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1 | /* |
2 | * linux/kernel/sys.c |
3 | * |
4 | * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds |
5 | */ |
6 | |
7 | #include <linux/export.h> |
8 | #include <linux/mm.h> |
9 | #include <linux/utsname.h> |
10 | #include <linux/mman.h> |
11 | #include <linux/reboot.h> |
12 | #include <linux/prctl.h> |
13 | #include <linux/highuid.h> |
14 | #include <linux/fs.h> |
15 | #include <linux/kmod.h> |
16 | #include <linux/perf_event.h> |
17 | #include <linux/resource.h> |
18 | #include <linux/kernel.h> |
19 | #include <linux/kexec.h> |
20 | #include <linux/workqueue.h> |
21 | #include <linux/capability.h> |
22 | #include <linux/device.h> |
23 | #include <linux/key.h> |
24 | #include <linux/times.h> |
25 | #include <linux/posix-timers.h> |
26 | #include <linux/security.h> |
27 | #include <linux/dcookies.h> |
28 | #include <linux/suspend.h> |
29 | #include <linux/tty.h> |
30 | #include <linux/signal.h> |
31 | #include <linux/cn_proc.h> |
32 | #include <linux/getcpu.h> |
33 | #include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h> |
34 | #include <linux/seccomp.h> |
35 | #include <linux/cpu.h> |
36 | #include <linux/personality.h> |
37 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> |
38 | #include <linux/fs_struct.h> |
39 | #include <linux/file.h> |
40 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
41 | #include <linux/gfp.h> |
42 | #include <linux/syscore_ops.h> |
43 | #include <linux/version.h> |
44 | #include <linux/ctype.h> |
45 | |
46 | #include <linux/compat.h> |
47 | #include <linux/syscalls.h> |
48 | #include <linux/kprobes.h> |
49 | #include <linux/user_namespace.h> |
50 | #include <linux/binfmts.h> |
51 | |
52 | #include <linux/sched.h> |
53 | #include <linux/rcupdate.h> |
54 | #include <linux/uidgid.h> |
55 | #include <linux/cred.h> |
56 | |
57 | #include <linux/kmsg_dump.h> |
58 | /* Move somewhere else to avoid recompiling? */ |
59 | #include <generated/utsrelease.h> |
60 | |
61 | #include <asm/uaccess.h> |
62 | #include <asm/io.h> |
63 | #include <asm/unistd.h> |
64 | |
65 | #ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL |
66 | # define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
67 | #endif |
68 | #ifndef GET_UNALIGN_CTL |
69 | # define GET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
70 | #endif |
71 | #ifndef SET_FPEMU_CTL |
72 | # define SET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
73 | #endif |
74 | #ifndef GET_FPEMU_CTL |
75 | # define GET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
76 | #endif |
77 | #ifndef SET_FPEXC_CTL |
78 | # define SET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
79 | #endif |
80 | #ifndef GET_FPEXC_CTL |
81 | # define GET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
82 | #endif |
83 | #ifndef GET_ENDIAN |
84 | # define GET_ENDIAN(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
85 | #endif |
86 | #ifndef SET_ENDIAN |
87 | # define SET_ENDIAN(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
88 | #endif |
89 | #ifndef GET_TSC_CTL |
90 | # define GET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL) |
91 | #endif |
92 | #ifndef SET_TSC_CTL |
93 | # define SET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL) |
94 | #endif |
95 | |
96 | /* |
97 | * this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for |
98 | * architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past |
99 | */ |
100 | |
101 | int overflowuid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWUID; |
102 | int overflowgid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWGID; |
103 | |
104 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowuid); |
105 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowgid); |
106 | |
107 | /* |
108 | * the same as above, but for filesystems which can only store a 16-bit |
109 | * UID and GID. as such, this is needed on all architectures |
110 | */ |
111 | |
112 | int fs_overflowuid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID; |
113 | int fs_overflowgid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID; |
114 | |
115 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowuid); |
116 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowgid); |
117 | |
118 | /* |
119 | * Returns true if current's euid is same as p's uid or euid, |
120 | * or has CAP_SYS_NICE to p's user_ns. |
121 | * |
122 | * Called with rcu_read_lock, creds are safe |
123 | */ |
124 | static bool set_one_prio_perm(struct task_struct *p) |
125 | { |
126 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p); |
127 | |
128 | if (uid_eq(pcred->uid, cred->euid) || |
129 | uid_eq(pcred->euid, cred->euid)) |
130 | return true; |
131 | if (ns_capable(pcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE)) |
132 | return true; |
133 | return false; |
134 | } |
135 | |
136 | /* |
137 | * set the priority of a task |
138 | * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock |
139 | */ |
140 | static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error) |
141 | { |
142 | int no_nice; |
143 | |
144 | if (!set_one_prio_perm(p)) { |
145 | error = -EPERM; |
146 | goto out; |
147 | } |
148 | if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !can_nice(p, niceval)) { |
149 | error = -EACCES; |
150 | goto out; |
151 | } |
152 | no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval); |
153 | if (no_nice) { |
154 | error = no_nice; |
155 | goto out; |
156 | } |
157 | if (error == -ESRCH) |
158 | error = 0; |
159 | set_user_nice(p, niceval); |
160 | out: |
161 | return error; |
162 | } |
163 | |
164 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setpriority, int, which, int, who, int, niceval) |
165 | { |
166 | struct task_struct *g, *p; |
167 | struct user_struct *user; |
168 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
169 | int error = -EINVAL; |
170 | struct pid *pgrp; |
171 | kuid_t uid; |
172 | |
173 | if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS) |
174 | goto out; |
175 | |
176 | /* normalize: avoid signed division (rounding problems) */ |
177 | error = -ESRCH; |
178 | if (niceval < -20) |
179 | niceval = -20; |
180 | if (niceval > 19) |
181 | niceval = 19; |
182 | |
183 | rcu_read_lock(); |
184 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock); |
185 | switch (which) { |
186 | case PRIO_PROCESS: |
187 | if (who) |
188 | p = find_task_by_vpid(who); |
189 | else |
190 | p = current; |
191 | if (p) |
192 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); |
193 | break; |
194 | case PRIO_PGRP: |
195 | if (who) |
196 | pgrp = find_vpid(who); |
197 | else |
198 | pgrp = task_pgrp(current); |
199 | do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) { |
200 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); |
201 | } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); |
202 | break; |
203 | case PRIO_USER: |
204 | uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, who); |
205 | user = cred->user; |
206 | if (!who) |
207 | uid = cred->uid; |
208 | else if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) && |
209 | !(user = find_user(uid))) |
210 | goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ |
211 | |
212 | do_each_thread(g, p) { |
213 | if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), uid)) |
214 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); |
215 | } while_each_thread(g, p); |
216 | if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) |
217 | free_uid(user); /* For find_user() */ |
218 | break; |
219 | } |
220 | out_unlock: |
221 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
222 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
223 | out: |
224 | return error; |
225 | } |
226 | |
227 | /* |
228 | * Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will |
229 | * not return the normal nice-value, but a negated value that |
230 | * has been offset by 20 (ie it returns 40..1 instead of -20..19) |
231 | * to stay compatible. |
232 | */ |
233 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getpriority, int, which, int, who) |
234 | { |
235 | struct task_struct *g, *p; |
236 | struct user_struct *user; |
237 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
238 | long niceval, retval = -ESRCH; |
239 | struct pid *pgrp; |
240 | kuid_t uid; |
241 | |
242 | if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS) |
243 | return -EINVAL; |
244 | |
245 | rcu_read_lock(); |
246 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock); |
247 | switch (which) { |
248 | case PRIO_PROCESS: |
249 | if (who) |
250 | p = find_task_by_vpid(who); |
251 | else |
252 | p = current; |
253 | if (p) { |
254 | niceval = 20 - task_nice(p); |
255 | if (niceval > retval) |
256 | retval = niceval; |
257 | } |
258 | break; |
259 | case PRIO_PGRP: |
260 | if (who) |
261 | pgrp = find_vpid(who); |
262 | else |
263 | pgrp = task_pgrp(current); |
264 | do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) { |
265 | niceval = 20 - task_nice(p); |
266 | if (niceval > retval) |
267 | retval = niceval; |
268 | } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); |
269 | break; |
270 | case PRIO_USER: |
271 | uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, who); |
272 | user = cred->user; |
273 | if (!who) |
274 | uid = cred->uid; |
275 | else if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) && |
276 | !(user = find_user(uid))) |
277 | goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ |
278 | |
279 | do_each_thread(g, p) { |
280 | if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), uid)) { |
281 | niceval = 20 - task_nice(p); |
282 | if (niceval > retval) |
283 | retval = niceval; |
284 | } |
285 | } while_each_thread(g, p); |
286 | if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) |
287 | free_uid(user); /* for find_user() */ |
288 | break; |
289 | } |
290 | out_unlock: |
291 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
292 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
293 | |
294 | return retval; |
295 | } |
296 | |
297 | /* |
298 | * Unprivileged users may change the real gid to the effective gid |
299 | * or vice versa. (BSD-style) |
300 | * |
301 | * If you set the real gid at all, or set the effective gid to a value not |
302 | * equal to the real gid, then the saved gid is set to the new effective gid. |
303 | * |
304 | * This makes it possible for a setgid program to completely drop its |
305 | * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing |
306 | * a security audit over a program. |
307 | * |
308 | * The general idea is that a program which uses just setregid() will be |
309 | * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setgid() will be |
310 | * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. |
311 | * |
312 | * SMP: There are not races, the GIDs are checked only by filesystem |
313 | * operations (as far as semantic preservation is concerned). |
314 | */ |
315 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid) |
316 | { |
317 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
318 | const struct cred *old; |
319 | struct cred *new; |
320 | int retval; |
321 | kgid_t krgid, kegid; |
322 | |
323 | krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid); |
324 | kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid); |
325 | |
326 | if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid)) |
327 | return -EINVAL; |
328 | if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid)) |
329 | return -EINVAL; |
330 | |
331 | new = prepare_creds(); |
332 | if (!new) |
333 | return -ENOMEM; |
334 | old = current_cred(); |
335 | |
336 | retval = -EPERM; |
337 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) { |
338 | if (gid_eq(old->gid, krgid) || |
339 | gid_eq(old->egid, krgid) || |
340 | ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) |
341 | new->gid = krgid; |
342 | else |
343 | goto error; |
344 | } |
345 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1) { |
346 | if (gid_eq(old->gid, kegid) || |
347 | gid_eq(old->egid, kegid) || |
348 | gid_eq(old->sgid, kegid) || |
349 | ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) |
350 | new->egid = kegid; |
351 | else |
352 | goto error; |
353 | } |
354 | |
355 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 || |
356 | (egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid))) |
357 | new->sgid = new->egid; |
358 | new->fsgid = new->egid; |
359 | |
360 | return commit_creds(new); |
361 | |
362 | error: |
363 | abort_creds(new); |
364 | return retval; |
365 | } |
366 | |
367 | /* |
368 | * setgid() is implemented like SysV w/ SAVED_IDS |
369 | * |
370 | * SMP: Same implicit races as above. |
371 | */ |
372 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid) |
373 | { |
374 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
375 | const struct cred *old; |
376 | struct cred *new; |
377 | int retval; |
378 | kgid_t kgid; |
379 | |
380 | kgid = make_kgid(ns, gid); |
381 | if (!gid_valid(kgid)) |
382 | return -EINVAL; |
383 | |
384 | new = prepare_creds(); |
385 | if (!new) |
386 | return -ENOMEM; |
387 | old = current_cred(); |
388 | |
389 | retval = -EPERM; |
390 | if (ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) |
391 | new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = kgid; |
392 | else if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid)) |
393 | new->egid = new->fsgid = kgid; |
394 | else |
395 | goto error; |
396 | |
397 | return commit_creds(new); |
398 | |
399 | error: |
400 | abort_creds(new); |
401 | return retval; |
402 | } |
403 | |
404 | /* |
405 | * change the user struct in a credentials set to match the new UID |
406 | */ |
407 | static int set_user(struct cred *new) |
408 | { |
409 | struct user_struct *new_user; |
410 | |
411 | new_user = alloc_uid(new->uid); |
412 | if (!new_user) |
413 | return -EAGAIN; |
414 | |
415 | /* |
416 | * We don't fail in case of NPROC limit excess here because too many |
417 | * poorly written programs don't check set*uid() return code, assuming |
418 | * it never fails if called by root. We may still enforce NPROC limit |
419 | * for programs doing set*uid()+execve() by harmlessly deferring the |
420 | * failure to the execve() stage. |
421 | */ |
422 | if (atomic_read(&new_user->processes) >= rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) && |
423 | new_user != INIT_USER) |
424 | current->flags |= PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; |
425 | else |
426 | current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; |
427 | |
428 | free_uid(new->user); |
429 | new->user = new_user; |
430 | return 0; |
431 | } |
432 | |
433 | /* |
434 | * Unprivileged users may change the real uid to the effective uid |
435 | * or vice versa. (BSD-style) |
436 | * |
437 | * If you set the real uid at all, or set the effective uid to a value not |
438 | * equal to the real uid, then the saved uid is set to the new effective uid. |
439 | * |
440 | * This makes it possible for a setuid program to completely drop its |
441 | * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing |
442 | * a security audit over a program. |
443 | * |
444 | * The general idea is that a program which uses just setreuid() will be |
445 | * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setuid() will be |
446 | * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. |
447 | */ |
448 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid) |
449 | { |
450 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
451 | const struct cred *old; |
452 | struct cred *new; |
453 | int retval; |
454 | kuid_t kruid, keuid; |
455 | |
456 | kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid); |
457 | keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid); |
458 | |
459 | if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(kruid)) |
460 | return -EINVAL; |
461 | if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(keuid)) |
462 | return -EINVAL; |
463 | |
464 | new = prepare_creds(); |
465 | if (!new) |
466 | return -ENOMEM; |
467 | old = current_cred(); |
468 | |
469 | retval = -EPERM; |
470 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { |
471 | new->uid = kruid; |
472 | if (!uid_eq(old->uid, kruid) && |
473 | !uid_eq(old->euid, kruid) && |
474 | !ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) |
475 | goto error; |
476 | } |
477 | |
478 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1) { |
479 | new->euid = keuid; |
480 | if (!uid_eq(old->uid, keuid) && |
481 | !uid_eq(old->euid, keuid) && |
482 | !uid_eq(old->suid, keuid) && |
483 | !ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) |
484 | goto error; |
485 | } |
486 | |
487 | if (!uid_eq(new->uid, old->uid)) { |
488 | retval = set_user(new); |
489 | if (retval < 0) |
490 | goto error; |
491 | } |
492 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 || |
493 | (euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid))) |
494 | new->suid = new->euid; |
495 | new->fsuid = new->euid; |
496 | |
497 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE); |
498 | if (retval < 0) |
499 | goto error; |
500 | |
501 | return commit_creds(new); |
502 | |
503 | error: |
504 | abort_creds(new); |
505 | return retval; |
506 | } |
507 | |
508 | /* |
509 | * setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS |
510 | * |
511 | * Note that SAVED_ID's is deficient in that a setuid root program |
512 | * like sendmail, for example, cannot set its uid to be a normal |
513 | * user and then switch back, because if you're root, setuid() sets |
514 | * the saved uid too. If you don't like this, blame the bright people |
515 | * in the POSIX committee and/or USG. Note that the BSD-style setreuid() |
516 | * will allow a root program to temporarily drop privileges and be able to |
517 | * regain them by swapping the real and effective uid. |
518 | */ |
519 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid, uid_t, uid) |
520 | { |
521 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
522 | const struct cred *old; |
523 | struct cred *new; |
524 | int retval; |
525 | kuid_t kuid; |
526 | |
527 | kuid = make_kuid(ns, uid); |
528 | if (!uid_valid(kuid)) |
529 | return -EINVAL; |
530 | |
531 | new = prepare_creds(); |
532 | if (!new) |
533 | return -ENOMEM; |
534 | old = current_cred(); |
535 | |
536 | retval = -EPERM; |
537 | if (ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { |
538 | new->suid = new->uid = kuid; |
539 | if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid)) { |
540 | retval = set_user(new); |
541 | if (retval < 0) |
542 | goto error; |
543 | } |
544 | } else if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(kuid, new->suid)) { |
545 | goto error; |
546 | } |
547 | |
548 | new->fsuid = new->euid = kuid; |
549 | |
550 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID); |
551 | if (retval < 0) |
552 | goto error; |
553 | |
554 | return commit_creds(new); |
555 | |
556 | error: |
557 | abort_creds(new); |
558 | return retval; |
559 | } |
560 | |
561 | |
562 | /* |
563 | * This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid, |
564 | * and suid. This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid(). |
565 | */ |
566 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid, uid_t, suid) |
567 | { |
568 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
569 | const struct cred *old; |
570 | struct cred *new; |
571 | int retval; |
572 | kuid_t kruid, keuid, ksuid; |
573 | |
574 | kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid); |
575 | keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid); |
576 | ksuid = make_kuid(ns, suid); |
577 | |
578 | if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(kruid)) |
579 | return -EINVAL; |
580 | |
581 | if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(keuid)) |
582 | return -EINVAL; |
583 | |
584 | if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(ksuid)) |
585 | return -EINVAL; |
586 | |
587 | new = prepare_creds(); |
588 | if (!new) |
589 | return -ENOMEM; |
590 | |
591 | old = current_cred(); |
592 | |
593 | retval = -EPERM; |
594 | if (!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { |
595 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(kruid, old->uid) && |
596 | !uid_eq(kruid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->suid)) |
597 | goto error; |
598 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid) && |
599 | !uid_eq(keuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(keuid, old->suid)) |
600 | goto error; |
601 | if (suid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->uid) && |
602 | !uid_eq(ksuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->suid)) |
603 | goto error; |
604 | } |
605 | |
606 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { |
607 | new->uid = kruid; |
608 | if (!uid_eq(kruid, old->uid)) { |
609 | retval = set_user(new); |
610 | if (retval < 0) |
611 | goto error; |
612 | } |
613 | } |
614 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1) |
615 | new->euid = keuid; |
616 | if (suid != (uid_t) -1) |
617 | new->suid = ksuid; |
618 | new->fsuid = new->euid; |
619 | |
620 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES); |
621 | if (retval < 0) |
622 | goto error; |
623 | |
624 | return commit_creds(new); |
625 | |
626 | error: |
627 | abort_creds(new); |
628 | return retval; |
629 | } |
630 | |
631 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresuid, uid_t __user *, ruidp, uid_t __user *, euidp, uid_t __user *, suidp) |
632 | { |
633 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
634 | int retval; |
635 | uid_t ruid, euid, suid; |
636 | |
637 | ruid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->uid); |
638 | euid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->euid); |
639 | suid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->suid); |
640 | |
641 | if (!(retval = put_user(ruid, ruidp)) && |
642 | !(retval = put_user(euid, euidp))) |
643 | retval = put_user(suid, suidp); |
644 | |
645 | return retval; |
646 | } |
647 | |
648 | /* |
649 | * Same as above, but for rgid, egid, sgid. |
650 | */ |
651 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid) |
652 | { |
653 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
654 | const struct cred *old; |
655 | struct cred *new; |
656 | int retval; |
657 | kgid_t krgid, kegid, ksgid; |
658 | |
659 | krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid); |
660 | kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid); |
661 | ksgid = make_kgid(ns, sgid); |
662 | |
663 | if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid)) |
664 | return -EINVAL; |
665 | if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid)) |
666 | return -EINVAL; |
667 | if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(ksgid)) |
668 | return -EINVAL; |
669 | |
670 | new = prepare_creds(); |
671 | if (!new) |
672 | return -ENOMEM; |
673 | old = current_cred(); |
674 | |
675 | retval = -EPERM; |
676 | if (!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) { |
677 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(krgid, old->gid) && |
678 | !gid_eq(krgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->sgid)) |
679 | goto error; |
680 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid) && |
681 | !gid_eq(kegid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(kegid, old->sgid)) |
682 | goto error; |
683 | if (sgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->gid) && |
684 | !gid_eq(ksgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->sgid)) |
685 | goto error; |
686 | } |
687 | |
688 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) |
689 | new->gid = krgid; |
690 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1) |
691 | new->egid = kegid; |
692 | if (sgid != (gid_t) -1) |
693 | new->sgid = ksgid; |
694 | new->fsgid = new->egid; |
695 | |
696 | return commit_creds(new); |
697 | |
698 | error: |
699 | abort_creds(new); |
700 | return retval; |
701 | } |
702 | |
703 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresgid, gid_t __user *, rgidp, gid_t __user *, egidp, gid_t __user *, sgidp) |
704 | { |
705 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
706 | int retval; |
707 | gid_t rgid, egid, sgid; |
708 | |
709 | rgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->gid); |
710 | egid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->egid); |
711 | sgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->sgid); |
712 | |
713 | if (!(retval = put_user(rgid, rgidp)) && |
714 | !(retval = put_user(egid, egidp))) |
715 | retval = put_user(sgid, sgidp); |
716 | |
717 | return retval; |
718 | } |
719 | |
720 | |
721 | /* |
722 | * "setfsuid()" sets the fsuid - the uid used for filesystem checks. This |
723 | * is used for "access()" and for the NFS daemon (letting nfsd stay at |
724 | * whatever uid it wants to). It normally shadows "euid", except when |
725 | * explicitly set by setfsuid() or for access.. |
726 | */ |
727 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid) |
728 | { |
729 | const struct cred *old; |
730 | struct cred *new; |
731 | uid_t old_fsuid; |
732 | kuid_t kuid; |
733 | |
734 | old = current_cred(); |
735 | old_fsuid = from_kuid_munged(old->user_ns, old->fsuid); |
736 | |
737 | kuid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, uid); |
738 | if (!uid_valid(kuid)) |
739 | return old_fsuid; |
740 | |
741 | new = prepare_creds(); |
742 | if (!new) |
743 | return old_fsuid; |
744 | |
745 | if (uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->euid) || |
746 | uid_eq(kuid, old->suid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid) || |
747 | ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { |
748 | if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid)) { |
749 | new->fsuid = kuid; |
750 | if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0) |
751 | goto change_okay; |
752 | } |
753 | } |
754 | |
755 | abort_creds(new); |
756 | return old_fsuid; |
757 | |
758 | change_okay: |
759 | commit_creds(new); |
760 | return old_fsuid; |
761 | } |
762 | |
763 | /* |
764 | * Samma på svenska.. |
765 | */ |
766 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid) |
767 | { |
768 | const struct cred *old; |
769 | struct cred *new; |
770 | gid_t old_fsgid; |
771 | kgid_t kgid; |
772 | |
773 | old = current_cred(); |
774 | old_fsgid = from_kgid_munged(old->user_ns, old->fsgid); |
775 | |
776 | kgid = make_kgid(old->user_ns, gid); |
777 | if (!gid_valid(kgid)) |
778 | return old_fsgid; |
779 | |
780 | new = prepare_creds(); |
781 | if (!new) |
782 | return old_fsgid; |
783 | |
784 | if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->egid) || |
785 | gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid) || |
786 | ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) { |
787 | if (!gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid)) { |
788 | new->fsgid = kgid; |
789 | goto change_okay; |
790 | } |
791 | } |
792 | |
793 | abort_creds(new); |
794 | return old_fsgid; |
795 | |
796 | change_okay: |
797 | commit_creds(new); |
798 | return old_fsgid; |
799 | } |
800 | |
801 | /** |
802 | * sys_getpid - return the thread group id of the current process |
803 | * |
804 | * Note, despite the name, this returns the tgid not the pid. The tgid and |
805 | * the pid are identical unless CLONE_THREAD was specified on clone() in |
806 | * which case the tgid is the same in all threads of the same group. |
807 | * |
808 | * This is SMP safe as current->tgid does not change. |
809 | */ |
810 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpid) |
811 | { |
812 | return task_tgid_vnr(current); |
813 | } |
814 | |
815 | /* Thread ID - the internal kernel "pid" */ |
816 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(gettid) |
817 | { |
818 | return task_pid_vnr(current); |
819 | } |
820 | |
821 | /* |
822 | * Accessing ->real_parent is not SMP-safe, it could |
823 | * change from under us. However, we can use a stale |
824 | * value of ->real_parent under rcu_read_lock(), see |
825 | * release_task()->call_rcu(delayed_put_task_struct). |
826 | */ |
827 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getppid) |
828 | { |
829 | int pid; |
830 | |
831 | rcu_read_lock(); |
832 | pid = task_tgid_vnr(rcu_dereference(current->real_parent)); |
833 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
834 | |
835 | return pid; |
836 | } |
837 | |
838 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getuid) |
839 | { |
840 | /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ |
841 | return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()); |
842 | } |
843 | |
844 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(geteuid) |
845 | { |
846 | /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ |
847 | return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_euid()); |
848 | } |
849 | |
850 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getgid) |
851 | { |
852 | /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ |
853 | return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_gid()); |
854 | } |
855 | |
856 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getegid) |
857 | { |
858 | /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ |
859 | return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_egid()); |
860 | } |
861 | |
862 | void do_sys_times(struct tms *tms) |
863 | { |
864 | cputime_t tgutime, tgstime, cutime, cstime; |
865 | |
866 | spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); |
867 | thread_group_cputime_adjusted(current, &tgutime, &tgstime); |
868 | cutime = current->signal->cutime; |
869 | cstime = current->signal->cstime; |
870 | spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); |
871 | tms->tms_utime = cputime_to_clock_t(tgutime); |
872 | tms->tms_stime = cputime_to_clock_t(tgstime); |
873 | tms->tms_cutime = cputime_to_clock_t(cutime); |
874 | tms->tms_cstime = cputime_to_clock_t(cstime); |
875 | } |
876 | |
877 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct tms __user *, tbuf) |
878 | { |
879 | if (tbuf) { |
880 | struct tms tmp; |
881 | |
882 | do_sys_times(&tmp); |
883 | if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(struct tms))) |
884 | return -EFAULT; |
885 | } |
886 | force_successful_syscall_return(); |
887 | return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(get_jiffies_64()); |
888 | } |
889 | |
890 | /* |
891 | * This needs some heavy checking ... |
892 | * I just haven't the stomach for it. I also don't fully |
893 | * understand sessions/pgrp etc. Let somebody who does explain it. |
894 | * |
895 | * OK, I think I have the protection semantics right.... this is really |
896 | * only important on a multi-user system anyway, to make sure one user |
897 | * can't send a signal to a process owned by another. -TYT, 12/12/91 |
898 | * |
899 | * Auch. Had to add the 'did_exec' flag to conform completely to POSIX. |
900 | * LBT 04.03.94 |
901 | */ |
902 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setpgid, pid_t, pid, pid_t, pgid) |
903 | { |
904 | struct task_struct *p; |
905 | struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader; |
906 | struct pid *pgrp; |
907 | int err; |
908 | |
909 | if (!pid) |
910 | pid = task_pid_vnr(group_leader); |
911 | if (!pgid) |
912 | pgid = pid; |
913 | if (pgid < 0) |
914 | return -EINVAL; |
915 | rcu_read_lock(); |
916 | |
917 | /* From this point forward we keep holding onto the tasklist lock |
918 | * so that our parent does not change from under us. -DaveM |
919 | */ |
920 | write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
921 | |
922 | err = -ESRCH; |
923 | p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); |
924 | if (!p) |
925 | goto out; |
926 | |
927 | err = -EINVAL; |
928 | if (!thread_group_leader(p)) |
929 | goto out; |
930 | |
931 | if (same_thread_group(p->real_parent, group_leader)) { |
932 | err = -EPERM; |
933 | if (task_session(p) != task_session(group_leader)) |
934 | goto out; |
935 | err = -EACCES; |
936 | if (p->did_exec) |
937 | goto out; |
938 | } else { |
939 | err = -ESRCH; |
940 | if (p != group_leader) |
941 | goto out; |
942 | } |
943 | |
944 | err = -EPERM; |
945 | if (p->signal->leader) |
946 | goto out; |
947 | |
948 | pgrp = task_pid(p); |
949 | if (pgid != pid) { |
950 | struct task_struct *g; |
951 | |
952 | pgrp = find_vpid(pgid); |
953 | g = pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID); |
954 | if (!g || task_session(g) != task_session(group_leader)) |
955 | goto out; |
956 | } |
957 | |
958 | err = security_task_setpgid(p, pgid); |
959 | if (err) |
960 | goto out; |
961 | |
962 | if (task_pgrp(p) != pgrp) |
963 | change_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, pgrp); |
964 | |
965 | err = 0; |
966 | out: |
967 | /* All paths lead to here, thus we are safe. -DaveM */ |
968 | write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
969 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
970 | return err; |
971 | } |
972 | |
973 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getpgid, pid_t, pid) |
974 | { |
975 | struct task_struct *p; |
976 | struct pid *grp; |
977 | int retval; |
978 | |
979 | rcu_read_lock(); |
980 | if (!pid) |
981 | grp = task_pgrp(current); |
982 | else { |
983 | retval = -ESRCH; |
984 | p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); |
985 | if (!p) |
986 | goto out; |
987 | grp = task_pgrp(p); |
988 | if (!grp) |
989 | goto out; |
990 | |
991 | retval = security_task_getpgid(p); |
992 | if (retval) |
993 | goto out; |
994 | } |
995 | retval = pid_vnr(grp); |
996 | out: |
997 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
998 | return retval; |
999 | } |
1000 | |
1001 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETPGRP |
1002 | |
1003 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpgrp) |
1004 | { |
1005 | return sys_getpgid(0); |
1006 | } |
1007 | |
1008 | #endif |
1009 | |
1010 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getsid, pid_t, pid) |
1011 | { |
1012 | struct task_struct *p; |
1013 | struct pid *sid; |
1014 | int retval; |
1015 | |
1016 | rcu_read_lock(); |
1017 | if (!pid) |
1018 | sid = task_session(current); |
1019 | else { |
1020 | retval = -ESRCH; |
1021 | p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); |
1022 | if (!p) |
1023 | goto out; |
1024 | sid = task_session(p); |
1025 | if (!sid) |
1026 | goto out; |
1027 | |
1028 | retval = security_task_getsid(p); |
1029 | if (retval) |
1030 | goto out; |
1031 | } |
1032 | retval = pid_vnr(sid); |
1033 | out: |
1034 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1035 | return retval; |
1036 | } |
1037 | |
1038 | static void set_special_pids(struct pid *pid) |
1039 | { |
1040 | struct task_struct *curr = current->group_leader; |
1041 | |
1042 | if (task_session(curr) != pid) |
1043 | change_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_SID, pid); |
1044 | |
1045 | if (task_pgrp(curr) != pid) |
1046 | change_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_PGID, pid); |
1047 | } |
1048 | |
1049 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(setsid) |
1050 | { |
1051 | struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader; |
1052 | struct pid *sid = task_pid(group_leader); |
1053 | pid_t session = pid_vnr(sid); |
1054 | int err = -EPERM; |
1055 | |
1056 | write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
1057 | /* Fail if I am already a session leader */ |
1058 | if (group_leader->signal->leader) |
1059 | goto out; |
1060 | |
1061 | /* Fail if a process group id already exists that equals the |
1062 | * proposed session id. |
1063 | */ |
1064 | if (pid_task(sid, PIDTYPE_PGID)) |
1065 | goto out; |
1066 | |
1067 | group_leader->signal->leader = 1; |
1068 | set_special_pids(sid); |
1069 | |
1070 | proc_clear_tty(group_leader); |
1071 | |
1072 | err = session; |
1073 | out: |
1074 | write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
1075 | if (err > 0) { |
1076 | proc_sid_connector(group_leader); |
1077 | sched_autogroup_create_attach(group_leader); |
1078 | } |
1079 | return err; |
1080 | } |
1081 | |
1082 | DECLARE_RWSEM(uts_sem); |
1083 | |
1084 | #ifdef COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE |
1085 | #define override_architecture(name) \ |
1086 | (personality(current->personality) == PER_LINUX32 && \ |
1087 | copy_to_user(name->machine, COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE, \ |
1088 | sizeof(COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE))) |
1089 | #else |
1090 | #define override_architecture(name) 0 |
1091 | #endif |
1092 | |
1093 | /* |
1094 | * Work around broken programs that cannot handle "Linux 3.0". |
1095 | * Instead we map 3.x to 2.6.40+x, so e.g. 3.0 would be 2.6.40 |
1096 | */ |
1097 | static int override_release(char __user *release, size_t len) |
1098 | { |
1099 | int ret = 0; |
1100 | |
1101 | if (current->personality & UNAME26) { |
1102 | const char *rest = UTS_RELEASE; |
1103 | char buf[65] = { 0 }; |
1104 | int ndots = 0; |
1105 | unsigned v; |
1106 | size_t copy; |
1107 | |
1108 | while (*rest) { |
1109 | if (*rest == '.' && ++ndots >= 3) |
1110 | break; |
1111 | if (!isdigit(*rest) && *rest != '.') |
1112 | break; |
1113 | rest++; |
1114 | } |
1115 | v = ((LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 8) & 0xff) + 40; |
1116 | copy = clamp_t(size_t, len, 1, sizeof(buf)); |
1117 | copy = scnprintf(buf, copy, "2.6.%u%s", v, rest); |
1118 | ret = copy_to_user(release, buf, copy + 1); |
1119 | } |
1120 | return ret; |
1121 | } |
1122 | |
1123 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(newuname, struct new_utsname __user *, name) |
1124 | { |
1125 | int errno = 0; |
1126 | |
1127 | down_read(&uts_sem); |
1128 | if (copy_to_user(name, utsname(), sizeof *name)) |
1129 | errno = -EFAULT; |
1130 | up_read(&uts_sem); |
1131 | |
1132 | if (!errno && override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release))) |
1133 | errno = -EFAULT; |
1134 | if (!errno && override_architecture(name)) |
1135 | errno = -EFAULT; |
1136 | return errno; |
1137 | } |
1138 | |
1139 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_UNAME |
1140 | /* |
1141 | * Old cruft |
1142 | */ |
1143 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uname, struct old_utsname __user *, name) |
1144 | { |
1145 | int error = 0; |
1146 | |
1147 | if (!name) |
1148 | return -EFAULT; |
1149 | |
1150 | down_read(&uts_sem); |
1151 | if (copy_to_user(name, utsname(), sizeof(*name))) |
1152 | error = -EFAULT; |
1153 | up_read(&uts_sem); |
1154 | |
1155 | if (!error && override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release))) |
1156 | error = -EFAULT; |
1157 | if (!error && override_architecture(name)) |
1158 | error = -EFAULT; |
1159 | return error; |
1160 | } |
1161 | |
1162 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(olduname, struct oldold_utsname __user *, name) |
1163 | { |
1164 | int error; |
1165 | |
1166 | if (!name) |
1167 | return -EFAULT; |
1168 | if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, name, sizeof(struct oldold_utsname))) |
1169 | return -EFAULT; |
1170 | |
1171 | down_read(&uts_sem); |
1172 | error = __copy_to_user(&name->sysname, &utsname()->sysname, |
1173 | __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
1174 | error |= __put_user(0, name->sysname + __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
1175 | error |= __copy_to_user(&name->nodename, &utsname()->nodename, |
1176 | __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
1177 | error |= __put_user(0, name->nodename + __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
1178 | error |= __copy_to_user(&name->release, &utsname()->release, |
1179 | __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
1180 | error |= __put_user(0, name->release + __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
1181 | error |= __copy_to_user(&name->version, &utsname()->version, |
1182 | __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
1183 | error |= __put_user(0, name->version + __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
1184 | error |= __copy_to_user(&name->machine, &utsname()->machine, |
1185 | __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
1186 | error |= __put_user(0, name->machine + __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
1187 | up_read(&uts_sem); |
1188 | |
1189 | if (!error && override_architecture(name)) |
1190 | error = -EFAULT; |
1191 | if (!error && override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release))) |
1192 | error = -EFAULT; |
1193 | return error ? -EFAULT : 0; |
1194 | } |
1195 | #endif |
1196 | |
1197 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
1198 | { |
1199 | int errno; |
1200 | char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN]; |
1201 | |
1202 | if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
1203 | return -EPERM; |
1204 | |
1205 | if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN) |
1206 | return -EINVAL; |
1207 | down_write(&uts_sem); |
1208 | errno = -EFAULT; |
1209 | if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) { |
1210 | struct new_utsname *u = utsname(); |
1211 | |
1212 | memcpy(u->nodename, tmp, len); |
1213 | memset(u->nodename + len, 0, sizeof(u->nodename) - len); |
1214 | errno = 0; |
1215 | uts_proc_notify(UTS_PROC_HOSTNAME); |
1216 | } |
1217 | up_write(&uts_sem); |
1218 | return errno; |
1219 | } |
1220 | |
1221 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETHOSTNAME |
1222 | |
1223 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(gethostname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
1224 | { |
1225 | int i, errno; |
1226 | struct new_utsname *u; |
1227 | |
1228 | if (len < 0) |
1229 | return -EINVAL; |
1230 | down_read(&uts_sem); |
1231 | u = utsname(); |
1232 | i = 1 + strlen(u->nodename); |
1233 | if (i > len) |
1234 | i = len; |
1235 | errno = 0; |
1236 | if (copy_to_user(name, u->nodename, i)) |
1237 | errno = -EFAULT; |
1238 | up_read(&uts_sem); |
1239 | return errno; |
1240 | } |
1241 | |
1242 | #endif |
1243 | |
1244 | /* |
1245 | * Only setdomainname; getdomainname can be implemented by calling |
1246 | * uname() |
1247 | */ |
1248 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setdomainname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
1249 | { |
1250 | int errno; |
1251 | char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN]; |
1252 | |
1253 | if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
1254 | return -EPERM; |
1255 | if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN) |
1256 | return -EINVAL; |
1257 | |
1258 | down_write(&uts_sem); |
1259 | errno = -EFAULT; |
1260 | if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) { |
1261 | struct new_utsname *u = utsname(); |
1262 | |
1263 | memcpy(u->domainname, tmp, len); |
1264 | memset(u->domainname + len, 0, sizeof(u->domainname) - len); |
1265 | errno = 0; |
1266 | uts_proc_notify(UTS_PROC_DOMAINNAME); |
1267 | } |
1268 | up_write(&uts_sem); |
1269 | return errno; |
1270 | } |
1271 | |
1272 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim) |
1273 | { |
1274 | struct rlimit value; |
1275 | int ret; |
1276 | |
1277 | ret = do_prlimit(current, resource, NULL, &value); |
1278 | if (!ret) |
1279 | ret = copy_to_user(rlim, &value, sizeof(*rlim)) ? -EFAULT : 0; |
1280 | |
1281 | return ret; |
1282 | } |
1283 | |
1284 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_GETRLIMIT |
1285 | |
1286 | /* |
1287 | * Back compatibility for getrlimit. Needed for some apps. |
1288 | */ |
1289 | |
1290 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, |
1291 | struct rlimit __user *, rlim) |
1292 | { |
1293 | struct rlimit x; |
1294 | if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) |
1295 | return -EINVAL; |
1296 | |
1297 | task_lock(current->group_leader); |
1298 | x = current->signal->rlim[resource]; |
1299 | task_unlock(current->group_leader); |
1300 | if (x.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF) |
1301 | x.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF; |
1302 | if (x.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF) |
1303 | x.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF; |
1304 | return copy_to_user(rlim, &x, sizeof(x))?-EFAULT:0; |
1305 | } |
1306 | |
1307 | #endif |
1308 | |
1309 | static inline bool rlim64_is_infinity(__u64 rlim64) |
1310 | { |
1311 | #if BITS_PER_LONG < 64 |
1312 | return rlim64 >= ULONG_MAX; |
1313 | #else |
1314 | return rlim64 == RLIM64_INFINITY; |
1315 | #endif |
1316 | } |
1317 | |
1318 | static void rlim_to_rlim64(const struct rlimit *rlim, struct rlimit64 *rlim64) |
1319 | { |
1320 | if (rlim->rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY) |
1321 | rlim64->rlim_cur = RLIM64_INFINITY; |
1322 | else |
1323 | rlim64->rlim_cur = rlim->rlim_cur; |
1324 | if (rlim->rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY) |
1325 | rlim64->rlim_max = RLIM64_INFINITY; |
1326 | else |
1327 | rlim64->rlim_max = rlim->rlim_max; |
1328 | } |
1329 | |
1330 | static void rlim64_to_rlim(const struct rlimit64 *rlim64, struct rlimit *rlim) |
1331 | { |
1332 | if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_cur)) |
1333 | rlim->rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY; |
1334 | else |
1335 | rlim->rlim_cur = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_cur; |
1336 | if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_max)) |
1337 | rlim->rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY; |
1338 | else |
1339 | rlim->rlim_max = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_max; |
1340 | } |
1341 | |
1342 | /* make sure you are allowed to change @tsk limits before calling this */ |
1343 | int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource, |
1344 | struct rlimit *new_rlim, struct rlimit *old_rlim) |
1345 | { |
1346 | struct rlimit *rlim; |
1347 | int retval = 0; |
1348 | |
1349 | if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) |
1350 | return -EINVAL; |
1351 | if (new_rlim) { |
1352 | if (new_rlim->rlim_cur > new_rlim->rlim_max) |
1353 | return -EINVAL; |
1354 | if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE && |
1355 | new_rlim->rlim_max > sysctl_nr_open) |
1356 | return -EPERM; |
1357 | } |
1358 | |
1359 | /* protect tsk->signal and tsk->sighand from disappearing */ |
1360 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock); |
1361 | if (!tsk->sighand) { |
1362 | retval = -ESRCH; |
1363 | goto out; |
1364 | } |
1365 | |
1366 | rlim = tsk->signal->rlim + resource; |
1367 | task_lock(tsk->group_leader); |
1368 | if (new_rlim) { |
1369 | /* Keep the capable check against init_user_ns until |
1370 | cgroups can contain all limits */ |
1371 | if (new_rlim->rlim_max > rlim->rlim_max && |
1372 | !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) |
1373 | retval = -EPERM; |
1374 | if (!retval) |
1375 | retval = security_task_setrlimit(tsk->group_leader, |
1376 | resource, new_rlim); |
1377 | if (resource == RLIMIT_CPU && new_rlim->rlim_cur == 0) { |
1378 | /* |
1379 | * The caller is asking for an immediate RLIMIT_CPU |
1380 | * expiry. But we use the zero value to mean "it was |
1381 | * never set". So let's cheat and make it one second |
1382 | * instead |
1383 | */ |
1384 | new_rlim->rlim_cur = 1; |
1385 | } |
1386 | } |
1387 | if (!retval) { |
1388 | if (old_rlim) |
1389 | *old_rlim = *rlim; |
1390 | if (new_rlim) |
1391 | *rlim = *new_rlim; |
1392 | } |
1393 | task_unlock(tsk->group_leader); |
1394 | |
1395 | /* |
1396 | * RLIMIT_CPU handling. Note that the kernel fails to return an error |
1397 | * code if it rejected the user's attempt to set RLIMIT_CPU. This is a |
1398 | * very long-standing error, and fixing it now risks breakage of |
1399 | * applications, so we live with it |
1400 | */ |
1401 | if (!retval && new_rlim && resource == RLIMIT_CPU && |
1402 | new_rlim->rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) |
1403 | update_rlimit_cpu(tsk, new_rlim->rlim_cur); |
1404 | out: |
1405 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
1406 | return retval; |
1407 | } |
1408 | |
1409 | /* rcu lock must be held */ |
1410 | static int check_prlimit_permission(struct task_struct *task) |
1411 | { |
1412 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred; |
1413 | |
1414 | if (current == task) |
1415 | return 0; |
1416 | |
1417 | tcred = __task_cred(task); |
1418 | if (uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->euid) && |
1419 | uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) && |
1420 | uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid) && |
1421 | gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->egid) && |
1422 | gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) && |
1423 | gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid)) |
1424 | return 0; |
1425 | if (ns_capable(tcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) |
1426 | return 0; |
1427 | |
1428 | return -EPERM; |
1429 | } |
1430 | |
1431 | SYSCALL_DEFINE4(prlimit64, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, resource, |
1432 | const struct rlimit64 __user *, new_rlim, |
1433 | struct rlimit64 __user *, old_rlim) |
1434 | { |
1435 | struct rlimit64 old64, new64; |
1436 | struct rlimit old, new; |
1437 | struct task_struct *tsk; |
1438 | int ret; |
1439 | |
1440 | if (new_rlim) { |
1441 | if (copy_from_user(&new64, new_rlim, sizeof(new64))) |
1442 | return -EFAULT; |
1443 | rlim64_to_rlim(&new64, &new); |
1444 | } |
1445 | |
1446 | rcu_read_lock(); |
1447 | tsk = pid ? find_task_by_vpid(pid) : current; |
1448 | if (!tsk) { |
1449 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1450 | return -ESRCH; |
1451 | } |
1452 | ret = check_prlimit_permission(tsk); |
1453 | if (ret) { |
1454 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1455 | return ret; |
1456 | } |
1457 | get_task_struct(tsk); |
1458 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1459 | |
1460 | ret = do_prlimit(tsk, resource, new_rlim ? &new : NULL, |
1461 | old_rlim ? &old : NULL); |
1462 | |
1463 | if (!ret && old_rlim) { |
1464 | rlim_to_rlim64(&old, &old64); |
1465 | if (copy_to_user(old_rlim, &old64, sizeof(old64))) |
1466 | ret = -EFAULT; |
1467 | } |
1468 | |
1469 | put_task_struct(tsk); |
1470 | return ret; |
1471 | } |
1472 | |
1473 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim) |
1474 | { |
1475 | struct rlimit new_rlim; |
1476 | |
1477 | if (copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim))) |
1478 | return -EFAULT; |
1479 | return do_prlimit(current, resource, &new_rlim, NULL); |
1480 | } |
1481 | |
1482 | /* |
1483 | * It would make sense to put struct rusage in the task_struct, |
1484 | * except that would make the task_struct be *really big*. After |
1485 | * task_struct gets moved into malloc'ed memory, it would |
1486 | * make sense to do this. It will make moving the rest of the information |
1487 | * a lot simpler! (Which we're not doing right now because we're not |
1488 | * measuring them yet). |
1489 | * |
1490 | * When sampling multiple threads for RUSAGE_SELF, under SMP we might have |
1491 | * races with threads incrementing their own counters. But since word |
1492 | * reads are atomic, we either get new values or old values and we don't |
1493 | * care which for the sums. We always take the siglock to protect reading |
1494 | * the c* fields from p->signal from races with exit.c updating those |
1495 | * fields when reaping, so a sample either gets all the additions of a |
1496 | * given child after it's reaped, or none so this sample is before reaping. |
1497 | * |
1498 | * Locking: |
1499 | * We need to take the siglock for CHILDEREN, SELF and BOTH |
1500 | * for the cases current multithreaded, non-current single threaded |
1501 | * non-current multithreaded. Thread traversal is now safe with |
1502 | * the siglock held. |
1503 | * Strictly speaking, we donot need to take the siglock if we are current and |
1504 | * single threaded, as no one else can take our signal_struct away, no one |
1505 | * else can reap the children to update signal->c* counters, and no one else |
1506 | * can race with the signal-> fields. If we do not take any lock, the |
1507 | * signal-> fields could be read out of order while another thread was just |
1508 | * exiting. So we should place a read memory barrier when we avoid the lock. |
1509 | * On the writer side, write memory barrier is implied in __exit_signal |
1510 | * as __exit_signal releases the siglock spinlock after updating the signal-> |
1511 | * fields. But we don't do this yet to keep things simple. |
1512 | * |
1513 | */ |
1514 | |
1515 | static void accumulate_thread_rusage(struct task_struct *t, struct rusage *r) |
1516 | { |
1517 | r->ru_nvcsw += t->nvcsw; |
1518 | r->ru_nivcsw += t->nivcsw; |
1519 | r->ru_minflt += t->min_flt; |
1520 | r->ru_majflt += t->maj_flt; |
1521 | r->ru_inblock += task_io_get_inblock(t); |
1522 | r->ru_oublock += task_io_get_oublock(t); |
1523 | } |
1524 | |
1525 | static void k_getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r) |
1526 | { |
1527 | struct task_struct *t; |
1528 | unsigned long flags; |
1529 | cputime_t tgutime, tgstime, utime, stime; |
1530 | unsigned long maxrss = 0; |
1531 | |
1532 | memset((char *) r, 0, sizeof *r); |
1533 | utime = stime = 0; |
1534 | |
1535 | if (who == RUSAGE_THREAD) { |
1536 | task_cputime_adjusted(current, &utime, &stime); |
1537 | accumulate_thread_rusage(p, r); |
1538 | maxrss = p->signal->maxrss; |
1539 | goto out; |
1540 | } |
1541 | |
1542 | if (!lock_task_sighand(p, &flags)) |
1543 | return; |
1544 | |
1545 | switch (who) { |
1546 | case RUSAGE_BOTH: |
1547 | case RUSAGE_CHILDREN: |
1548 | utime = p->signal->cutime; |
1549 | stime = p->signal->cstime; |
1550 | r->ru_nvcsw = p->signal->cnvcsw; |
1551 | r->ru_nivcsw = p->signal->cnivcsw; |
1552 | r->ru_minflt = p->signal->cmin_flt; |
1553 | r->ru_majflt = p->signal->cmaj_flt; |
1554 | r->ru_inblock = p->signal->cinblock; |
1555 | r->ru_oublock = p->signal->coublock; |
1556 | maxrss = p->signal->cmaxrss; |
1557 | |
1558 | if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN) |
1559 | break; |
1560 | |
1561 | case RUSAGE_SELF: |
1562 | thread_group_cputime_adjusted(p, &tgutime, &tgstime); |
1563 | utime += tgutime; |
1564 | stime += tgstime; |
1565 | r->ru_nvcsw += p->signal->nvcsw; |
1566 | r->ru_nivcsw += p->signal->nivcsw; |
1567 | r->ru_minflt += p->signal->min_flt; |
1568 | r->ru_majflt += p->signal->maj_flt; |
1569 | r->ru_inblock += p->signal->inblock; |
1570 | r->ru_oublock += p->signal->oublock; |
1571 | if (maxrss < p->signal->maxrss) |
1572 | maxrss = p->signal->maxrss; |
1573 | t = p; |
1574 | do { |
1575 | accumulate_thread_rusage(t, r); |
1576 | t = next_thread(t); |
1577 | } while (t != p); |
1578 | break; |
1579 | |
1580 | default: |
1581 | BUG(); |
1582 | } |
1583 | unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags); |
1584 | |
1585 | out: |
1586 | cputime_to_timeval(utime, &r->ru_utime); |
1587 | cputime_to_timeval(stime, &r->ru_stime); |
1588 | |
1589 | if (who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN) { |
1590 | struct mm_struct *mm = get_task_mm(p); |
1591 | if (mm) { |
1592 | setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&maxrss, mm); |
1593 | mmput(mm); |
1594 | } |
1595 | } |
1596 | r->ru_maxrss = maxrss * (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* convert pages to KBs */ |
1597 | } |
1598 | |
1599 | int getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage __user *ru) |
1600 | { |
1601 | struct rusage r; |
1602 | k_getrusage(p, who, &r); |
1603 | return copy_to_user(ru, &r, sizeof(r)) ? -EFAULT : 0; |
1604 | } |
1605 | |
1606 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct rusage __user *, ru) |
1607 | { |
1608 | if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN && |
1609 | who != RUSAGE_THREAD) |
1610 | return -EINVAL; |
1611 | return getrusage(current, who, ru); |
1612 | } |
1613 | |
1614 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT |
1615 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct compat_rusage __user *, ru) |
1616 | { |
1617 | struct rusage r; |
1618 | |
1619 | if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN && |
1620 | who != RUSAGE_THREAD) |
1621 | return -EINVAL; |
1622 | |
1623 | k_getrusage(current, who, &r); |
1624 | return put_compat_rusage(&r, ru); |
1625 | } |
1626 | #endif |
1627 | |
1628 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(umask, int, mask) |
1629 | { |
1630 | mask = xchg(¤t->fs->umask, mask & S_IRWXUGO); |
1631 | return mask; |
1632 | } |
1633 | |
1634 | static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd) |
1635 | { |
1636 | struct fd exe; |
1637 | struct inode *inode; |
1638 | int err; |
1639 | |
1640 | exe = fdget(fd); |
1641 | if (!exe.file) |
1642 | return -EBADF; |
1643 | |
1644 | inode = file_inode(exe.file); |
1645 | |
1646 | /* |
1647 | * Because the original mm->exe_file points to executable file, make |
1648 | * sure that this one is executable as well, to avoid breaking an |
1649 | * overall picture. |
1650 | */ |
1651 | err = -EACCES; |
1652 | if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || |
1653 | exe.file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) |
1654 | goto exit; |
1655 | |
1656 | err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC); |
1657 | if (err) |
1658 | goto exit; |
1659 | |
1660 | down_write(&mm->mmap_sem); |
1661 | |
1662 | /* |
1663 | * Forbid mm->exe_file change if old file still mapped. |
1664 | */ |
1665 | err = -EBUSY; |
1666 | if (mm->exe_file) { |
1667 | struct vm_area_struct *vma; |
1668 | |
1669 | for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) |
1670 | if (vma->vm_file && |
1671 | path_equal(&vma->vm_file->f_path, |
1672 | &mm->exe_file->f_path)) |
1673 | goto exit_unlock; |
1674 | } |
1675 | |
1676 | /* |
1677 | * The symlink can be changed only once, just to disallow arbitrary |
1678 | * transitions malicious software might bring in. This means one |
1679 | * could make a snapshot over all processes running and monitor |
1680 | * /proc/pid/exe changes to notice unusual activity if needed. |
1681 | */ |
1682 | err = -EPERM; |
1683 | if (test_and_set_bit(MMF_EXE_FILE_CHANGED, &mm->flags)) |
1684 | goto exit_unlock; |
1685 | |
1686 | err = 0; |
1687 | set_mm_exe_file(mm, exe.file); /* this grabs a reference to exe.file */ |
1688 | exit_unlock: |
1689 | up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); |
1690 | |
1691 | exit: |
1692 | fdput(exe); |
1693 | return err; |
1694 | } |
1695 | |
1696 | static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr, |
1697 | unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) |
1698 | { |
1699 | unsigned long rlim = rlimit(RLIMIT_DATA); |
1700 | struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; |
1701 | struct vm_area_struct *vma; |
1702 | int error; |
1703 | |
1704 | if (arg5 || (arg4 && opt != PR_SET_MM_AUXV)) |
1705 | return -EINVAL; |
1706 | |
1707 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) |
1708 | return -EPERM; |
1709 | |
1710 | if (opt == PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE) |
1711 | return prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, (unsigned int)addr); |
1712 | |
1713 | if (addr >= TASK_SIZE || addr < mmap_min_addr) |
1714 | return -EINVAL; |
1715 | |
1716 | error = -EINVAL; |
1717 | |
1718 | down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); |
1719 | vma = find_vma(mm, addr); |
1720 | |
1721 | switch (opt) { |
1722 | case PR_SET_MM_START_CODE: |
1723 | mm->start_code = addr; |
1724 | break; |
1725 | case PR_SET_MM_END_CODE: |
1726 | mm->end_code = addr; |
1727 | break; |
1728 | case PR_SET_MM_START_DATA: |
1729 | mm->start_data = addr; |
1730 | break; |
1731 | case PR_SET_MM_END_DATA: |
1732 | mm->end_data = addr; |
1733 | break; |
1734 | |
1735 | case PR_SET_MM_START_BRK: |
1736 | if (addr <= mm->end_data) |
1737 | goto out; |
1738 | |
1739 | if (rlim < RLIM_INFINITY && |
1740 | (mm->brk - addr) + |
1741 | (mm->end_data - mm->start_data) > rlim) |
1742 | goto out; |
1743 | |
1744 | mm->start_brk = addr; |
1745 | break; |
1746 | |
1747 | case PR_SET_MM_BRK: |
1748 | if (addr <= mm->end_data) |
1749 | goto out; |
1750 | |
1751 | if (rlim < RLIM_INFINITY && |
1752 | (addr - mm->start_brk) + |
1753 | (mm->end_data - mm->start_data) > rlim) |
1754 | goto out; |
1755 | |
1756 | mm->brk = addr; |
1757 | break; |
1758 | |
1759 | /* |
1760 | * If command line arguments and environment |
1761 | * are placed somewhere else on stack, we can |
1762 | * set them up here, ARG_START/END to setup |
1763 | * command line argumets and ENV_START/END |
1764 | * for environment. |
1765 | */ |
1766 | case PR_SET_MM_START_STACK: |
1767 | case PR_SET_MM_ARG_START: |
1768 | case PR_SET_MM_ARG_END: |
1769 | case PR_SET_MM_ENV_START: |
1770 | case PR_SET_MM_ENV_END: |
1771 | if (!vma) { |
1772 | error = -EFAULT; |
1773 | goto out; |
1774 | } |
1775 | if (opt == PR_SET_MM_START_STACK) |
1776 | mm->start_stack = addr; |
1777 | else if (opt == PR_SET_MM_ARG_START) |
1778 | mm->arg_start = addr; |
1779 | else if (opt == PR_SET_MM_ARG_END) |
1780 | mm->arg_end = addr; |
1781 | else if (opt == PR_SET_MM_ENV_START) |
1782 | mm->env_start = addr; |
1783 | else if (opt == PR_SET_MM_ENV_END) |
1784 | mm->env_end = addr; |
1785 | break; |
1786 | |
1787 | /* |
1788 | * This doesn't move auxiliary vector itself |
1789 | * since it's pinned to mm_struct, but allow |
1790 | * to fill vector with new values. It's up |
1791 | * to a caller to provide sane values here |
1792 | * otherwise user space tools which use this |
1793 | * vector might be unhappy. |
1794 | */ |
1795 | case PR_SET_MM_AUXV: { |
1796 | unsigned long user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE]; |
1797 | |
1798 | if (arg4 > sizeof(user_auxv)) |
1799 | goto out; |
1800 | up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); |
1801 | |
1802 | if (copy_from_user(user_auxv, (const void __user *)addr, arg4)) |
1803 | return -EFAULT; |
1804 | |
1805 | /* Make sure the last entry is always AT_NULL */ |
1806 | user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 2] = 0; |
1807 | user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 1] = 0; |
1808 | |
1809 | BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_auxv) != sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)); |
1810 | |
1811 | task_lock(current); |
1812 | memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, arg4); |
1813 | task_unlock(current); |
1814 | |
1815 | return 0; |
1816 | } |
1817 | default: |
1818 | goto out; |
1819 | } |
1820 | |
1821 | error = 0; |
1822 | out: |
1823 | up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); |
1824 | return error; |
1825 | } |
1826 | |
1827 | #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE |
1828 | static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user **tid_addr) |
1829 | { |
1830 | return put_user(me->clear_child_tid, tid_addr); |
1831 | } |
1832 | #else |
1833 | static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user **tid_addr) |
1834 | { |
1835 | return -EINVAL; |
1836 | } |
1837 | #endif |
1838 | |
1839 | SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3, |
1840 | unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5) |
1841 | { |
1842 | struct task_struct *me = current; |
1843 | unsigned char comm[sizeof(me->comm)]; |
1844 | long error; |
1845 | |
1846 | error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); |
1847 | if (error != -ENOSYS) |
1848 | return error; |
1849 | |
1850 | error = 0; |
1851 | switch (option) { |
1852 | case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG: |
1853 | if (!valid_signal(arg2)) { |
1854 | error = -EINVAL; |
1855 | break; |
1856 | } |
1857 | me->pdeath_signal = arg2; |
1858 | break; |
1859 | case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG: |
1860 | error = put_user(me->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2); |
1861 | break; |
1862 | case PR_GET_DUMPABLE: |
1863 | error = get_dumpable(me->mm); |
1864 | break; |
1865 | case PR_SET_DUMPABLE: |
1866 | if (arg2 != SUID_DUMP_DISABLE && arg2 != SUID_DUMP_USER) { |
1867 | error = -EINVAL; |
1868 | break; |
1869 | } |
1870 | set_dumpable(me->mm, arg2); |
1871 | break; |
1872 | |
1873 | case PR_SET_UNALIGN: |
1874 | error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); |
1875 | break; |
1876 | case PR_GET_UNALIGN: |
1877 | error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); |
1878 | break; |
1879 | case PR_SET_FPEMU: |
1880 | error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); |
1881 | break; |
1882 | case PR_GET_FPEMU: |
1883 | error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); |
1884 | break; |
1885 | case PR_SET_FPEXC: |
1886 | error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); |
1887 | break; |
1888 | case PR_GET_FPEXC: |
1889 | error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); |
1890 | break; |
1891 | case PR_GET_TIMING: |
1892 | error = PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL; |
1893 | break; |
1894 | case PR_SET_TIMING: |
1895 | if (arg2 != PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL) |
1896 | error = -EINVAL; |
1897 | break; |
1898 | case PR_SET_NAME: |
1899 | comm[sizeof(me->comm) - 1] = 0; |
1900 | if (strncpy_from_user(comm, (char __user *)arg2, |
1901 | sizeof(me->comm) - 1) < 0) |
1902 | return -EFAULT; |
1903 | set_task_comm(me, comm); |
1904 | proc_comm_connector(me); |
1905 | break; |
1906 | case PR_GET_NAME: |
1907 | get_task_comm(comm, me); |
1908 | if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm, sizeof(comm))) |
1909 | return -EFAULT; |
1910 | break; |
1911 | case PR_GET_ENDIAN: |
1912 | error = GET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); |
1913 | break; |
1914 | case PR_SET_ENDIAN: |
1915 | error = SET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); |
1916 | break; |
1917 | case PR_GET_SECCOMP: |
1918 | error = prctl_get_seccomp(); |
1919 | break; |
1920 | case PR_SET_SECCOMP: |
1921 | error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2, (char __user *)arg3); |
1922 | break; |
1923 | case PR_GET_TSC: |
1924 | error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2); |
1925 | break; |
1926 | case PR_SET_TSC: |
1927 | error = SET_TSC_CTL(arg2); |
1928 | break; |
1929 | case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE: |
1930 | error = perf_event_task_disable(); |
1931 | break; |
1932 | case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE: |
1933 | error = perf_event_task_enable(); |
1934 | break; |
1935 | case PR_GET_TIMERSLACK: |
1936 | error = current->timer_slack_ns; |
1937 | break; |
1938 | case PR_SET_TIMERSLACK: |
1939 | if (arg2 <= 0) |
1940 | current->timer_slack_ns = |
1941 | current->default_timer_slack_ns; |
1942 | else |
1943 | current->timer_slack_ns = arg2; |
1944 | break; |
1945 | case PR_MCE_KILL: |
1946 | if (arg4 | arg5) |
1947 | return -EINVAL; |
1948 | switch (arg2) { |
1949 | case PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR: |
1950 | if (arg3 != 0) |
1951 | return -EINVAL; |
1952 | current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_PROCESS; |
1953 | break; |
1954 | case PR_MCE_KILL_SET: |
1955 | current->flags |= PF_MCE_PROCESS; |
1956 | if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY) |
1957 | current->flags |= PF_MCE_EARLY; |
1958 | else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_LATE) |
1959 | current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_EARLY; |
1960 | else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT) |
1961 | current->flags &= |
1962 | ~(PF_MCE_EARLY|PF_MCE_PROCESS); |
1963 | else |
1964 | return -EINVAL; |
1965 | break; |
1966 | default: |
1967 | return -EINVAL; |
1968 | } |
1969 | break; |
1970 | case PR_MCE_KILL_GET: |
1971 | if (arg2 | arg3 | arg4 | arg5) |
1972 | return -EINVAL; |
1973 | if (current->flags & PF_MCE_PROCESS) |
1974 | error = (current->flags & PF_MCE_EARLY) ? |
1975 | PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY : PR_MCE_KILL_LATE; |
1976 | else |
1977 | error = PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT; |
1978 | break; |
1979 | case PR_SET_MM: |
1980 | error = prctl_set_mm(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); |
1981 | break; |
1982 | case PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS: |
1983 | error = prctl_get_tid_address(me, (int __user **)arg2); |
1984 | break; |
1985 | case PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER: |
1986 | me->signal->is_child_subreaper = !!arg2; |
1987 | break; |
1988 | case PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER: |
1989 | error = put_user(me->signal->is_child_subreaper, |
1990 | (int __user *)arg2); |
1991 | break; |
1992 | case PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS: |
1993 | if (arg2 != 1 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
1994 | return -EINVAL; |
1995 | |
1996 | current->no_new_privs = 1; |
1997 | break; |
1998 | case PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS: |
1999 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
2000 | return -EINVAL; |
2001 | return current->no_new_privs ? 1 : 0; |
2002 | default: |
2003 | error = -EINVAL; |
2004 | break; |
2005 | } |
2006 | return error; |
2007 | } |
2008 | |
2009 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getcpu, unsigned __user *, cpup, unsigned __user *, nodep, |
2010 | struct getcpu_cache __user *, unused) |
2011 | { |
2012 | int err = 0; |
2013 | int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(); |
2014 | if (cpup) |
2015 | err |= put_user(cpu, cpup); |
2016 | if (nodep) |
2017 | err |= put_user(cpu_to_node(cpu), nodep); |
2018 | return err ? -EFAULT : 0; |
2019 | } |
2020 | |
2021 | /** |
2022 | * do_sysinfo - fill in sysinfo struct |
2023 | * @info: pointer to buffer to fill |
2024 | */ |
2025 | static int do_sysinfo(struct sysinfo *info) |
2026 | { |
2027 | unsigned long mem_total, sav_total; |
2028 | unsigned int mem_unit, bitcount; |
2029 | struct timespec tp; |
2030 | |
2031 | memset(info, 0, sizeof(struct sysinfo)); |
2032 | |
2033 | get_monotonic_boottime(&tp); |
2034 | info->uptime = tp.tv_sec + (tp.tv_nsec ? 1 : 0); |
2035 | |
2036 | get_avenrun(info->loads, 0, SI_LOAD_SHIFT - FSHIFT); |
2037 | |
2038 | info->procs = nr_threads; |
2039 | |
2040 | si_meminfo(info); |
2041 | si_swapinfo(info); |
2042 | |
2043 | /* |
2044 | * If the sum of all the available memory (i.e. ram + swap) |
2045 | * is less than can be stored in a 32 bit unsigned long then |
2046 | * we can be binary compatible with 2.2.x kernels. If not, |
2047 | * well, in that case 2.2.x was broken anyways... |
2048 | * |
2049 | * -Erik Andersen <andersee@debian.org> |
2050 | */ |
2051 | |
2052 | mem_total = info->totalram + info->totalswap; |
2053 | if (mem_total < info->totalram || mem_total < info->totalswap) |
2054 | goto out; |
2055 | bitcount = 0; |
2056 | mem_unit = info->mem_unit; |
2057 | while (mem_unit > 1) { |
2058 | bitcount++; |
2059 | mem_unit >>= 1; |
2060 | sav_total = mem_total; |
2061 | mem_total <<= 1; |
2062 | if (mem_total < sav_total) |
2063 | goto out; |
2064 | } |
2065 | |
2066 | /* |
2067 | * If mem_total did not overflow, multiply all memory values by |
2068 | * info->mem_unit and set it to 1. This leaves things compatible |
2069 | * with 2.2.x, and also retains compatibility with earlier 2.4.x |
2070 | * kernels... |
2071 | */ |
2072 | |
2073 | info->mem_unit = 1; |
2074 | info->totalram <<= bitcount; |
2075 | info->freeram <<= bitcount; |
2076 | info->sharedram <<= bitcount; |
2077 | info->bufferram <<= bitcount; |
2078 | info->totalswap <<= bitcount; |
2079 | info->freeswap <<= bitcount; |
2080 | info->totalhigh <<= bitcount; |
2081 | info->freehigh <<= bitcount; |
2082 | |
2083 | out: |
2084 | return 0; |
2085 | } |
2086 | |
2087 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct sysinfo __user *, info) |
2088 | { |
2089 | struct sysinfo val; |
2090 | |
2091 | do_sysinfo(&val); |
2092 | |
2093 | if (copy_to_user(info, &val, sizeof(struct sysinfo))) |
2094 | return -EFAULT; |
2095 | |
2096 | return 0; |
2097 | } |
2098 | |
2099 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT |
2100 | struct compat_sysinfo { |
2101 | s32 uptime; |
2102 | u32 loads[3]; |
2103 | u32 totalram; |
2104 | u32 freeram; |
2105 | u32 sharedram; |
2106 | u32 bufferram; |
2107 | u32 totalswap; |
2108 | u32 freeswap; |
2109 | u16 procs; |
2110 | u16 pad; |
2111 | u32 totalhigh; |
2112 | u32 freehigh; |
2113 | u32 mem_unit; |
2114 | char _f[20-2*sizeof(u32)-sizeof(int)]; |
2115 | }; |
2116 | |
2117 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info) |
2118 | { |
2119 | struct sysinfo s; |
2120 | |
2121 | do_sysinfo(&s); |
2122 | |
2123 | /* Check to see if any memory value is too large for 32-bit and scale |
2124 | * down if needed |
2125 | */ |
2126 | if ((s.totalram >> 32) || (s.totalswap >> 32)) { |
2127 | int bitcount = 0; |
2128 | |
2129 | while (s.mem_unit < PAGE_SIZE) { |
2130 | s.mem_unit <<= 1; |
2131 | bitcount++; |
2132 | } |
2133 | |
2134 | s.totalram >>= bitcount; |
2135 | s.freeram >>= bitcount; |
2136 | s.sharedram >>= bitcount; |
2137 | s.bufferram >>= bitcount; |
2138 | s.totalswap >>= bitcount; |
2139 | s.freeswap >>= bitcount; |
2140 | s.totalhigh >>= bitcount; |
2141 | s.freehigh >>= bitcount; |
2142 | } |
2143 | |
2144 | if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, info, sizeof(struct compat_sysinfo)) || |
2145 | __put_user(s.uptime, &info->uptime) || |
2146 | __put_user(s.loads[0], &info->loads[0]) || |
2147 | __put_user(s.loads[1], &info->loads[1]) || |
2148 | __put_user(s.loads[2], &info->loads[2]) || |
2149 | __put_user(s.totalram, &info->totalram) || |
2150 | __put_user(s.freeram, &info->freeram) || |
2151 | __put_user(s.sharedram, &info->sharedram) || |
2152 | __put_user(s.bufferram, &info->bufferram) || |
2153 | __put_user(s.totalswap, &info->totalswap) || |
2154 | __put_user(s.freeswap, &info->freeswap) || |
2155 | __put_user(s.procs, &info->procs) || |
2156 | __put_user(s.totalhigh, &info->totalhigh) || |
2157 | __put_user(s.freehigh, &info->freehigh) || |
2158 | __put_user(s.mem_unit, &info->mem_unit)) |
2159 | return -EFAULT; |
2160 | |
2161 | return 0; |
2162 | } |
2163 | #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */ |
2164 |
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Tags:
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v2.6.34-rc5
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