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1 | /* |
2 | * AppArmor security module |
3 | * |
4 | * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks. |
5 | * |
6 | * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE |
7 | * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. |
8 | * |
9 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or |
10 | * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as |
11 | * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the |
12 | * License. |
13 | */ |
14 | |
15 | #include <linux/security.h> |
16 | #include <linux/moduleparam.h> |
17 | #include <linux/mm.h> |
18 | #include <linux/mman.h> |
19 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
20 | #include <linux/namei.h> |
21 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> |
22 | #include <linux/ctype.h> |
23 | #include <linux/sysctl.h> |
24 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
25 | #include <linux/user_namespace.h> |
26 | #include <net/sock.h> |
27 | |
28 | #include "include/apparmor.h" |
29 | #include "include/apparmorfs.h" |
30 | #include "include/audit.h" |
31 | #include "include/capability.h" |
32 | #include "include/context.h" |
33 | #include "include/file.h" |
34 | #include "include/ipc.h" |
35 | #include "include/path.h" |
36 | #include "include/policy.h" |
37 | #include "include/procattr.h" |
38 | |
39 | /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */ |
40 | int apparmor_initialized __initdata; |
41 | |
42 | /* |
43 | * LSM hook functions |
44 | */ |
45 | |
46 | /* |
47 | * free the associated aa_task_cxt and put its profiles |
48 | */ |
49 | static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred) |
50 | { |
51 | aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred)); |
52 | cred_cxt(cred) = NULL; |
53 | } |
54 | |
55 | /* |
56 | * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials |
57 | */ |
58 | static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) |
59 | { |
60 | /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */ |
61 | struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp); |
62 | if (!cxt) |
63 | return -ENOMEM; |
64 | |
65 | cred_cxt(cred) = cxt; |
66 | return 0; |
67 | } |
68 | |
69 | /* |
70 | * prepare new aa_task_cxt for modification by prepare_cred block |
71 | */ |
72 | static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, |
73 | gfp_t gfp) |
74 | { |
75 | /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */ |
76 | struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp); |
77 | if (!cxt) |
78 | return -ENOMEM; |
79 | |
80 | aa_dup_task_context(cxt, cred_cxt(old)); |
81 | cred_cxt(new) = cxt; |
82 | return 0; |
83 | } |
84 | |
85 | /* |
86 | * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds |
87 | */ |
88 | static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
89 | { |
90 | const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = cred_cxt(old); |
91 | struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = cred_cxt(new); |
92 | |
93 | aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt); |
94 | } |
95 | |
96 | static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, |
97 | unsigned int mode) |
98 | { |
99 | int error = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode); |
100 | if (error) |
101 | return error; |
102 | |
103 | return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode); |
104 | } |
105 | |
106 | static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) |
107 | { |
108 | int error = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent); |
109 | if (error) |
110 | return error; |
111 | |
112 | return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH); |
113 | } |
114 | |
115 | /* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */ |
116 | static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, |
117 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) |
118 | { |
119 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
120 | const struct cred *cred; |
121 | |
122 | rcu_read_lock(); |
123 | cred = __task_cred(target); |
124 | profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); |
125 | |
126 | *effective = cred->cap_effective; |
127 | *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable; |
128 | *permitted = cred->cap_permitted; |
129 | |
130 | if (!unconfined(profile) && !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) { |
131 | *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow); |
132 | *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow); |
133 | } |
134 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
135 | |
136 | return 0; |
137 | } |
138 | |
139 | static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, |
140 | int cap, int audit) |
141 | { |
142 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
143 | /* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */ |
144 | int error = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit); |
145 | if (!error) { |
146 | profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); |
147 | if (!unconfined(profile)) |
148 | error = aa_capable(profile, cap, audit); |
149 | } |
150 | return error; |
151 | } |
152 | |
153 | /** |
154 | * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths |
155 | * @op: operation being checked |
156 | * @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL) |
157 | * @mask: requested permissions mask |
158 | * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) |
159 | * |
160 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
161 | */ |
162 | static int common_perm(int op, struct path *path, u32 mask, |
163 | struct path_cond *cond) |
164 | { |
165 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
166 | int error = 0; |
167 | |
168 | profile = __aa_current_profile(); |
169 | if (!unconfined(profile)) |
170 | error = aa_path_perm(op, profile, path, 0, mask, cond); |
171 | |
172 | return error; |
173 | } |
174 | |
175 | /** |
176 | * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry |
177 | * @op: operation being checked |
178 | * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL) |
179 | * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL) |
180 | * @mask: requested permissions mask |
181 | * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) |
182 | * |
183 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
184 | */ |
185 | static int common_perm_dir_dentry(int op, struct path *dir, |
186 | struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, |
187 | struct path_cond *cond) |
188 | { |
189 | struct path path = { dir->mnt, dentry }; |
190 | |
191 | return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond); |
192 | } |
193 | |
194 | /** |
195 | * common_perm_mnt_dentry - common permission wrapper when mnt, dentry |
196 | * @op: operation being checked |
197 | * @mnt: mount point of dentry (NOT NULL) |
198 | * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL) |
199 | * @mask: requested permissions mask |
200 | * |
201 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
202 | */ |
203 | static int common_perm_mnt_dentry(int op, struct vfsmount *mnt, |
204 | struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask) |
205 | { |
206 | struct path path = { mnt, dentry }; |
207 | struct path_cond cond = { dentry->d_inode->i_uid, |
208 | dentry->d_inode->i_mode |
209 | }; |
210 | |
211 | return common_perm(op, &path, mask, &cond); |
212 | } |
213 | |
214 | /** |
215 | * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm |
216 | * @op: operation being checked |
217 | * @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL) |
218 | * @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL) |
219 | * @mask: requested permission mask |
220 | * |
221 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
222 | */ |
223 | static int common_perm_rm(int op, struct path *dir, |
224 | struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask) |
225 | { |
226 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
227 | struct path_cond cond = { }; |
228 | |
229 | if (!inode || !dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(inode)) |
230 | return 0; |
231 | |
232 | cond.uid = inode->i_uid; |
233 | cond.mode = inode->i_mode; |
234 | |
235 | return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond); |
236 | } |
237 | |
238 | /** |
239 | * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create |
240 | * @op: operation being checked |
241 | * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL) |
242 | * @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL) |
243 | * @mask: request permission mask |
244 | * @mode: created file mode |
245 | * |
246 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
247 | */ |
248 | static int common_perm_create(int op, struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, |
249 | u32 mask, umode_t mode) |
250 | { |
251 | struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode }; |
252 | |
253 | if (!dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dir->dentry->d_inode)) |
254 | return 0; |
255 | |
256 | return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond); |
257 | } |
258 | |
259 | static int apparmor_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) |
260 | { |
261 | return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); |
262 | } |
263 | |
264 | static int apparmor_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, |
265 | umode_t mode) |
266 | { |
267 | return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, |
268 | S_IFDIR); |
269 | } |
270 | |
271 | static int apparmor_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) |
272 | { |
273 | return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); |
274 | } |
275 | |
276 | static int apparmor_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, |
277 | umode_t mode, unsigned int dev) |
278 | { |
279 | return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode); |
280 | } |
281 | |
282 | static int apparmor_path_truncate(struct path *path) |
283 | { |
284 | struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid, |
285 | path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode |
286 | }; |
287 | |
288 | if (!path->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode)) |
289 | return 0; |
290 | |
291 | return common_perm(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE, |
292 | &cond); |
293 | } |
294 | |
295 | static int apparmor_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, |
296 | const char *old_name) |
297 | { |
298 | return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, |
299 | S_IFLNK); |
300 | } |
301 | |
302 | static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir, |
303 | struct dentry *new_dentry) |
304 | { |
305 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
306 | int error = 0; |
307 | |
308 | if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode)) |
309 | return 0; |
310 | |
311 | profile = aa_current_profile(); |
312 | if (!unconfined(profile)) |
313 | error = aa_path_link(profile, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); |
314 | return error; |
315 | } |
316 | |
317 | static int apparmor_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, |
318 | struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) |
319 | { |
320 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
321 | int error = 0; |
322 | |
323 | if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode)) |
324 | return 0; |
325 | |
326 | profile = aa_current_profile(); |
327 | if (!unconfined(profile)) { |
328 | struct path old_path = { old_dir->mnt, old_dentry }; |
329 | struct path new_path = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry }; |
330 | struct path_cond cond = { old_dentry->d_inode->i_uid, |
331 | old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode |
332 | }; |
333 | |
334 | error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, profile, &old_path, 0, |
335 | MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ | MAY_WRITE | |
336 | AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_DELETE, |
337 | &cond); |
338 | if (!error) |
339 | error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, profile, &new_path, |
340 | 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE | |
341 | AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond); |
342 | |
343 | } |
344 | return error; |
345 | } |
346 | |
347 | static int apparmor_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode) |
348 | { |
349 | if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode)) |
350 | return 0; |
351 | |
352 | return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_CHMOD, path->mnt, path->dentry, AA_MAY_CHMOD); |
353 | } |
354 | |
355 | static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) |
356 | { |
357 | struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid, |
358 | path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode |
359 | }; |
360 | |
361 | if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode)) |
362 | return 0; |
363 | |
364 | return common_perm(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN, &cond); |
365 | } |
366 | |
367 | static int apparmor_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) |
368 | { |
369 | if (!mediated_filesystem(dentry->d_inode)) |
370 | return 0; |
371 | |
372 | return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_GETATTR, mnt, dentry, |
373 | AA_MAY_META_READ); |
374 | } |
375 | |
376 | static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) |
377 | { |
378 | struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security; |
379 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
380 | int error = 0; |
381 | |
382 | if (!mediated_filesystem(file_inode(file))) |
383 | return 0; |
384 | |
385 | /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks. |
386 | * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with |
387 | * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to |
388 | * actually execute the image. |
389 | */ |
390 | if (current->in_execve) { |
391 | fcxt->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP; |
392 | return 0; |
393 | } |
394 | |
395 | profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); |
396 | if (!unconfined(profile)) { |
397 | struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); |
398 | struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode }; |
399 | |
400 | error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, profile, &file->f_path, 0, |
401 | aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond); |
402 | /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */ |
403 | fcxt->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file); |
404 | } |
405 | |
406 | return error; |
407 | } |
408 | |
409 | static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) |
410 | { |
411 | /* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */ |
412 | file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_context(GFP_KERNEL); |
413 | if (!file->f_security) |
414 | return -ENOMEM; |
415 | return 0; |
416 | |
417 | } |
418 | |
419 | static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file) |
420 | { |
421 | struct aa_file_cxt *cxt = file->f_security; |
422 | |
423 | aa_free_file_context(cxt); |
424 | } |
425 | |
426 | static int common_file_perm(int op, struct file *file, u32 mask) |
427 | { |
428 | struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security; |
429 | struct aa_profile *profile, *fprofile = aa_cred_profile(file->f_cred); |
430 | int error = 0; |
431 | |
432 | BUG_ON(!fprofile); |
433 | |
434 | if (!file->f_path.mnt || |
435 | !mediated_filesystem(file_inode(file))) |
436 | return 0; |
437 | |
438 | profile = __aa_current_profile(); |
439 | |
440 | /* revalidate access, if task is unconfined, or the cached cred |
441 | * doesn't match or if the request is for more permissions than |
442 | * was granted. |
443 | * |
444 | * Note: the test for !unconfined(fprofile) is to handle file |
445 | * delegation from unconfined tasks |
446 | */ |
447 | if (!unconfined(profile) && !unconfined(fprofile) && |
448 | ((fprofile != profile) || (mask & ~fcxt->allow))) |
449 | error = aa_file_perm(op, profile, file, mask); |
450 | |
451 | return error; |
452 | } |
453 | |
454 | static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) |
455 | { |
456 | return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask); |
457 | } |
458 | |
459 | static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) |
460 | { |
461 | u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK; |
462 | |
463 | if (cmd == F_WRLCK) |
464 | mask |= MAY_WRITE; |
465 | |
466 | return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask); |
467 | } |
468 | |
469 | static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot, |
470 | unsigned long flags) |
471 | { |
472 | int mask = 0; |
473 | |
474 | if (!file || !file->f_security) |
475 | return 0; |
476 | |
477 | if (prot & PROT_READ) |
478 | mask |= MAY_READ; |
479 | /* |
480 | * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't |
481 | * write back to the files |
482 | */ |
483 | if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE)) |
484 | mask |= MAY_WRITE; |
485 | if (prot & PROT_EXEC) |
486 | mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP; |
487 | |
488 | return common_file_perm(op, file, mask); |
489 | } |
490 | |
491 | static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, |
492 | unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) |
493 | { |
494 | return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags); |
495 | } |
496 | |
497 | static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, |
498 | unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) |
499 | { |
500 | return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot, |
501 | !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0); |
502 | } |
503 | |
504 | static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, |
505 | char **value) |
506 | { |
507 | int error = -ENOENT; |
508 | /* released below */ |
509 | const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task); |
510 | struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred); |
511 | struct aa_profile *profile = NULL; |
512 | |
513 | if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) |
514 | profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->profile); |
515 | else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && cxt->previous) |
516 | profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->previous); |
517 | else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec) |
518 | profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->onexec); |
519 | else |
520 | error = -EINVAL; |
521 | |
522 | if (profile) |
523 | error = aa_getprocattr(profile, value); |
524 | |
525 | aa_put_profile(profile); |
526 | put_cred(cred); |
527 | |
528 | return error; |
529 | } |
530 | |
531 | static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, |
532 | void *value, size_t size) |
533 | { |
534 | struct common_audit_data sa; |
535 | struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; |
536 | char *command, *args = value; |
537 | size_t arg_size; |
538 | int error; |
539 | |
540 | if (size == 0) |
541 | return -EINVAL; |
542 | /* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that |
543 | * the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1 |
544 | * so that AppArmor can null terminate them |
545 | */ |
546 | if (args[size - 1] != '\0') { |
547 | if (size == PAGE_SIZE) |
548 | return -EINVAL; |
549 | args[size] = '\0'; |
550 | } |
551 | |
552 | /* task can only write its own attributes */ |
553 | if (current != task) |
554 | return -EACCES; |
555 | |
556 | args = value; |
557 | args = strim(args); |
558 | command = strsep(&args, " "); |
559 | if (!args) |
560 | return -EINVAL; |
561 | args = skip_spaces(args); |
562 | if (!*args) |
563 | return -EINVAL; |
564 | |
565 | arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value); |
566 | if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) { |
567 | if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) { |
568 | error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, |
569 | !AA_DO_TEST); |
570 | } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) { |
571 | error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, |
572 | AA_DO_TEST); |
573 | } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) { |
574 | error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC, |
575 | !AA_DO_TEST); |
576 | } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) { |
577 | error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC, |
578 | AA_DO_TEST); |
579 | } else |
580 | goto fail; |
581 | } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) { |
582 | if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0) |
583 | error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC, |
584 | !AA_DO_TEST); |
585 | else |
586 | goto fail; |
587 | } else |
588 | /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */ |
589 | return -EINVAL; |
590 | |
591 | if (!error) |
592 | error = size; |
593 | return error; |
594 | |
595 | fail: |
596 | sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE; |
597 | sa.aad = &aad; |
598 | aad.profile = aa_current_profile(); |
599 | aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR; |
600 | aad.info = name; |
601 | aad.error = -EINVAL; |
602 | aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL); |
603 | return -EINVAL; |
604 | } |
605 | |
606 | static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task, |
607 | unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) |
608 | { |
609 | struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile(); |
610 | int error = 0; |
611 | |
612 | if (!unconfined(profile)) |
613 | error = aa_task_setrlimit(profile, task, resource, new_rlim); |
614 | |
615 | return error; |
616 | } |
617 | |
618 | static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = { |
619 | .name = "apparmor", |
620 | |
621 | .ptrace_access_check = apparmor_ptrace_access_check, |
622 | .ptrace_traceme = apparmor_ptrace_traceme, |
623 | .capget = apparmor_capget, |
624 | .capable = apparmor_capable, |
625 | |
626 | .path_link = apparmor_path_link, |
627 | .path_unlink = apparmor_path_unlink, |
628 | .path_symlink = apparmor_path_symlink, |
629 | .path_mkdir = apparmor_path_mkdir, |
630 | .path_rmdir = apparmor_path_rmdir, |
631 | .path_mknod = apparmor_path_mknod, |
632 | .path_rename = apparmor_path_rename, |
633 | .path_chmod = apparmor_path_chmod, |
634 | .path_chown = apparmor_path_chown, |
635 | .path_truncate = apparmor_path_truncate, |
636 | .inode_getattr = apparmor_inode_getattr, |
637 | |
638 | .file_open = apparmor_file_open, |
639 | .file_permission = apparmor_file_permission, |
640 | .file_alloc_security = apparmor_file_alloc_security, |
641 | .file_free_security = apparmor_file_free_security, |
642 | .mmap_file = apparmor_mmap_file, |
643 | .mmap_addr = cap_mmap_addr, |
644 | .file_mprotect = apparmor_file_mprotect, |
645 | .file_lock = apparmor_file_lock, |
646 | |
647 | .getprocattr = apparmor_getprocattr, |
648 | .setprocattr = apparmor_setprocattr, |
649 | |
650 | .cred_alloc_blank = apparmor_cred_alloc_blank, |
651 | .cred_free = apparmor_cred_free, |
652 | .cred_prepare = apparmor_cred_prepare, |
653 | .cred_transfer = apparmor_cred_transfer, |
654 | |
655 | .bprm_set_creds = apparmor_bprm_set_creds, |
656 | .bprm_committing_creds = apparmor_bprm_committing_creds, |
657 | .bprm_committed_creds = apparmor_bprm_committed_creds, |
658 | .bprm_secureexec = apparmor_bprm_secureexec, |
659 | |
660 | .task_setrlimit = apparmor_task_setrlimit, |
661 | }; |
662 | |
663 | /* |
664 | * AppArmor sysfs module parameters |
665 | */ |
666 | |
667 | static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
668 | static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
669 | #define param_check_aabool param_check_bool |
670 | static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = { |
671 | .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_FL_NOARG, |
672 | .set = param_set_aabool, |
673 | .get = param_get_aabool |
674 | }; |
675 | |
676 | static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
677 | static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
678 | #define param_check_aauint param_check_uint |
679 | static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = { |
680 | .set = param_set_aauint, |
681 | .get = param_get_aauint |
682 | }; |
683 | |
684 | static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
685 | static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
686 | #define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool |
687 | static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = { |
688 | .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_FL_NOARG, |
689 | .set = param_set_aalockpolicy, |
690 | .get = param_get_aalockpolicy |
691 | }; |
692 | |
693 | static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp); |
694 | static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp); |
695 | |
696 | static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp); |
697 | static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp); |
698 | |
699 | /* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters |
700 | * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation. |
701 | */ |
702 | |
703 | /* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */ |
704 | enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE; |
705 | module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode, |
706 | &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
707 | |
708 | /* Debug mode */ |
709 | bool aa_g_debug; |
710 | module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
711 | |
712 | /* Audit mode */ |
713 | enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; |
714 | module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit, |
715 | &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
716 | |
717 | /* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This |
718 | * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running |
719 | */ |
720 | bool aa_g_audit_header = 1; |
721 | module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool, |
722 | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
723 | |
724 | /* lock out loading/removal of policy |
725 | * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to |
726 | * load policy, if lock_policy is set |
727 | */ |
728 | bool aa_g_lock_policy; |
729 | module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy, |
730 | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
731 | |
732 | /* Syscall logging mode */ |
733 | bool aa_g_logsyscall; |
734 | module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
735 | |
736 | /* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */ |
737 | unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX; |
738 | module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
739 | |
740 | /* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification |
741 | * on the loaded policy is done. |
742 | */ |
743 | bool aa_g_paranoid_load = 1; |
744 | module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, |
745 | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
746 | |
747 | /* Boot time disable flag */ |
748 | static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; |
749 | module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO); |
750 | |
751 | static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str) |
752 | { |
753 | unsigned long enabled; |
754 | int error = strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled); |
755 | if (!error) |
756 | apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; |
757 | return 1; |
758 | } |
759 | |
760 | __setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup); |
761 | |
762 | /* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */ |
763 | static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
764 | { |
765 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
766 | return -EPERM; |
767 | if (aa_g_lock_policy) |
768 | return -EACCES; |
769 | return param_set_bool(val, kp); |
770 | } |
771 | |
772 | static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
773 | { |
774 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
775 | return -EPERM; |
776 | return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); |
777 | } |
778 | |
779 | static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
780 | { |
781 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
782 | return -EPERM; |
783 | return param_set_bool(val, kp); |
784 | } |
785 | |
786 | static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
787 | { |
788 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
789 | return -EPERM; |
790 | return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); |
791 | } |
792 | |
793 | static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
794 | { |
795 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
796 | return -EPERM; |
797 | return param_set_uint(val, kp); |
798 | } |
799 | |
800 | static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
801 | { |
802 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
803 | return -EPERM; |
804 | return param_get_uint(buffer, kp); |
805 | } |
806 | |
807 | static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) |
808 | { |
809 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
810 | return -EPERM; |
811 | |
812 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
813 | return -EINVAL; |
814 | |
815 | return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]); |
816 | } |
817 | |
818 | static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) |
819 | { |
820 | int i; |
821 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
822 | return -EPERM; |
823 | |
824 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
825 | return -EINVAL; |
826 | |
827 | if (!val) |
828 | return -EINVAL; |
829 | |
830 | for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_MAX_INDEX; i++) { |
831 | if (strcmp(val, audit_mode_names[i]) == 0) { |
832 | aa_g_audit = i; |
833 | return 0; |
834 | } |
835 | } |
836 | |
837 | return -EINVAL; |
838 | } |
839 | |
840 | static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) |
841 | { |
842 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
843 | return -EPERM; |
844 | |
845 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
846 | return -EINVAL; |
847 | |
848 | return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]); |
849 | } |
850 | |
851 | static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) |
852 | { |
853 | int i; |
854 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
855 | return -EPERM; |
856 | |
857 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
858 | return -EINVAL; |
859 | |
860 | if (!val) |
861 | return -EINVAL; |
862 | |
863 | for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) { |
864 | if (strcmp(val, aa_profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) { |
865 | aa_g_profile_mode = i; |
866 | return 0; |
867 | } |
868 | } |
869 | |
870 | return -EINVAL; |
871 | } |
872 | |
873 | /* |
874 | * AppArmor init functions |
875 | */ |
876 | |
877 | /** |
878 | * set_init_cxt - set a task context and profile on the first task. |
879 | * |
880 | * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined |
881 | */ |
882 | static int __init set_init_cxt(void) |
883 | { |
884 | struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred; |
885 | struct aa_task_cxt *cxt; |
886 | |
887 | cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL); |
888 | if (!cxt) |
889 | return -ENOMEM; |
890 | |
891 | cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined); |
892 | cred_cxt(cred) = cxt; |
893 | |
894 | return 0; |
895 | } |
896 | |
897 | static int __init apparmor_init(void) |
898 | { |
899 | int error; |
900 | |
901 | if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable(&apparmor_ops)) { |
902 | aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter"); |
903 | apparmor_enabled = 0; |
904 | return 0; |
905 | } |
906 | |
907 | error = aa_alloc_root_ns(); |
908 | if (error) { |
909 | AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n"); |
910 | goto alloc_out; |
911 | } |
912 | |
913 | error = set_init_cxt(); |
914 | if (error) { |
915 | AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n"); |
916 | goto register_security_out; |
917 | } |
918 | |
919 | error = register_security(&apparmor_ops); |
920 | if (error) { |
921 | struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred; |
922 | aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred)); |
923 | cred_cxt(cred) = NULL; |
924 | AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n"); |
925 | goto register_security_out; |
926 | } |
927 | |
928 | /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */ |
929 | apparmor_initialized = 1; |
930 | if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN) |
931 | aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled"); |
932 | else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL) |
933 | aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled"); |
934 | else |
935 | aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized"); |
936 | |
937 | return error; |
938 | |
939 | register_security_out: |
940 | aa_free_root_ns(); |
941 | |
942 | alloc_out: |
943 | aa_destroy_aafs(); |
944 | |
945 | apparmor_enabled = 0; |
946 | return error; |
947 | } |
948 | |
949 | security_initcall(apparmor_init); |
950 |
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