694 | */ |
1695 | void __audit_getname(struct filename *name) |
1696 | { |
1697 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
1698 | struct audit_names *n; |
1699 | |
1700 | if (!context->in_syscall) { |
1701 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 |
1702 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n", |
1703 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); |
1704 | dump_stack(); |
1705 | #endif |
1706 | return; |
1707 | } |
1708 | |
1709 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
1710 | /* The filename _must_ have a populated ->name */ |
1711 | BUG_ON(!name->name); |
1712 | #endif |
1713 | |
1714 | n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN); |
1715 | if (!n) |
1716 | return; |
1717 | |
1718 | n->name = name; |
1719 | n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; |
1720 | n->name_put = true; |
1721 | name->aname = n; |
1722 | |
1723 | if (!context->pwd.dentry) |
1724 | get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd); |
1725 | } |
1726 | |
1727 | /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request |
1728 | * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname |
1729 | * |
1730 | * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context, |
1731 | * then we delay the putname until syscall exit. |
1732 | * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname(). |
1733 | */ |
1734 | void audit_putname(struct filename *name) |
1735 | { |
1736 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
1737 | |
1738 | BUG_ON(!context); |
1739 | if (!context->in_syscall) { |
1740 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 |
1741 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): final_putname(%p)\n", |
1742 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); |
1743 | if (context->name_count) { |
1744 | struct audit_names *n; |
1745 | int i = 0; |
1746 | |
1747 | list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) |
1748 | printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i++, |
1749 | n->name, n->name->name ?: "(null)"); |
1750 | } |
1751 | #endif |
1752 | final_putname(name); |
1753 | } |
1754 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
1755 | else { |
1756 | ++context->put_count; |
1757 | if (context->put_count > context->name_count) { |
1758 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d" |
1759 | " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d" |
1760 | " put_count=%d\n", |
1761 | __FILE__, __LINE__, |
1762 | context->serial, context->major, |
1763 | context->in_syscall, name->name, |
1764 | context->name_count, context->put_count); |
1765 | dump_stack(); |
1766 | } |
1767 | } |
1768 | #endif |
1769 | } |
1770 | |
1771 | /** |
1772 | * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup |
1773 | * @name: name being audited |
1774 | * @dentry: dentry being audited |
1775 | * @flags: attributes for this particular entry |
1776 | */ |
1777 | void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry, |
1778 | unsigned int flags) |
1779 | { |
1780 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
1781 | const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
1782 | struct audit_names *n; |
1783 | bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT; |
1784 | |
1785 | if (!context->in_syscall) |
1786 | return; |
1787 | |
1788 | if (!name) |
1789 | goto out_alloc; |
1790 | |
1791 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
1792 | /* The struct filename _must_ have a populated ->name */ |
1793 | BUG_ON(!name->name); |
1794 | #endif |
1795 | /* |
1796 | * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can |
1797 | * just use it directly if the type is correct. |
1798 | */ |
1799 | n = name->aname; |
1800 | if (n) { |
1801 | if (parent) { |
1802 | if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT || |
1803 | n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) |
1804 | goto out; |
1805 | } else { |
1806 | if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT) |
1807 | goto out; |
1808 | } |
1809 | } |
1810 | |
1811 | list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) { |
1812 | /* does the name pointer match? */ |
1813 | if (!n->name || n->name->name != name->name) |
1814 | continue; |
1815 | |
1816 | /* match the correct record type */ |
1817 | if (parent) { |
1818 | if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT || |
1819 | n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) |
1820 | goto out; |
1821 | } else { |
1822 | if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT) |
1823 | goto out; |
1824 | } |
1825 | } |
1826 | |
1827 | out_alloc: |
1828 | /* unable to find the name from a previous getname(). Allocate a new |
1829 | * anonymous entry. |
1830 | */ |
1831 | n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL); |
1832 | if (!n) |
1833 | return; |
1834 | out: |
1835 | if (parent) { |
1836 | n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL; |
1837 | n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT; |
1838 | if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN) |
1839 | n->hidden = true; |
1840 | } else { |
1841 | n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; |
1842 | n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL; |
1843 | } |
1844 | handle_path(dentry); |
1845 | audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode); |
1846 | } |
1847 | |
1848 | /** |
1849 | * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects |
1850 | * @parent: inode of dentry parent |
1851 | * @dentry: dentry being audited |
1852 | * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for |
1853 | * |
1854 | * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode |
1855 | * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent. |
1856 | * This call updates the audit context with the child's information. |
1857 | * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after |
1858 | * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object |
1859 | * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during |
1860 | * unsuccessful attempts. |
1861 | */ |
1862 | void __audit_inode_child(const struct inode *parent, |
1863 | const struct dentry *dentry, |
1864 | const unsigned char type) |
1865 | { |
1866 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
1867 | const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
1868 | const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name; |
1869 | struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL; |
1870 | |
1871 | if (!context->in_syscall) |
1872 | return; |
1873 | |
1874 | if (inode) |
1875 | handle_one(inode); |
1876 | |
1877 | /* look for a parent entry first */ |
1878 | list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { |
1879 | if (!n->name || n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT) |
1880 | continue; |
1881 | |
1882 | if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && |
1883 | !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name, n->name_len)) { |
1884 | found_parent = n; |
1885 | break; |
1886 | } |
1887 | } |
1888 | |
1889 | /* is there a matching child entry? */ |
1890 | list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { |
1891 | /* can only match entries that have a name */ |
1892 | if (!n->name || n->type != type) |
1893 | continue; |
1894 | |
1895 | /* if we found a parent, make sure this one is a child of it */ |
1896 | if (found_parent && (n->name != found_parent->name)) |
1897 | continue; |
1898 | |
1899 | if (!strcmp(dname, n->name->name) || |
1900 | !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name, |
1901 | found_parent ? |
1902 | found_parent->name_len : |
1903 | AUDIT_NAME_FULL)) { |
1904 | found_child = n; |
1905 | break; |
1906 | } |
1907 | } |
1908 | |
1909 | if (!found_parent) { |
1910 | /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */ |
1911 | n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT); |
1912 | if (!n) |
1913 | return; |
1914 | audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent); |
1915 | } |
1916 | |
1917 | if (!found_child) { |
1918 | found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type); |
1919 | if (!found_child) |
1920 | return; |
1921 | |
1922 | /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent |
1923 | * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in |
1924 | * audit_free_names() */ |
1925 | if (found_parent) { |
1926 | found_child->name = found_parent->name; |
1927 | found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; |
1928 | /* don't call __putname() */ |
1929 | found_child->name_put = false; |
1930 | } |
1931 | } |
1932 | if (inode) |
1933 | audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode); |
1934 | else |
1935 | found_child->ino = (unsigned long)-1; |
1936 | } |
1937 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child); |
1938 | |
1939 | /** |
1940 | * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values |
1941 | * @ctx: audit_context for the task |
1942 | * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context |
1943 | * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context |
1944 | * |
1945 | * Also sets the context as auditable. |
1946 | */ |
1947 | int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, |
1948 | struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial) |
1949 | { |
1950 | if (!ctx->in_syscall) |
1951 | return 0; |
1952 | if (!ctx->serial) |
1953 | ctx->serial = audit_serial(); |
1954 | t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec; |
1955 | t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec; |
1956 | *serial = ctx->serial; |
1957 | if (!ctx->prio) { |
1958 | ctx->prio = 1; |
1959 | ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; |
1960 | } |
1961 | return 1; |
1962 | } |
1963 | |
1964 | /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */ |
1965 | static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0); |
1966 | |
1967 | /** |
1968 | * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid |
1969 | * @loginuid: loginuid value |
1970 | * |
1971 | * Returns 0. |
1972 | * |
1973 | * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write(). |
1974 | */ |
1975 | int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) |
1976 | { |
1977 | struct task_struct *task = current; |
1978 | struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context; |
1979 | unsigned int sessionid; |
1980 | |
1981 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE |
1982 | if (audit_loginuid_set(task)) |
1983 | return -EPERM; |
1984 | #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */ |
1985 | if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) |
1986 | return -EPERM; |
1987 | #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */ |
1988 | |
1989 | sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id); |
1990 | if (context && context->in_syscall) { |
1991 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
1992 | |
1993 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN); |
1994 | if (ab) { |
1995 | audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u " |
1996 | "old auid=%u new auid=%u" |
1997 | " old ses=%u new ses=%u", |
1998 | task->pid, |
1999 | from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(task)), |
2000 | from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task->loginuid), |
2001 | from_kuid(&init_user_ns, loginuid), |
2002 | task->sessionid, sessionid); |
2003 | audit_log_end(ab); |
2004 | } |
2005 | } |
2006 | task->sessionid = sessionid; |
2007 | task->loginuid = loginuid; |
2008 | return 0; |
2009 | } |
2010 | |
2011 | /** |
2012 | * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open |
2013 | * @oflag: open flag |
2014 | * @mode: mode bits |
2015 | * @attr: queue attributes |
2016 | * |
2017 | */ |
2018 | void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr) |
2019 | { |
2020 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2021 | |
2022 | if (attr) |
2023 | memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); |
2024 | else |
2025 | memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); |
2026 | |
2027 | context->mq_open.oflag = oflag; |
2028 | context->mq_open.mode = mode; |
2029 | |
2030 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN; |
2031 | } |
2032 | |
2033 | /** |
2034 | * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive |
2035 | * @mqdes: MQ descriptor |
2036 | * @msg_len: Message length |
2037 | * @msg_prio: Message priority |
2038 | * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time |
2039 | * |
2040 | */ |
2041 | void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio, |
2042 | const struct timespec *abs_timeout) |
2043 | { |
2044 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2045 | struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout; |
2046 | |
2047 | if (abs_timeout) |
2048 | memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec)); |
2049 | else |
2050 | memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec)); |
2051 | |
2052 | context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes; |
2053 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len; |
2054 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio; |
2055 | |
2056 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV; |
2057 | } |
2058 | |
2059 | /** |
2060 | * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify |
2061 | * @mqdes: MQ descriptor |
2062 | * @notification: Notification event |
2063 | * |
2064 | */ |
2065 | |
2066 | void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification) |
2067 | { |
2068 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2069 | |
2070 | if (notification) |
2071 | context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo; |
2072 | else |
2073 | context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0; |
2074 | |
2075 | context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes; |
2076 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY; |
2077 | } |
2078 | |
2079 | /** |
2080 | * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute |
2081 | * @mqdes: MQ descriptor |
2082 | * @mqstat: MQ flags |
2083 | * |
2084 | */ |
2085 | void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat) |
2086 | { |
2087 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2088 | context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes; |
2089 | context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat; |
2090 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR; |
2091 | } |
2092 | |
2093 | /** |
2094 | * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object |
2095 | * @ipcp: ipc permissions |
2096 | * |
2097 | */ |
2098 | void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) |
2099 | { |
2100 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2101 | context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid; |
2102 | context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid; |
2103 | context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode; |
2104 | context->ipc.has_perm = 0; |
2105 | security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid); |
2106 | context->type = AUDIT_IPC; |
2107 | } |
2108 | |
2109 | /** |
2110 | * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions |
2111 | * @qbytes: msgq bytes |
2112 | * @uid: msgq user id |
2113 | * @gid: msgq group id |
2114 | * @mode: msgq mode (permissions) |
2115 | * |
2116 | * Called only after audit_ipc_obj(). |
2117 | */ |
2118 | void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode) |
2119 | { |
2120 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2121 | |
2122 | context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes; |
2123 | context->ipc.perm_uid = uid; |
2124 | context->ipc.perm_gid = gid; |
2125 | context->ipc.perm_mode = mode; |
2126 | context->ipc.has_perm = 1; |
2127 | } |
2128 | |
2129 | int __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
2130 | { |
2131 | struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax; |
2132 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2133 | |
2134 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); |
2135 | if (!ax) |
2136 | return -ENOMEM; |
2137 | |
2138 | ax->argc = bprm->argc; |
2139 | ax->envc = bprm->envc; |
2140 | ax->mm = bprm->mm; |
2141 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE; |
2142 | ax->d.next = context->aux; |
2143 | context->aux = (void *)ax; |
2144 | return 0; |
2145 | } |
2146 | |
2147 | |
2148 | /** |
2149 | * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall |
2150 | * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS. |
2151 | * @args: args array |
2152 | * |
2153 | */ |
2154 | int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) |
2155 | { |
2156 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2157 | |
2158 | if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args) |
2159 | return -EINVAL; |
2160 | context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL; |
2161 | context->socketcall.nargs = nargs; |
2162 | memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long)); |
2163 | return 0; |
2164 | } |
2165 | |
2166 | /** |
2167 | * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair |
2168 | * @fd1: the first file descriptor |
2169 | * @fd2: the second file descriptor |
2170 | * |
2171 | */ |
2172 | void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2) |
2173 | { |
2174 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2175 | context->fds[0] = fd1; |
2176 | context->fds[1] = fd2; |
2177 | } |
2178 | |
2179 | /** |
2180 | * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto |
2181 | * @len: data length in user space |
2182 | * @a: data address in kernel space |
2183 | * |
2184 | * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. |
2185 | */ |
2186 | int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) |
2187 | { |
2188 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2189 | |
2190 | if (!context->sockaddr) { |
2191 | void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL); |
2192 | if (!p) |
2193 | return -ENOMEM; |
2194 | context->sockaddr = p; |
2195 | } |
2196 | |
2197 | context->sockaddr_len = len; |
2198 | memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len); |
2199 | return 0; |
2200 | } |
2201 | |
2202 | void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) |
2203 | { |
2204 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2205 | |
2206 | context->target_pid = t->pid; |
2207 | context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); |
2208 | context->target_uid = task_uid(t); |
2209 | context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); |
2210 | security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); |
2211 | memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); |
2212 | } |
2213 | |
2214 | /** |
2215 | * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem |
2216 | * @sig: signal value |
2217 | * @t: task being signaled |
2218 | * |
2219 | * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid) |
2220 | * and uid that is doing that. |
2221 | */ |
2222 | int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) |
2223 | { |
2224 | struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp; |
2225 | struct task_struct *tsk = current; |
2226 | struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context; |
2227 | kuid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t); |
2228 | |
2229 | if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) { |
2230 | if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) { |
2231 | audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid; |
2232 | if (uid_valid(tsk->loginuid)) |
2233 | audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid; |
2234 | else |
2235 | audit_sig_uid = uid; |
2236 | security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid); |
2237 | } |
2238 | if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) |
2239 | return 0; |
2240 | } |
2241 | |
2242 | /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly |
2243 | * in audit_context */ |
2244 | if (!ctx->target_pid) { |
2245 | ctx->target_pid = t->tgid; |
2246 | ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); |
2247 | ctx->target_uid = t_uid; |
2248 | ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); |
2249 | security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); |
2250 | memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); |
2251 | return 0; |
2252 | } |
2253 | |
2254 | axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids; |
2255 | if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) { |
2256 | axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC); |
2257 | if (!axp) |
2258 | return -ENOMEM; |
2259 | |
2260 | axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID; |
2261 | axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids; |
2262 | ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp; |
2263 | } |
2264 | BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS); |
2265 | |
2266 | axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid; |
2267 | axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); |
2268 | axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; |
2269 | axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); |
2270 | security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); |
2271 | memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); |
2272 | axp->pid_count++; |
2273 | |
2274 | return 0; |
2275 | } |
2276 | |
2277 | /** |
2278 | * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps |
2279 | * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed |
2280 | * @new: the proposed new credentials |
2281 | * @old: the old credentials |
2282 | * |
2283 | * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not |
2284 | * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall |
2285 | * |
2286 | * -Eric |
2287 | */ |
2288 | int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, |
2289 | const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
2290 | { |
2291 | struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax; |
2292 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2293 | struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps; |
2294 | struct dentry *dentry; |
2295 | |
2296 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); |
2297 | if (!ax) |
2298 | return -ENOMEM; |
2299 | |
2300 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS; |
2301 | ax->d.next = context->aux; |
2302 | context->aux = (void *)ax; |
2303 | |
2304 | dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry); |
2305 | get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps); |
2306 | dput(dentry); |
2307 | |
2308 | ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted; |
2309 | ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable; |
2310 | ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); |
2311 | ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; |
2312 | |
2313 | ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted; |
2314 | ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable; |
2315 | ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective; |
2316 | |
2317 | ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; |
2318 | ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable; |
2319 | ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective; |
2320 | return 0; |
2321 | } |
2322 | |
2323 | /** |
2324 | * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall |
2325 | * @pid: target pid of the capset call |
2326 | * @new: the new credentials |
2327 | * @old: the old (current) credentials |
2328 | * |
2329 | * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the |
2330 | * audit system if applicable |
2331 | */ |
2332 | void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid, |
2333 | const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
2334 | { |
2335 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2336 | context->capset.pid = pid; |
2337 | context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective; |
2338 | context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective; |
2339 | context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; |
2340 | context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET; |
2341 | } |
2342 | |
2343 | void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) |
2344 | { |
2345 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2346 | context->mmap.fd = fd; |
2347 | context->mmap.flags = flags; |
2348 | context->type = AUDIT_MMAP; |
2349 | } |
2350 | |
2351 | static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab) |
2352 | { |
2353 | kuid_t auid, uid; |
2354 | kgid_t gid; |
2355 | unsigned int sessionid; |
2356 | |
2357 | auid = audit_get_loginuid(current); |
2358 | sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); |
2359 | current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid); |
2360 | |
2361 | audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u", |
2362 | from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid), |
2363 | from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), |
2364 | from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid), |
2365 | sessionid); |
2366 | audit_log_task_context(ab); |
2367 | audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid); |
2368 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm); |
2369 | } |
2370 | |
2371 | static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason, long signr) |
2372 | { |
2373 | audit_log_task(ab); |
2374 | audit_log_format(ab, " reason="); |
2375 | audit_log_string(ab, reason); |
2376 | audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr); |
2377 | } |
2378 | /** |
2379 | * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally |
2380 | * @signr: signal value |
2381 | * |
2382 | * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we |
2383 | * should record the event for investigation. |
2384 | */ |
2385 | void audit_core_dumps(long signr) |
2386 | { |
2387 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
2388 | |
2389 | if (!audit_enabled) |
2390 | return; |
2391 | |
2392 | if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */ |
2393 | return; |
2394 | |
2395 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND); |
2396 | if (unlikely(!ab)) |
2397 | return; |
2398 | audit_log_abend(ab, "memory violation", signr); |
2399 | audit_log_end(ab); |
2400 | } |
2401 | |
2402 | void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code) |
2403 | { |
2404 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
2405 | |
2406 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP); |
2407 | if (unlikely(!ab)) |
2408 | return; |
2409 | audit_log_task(ab); |
2410 | audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr); |
2411 | audit_log_format(ab, " syscall=%ld", syscall); |
2412 | audit_log_format(ab, " compat=%d", is_compat_task()); |
2413 | audit_log_format(ab, " ip=0x%lx", KSTK_EIP(current)); |
2414 | audit_log_format(ab, " code=0x%x", code); |
2415 | audit_log_end(ab); |
2416 | } |
2417 | |
2418 | struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void) |
2419 | { |
2420 | struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; |
2421 | if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall)) |
2422 | return NULL; |
2423 | return &ctx->killed_trees; |
2424 | } |
2425 |
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v2.6.34-rc5
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