Root/
1 | /* |
2 | * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module |
3 | * |
4 | * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations. |
5 | * |
6 | * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> |
7 | * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com> |
8 | * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com> |
9 | * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> |
10 | * |
11 | * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. |
12 | * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> |
13 | * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
14 | * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. |
15 | * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> |
16 | * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. |
17 | * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
18 | * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd. |
19 | * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp> |
20 | * |
21 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
22 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, |
23 | * as published by the Free Software Foundation. |
24 | */ |
25 | |
26 | #include <linux/init.h> |
27 | #include <linux/kd.h> |
28 | #include <linux/kernel.h> |
29 | #include <linux/tracehook.h> |
30 | #include <linux/errno.h> |
31 | #include <linux/sched.h> |
32 | #include <linux/security.h> |
33 | #include <linux/xattr.h> |
34 | #include <linux/capability.h> |
35 | #include <linux/unistd.h> |
36 | #include <linux/mm.h> |
37 | #include <linux/mman.h> |
38 | #include <linux/slab.h> |
39 | #include <linux/pagemap.h> |
40 | #include <linux/proc_fs.h> |
41 | #include <linux/swap.h> |
42 | #include <linux/spinlock.h> |
43 | #include <linux/syscalls.h> |
44 | #include <linux/dcache.h> |
45 | #include <linux/file.h> |
46 | #include <linux/fdtable.h> |
47 | #include <linux/namei.h> |
48 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
49 | #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h> |
50 | #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> |
51 | #include <linux/tty.h> |
52 | #include <net/icmp.h> |
53 | #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */ |
54 | #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */ |
55 | #include <net/net_namespace.h> |
56 | #include <net/netlabel.h> |
57 | #include <linux/uaccess.h> |
58 | #include <asm/ioctls.h> |
59 | #include <linux/atomic.h> |
60 | #include <linux/bitops.h> |
61 | #include <linux/interrupt.h> |
62 | #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */ |
63 | #include <linux/netlink.h> |
64 | #include <linux/tcp.h> |
65 | #include <linux/udp.h> |
66 | #include <linux/dccp.h> |
67 | #include <linux/quota.h> |
68 | #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */ |
69 | #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */ |
70 | #include <linux/parser.h> |
71 | #include <linux/nfs_mount.h> |
72 | #include <net/ipv6.h> |
73 | #include <linux/hugetlb.h> |
74 | #include <linux/personality.h> |
75 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
76 | #include <linux/string.h> |
77 | #include <linux/selinux.h> |
78 | #include <linux/mutex.h> |
79 | #include <linux/posix-timers.h> |
80 | #include <linux/syslog.h> |
81 | #include <linux/user_namespace.h> |
82 | #include <linux/export.h> |
83 | #include <linux/msg.h> |
84 | #include <linux/shm.h> |
85 | |
86 | #include "avc.h" |
87 | #include "objsec.h" |
88 | #include "netif.h" |
89 | #include "netnode.h" |
90 | #include "netport.h" |
91 | #include "xfrm.h" |
92 | #include "netlabel.h" |
93 | #include "audit.h" |
94 | #include "avc_ss.h" |
95 | |
96 | #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5 |
97 | |
98 | extern struct security_operations *security_ops; |
99 | |
100 | /* SECMARK reference count */ |
101 | static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0); |
102 | |
103 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP |
104 | int selinux_enforcing; |
105 | |
106 | static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str) |
107 | { |
108 | unsigned long enforcing; |
109 | if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing)) |
110 | selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0; |
111 | return 1; |
112 | } |
113 | __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup); |
114 | #endif |
115 | |
116 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM |
117 | int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; |
118 | |
119 | static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str) |
120 | { |
121 | unsigned long enabled; |
122 | if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled)) |
123 | selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; |
124 | return 1; |
125 | } |
126 | __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup); |
127 | #else |
128 | int selinux_enabled = 1; |
129 | #endif |
130 | |
131 | static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache; |
132 | |
133 | /** |
134 | * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled |
135 | * |
136 | * Description: |
137 | * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK |
138 | * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than |
139 | * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is |
140 | * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. |
141 | * |
142 | */ |
143 | static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void) |
144 | { |
145 | return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0); |
146 | } |
147 | |
148 | /* |
149 | * initialise the security for the init task |
150 | */ |
151 | static void cred_init_security(void) |
152 | { |
153 | struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred; |
154 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
155 | |
156 | tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
157 | if (!tsec) |
158 | panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n"); |
159 | |
160 | tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; |
161 | cred->security = tsec; |
162 | } |
163 | |
164 | /* |
165 | * get the security ID of a set of credentials |
166 | */ |
167 | static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred) |
168 | { |
169 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
170 | |
171 | tsec = cred->security; |
172 | return tsec->sid; |
173 | } |
174 | |
175 | /* |
176 | * get the objective security ID of a task |
177 | */ |
178 | static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task) |
179 | { |
180 | u32 sid; |
181 | |
182 | rcu_read_lock(); |
183 | sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task)); |
184 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
185 | return sid; |
186 | } |
187 | |
188 | /* |
189 | * get the subjective security ID of the current task |
190 | */ |
191 | static inline u32 current_sid(void) |
192 | { |
193 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); |
194 | |
195 | return tsec->sid; |
196 | } |
197 | |
198 | /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */ |
199 | |
200 | static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) |
201 | { |
202 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
203 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
204 | |
205 | isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS); |
206 | if (!isec) |
207 | return -ENOMEM; |
208 | |
209 | mutex_init(&isec->lock); |
210 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list); |
211 | isec->inode = inode; |
212 | isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
213 | isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE; |
214 | isec->task_sid = sid; |
215 | inode->i_security = isec; |
216 | |
217 | return 0; |
218 | } |
219 | |
220 | static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) |
221 | { |
222 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
223 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; |
224 | |
225 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
226 | if (!list_empty(&isec->list)) |
227 | list_del_init(&isec->list); |
228 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
229 | |
230 | inode->i_security = NULL; |
231 | kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec); |
232 | } |
233 | |
234 | static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file) |
235 | { |
236 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; |
237 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
238 | |
239 | fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
240 | if (!fsec) |
241 | return -ENOMEM; |
242 | |
243 | fsec->sid = sid; |
244 | fsec->fown_sid = sid; |
245 | file->f_security = fsec; |
246 | |
247 | return 0; |
248 | } |
249 | |
250 | static void file_free_security(struct file *file) |
251 | { |
252 | struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; |
253 | file->f_security = NULL; |
254 | kfree(fsec); |
255 | } |
256 | |
257 | static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) |
258 | { |
259 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; |
260 | |
261 | sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
262 | if (!sbsec) |
263 | return -ENOMEM; |
264 | |
265 | mutex_init(&sbsec->lock); |
266 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head); |
267 | spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
268 | sbsec->sb = sb; |
269 | sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
270 | sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE; |
271 | sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
272 | sb->s_security = sbsec; |
273 | |
274 | return 0; |
275 | } |
276 | |
277 | static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb) |
278 | { |
279 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; |
280 | sb->s_security = NULL; |
281 | kfree(sbsec); |
282 | } |
283 | |
284 | /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */ |
285 | |
286 | static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = { |
287 | "uses xattr", |
288 | "uses transition SIDs", |
289 | "uses task SIDs", |
290 | "uses genfs_contexts", |
291 | "not configured for labeling", |
292 | "uses mountpoint labeling", |
293 | }; |
294 | |
295 | static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry); |
296 | |
297 | static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode) |
298 | { |
299 | return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL); |
300 | } |
301 | |
302 | enum { |
303 | Opt_error = -1, |
304 | Opt_context = 1, |
305 | Opt_fscontext = 2, |
306 | Opt_defcontext = 3, |
307 | Opt_rootcontext = 4, |
308 | Opt_labelsupport = 5, |
309 | }; |
310 | |
311 | static const match_table_t tokens = { |
312 | {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"}, |
313 | {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"}, |
314 | {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"}, |
315 | {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"}, |
316 | {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR}, |
317 | {Opt_error, NULL}, |
318 | }; |
319 | |
320 | #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n" |
321 | |
322 | static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid, |
323 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, |
324 | const struct cred *cred) |
325 | { |
326 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; |
327 | int rc; |
328 | |
329 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
330 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); |
331 | if (rc) |
332 | return rc; |
333 | |
334 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
335 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL); |
336 | return rc; |
337 | } |
338 | |
339 | static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid, |
340 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, |
341 | const struct cred *cred) |
342 | { |
343 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; |
344 | int rc; |
345 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
346 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); |
347 | if (rc) |
348 | return rc; |
349 | |
350 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
351 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL); |
352 | return rc; |
353 | } |
354 | |
355 | static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) |
356 | { |
357 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; |
358 | struct dentry *root = sb->s_root; |
359 | struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode; |
360 | int rc = 0; |
361 | |
362 | if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { |
363 | /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no |
364 | error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on |
365 | the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be |
366 | the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have |
367 | assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */ |
368 | if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) { |
369 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no " |
370 | "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); |
371 | rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; |
372 | goto out; |
373 | } |
374 | rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); |
375 | if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) { |
376 | if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) |
377 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " |
378 | "%s) has no security xattr handler\n", |
379 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); |
380 | else |
381 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " |
382 | "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id, |
383 | sb->s_type->name, -rc); |
384 | goto out; |
385 | } |
386 | } |
387 | |
388 | sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP); |
389 | |
390 | if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) |
391 | printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n", |
392 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); |
393 | else |
394 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n", |
395 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, |
396 | labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]); |
397 | |
398 | if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS || |
399 | sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT || |
400 | sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE || |
401 | sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) |
402 | sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP; |
403 | |
404 | /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/ |
405 | if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0) |
406 | sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP; |
407 | |
408 | /* Initialize the root inode. */ |
409 | rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root); |
410 | |
411 | /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g. |
412 | inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created |
413 | during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly |
414 | populates itself. */ |
415 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
416 | next_inode: |
417 | if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) { |
418 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = |
419 | list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next, |
420 | struct inode_security_struct, list); |
421 | struct inode *inode = isec->inode; |
422 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
423 | inode = igrab(inode); |
424 | if (inode) { |
425 | if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode)) |
426 | inode_doinit(inode); |
427 | iput(inode); |
428 | } |
429 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
430 | list_del_init(&isec->list); |
431 | goto next_inode; |
432 | } |
433 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
434 | out: |
435 | return rc; |
436 | } |
437 | |
438 | /* |
439 | * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security |
440 | * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying |
441 | * mount options, or whatever. |
442 | */ |
443 | static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb, |
444 | struct security_mnt_opts *opts) |
445 | { |
446 | int rc = 0, i; |
447 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; |
448 | char *context = NULL; |
449 | u32 len; |
450 | char tmp; |
451 | |
452 | security_init_mnt_opts(opts); |
453 | |
454 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) |
455 | return -EINVAL; |
456 | |
457 | if (!ss_initialized) |
458 | return -EINVAL; |
459 | |
460 | tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK; |
461 | /* count the number of mount options for this sb */ |
462 | for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { |
463 | if (tmp & 0x01) |
464 | opts->num_mnt_opts++; |
465 | tmp >>= 1; |
466 | } |
467 | /* Check if the Label support flag is set */ |
468 | if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) |
469 | opts->num_mnt_opts++; |
470 | |
471 | opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC); |
472 | if (!opts->mnt_opts) { |
473 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
474 | goto out_free; |
475 | } |
476 | |
477 | opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC); |
478 | if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) { |
479 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
480 | goto out_free; |
481 | } |
482 | |
483 | i = 0; |
484 | if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) { |
485 | rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len); |
486 | if (rc) |
487 | goto out_free; |
488 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; |
489 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT; |
490 | } |
491 | if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) { |
492 | rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len); |
493 | if (rc) |
494 | goto out_free; |
495 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; |
496 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT; |
497 | } |
498 | if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) { |
499 | rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len); |
500 | if (rc) |
501 | goto out_free; |
502 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; |
503 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT; |
504 | } |
505 | if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) { |
506 | struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode; |
507 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security; |
508 | |
509 | rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len); |
510 | if (rc) |
511 | goto out_free; |
512 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; |
513 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; |
514 | } |
515 | if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) { |
516 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL; |
517 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP; |
518 | } |
519 | |
520 | BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts); |
521 | |
522 | return 0; |
523 | |
524 | out_free: |
525 | security_free_mnt_opts(opts); |
526 | return rc; |
527 | } |
528 | |
529 | static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag, |
530 | u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid) |
531 | { |
532 | char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK; |
533 | |
534 | /* check if the old mount command had the same options */ |
535 | if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) |
536 | if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) || |
537 | (old_sid != new_sid)) |
538 | return 1; |
539 | |
540 | /* check if we were passed the same options twice, |
541 | * aka someone passed context=a,context=b |
542 | */ |
543 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) |
544 | if (mnt_flags & flag) |
545 | return 1; |
546 | return 0; |
547 | } |
548 | |
549 | /* |
550 | * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point |
551 | * labeling information. |
552 | */ |
553 | static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, |
554 | struct security_mnt_opts *opts) |
555 | { |
556 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
557 | int rc = 0, i; |
558 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; |
559 | const char *name = sb->s_type->name; |
560 | struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode; |
561 | struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security; |
562 | u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0; |
563 | u32 defcontext_sid = 0; |
564 | char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts; |
565 | int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags; |
566 | int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts; |
567 | |
568 | mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock); |
569 | |
570 | if (!ss_initialized) { |
571 | if (!num_opts) { |
572 | /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, |
573 | after the initial policy is loaded and the security |
574 | server is ready to handle calls. */ |
575 | goto out; |
576 | } |
577 | rc = -EINVAL; |
578 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options " |
579 | "before the security server is initialized\n"); |
580 | goto out; |
581 | } |
582 | |
583 | /* |
584 | * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once |
585 | * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs. |
586 | * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data |
587 | * we need to skip the double mount verification. |
588 | * |
589 | * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first |
590 | * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using |
591 | * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options |
592 | * will be used for both mounts) |
593 | */ |
594 | if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) |
595 | && (num_opts == 0)) |
596 | goto out; |
597 | |
598 | /* |
599 | * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids. |
600 | * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more |
601 | * than once with different security options. |
602 | */ |
603 | for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) { |
604 | u32 sid; |
605 | |
606 | if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP) |
607 | continue; |
608 | rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], |
609 | strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid); |
610 | if (rc) { |
611 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" |
612 | "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", |
613 | mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc); |
614 | goto out; |
615 | } |
616 | switch (flags[i]) { |
617 | case FSCONTEXT_MNT: |
618 | fscontext_sid = sid; |
619 | |
620 | if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, |
621 | fscontext_sid)) |
622 | goto out_double_mount; |
623 | |
624 | sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT; |
625 | break; |
626 | case CONTEXT_MNT: |
627 | context_sid = sid; |
628 | |
629 | if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, |
630 | context_sid)) |
631 | goto out_double_mount; |
632 | |
633 | sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT; |
634 | break; |
635 | case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: |
636 | rootcontext_sid = sid; |
637 | |
638 | if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, |
639 | rootcontext_sid)) |
640 | goto out_double_mount; |
641 | |
642 | sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; |
643 | |
644 | break; |
645 | case DEFCONTEXT_MNT: |
646 | defcontext_sid = sid; |
647 | |
648 | if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, |
649 | defcontext_sid)) |
650 | goto out_double_mount; |
651 | |
652 | sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT; |
653 | |
654 | break; |
655 | default: |
656 | rc = -EINVAL; |
657 | goto out; |
658 | } |
659 | } |
660 | |
661 | if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { |
662 | /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */ |
663 | if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts) |
664 | goto out_double_mount; |
665 | rc = 0; |
666 | goto out; |
667 | } |
668 | |
669 | if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0) |
670 | sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC; |
671 | |
672 | /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */ |
673 | rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid); |
674 | if (rc) { |
675 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", |
676 | __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc); |
677 | goto out; |
678 | } |
679 | |
680 | /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */ |
681 | if (fscontext_sid) { |
682 | rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred); |
683 | if (rc) |
684 | goto out; |
685 | |
686 | sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid; |
687 | } |
688 | |
689 | /* |
690 | * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior. |
691 | * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set |
692 | * the superblock context if not already set. |
693 | */ |
694 | if (context_sid) { |
695 | if (!fscontext_sid) { |
696 | rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, |
697 | cred); |
698 | if (rc) |
699 | goto out; |
700 | sbsec->sid = context_sid; |
701 | } else { |
702 | rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, |
703 | cred); |
704 | if (rc) |
705 | goto out; |
706 | } |
707 | if (!rootcontext_sid) |
708 | rootcontext_sid = context_sid; |
709 | |
710 | sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid; |
711 | sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT; |
712 | } |
713 | |
714 | if (rootcontext_sid) { |
715 | rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, |
716 | cred); |
717 | if (rc) |
718 | goto out; |
719 | |
720 | root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid; |
721 | root_isec->initialized = 1; |
722 | } |
723 | |
724 | if (defcontext_sid) { |
725 | if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { |
726 | rc = -EINVAL; |
727 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is " |
728 | "invalid for this filesystem type\n"); |
729 | goto out; |
730 | } |
731 | |
732 | if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) { |
733 | rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid, |
734 | sbsec, cred); |
735 | if (rc) |
736 | goto out; |
737 | } |
738 | |
739 | sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid; |
740 | } |
741 | |
742 | rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb); |
743 | out: |
744 | mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock); |
745 | return rc; |
746 | out_double_mount: |
747 | rc = -EINVAL; |
748 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different " |
749 | "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name); |
750 | goto out; |
751 | } |
752 | |
753 | static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, |
754 | struct super_block *newsb) |
755 | { |
756 | const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security; |
757 | struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security; |
758 | |
759 | int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT); |
760 | int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT); |
761 | int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT); |
762 | |
763 | /* |
764 | * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm |
765 | * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later |
766 | */ |
767 | if (!ss_initialized) |
768 | return; |
769 | |
770 | /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */ |
771 | BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)); |
772 | |
773 | /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */ |
774 | if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) |
775 | return; |
776 | |
777 | mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock); |
778 | |
779 | newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags; |
780 | |
781 | newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid; |
782 | newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid; |
783 | newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior; |
784 | |
785 | if (set_context) { |
786 | u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid; |
787 | |
788 | if (!set_fscontext) |
789 | newsbsec->sid = sid; |
790 | if (!set_rootcontext) { |
791 | struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode; |
792 | struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security; |
793 | newisec->sid = sid; |
794 | } |
795 | newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid; |
796 | } |
797 | if (set_rootcontext) { |
798 | const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode; |
799 | const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security; |
800 | struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode; |
801 | struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security; |
802 | |
803 | newisec->sid = oldisec->sid; |
804 | } |
805 | |
806 | sb_finish_set_opts(newsb); |
807 | mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock); |
808 | } |
809 | |
810 | static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options, |
811 | struct security_mnt_opts *opts) |
812 | { |
813 | char *p; |
814 | char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL; |
815 | char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL; |
816 | int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0; |
817 | |
818 | opts->num_mnt_opts = 0; |
819 | |
820 | /* Standard string-based options. */ |
821 | while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) { |
822 | int token; |
823 | substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; |
824 | |
825 | if (!*p) |
826 | continue; |
827 | |
828 | token = match_token(p, tokens, args); |
829 | |
830 | switch (token) { |
831 | case Opt_context: |
832 | if (context || defcontext) { |
833 | rc = -EINVAL; |
834 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); |
835 | goto out_err; |
836 | } |
837 | context = match_strdup(&args[0]); |
838 | if (!context) { |
839 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
840 | goto out_err; |
841 | } |
842 | break; |
843 | |
844 | case Opt_fscontext: |
845 | if (fscontext) { |
846 | rc = -EINVAL; |
847 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); |
848 | goto out_err; |
849 | } |
850 | fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); |
851 | if (!fscontext) { |
852 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
853 | goto out_err; |
854 | } |
855 | break; |
856 | |
857 | case Opt_rootcontext: |
858 | if (rootcontext) { |
859 | rc = -EINVAL; |
860 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); |
861 | goto out_err; |
862 | } |
863 | rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); |
864 | if (!rootcontext) { |
865 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
866 | goto out_err; |
867 | } |
868 | break; |
869 | |
870 | case Opt_defcontext: |
871 | if (context || defcontext) { |
872 | rc = -EINVAL; |
873 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); |
874 | goto out_err; |
875 | } |
876 | defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); |
877 | if (!defcontext) { |
878 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
879 | goto out_err; |
880 | } |
881 | break; |
882 | case Opt_labelsupport: |
883 | break; |
884 | default: |
885 | rc = -EINVAL; |
886 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n"); |
887 | goto out_err; |
888 | |
889 | } |
890 | } |
891 | |
892 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
893 | opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC); |
894 | if (!opts->mnt_opts) |
895 | goto out_err; |
896 | |
897 | opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC); |
898 | if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) { |
899 | kfree(opts->mnt_opts); |
900 | goto out_err; |
901 | } |
902 | |
903 | if (fscontext) { |
904 | opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext; |
905 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT; |
906 | } |
907 | if (context) { |
908 | opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context; |
909 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT; |
910 | } |
911 | if (rootcontext) { |
912 | opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext; |
913 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; |
914 | } |
915 | if (defcontext) { |
916 | opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext; |
917 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT; |
918 | } |
919 | |
920 | opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts; |
921 | return 0; |
922 | |
923 | out_err: |
924 | kfree(context); |
925 | kfree(defcontext); |
926 | kfree(fscontext); |
927 | kfree(rootcontext); |
928 | return rc; |
929 | } |
930 | /* |
931 | * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec |
932 | */ |
933 | static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data) |
934 | { |
935 | int rc = 0; |
936 | char *options = data; |
937 | struct security_mnt_opts opts; |
938 | |
939 | security_init_mnt_opts(&opts); |
940 | |
941 | if (!data) |
942 | goto out; |
943 | |
944 | BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA); |
945 | |
946 | rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts); |
947 | if (rc) |
948 | goto out_err; |
949 | |
950 | out: |
951 | rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts); |
952 | |
953 | out_err: |
954 | security_free_mnt_opts(&opts); |
955 | return rc; |
956 | } |
957 | |
958 | static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m, |
959 | struct security_mnt_opts *opts) |
960 | { |
961 | int i; |
962 | char *prefix; |
963 | |
964 | for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) { |
965 | char *has_comma; |
966 | |
967 | if (opts->mnt_opts[i]) |
968 | has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ','); |
969 | else |
970 | has_comma = NULL; |
971 | |
972 | switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) { |
973 | case CONTEXT_MNT: |
974 | prefix = CONTEXT_STR; |
975 | break; |
976 | case FSCONTEXT_MNT: |
977 | prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR; |
978 | break; |
979 | case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: |
980 | prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR; |
981 | break; |
982 | case DEFCONTEXT_MNT: |
983 | prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR; |
984 | break; |
985 | case SE_SBLABELSUPP: |
986 | seq_putc(m, ','); |
987 | seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR); |
988 | continue; |
989 | default: |
990 | BUG(); |
991 | return; |
992 | }; |
993 | /* we need a comma before each option */ |
994 | seq_putc(m, ','); |
995 | seq_puts(m, prefix); |
996 | if (has_comma) |
997 | seq_putc(m, '\"'); |
998 | seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]); |
999 | if (has_comma) |
1000 | seq_putc(m, '\"'); |
1001 | } |
1002 | } |
1003 | |
1004 | static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) |
1005 | { |
1006 | struct security_mnt_opts opts; |
1007 | int rc; |
1008 | |
1009 | rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts); |
1010 | if (rc) { |
1011 | /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */ |
1012 | if (rc == -EINVAL) |
1013 | rc = 0; |
1014 | return rc; |
1015 | } |
1016 | |
1017 | selinux_write_opts(m, &opts); |
1018 | |
1019 | security_free_mnt_opts(&opts); |
1020 | |
1021 | return rc; |
1022 | } |
1023 | |
1024 | static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode) |
1025 | { |
1026 | switch (mode & S_IFMT) { |
1027 | case S_IFSOCK: |
1028 | return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE; |
1029 | case S_IFLNK: |
1030 | return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE; |
1031 | case S_IFREG: |
1032 | return SECCLASS_FILE; |
1033 | case S_IFBLK: |
1034 | return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE; |
1035 | case S_IFDIR: |
1036 | return SECCLASS_DIR; |
1037 | case S_IFCHR: |
1038 | return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE; |
1039 | case S_IFIFO: |
1040 | return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE; |
1041 | |
1042 | } |
1043 | |
1044 | return SECCLASS_FILE; |
1045 | } |
1046 | |
1047 | static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol) |
1048 | { |
1049 | return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP); |
1050 | } |
1051 | |
1052 | static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol) |
1053 | { |
1054 | return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP); |
1055 | } |
1056 | |
1057 | static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol) |
1058 | { |
1059 | switch (family) { |
1060 | case PF_UNIX: |
1061 | switch (type) { |
1062 | case SOCK_STREAM: |
1063 | case SOCK_SEQPACKET: |
1064 | return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET; |
1065 | case SOCK_DGRAM: |
1066 | return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET; |
1067 | } |
1068 | break; |
1069 | case PF_INET: |
1070 | case PF_INET6: |
1071 | switch (type) { |
1072 | case SOCK_STREAM: |
1073 | if (default_protocol_stream(protocol)) |
1074 | return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET; |
1075 | else |
1076 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; |
1077 | case SOCK_DGRAM: |
1078 | if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol)) |
1079 | return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET; |
1080 | else |
1081 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; |
1082 | case SOCK_DCCP: |
1083 | return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET; |
1084 | default: |
1085 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; |
1086 | } |
1087 | break; |
1088 | case PF_NETLINK: |
1089 | switch (protocol) { |
1090 | case NETLINK_ROUTE: |
1091 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET; |
1092 | case NETLINK_FIREWALL: |
1093 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET; |
1094 | case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG: |
1095 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET; |
1096 | case NETLINK_NFLOG: |
1097 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET; |
1098 | case NETLINK_XFRM: |
1099 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET; |
1100 | case NETLINK_SELINUX: |
1101 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET; |
1102 | case NETLINK_AUDIT: |
1103 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET; |
1104 | case NETLINK_IP6_FW: |
1105 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET; |
1106 | case NETLINK_DNRTMSG: |
1107 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET; |
1108 | case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT: |
1109 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET; |
1110 | default: |
1111 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET; |
1112 | } |
1113 | case PF_PACKET: |
1114 | return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET; |
1115 | case PF_KEY: |
1116 | return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET; |
1117 | case PF_APPLETALK: |
1118 | return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET; |
1119 | } |
1120 | |
1121 | return SECCLASS_SOCKET; |
1122 | } |
1123 | |
1124 | #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS |
1125 | static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry, |
1126 | u16 tclass, |
1127 | u32 *sid) |
1128 | { |
1129 | int rc; |
1130 | char *buffer, *path; |
1131 | |
1132 | buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); |
1133 | if (!buffer) |
1134 | return -ENOMEM; |
1135 | |
1136 | path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE); |
1137 | if (IS_ERR(path)) |
1138 | rc = PTR_ERR(path); |
1139 | else { |
1140 | /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the |
1141 | * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling. |
1142 | * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */ |
1143 | while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') { |
1144 | path[1] = '/'; |
1145 | path++; |
1146 | } |
1147 | rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid); |
1148 | } |
1149 | free_page((unsigned long)buffer); |
1150 | return rc; |
1151 | } |
1152 | #else |
1153 | static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry, |
1154 | u16 tclass, |
1155 | u32 *sid) |
1156 | { |
1157 | return -EINVAL; |
1158 | } |
1159 | #endif |
1160 | |
1161 | /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */ |
1162 | static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry) |
1163 | { |
1164 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL; |
1165 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
1166 | u32 sid; |
1167 | struct dentry *dentry; |
1168 | #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 |
1169 | char *context = NULL; |
1170 | unsigned len = 0; |
1171 | int rc = 0; |
1172 | |
1173 | if (isec->initialized) |
1174 | goto out; |
1175 | |
1176 | mutex_lock(&isec->lock); |
1177 | if (isec->initialized) |
1178 | goto out_unlock; |
1179 | |
1180 | sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; |
1181 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) { |
1182 | /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, |
1183 | after the initial policy is loaded and the security |
1184 | server is ready to handle calls. */ |
1185 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
1186 | if (list_empty(&isec->list)) |
1187 | list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head); |
1188 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
1189 | goto out_unlock; |
1190 | } |
1191 | |
1192 | switch (sbsec->behavior) { |
1193 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR: |
1194 | if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) { |
1195 | isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid; |
1196 | break; |
1197 | } |
1198 | |
1199 | /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one. |
1200 | Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */ |
1201 | if (opt_dentry) { |
1202 | /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */ |
1203 | dentry = dget(opt_dentry); |
1204 | } else { |
1205 | /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */ |
1206 | dentry = d_find_alias(inode); |
1207 | } |
1208 | if (!dentry) { |
1209 | /* |
1210 | * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed |
1211 | * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we |
1212 | * may find inodes that have no dentry on the |
1213 | * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these |
1214 | * will get fixed up the next time we go through |
1215 | * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could |
1216 | * be used again by userspace. |
1217 | */ |
1218 | goto out_unlock; |
1219 | } |
1220 | |
1221 | len = INITCONTEXTLEN; |
1222 | context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS); |
1223 | if (!context) { |
1224 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
1225 | dput(dentry); |
1226 | goto out_unlock; |
1227 | } |
1228 | context[len] = '\0'; |
1229 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, |
1230 | context, len); |
1231 | if (rc == -ERANGE) { |
1232 | kfree(context); |
1233 | |
1234 | /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ |
1235 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, |
1236 | NULL, 0); |
1237 | if (rc < 0) { |
1238 | dput(dentry); |
1239 | goto out_unlock; |
1240 | } |
1241 | len = rc; |
1242 | context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS); |
1243 | if (!context) { |
1244 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
1245 | dput(dentry); |
1246 | goto out_unlock; |
1247 | } |
1248 | context[len] = '\0'; |
1249 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, |
1250 | XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, |
1251 | context, len); |
1252 | } |
1253 | dput(dentry); |
1254 | if (rc < 0) { |
1255 | if (rc != -ENODATA) { |
1256 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned " |
1257 | "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__, |
1258 | -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); |
1259 | kfree(context); |
1260 | goto out_unlock; |
1261 | } |
1262 | /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */ |
1263 | sid = sbsec->def_sid; |
1264 | rc = 0; |
1265 | } else { |
1266 | rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid, |
1267 | sbsec->def_sid, |
1268 | GFP_NOFS); |
1269 | if (rc) { |
1270 | char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id; |
1271 | unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino; |
1272 | |
1273 | if (rc == -EINVAL) { |
1274 | if (printk_ratelimit()) |
1275 | printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid " |
1276 | "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the " |
1277 | "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context); |
1278 | } else { |
1279 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) " |
1280 | "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", |
1281 | __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino); |
1282 | } |
1283 | kfree(context); |
1284 | /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */ |
1285 | rc = 0; |
1286 | break; |
1287 | } |
1288 | } |
1289 | kfree(context); |
1290 | isec->sid = sid; |
1291 | break; |
1292 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK: |
1293 | isec->sid = isec->task_sid; |
1294 | break; |
1295 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS: |
1296 | /* Default to the fs SID. */ |
1297 | isec->sid = sbsec->sid; |
1298 | |
1299 | /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */ |
1300 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); |
1301 | rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid, |
1302 | isec->sclass, NULL, &sid); |
1303 | if (rc) |
1304 | goto out_unlock; |
1305 | isec->sid = sid; |
1306 | break; |
1307 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT: |
1308 | isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid; |
1309 | break; |
1310 | default: |
1311 | /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */ |
1312 | isec->sid = sbsec->sid; |
1313 | |
1314 | if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { |
1315 | if (opt_dentry) { |
1316 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); |
1317 | rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry, |
1318 | isec->sclass, |
1319 | &sid); |
1320 | if (rc) |
1321 | goto out_unlock; |
1322 | isec->sid = sid; |
1323 | } |
1324 | } |
1325 | break; |
1326 | } |
1327 | |
1328 | isec->initialized = 1; |
1329 | |
1330 | out_unlock: |
1331 | mutex_unlock(&isec->lock); |
1332 | out: |
1333 | if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE) |
1334 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); |
1335 | return rc; |
1336 | } |
1337 | |
1338 | /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */ |
1339 | static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig) |
1340 | { |
1341 | u32 perm = 0; |
1342 | |
1343 | switch (sig) { |
1344 | case SIGCHLD: |
1345 | /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */ |
1346 | perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD; |
1347 | break; |
1348 | case SIGKILL: |
1349 | /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ |
1350 | perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL; |
1351 | break; |
1352 | case SIGSTOP: |
1353 | /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ |
1354 | perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP; |
1355 | break; |
1356 | default: |
1357 | /* All other signals. */ |
1358 | perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL; |
1359 | break; |
1360 | } |
1361 | |
1362 | return perm; |
1363 | } |
1364 | |
1365 | /* |
1366 | * Check permission between a pair of credentials |
1367 | * fork check, ptrace check, etc. |
1368 | */ |
1369 | static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor, |
1370 | const struct cred *target, |
1371 | u32 perms) |
1372 | { |
1373 | u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target); |
1374 | |
1375 | return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL); |
1376 | } |
1377 | |
1378 | /* |
1379 | * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks, |
1380 | * fork check, ptrace check, etc. |
1381 | * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target |
1382 | * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1 |
1383 | */ |
1384 | static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1, |
1385 | const struct task_struct *tsk2, |
1386 | u32 perms) |
1387 | { |
1388 | const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2; |
1389 | u32 sid1, sid2; |
1390 | |
1391 | rcu_read_lock(); |
1392 | __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid; |
1393 | __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid; |
1394 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1395 | return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL); |
1396 | } |
1397 | |
1398 | /* |
1399 | * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks, |
1400 | * fork check, ptrace check, etc. |
1401 | * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target |
1402 | * - this uses current's subjective creds |
1403 | */ |
1404 | static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk, |
1405 | u32 perms) |
1406 | { |
1407 | u32 sid, tsid; |
1408 | |
1409 | sid = current_sid(); |
1410 | tsid = task_sid(tsk); |
1411 | return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL); |
1412 | } |
1413 | |
1414 | #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63 |
1415 | #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63. |
1416 | #endif |
1417 | |
1418 | /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */ |
1419 | static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, |
1420 | int cap, int audit) |
1421 | { |
1422 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
1423 | struct av_decision avd; |
1424 | u16 sclass; |
1425 | u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); |
1426 | u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap); |
1427 | int rc; |
1428 | |
1429 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP; |
1430 | ad.u.cap = cap; |
1431 | |
1432 | switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) { |
1433 | case 0: |
1434 | sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY; |
1435 | break; |
1436 | case 1: |
1437 | sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2; |
1438 | break; |
1439 | default: |
1440 | printk(KERN_ERR |
1441 | "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap); |
1442 | BUG(); |
1443 | return -EINVAL; |
1444 | } |
1445 | |
1446 | rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd); |
1447 | if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) { |
1448 | int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0); |
1449 | if (rc2) |
1450 | return rc2; |
1451 | } |
1452 | return rc; |
1453 | } |
1454 | |
1455 | /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */ |
1456 | static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk, |
1457 | u32 perms) |
1458 | { |
1459 | u32 sid = task_sid(tsk); |
1460 | |
1461 | return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, |
1462 | SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL); |
1463 | } |
1464 | |
1465 | /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode. |
1466 | The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit |
1467 | data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */ |
1468 | static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, |
1469 | struct inode *inode, |
1470 | u32 perms, |
1471 | struct common_audit_data *adp, |
1472 | unsigned flags) |
1473 | { |
1474 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
1475 | u32 sid; |
1476 | |
1477 | validate_creds(cred); |
1478 | |
1479 | if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) |
1480 | return 0; |
1481 | |
1482 | sid = cred_sid(cred); |
1483 | isec = inode->i_security; |
1484 | |
1485 | return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags); |
1486 | } |
1487 | |
1488 | /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing |
1489 | the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the |
1490 | pathname if needed. */ |
1491 | static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, |
1492 | struct dentry *dentry, |
1493 | u32 av) |
1494 | { |
1495 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
1496 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
1497 | |
1498 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; |
1499 | ad.u.dentry = dentry; |
1500 | return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0); |
1501 | } |
1502 | |
1503 | /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing |
1504 | the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the |
1505 | pathname if needed. */ |
1506 | static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, |
1507 | struct path *path, |
1508 | u32 av) |
1509 | { |
1510 | struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode; |
1511 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
1512 | |
1513 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; |
1514 | ad.u.path = *path; |
1515 | return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0); |
1516 | } |
1517 | |
1518 | /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to |
1519 | access an inode in a given way. Check access to the |
1520 | descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to |
1521 | check a particular permission to the file. |
1522 | Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it |
1523 | has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then |
1524 | access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases |
1525 | where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */ |
1526 | static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, |
1527 | struct file *file, |
1528 | u32 av) |
1529 | { |
1530 | struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; |
1531 | struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; |
1532 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
1533 | u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); |
1534 | int rc; |
1535 | |
1536 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; |
1537 | ad.u.path = file->f_path; |
1538 | |
1539 | if (sid != fsec->sid) { |
1540 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, |
1541 | SECCLASS_FD, |
1542 | FD__USE, |
1543 | &ad); |
1544 | if (rc) |
1545 | goto out; |
1546 | } |
1547 | |
1548 | /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */ |
1549 | rc = 0; |
1550 | if (av) |
1551 | rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0); |
1552 | |
1553 | out: |
1554 | return rc; |
1555 | } |
1556 | |
1557 | /* Check whether a task can create a file. */ |
1558 | static int may_create(struct inode *dir, |
1559 | struct dentry *dentry, |
1560 | u16 tclass) |
1561 | { |
1562 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); |
1563 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec; |
1564 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; |
1565 | u32 sid, newsid; |
1566 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
1567 | int rc; |
1568 | |
1569 | dsec = dir->i_security; |
1570 | sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; |
1571 | |
1572 | sid = tsec->sid; |
1573 | newsid = tsec->create_sid; |
1574 | |
1575 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; |
1576 | ad.u.dentry = dentry; |
1577 | |
1578 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, |
1579 | DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, |
1580 | &ad); |
1581 | if (rc) |
1582 | return rc; |
1583 | |
1584 | if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) { |
1585 | rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, |
1586 | &dentry->d_name, &newsid); |
1587 | if (rc) |
1588 | return rc; |
1589 | } |
1590 | |
1591 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad); |
1592 | if (rc) |
1593 | return rc; |
1594 | |
1595 | return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid, |
1596 | SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
1597 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); |
1598 | } |
1599 | |
1600 | /* Check whether a task can create a key. */ |
1601 | static int may_create_key(u32 ksid, |
1602 | struct task_struct *ctx) |
1603 | { |
1604 | u32 sid = task_sid(ctx); |
1605 | |
1606 | return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL); |
1607 | } |
1608 | |
1609 | #define MAY_LINK 0 |
1610 | #define MAY_UNLINK 1 |
1611 | #define MAY_RMDIR 2 |
1612 | |
1613 | /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */ |
1614 | static int may_link(struct inode *dir, |
1615 | struct dentry *dentry, |
1616 | int kind) |
1617 | |
1618 | { |
1619 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec; |
1620 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
1621 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
1622 | u32 av; |
1623 | int rc; |
1624 | |
1625 | dsec = dir->i_security; |
1626 | isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security; |
1627 | |
1628 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; |
1629 | ad.u.dentry = dentry; |
1630 | |
1631 | av = DIR__SEARCH; |
1632 | av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME); |
1633 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); |
1634 | if (rc) |
1635 | return rc; |
1636 | |
1637 | switch (kind) { |
1638 | case MAY_LINK: |
1639 | av = FILE__LINK; |
1640 | break; |
1641 | case MAY_UNLINK: |
1642 | av = FILE__UNLINK; |
1643 | break; |
1644 | case MAY_RMDIR: |
1645 | av = DIR__RMDIR; |
1646 | break; |
1647 | default: |
1648 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n", |
1649 | __func__, kind); |
1650 | return 0; |
1651 | } |
1652 | |
1653 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad); |
1654 | return rc; |
1655 | } |
1656 | |
1657 | static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, |
1658 | struct dentry *old_dentry, |
1659 | struct inode *new_dir, |
1660 | struct dentry *new_dentry) |
1661 | { |
1662 | struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec; |
1663 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
1664 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
1665 | u32 av; |
1666 | int old_is_dir, new_is_dir; |
1667 | int rc; |
1668 | |
1669 | old_dsec = old_dir->i_security; |
1670 | old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security; |
1671 | old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode); |
1672 | new_dsec = new_dir->i_security; |
1673 | |
1674 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; |
1675 | |
1676 | ad.u.dentry = old_dentry; |
1677 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, |
1678 | DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad); |
1679 | if (rc) |
1680 | return rc; |
1681 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid, |
1682 | old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad); |
1683 | if (rc) |
1684 | return rc; |
1685 | if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) { |
1686 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid, |
1687 | old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad); |
1688 | if (rc) |
1689 | return rc; |
1690 | } |
1691 | |
1692 | ad.u.dentry = new_dentry; |
1693 | av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH; |
1694 | if (new_dentry->d_inode) |
1695 | av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME; |
1696 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); |
1697 | if (rc) |
1698 | return rc; |
1699 | if (new_dentry->d_inode) { |
1700 | new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security; |
1701 | new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode); |
1702 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid, |
1703 | new_isec->sclass, |
1704 | (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad); |
1705 | if (rc) |
1706 | return rc; |
1707 | } |
1708 | |
1709 | return 0; |
1710 | } |
1711 | |
1712 | /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */ |
1713 | static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, |
1714 | struct super_block *sb, |
1715 | u32 perms, |
1716 | struct common_audit_data *ad) |
1717 | { |
1718 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; |
1719 | u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); |
1720 | |
1721 | sbsec = sb->s_security; |
1722 | return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad); |
1723 | } |
1724 | |
1725 | /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */ |
1726 | static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask) |
1727 | { |
1728 | u32 av = 0; |
1729 | |
1730 | if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) { |
1731 | if (mask & MAY_EXEC) |
1732 | av |= FILE__EXECUTE; |
1733 | if (mask & MAY_READ) |
1734 | av |= FILE__READ; |
1735 | |
1736 | if (mask & MAY_APPEND) |
1737 | av |= FILE__APPEND; |
1738 | else if (mask & MAY_WRITE) |
1739 | av |= FILE__WRITE; |
1740 | |
1741 | } else { |
1742 | if (mask & MAY_EXEC) |
1743 | av |= DIR__SEARCH; |
1744 | if (mask & MAY_WRITE) |
1745 | av |= DIR__WRITE; |
1746 | if (mask & MAY_READ) |
1747 | av |= DIR__READ; |
1748 | } |
1749 | |
1750 | return av; |
1751 | } |
1752 | |
1753 | /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */ |
1754 | static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file) |
1755 | { |
1756 | u32 av = 0; |
1757 | |
1758 | if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) |
1759 | av |= FILE__READ; |
1760 | if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) { |
1761 | if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND) |
1762 | av |= FILE__APPEND; |
1763 | else |
1764 | av |= FILE__WRITE; |
1765 | } |
1766 | if (!av) { |
1767 | /* |
1768 | * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use. |
1769 | */ |
1770 | av = FILE__IOCTL; |
1771 | } |
1772 | |
1773 | return av; |
1774 | } |
1775 | |
1776 | /* |
1777 | * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open |
1778 | * open permission. |
1779 | */ |
1780 | static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file) |
1781 | { |
1782 | u32 av = file_to_av(file); |
1783 | |
1784 | if (selinux_policycap_openperm) |
1785 | av |= FILE__OPEN; |
1786 | |
1787 | return av; |
1788 | } |
1789 | |
1790 | /* Hook functions begin here. */ |
1791 | |
1792 | static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, |
1793 | unsigned int mode) |
1794 | { |
1795 | int rc; |
1796 | |
1797 | rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode); |
1798 | if (rc) |
1799 | return rc; |
1800 | |
1801 | if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) { |
1802 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
1803 | u32 csid = task_sid(child); |
1804 | return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL); |
1805 | } |
1806 | |
1807 | return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE); |
1808 | } |
1809 | |
1810 | static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) |
1811 | { |
1812 | int rc; |
1813 | |
1814 | rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent); |
1815 | if (rc) |
1816 | return rc; |
1817 | |
1818 | return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE); |
1819 | } |
1820 | |
1821 | static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, |
1822 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) |
1823 | { |
1824 | int error; |
1825 | |
1826 | error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP); |
1827 | if (error) |
1828 | return error; |
1829 | |
1830 | return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); |
1831 | } |
1832 | |
1833 | static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, |
1834 | const kernel_cap_t *effective, |
1835 | const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, |
1836 | const kernel_cap_t *permitted) |
1837 | { |
1838 | int error; |
1839 | |
1840 | error = cap_capset(new, old, |
1841 | effective, inheritable, permitted); |
1842 | if (error) |
1843 | return error; |
1844 | |
1845 | return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP); |
1846 | } |
1847 | |
1848 | /* |
1849 | * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook, |
1850 | * which was removed). |
1851 | * |
1852 | * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux |
1853 | * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not |
1854 | * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of |
1855 | * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook. |
1856 | */ |
1857 | |
1858 | static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, |
1859 | int cap, int audit) |
1860 | { |
1861 | int rc; |
1862 | |
1863 | rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit); |
1864 | if (rc) |
1865 | return rc; |
1866 | |
1867 | return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit); |
1868 | } |
1869 | |
1870 | static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) |
1871 | { |
1872 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
1873 | int rc = 0; |
1874 | |
1875 | if (!sb) |
1876 | return 0; |
1877 | |
1878 | switch (cmds) { |
1879 | case Q_SYNC: |
1880 | case Q_QUOTAON: |
1881 | case Q_QUOTAOFF: |
1882 | case Q_SETINFO: |
1883 | case Q_SETQUOTA: |
1884 | rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL); |
1885 | break; |
1886 | case Q_GETFMT: |
1887 | case Q_GETINFO: |
1888 | case Q_GETQUOTA: |
1889 | rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL); |
1890 | break; |
1891 | default: |
1892 | rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */ |
1893 | break; |
1894 | } |
1895 | return rc; |
1896 | } |
1897 | |
1898 | static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) |
1899 | { |
1900 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
1901 | |
1902 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON); |
1903 | } |
1904 | |
1905 | static int selinux_syslog(int type) |
1906 | { |
1907 | int rc; |
1908 | |
1909 | switch (type) { |
1910 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */ |
1911 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */ |
1912 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ); |
1913 | break; |
1914 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */ |
1915 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */ |
1916 | /* Set level of messages printed to console */ |
1917 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL: |
1918 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE); |
1919 | break; |
1920 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */ |
1921 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */ |
1922 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */ |
1923 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */ |
1924 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */ |
1925 | default: |
1926 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD); |
1927 | break; |
1928 | } |
1929 | return rc; |
1930 | } |
1931 | |
1932 | /* |
1933 | * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual |
1934 | * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to |
1935 | * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not. |
1936 | * |
1937 | * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all |
1938 | * processes that allocate mappings. |
1939 | */ |
1940 | static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) |
1941 | { |
1942 | int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0; |
1943 | |
1944 | rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, |
1945 | SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); |
1946 | if (rc == 0) |
1947 | cap_sys_admin = 1; |
1948 | |
1949 | return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); |
1950 | } |
1951 | |
1952 | /* binprm security operations */ |
1953 | |
1954 | static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
1955 | { |
1956 | const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec; |
1957 | struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; |
1958 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
1959 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
1960 | struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; |
1961 | int rc; |
1962 | |
1963 | rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm); |
1964 | if (rc) |
1965 | return rc; |
1966 | |
1967 | /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not |
1968 | * the script interpreter */ |
1969 | if (bprm->cred_prepared) |
1970 | return 0; |
1971 | |
1972 | old_tsec = current_security(); |
1973 | new_tsec = bprm->cred->security; |
1974 | isec = inode->i_security; |
1975 | |
1976 | /* Default to the current task SID. */ |
1977 | new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid; |
1978 | new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid; |
1979 | |
1980 | /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */ |
1981 | new_tsec->create_sid = 0; |
1982 | new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0; |
1983 | new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0; |
1984 | |
1985 | if (old_tsec->exec_sid) { |
1986 | new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid; |
1987 | /* Reset exec SID on execve. */ |
1988 | new_tsec->exec_sid = 0; |
1989 | |
1990 | /* |
1991 | * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs and a transition is |
1992 | * explicitly requested, then fail the exec. |
1993 | */ |
1994 | if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) |
1995 | return -EPERM; |
1996 | } else { |
1997 | /* Check for a default transition on this program. */ |
1998 | rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, |
1999 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL, |
2000 | &new_tsec->sid); |
2001 | if (rc) |
2002 | return rc; |
2003 | } |
2004 | |
2005 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; |
2006 | ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path; |
2007 | |
2008 | if ((bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) || |
2009 | (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)) |
2010 | new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid; |
2011 | |
2012 | if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) { |
2013 | rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, |
2014 | SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad); |
2015 | if (rc) |
2016 | return rc; |
2017 | } else { |
2018 | /* Check permissions for the transition. */ |
2019 | rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, |
2020 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad); |
2021 | if (rc) |
2022 | return rc; |
2023 | |
2024 | rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid, |
2025 | SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad); |
2026 | if (rc) |
2027 | return rc; |
2028 | |
2029 | /* Check for shared state */ |
2030 | if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) { |
2031 | rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, |
2032 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE, |
2033 | NULL); |
2034 | if (rc) |
2035 | return -EPERM; |
2036 | } |
2037 | |
2038 | /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that |
2039 | * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */ |
2040 | if (bprm->unsafe & |
2041 | (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) { |
2042 | struct task_struct *tracer; |
2043 | struct task_security_struct *sec; |
2044 | u32 ptsid = 0; |
2045 | |
2046 | rcu_read_lock(); |
2047 | tracer = ptrace_parent(current); |
2048 | if (likely(tracer != NULL)) { |
2049 | sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security; |
2050 | ptsid = sec->sid; |
2051 | } |
2052 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
2053 | |
2054 | if (ptsid != 0) { |
2055 | rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid, |
2056 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, |
2057 | PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); |
2058 | if (rc) |
2059 | return -EPERM; |
2060 | } |
2061 | } |
2062 | |
2063 | /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */ |
2064 | bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; |
2065 | } |
2066 | |
2067 | return 0; |
2068 | } |
2069 | |
2070 | static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
2071 | { |
2072 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); |
2073 | u32 sid, osid; |
2074 | int atsecure = 0; |
2075 | |
2076 | sid = tsec->sid; |
2077 | osid = tsec->osid; |
2078 | |
2079 | if (osid != sid) { |
2080 | /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless |
2081 | the noatsecure permission is granted between |
2082 | the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */ |
2083 | atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, |
2084 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, |
2085 | PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL); |
2086 | } |
2087 | |
2088 | return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm)); |
2089 | } |
2090 | |
2091 | /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */ |
2092 | static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, |
2093 | struct files_struct *files) |
2094 | { |
2095 | struct file *file, *devnull = NULL; |
2096 | struct tty_struct *tty; |
2097 | struct fdtable *fdt; |
2098 | long j = -1; |
2099 | int drop_tty = 0; |
2100 | |
2101 | tty = get_current_tty(); |
2102 | if (tty) { |
2103 | spin_lock(&tty_files_lock); |
2104 | if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) { |
2105 | struct tty_file_private *file_priv; |
2106 | |
2107 | /* Revalidate access to controlling tty. |
2108 | Use path_has_perm on the tty path directly rather |
2109 | than using file_has_perm, as this particular open |
2110 | file may belong to another process and we are only |
2111 | interested in the inode-based check here. */ |
2112 | file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, |
2113 | struct tty_file_private, list); |
2114 | file = file_priv->file; |
2115 | if (path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE)) |
2116 | drop_tty = 1; |
2117 | } |
2118 | spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock); |
2119 | tty_kref_put(tty); |
2120 | } |
2121 | /* Reset controlling tty. */ |
2122 | if (drop_tty) |
2123 | no_tty(); |
2124 | |
2125 | /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */ |
2126 | spin_lock(&files->file_lock); |
2127 | for (;;) { |
2128 | unsigned long set, i; |
2129 | int fd; |
2130 | |
2131 | j++; |
2132 | i = j * BITS_PER_LONG; |
2133 | fdt = files_fdtable(files); |
2134 | if (i >= fdt->max_fds) |
2135 | break; |
2136 | set = fdt->open_fds[j]; |
2137 | if (!set) |
2138 | continue; |
2139 | spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); |
2140 | for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) { |
2141 | if (set & 1) { |
2142 | file = fget(i); |
2143 | if (!file) |
2144 | continue; |
2145 | if (file_has_perm(cred, |
2146 | file, |
2147 | file_to_av(file))) { |
2148 | sys_close(i); |
2149 | fd = get_unused_fd(); |
2150 | if (fd != i) { |
2151 | if (fd >= 0) |
2152 | put_unused_fd(fd); |
2153 | fput(file); |
2154 | continue; |
2155 | } |
2156 | if (devnull) { |
2157 | get_file(devnull); |
2158 | } else { |
2159 | devnull = dentry_open( |
2160 | &selinux_null, |
2161 | O_RDWR, cred); |
2162 | if (IS_ERR(devnull)) { |
2163 | devnull = NULL; |
2164 | put_unused_fd(fd); |
2165 | fput(file); |
2166 | continue; |
2167 | } |
2168 | } |
2169 | fd_install(fd, devnull); |
2170 | } |
2171 | fput(file); |
2172 | } |
2173 | } |
2174 | spin_lock(&files->file_lock); |
2175 | |
2176 | } |
2177 | spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); |
2178 | } |
2179 | |
2180 | /* |
2181 | * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec |
2182 | */ |
2183 | static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
2184 | { |
2185 | struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; |
2186 | struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim; |
2187 | int rc, i; |
2188 | |
2189 | new_tsec = bprm->cred->security; |
2190 | if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid) |
2191 | return; |
2192 | |
2193 | /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */ |
2194 | flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files); |
2195 | |
2196 | /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */ |
2197 | current->pdeath_signal = 0; |
2198 | |
2199 | /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old |
2200 | * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current |
2201 | * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit. |
2202 | * |
2203 | * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be |
2204 | * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's |
2205 | * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits |
2206 | * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is |
2207 | * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK. |
2208 | */ |
2209 | rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, |
2210 | PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL); |
2211 | if (rc) { |
2212 | /* protect against do_prlimit() */ |
2213 | task_lock(current); |
2214 | for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) { |
2215 | rlim = current->signal->rlim + i; |
2216 | initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i; |
2217 | rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur); |
2218 | } |
2219 | task_unlock(current); |
2220 | update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU)); |
2221 | } |
2222 | } |
2223 | |
2224 | /* |
2225 | * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials |
2226 | * due to exec |
2227 | */ |
2228 | static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
2229 | { |
2230 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); |
2231 | struct itimerval itimer; |
2232 | u32 osid, sid; |
2233 | int rc, i; |
2234 | |
2235 | osid = tsec->osid; |
2236 | sid = tsec->sid; |
2237 | |
2238 | if (sid == osid) |
2239 | return; |
2240 | |
2241 | /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID. |
2242 | * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and |
2243 | * flush and unblock signals. |
2244 | * |
2245 | * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any |
2246 | * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID. |
2247 | */ |
2248 | rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL); |
2249 | if (rc) { |
2250 | memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer); |
2251 | for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) |
2252 | do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL); |
2253 | spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); |
2254 | if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) { |
2255 | __flush_signals(current); |
2256 | flush_signal_handlers(current, 1); |
2257 | sigemptyset(¤t->blocked); |
2258 | } |
2259 | spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); |
2260 | } |
2261 | |
2262 | /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck |
2263 | * wait permission to the new task SID. */ |
2264 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock); |
2265 | __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent); |
2266 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
2267 | } |
2268 | |
2269 | /* superblock security operations */ |
2270 | |
2271 | static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) |
2272 | { |
2273 | return superblock_alloc_security(sb); |
2274 | } |
2275 | |
2276 | static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb) |
2277 | { |
2278 | superblock_free_security(sb); |
2279 | } |
2280 | |
2281 | static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen) |
2282 | { |
2283 | if (plen > olen) |
2284 | return 0; |
2285 | |
2286 | return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen); |
2287 | } |
2288 | |
2289 | static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len) |
2290 | { |
2291 | return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || |
2292 | match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || |
2293 | match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || |
2294 | match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || |
2295 | match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len)); |
2296 | } |
2297 | |
2298 | static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len) |
2299 | { |
2300 | if (!*first) { |
2301 | **to = ','; |
2302 | *to += 1; |
2303 | } else |
2304 | *first = 0; |
2305 | memcpy(*to, from, len); |
2306 | *to += len; |
2307 | } |
2308 | |
2309 | static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, |
2310 | int len) |
2311 | { |
2312 | int current_size = 0; |
2313 | |
2314 | if (!*first) { |
2315 | **to = '|'; |
2316 | *to += 1; |
2317 | } else |
2318 | *first = 0; |
2319 | |
2320 | while (current_size < len) { |
2321 | if (*from != '"') { |
2322 | **to = *from; |
2323 | *to += 1; |
2324 | } |
2325 | from += 1; |
2326 | current_size += 1; |
2327 | } |
2328 | } |
2329 | |
2330 | static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy) |
2331 | { |
2332 | int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0; |
2333 | char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end; |
2334 | char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec; |
2335 | int open_quote = 0; |
2336 | |
2337 | in_curr = orig; |
2338 | sec_curr = copy; |
2339 | |
2340 | nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); |
2341 | if (!nosec) { |
2342 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
2343 | goto out; |
2344 | } |
2345 | |
2346 | nosec_save = nosec; |
2347 | fnosec = fsec = 1; |
2348 | in_save = in_end = orig; |
2349 | |
2350 | do { |
2351 | if (*in_end == '"') |
2352 | open_quote = !open_quote; |
2353 | if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) || |
2354 | *in_end == '\0') { |
2355 | int len = in_end - in_curr; |
2356 | |
2357 | if (selinux_option(in_curr, len)) |
2358 | take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len); |
2359 | else |
2360 | take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len); |
2361 | |
2362 | in_curr = in_end + 1; |
2363 | } |
2364 | } while (*in_end++); |
2365 | |
2366 | strcpy(in_save, nosec_save); |
2367 | free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save); |
2368 | out: |
2369 | return rc; |
2370 | } |
2371 | |
2372 | static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) |
2373 | { |
2374 | int rc, i, *flags; |
2375 | struct security_mnt_opts opts; |
2376 | char *secdata, **mount_options; |
2377 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; |
2378 | |
2379 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) |
2380 | return 0; |
2381 | |
2382 | if (!data) |
2383 | return 0; |
2384 | |
2385 | if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) |
2386 | return 0; |
2387 | |
2388 | security_init_mnt_opts(&opts); |
2389 | secdata = alloc_secdata(); |
2390 | if (!secdata) |
2391 | return -ENOMEM; |
2392 | rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata); |
2393 | if (rc) |
2394 | goto out_free_secdata; |
2395 | |
2396 | rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts); |
2397 | if (rc) |
2398 | goto out_free_secdata; |
2399 | |
2400 | mount_options = opts.mnt_opts; |
2401 | flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags; |
2402 | |
2403 | for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) { |
2404 | u32 sid; |
2405 | size_t len; |
2406 | |
2407 | if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP) |
2408 | continue; |
2409 | len = strlen(mount_options[i]); |
2410 | rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid); |
2411 | if (rc) { |
2412 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" |
2413 | "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", |
2414 | mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc); |
2415 | goto out_free_opts; |
2416 | } |
2417 | rc = -EINVAL; |
2418 | switch (flags[i]) { |
2419 | case FSCONTEXT_MNT: |
2420 | if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid)) |
2421 | goto out_bad_option; |
2422 | break; |
2423 | case CONTEXT_MNT: |
2424 | if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid)) |
2425 | goto out_bad_option; |
2426 | break; |
2427 | case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: { |
2428 | struct inode_security_struct *root_isec; |
2429 | root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security; |
2430 | |
2431 | if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid)) |
2432 | goto out_bad_option; |
2433 | break; |
2434 | } |
2435 | case DEFCONTEXT_MNT: |
2436 | if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid)) |
2437 | goto out_bad_option; |
2438 | break; |
2439 | default: |
2440 | goto out_free_opts; |
2441 | } |
2442 | } |
2443 | |
2444 | rc = 0; |
2445 | out_free_opts: |
2446 | security_free_mnt_opts(&opts); |
2447 | out_free_secdata: |
2448 | free_secdata(secdata); |
2449 | return rc; |
2450 | out_bad_option: |
2451 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options " |
2452 | "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id, |
2453 | sb->s_type->name); |
2454 | goto out_free_opts; |
2455 | } |
2456 | |
2457 | static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) |
2458 | { |
2459 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2460 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
2461 | int rc; |
2462 | |
2463 | rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data); |
2464 | if (rc) |
2465 | return rc; |
2466 | |
2467 | /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */ |
2468 | if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT) |
2469 | return 0; |
2470 | |
2471 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; |
2472 | ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root; |
2473 | return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad); |
2474 | } |
2475 | |
2476 | static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) |
2477 | { |
2478 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2479 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
2480 | |
2481 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; |
2482 | ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root; |
2483 | return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad); |
2484 | } |
2485 | |
2486 | static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name, |
2487 | struct path *path, |
2488 | char *type, |
2489 | unsigned long flags, |
2490 | void *data) |
2491 | { |
2492 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2493 | |
2494 | if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) |
2495 | return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb, |
2496 | FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL); |
2497 | else |
2498 | return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON); |
2499 | } |
2500 | |
2501 | static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) |
2502 | { |
2503 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2504 | |
2505 | return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb, |
2506 | FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL); |
2507 | } |
2508 | |
2509 | /* inode security operations */ |
2510 | |
2511 | static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) |
2512 | { |
2513 | return inode_alloc_security(inode); |
2514 | } |
2515 | |
2516 | static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) |
2517 | { |
2518 | inode_free_security(inode); |
2519 | } |
2520 | |
2521 | static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, |
2522 | const struct qstr *qstr, char **name, |
2523 | void **value, size_t *len) |
2524 | { |
2525 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); |
2526 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec; |
2527 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; |
2528 | u32 sid, newsid, clen; |
2529 | int rc; |
2530 | char *namep = NULL, *context; |
2531 | |
2532 | dsec = dir->i_security; |
2533 | sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; |
2534 | |
2535 | sid = tsec->sid; |
2536 | newsid = tsec->create_sid; |
2537 | |
2538 | if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && |
2539 | (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) |
2540 | newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid; |
2541 | else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) { |
2542 | rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, |
2543 | inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode), |
2544 | qstr, &newsid); |
2545 | if (rc) { |
2546 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: " |
2547 | "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s " |
2548 | "ino=%ld)\n", |
2549 | __func__, |
2550 | -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); |
2551 | return rc; |
2552 | } |
2553 | } |
2554 | |
2555 | /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */ |
2556 | if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { |
2557 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
2558 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); |
2559 | isec->sid = newsid; |
2560 | isec->initialized = 1; |
2561 | } |
2562 | |
2563 | if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) |
2564 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
2565 | |
2566 | if (name) { |
2567 | namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS); |
2568 | if (!namep) |
2569 | return -ENOMEM; |
2570 | *name = namep; |
2571 | } |
2572 | |
2573 | if (value && len) { |
2574 | rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen); |
2575 | if (rc) { |
2576 | kfree(namep); |
2577 | return rc; |
2578 | } |
2579 | *value = context; |
2580 | *len = clen; |
2581 | } |
2582 | |
2583 | return 0; |
2584 | } |
2585 | |
2586 | static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) |
2587 | { |
2588 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE); |
2589 | } |
2590 | |
2591 | static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) |
2592 | { |
2593 | return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK); |
2594 | } |
2595 | |
2596 | static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) |
2597 | { |
2598 | return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK); |
2599 | } |
2600 | |
2601 | static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) |
2602 | { |
2603 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE); |
2604 | } |
2605 | |
2606 | static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask) |
2607 | { |
2608 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR); |
2609 | } |
2610 | |
2611 | static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) |
2612 | { |
2613 | return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR); |
2614 | } |
2615 | |
2616 | static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev) |
2617 | { |
2618 | return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode)); |
2619 | } |
2620 | |
2621 | static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry, |
2622 | struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry) |
2623 | { |
2624 | return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry); |
2625 | } |
2626 | |
2627 | static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) |
2628 | { |
2629 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2630 | |
2631 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ); |
2632 | } |
2633 | |
2634 | static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata) |
2635 | { |
2636 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2637 | |
2638 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ); |
2639 | } |
2640 | |
2641 | static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, |
2642 | u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied, |
2643 | unsigned flags) |
2644 | { |
2645 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
2646 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
2647 | int rc; |
2648 | |
2649 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE; |
2650 | ad.u.inode = inode; |
2651 | |
2652 | rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, |
2653 | audited, denied, &ad, flags); |
2654 | if (rc) |
2655 | return rc; |
2656 | return 0; |
2657 | } |
2658 | |
2659 | static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) |
2660 | { |
2661 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2662 | u32 perms; |
2663 | bool from_access; |
2664 | unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK; |
2665 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
2666 | u32 sid; |
2667 | struct av_decision avd; |
2668 | int rc, rc2; |
2669 | u32 audited, denied; |
2670 | |
2671 | from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS; |
2672 | mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND); |
2673 | |
2674 | /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ |
2675 | if (!mask) |
2676 | return 0; |
2677 | |
2678 | validate_creds(cred); |
2679 | |
2680 | if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) |
2681 | return 0; |
2682 | |
2683 | perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask); |
2684 | |
2685 | sid = cred_sid(cred); |
2686 | isec = inode->i_security; |
2687 | |
2688 | rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd); |
2689 | audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc, |
2690 | from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0, |
2691 | &denied); |
2692 | if (likely(!audited)) |
2693 | return rc; |
2694 | |
2695 | rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, flags); |
2696 | if (rc2) |
2697 | return rc2; |
2698 | return rc; |
2699 | } |
2700 | |
2701 | static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) |
2702 | { |
2703 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2704 | unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid; |
2705 | __u32 av = FILE__WRITE; |
2706 | |
2707 | /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */ |
2708 | if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) { |
2709 | ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE | |
2710 | ATTR_FORCE); |
2711 | if (!ia_valid) |
2712 | return 0; |
2713 | } |
2714 | |
2715 | if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID | |
2716 | ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) |
2717 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); |
2718 | |
2719 | if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)) |
2720 | av |= FILE__OPEN; |
2721 | |
2722 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av); |
2723 | } |
2724 | |
2725 | static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) |
2726 | { |
2727 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2728 | struct path path; |
2729 | |
2730 | path.dentry = dentry; |
2731 | path.mnt = mnt; |
2732 | |
2733 | return path_has_perm(cred, &path, FILE__GETATTR); |
2734 | } |
2735 | |
2736 | static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) |
2737 | { |
2738 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2739 | |
2740 | if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, |
2741 | sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) { |
2742 | if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) { |
2743 | if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP)) |
2744 | return -EPERM; |
2745 | } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { |
2746 | /* A different attribute in the security namespace. |
2747 | Restrict to administrator. */ |
2748 | return -EPERM; |
2749 | } |
2750 | } |
2751 | |
2752 | /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the |
2753 | ordinary setattr permission. */ |
2754 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); |
2755 | } |
2756 | |
2757 | static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, |
2758 | const void *value, size_t size, int flags) |
2759 | { |
2760 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
2761 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
2762 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; |
2763 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
2764 | u32 newsid, sid = current_sid(); |
2765 | int rc = 0; |
2766 | |
2767 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) |
2768 | return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name); |
2769 | |
2770 | sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; |
2771 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) |
2772 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
2773 | |
2774 | if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) |
2775 | return -EPERM; |
2776 | |
2777 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; |
2778 | ad.u.dentry = dentry; |
2779 | |
2780 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, |
2781 | FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad); |
2782 | if (rc) |
2783 | return rc; |
2784 | |
2785 | rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid); |
2786 | if (rc == -EINVAL) { |
2787 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { |
2788 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
2789 | size_t audit_size; |
2790 | const char *str; |
2791 | |
2792 | /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the |
2793 | * context contains a nul and we should audit that */ |
2794 | if (value) { |
2795 | str = value; |
2796 | if (str[size - 1] == '\0') |
2797 | audit_size = size - 1; |
2798 | else |
2799 | audit_size = size; |
2800 | } else { |
2801 | str = ""; |
2802 | audit_size = 0; |
2803 | } |
2804 | ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR); |
2805 | audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context="); |
2806 | audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size); |
2807 | audit_log_end(ab); |
2808 | |
2809 | return rc; |
2810 | } |
2811 | rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid); |
2812 | } |
2813 | if (rc) |
2814 | return rc; |
2815 | |
2816 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass, |
2817 | FILE__RELABELTO, &ad); |
2818 | if (rc) |
2819 | return rc; |
2820 | |
2821 | rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid, |
2822 | isec->sclass); |
2823 | if (rc) |
2824 | return rc; |
2825 | |
2826 | return avc_has_perm(newsid, |
2827 | sbsec->sid, |
2828 | SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
2829 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, |
2830 | &ad); |
2831 | } |
2832 | |
2833 | static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, |
2834 | const void *value, size_t size, |
2835 | int flags) |
2836 | { |
2837 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
2838 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
2839 | u32 newsid; |
2840 | int rc; |
2841 | |
2842 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { |
2843 | /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */ |
2844 | return; |
2845 | } |
2846 | |
2847 | rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid); |
2848 | if (rc) { |
2849 | printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID" |
2850 | "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n", |
2851 | inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc); |
2852 | return; |
2853 | } |
2854 | |
2855 | isec->sid = newsid; |
2856 | return; |
2857 | } |
2858 | |
2859 | static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) |
2860 | { |
2861 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2862 | |
2863 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); |
2864 | } |
2865 | |
2866 | static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) |
2867 | { |
2868 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2869 | |
2870 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); |
2871 | } |
2872 | |
2873 | static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) |
2874 | { |
2875 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) |
2876 | return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name); |
2877 | |
2878 | /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label. |
2879 | You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */ |
2880 | return -EACCES; |
2881 | } |
2882 | |
2883 | /* |
2884 | * Copy the inode security context value to the user. |
2885 | * |
2886 | * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook. |
2887 | */ |
2888 | static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) |
2889 | { |
2890 | u32 size; |
2891 | int error; |
2892 | char *context = NULL; |
2893 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
2894 | |
2895 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) |
2896 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
2897 | |
2898 | /* |
2899 | * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context |
2900 | * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise, |
2901 | * use the in-core value under current policy. |
2902 | * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since |
2903 | * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly |
2904 | * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the |
2905 | * in-core context value, not a denial. |
2906 | */ |
2907 | error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, |
2908 | SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); |
2909 | if (!error) |
2910 | error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context, |
2911 | &size); |
2912 | else |
2913 | error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size); |
2914 | if (error) |
2915 | return error; |
2916 | error = size; |
2917 | if (alloc) { |
2918 | *buffer = context; |
2919 | goto out_nofree; |
2920 | } |
2921 | kfree(context); |
2922 | out_nofree: |
2923 | return error; |
2924 | } |
2925 | |
2926 | static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, |
2927 | const void *value, size_t size, int flags) |
2928 | { |
2929 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
2930 | u32 newsid; |
2931 | int rc; |
2932 | |
2933 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) |
2934 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
2935 | |
2936 | if (!value || !size) |
2937 | return -EACCES; |
2938 | |
2939 | rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid); |
2940 | if (rc) |
2941 | return rc; |
2942 | |
2943 | isec->sid = newsid; |
2944 | isec->initialized = 1; |
2945 | return 0; |
2946 | } |
2947 | |
2948 | static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) |
2949 | { |
2950 | const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX); |
2951 | if (buffer && len <= buffer_size) |
2952 | memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len); |
2953 | return len; |
2954 | } |
2955 | |
2956 | static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) |
2957 | { |
2958 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
2959 | *secid = isec->sid; |
2960 | } |
2961 | |
2962 | /* file security operations */ |
2963 | |
2964 | static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) |
2965 | { |
2966 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2967 | struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; |
2968 | |
2969 | /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */ |
2970 | if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE)) |
2971 | mask |= MAY_APPEND; |
2972 | |
2973 | return file_has_perm(cred, file, |
2974 | file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask)); |
2975 | } |
2976 | |
2977 | static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) |
2978 | { |
2979 | struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; |
2980 | struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; |
2981 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
2982 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
2983 | |
2984 | if (!mask) |
2985 | /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ |
2986 | return 0; |
2987 | |
2988 | if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid && |
2989 | fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno()) |
2990 | /* No change since file_open check. */ |
2991 | return 0; |
2992 | |
2993 | return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask); |
2994 | } |
2995 | |
2996 | static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) |
2997 | { |
2998 | return file_alloc_security(file); |
2999 | } |
3000 | |
3001 | static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file) |
3002 | { |
3003 | file_free_security(file); |
3004 | } |
3005 | |
3006 | static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, |
3007 | unsigned long arg) |
3008 | { |
3009 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
3010 | int error = 0; |
3011 | |
3012 | switch (cmd) { |
3013 | case FIONREAD: |
3014 | /* fall through */ |
3015 | case FIBMAP: |
3016 | /* fall through */ |
3017 | case FIGETBSZ: |
3018 | /* fall through */ |
3019 | case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS: |
3020 | /* fall through */ |
3021 | case FS_IOC_GETVERSION: |
3022 | error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR); |
3023 | break; |
3024 | |
3025 | case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS: |
3026 | /* fall through */ |
3027 | case FS_IOC_SETVERSION: |
3028 | error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR); |
3029 | break; |
3030 | |
3031 | /* sys_ioctl() checks */ |
3032 | case FIONBIO: |
3033 | /* fall through */ |
3034 | case FIOASYNC: |
3035 | error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0); |
3036 | break; |
3037 | |
3038 | case KDSKBENT: |
3039 | case KDSKBSENT: |
3040 | error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG, |
3041 | SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); |
3042 | break; |
3043 | |
3044 | /* default case assumes that the command will go |
3045 | * to the file's ioctl() function. |
3046 | */ |
3047 | default: |
3048 | error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL); |
3049 | } |
3050 | return error; |
3051 | } |
3052 | |
3053 | static int default_noexec; |
3054 | |
3055 | static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared) |
3056 | { |
3057 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
3058 | int rc = 0; |
3059 | |
3060 | if (default_noexec && |
3061 | (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) { |
3062 | /* |
3063 | * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a |
3064 | * private file mapping that will also be writable. |
3065 | * This has an additional check. |
3066 | */ |
3067 | rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM); |
3068 | if (rc) |
3069 | goto error; |
3070 | } |
3071 | |
3072 | if (file) { |
3073 | /* read access is always possible with a mapping */ |
3074 | u32 av = FILE__READ; |
3075 | |
3076 | /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */ |
3077 | if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)) |
3078 | av |= FILE__WRITE; |
3079 | |
3080 | if (prot & PROT_EXEC) |
3081 | av |= FILE__EXECUTE; |
3082 | |
3083 | return file_has_perm(cred, file, av); |
3084 | } |
3085 | |
3086 | error: |
3087 | return rc; |
3088 | } |
3089 | |
3090 | static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) |
3091 | { |
3092 | int rc = 0; |
3093 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
3094 | |
3095 | /* |
3096 | * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before |
3097 | * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt |
3098 | * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even |
3099 | * if DAC would have also denied the operation. |
3100 | */ |
3101 | if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) { |
3102 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, |
3103 | MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL); |
3104 | if (rc) |
3105 | return rc; |
3106 | } |
3107 | |
3108 | /* do DAC check on address space usage */ |
3109 | return cap_mmap_addr(addr); |
3110 | } |
3111 | |
3112 | static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, |
3113 | unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) |
3114 | { |
3115 | if (selinux_checkreqprot) |
3116 | prot = reqprot; |
3117 | |
3118 | return file_map_prot_check(file, prot, |
3119 | (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED); |
3120 | } |
3121 | |
3122 | static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, |
3123 | unsigned long reqprot, |
3124 | unsigned long prot) |
3125 | { |
3126 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
3127 | |
3128 | if (selinux_checkreqprot) |
3129 | prot = reqprot; |
3130 | |
3131 | if (default_noexec && |
3132 | (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { |
3133 | int rc = 0; |
3134 | if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk && |
3135 | vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) { |
3136 | rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP); |
3137 | } else if (!vma->vm_file && |
3138 | vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack && |
3139 | vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) { |
3140 | rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK); |
3141 | } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) { |
3142 | /* |
3143 | * We are making executable a file mapping that has |
3144 | * had some COW done. Since pages might have been |
3145 | * written, check ability to execute the possibly |
3146 | * modified content. This typically should only |
3147 | * occur for text relocations. |
3148 | */ |
3149 | rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD); |
3150 | } |
3151 | if (rc) |
3152 | return rc; |
3153 | } |
3154 | |
3155 | return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED); |
3156 | } |
3157 | |
3158 | static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) |
3159 | { |
3160 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
3161 | |
3162 | return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK); |
3163 | } |
3164 | |
3165 | static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, |
3166 | unsigned long arg) |
3167 | { |
3168 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
3169 | int err = 0; |
3170 | |
3171 | switch (cmd) { |
3172 | case F_SETFL: |
3173 | if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) { |
3174 | err = -EINVAL; |
3175 | break; |
3176 | } |
3177 | |
3178 | if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) { |
3179 | err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE); |
3180 | break; |
3181 | } |
3182 | /* fall through */ |
3183 | case F_SETOWN: |
3184 | case F_SETSIG: |
3185 | case F_GETFL: |
3186 | case F_GETOWN: |
3187 | case F_GETSIG: |
3188 | case F_GETOWNER_UIDS: |
3189 | /* Just check FD__USE permission */ |
3190 | err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0); |
3191 | break; |
3192 | case F_GETLK: |
3193 | case F_SETLK: |
3194 | case F_SETLKW: |
3195 | #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 |
3196 | case F_GETLK64: |
3197 | case F_SETLK64: |
3198 | case F_SETLKW64: |
3199 | #endif |
3200 | if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) { |
3201 | err = -EINVAL; |
3202 | break; |
3203 | } |
3204 | err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK); |
3205 | break; |
3206 | } |
3207 | |
3208 | return err; |
3209 | } |
3210 | |
3211 | static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) |
3212 | { |
3213 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; |
3214 | |
3215 | fsec = file->f_security; |
3216 | fsec->fown_sid = current_sid(); |
3217 | |
3218 | return 0; |
3219 | } |
3220 | |
3221 | static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, |
3222 | struct fown_struct *fown, int signum) |
3223 | { |
3224 | struct file *file; |
3225 | u32 sid = task_sid(tsk); |
3226 | u32 perm; |
3227 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; |
3228 | |
3229 | /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */ |
3230 | file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner); |
3231 | |
3232 | fsec = file->f_security; |
3233 | |
3234 | if (!signum) |
3235 | perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */ |
3236 | else |
3237 | perm = signal_to_av(signum); |
3238 | |
3239 | return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid, |
3240 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); |
3241 | } |
3242 | |
3243 | static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file) |
3244 | { |
3245 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
3246 | |
3247 | return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file)); |
3248 | } |
3249 | |
3250 | static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) |
3251 | { |
3252 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; |
3253 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
3254 | |
3255 | fsec = file->f_security; |
3256 | isec = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_security; |
3257 | /* |
3258 | * Save inode label and policy sequence number |
3259 | * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission |
3260 | * can determine whether revalidation is necessary. |
3261 | * Task label is already saved in the file security |
3262 | * struct as its SID. |
3263 | */ |
3264 | fsec->isid = isec->sid; |
3265 | fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(); |
3266 | /* |
3267 | * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed |
3268 | * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving |
3269 | * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted. |
3270 | * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the |
3271 | * new inode label or new policy. |
3272 | * This check is not redundant - do not remove. |
3273 | */ |
3274 | return path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, open_file_to_av(file)); |
3275 | } |
3276 | |
3277 | /* task security operations */ |
3278 | |
3279 | static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags) |
3280 | { |
3281 | return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK); |
3282 | } |
3283 | |
3284 | /* |
3285 | * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials |
3286 | */ |
3287 | static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) |
3288 | { |
3289 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
3290 | |
3291 | tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp); |
3292 | if (!tsec) |
3293 | return -ENOMEM; |
3294 | |
3295 | cred->security = tsec; |
3296 | return 0; |
3297 | } |
3298 | |
3299 | /* |
3300 | * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials |
3301 | */ |
3302 | static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred) |
3303 | { |
3304 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; |
3305 | |
3306 | /* |
3307 | * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or |
3308 | * security_prepare_creds() returned an error. |
3309 | */ |
3310 | BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE); |
3311 | cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL; |
3312 | kfree(tsec); |
3313 | } |
3314 | |
3315 | /* |
3316 | * prepare a new set of credentials for modification |
3317 | */ |
3318 | static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, |
3319 | gfp_t gfp) |
3320 | { |
3321 | const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec; |
3322 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
3323 | |
3324 | old_tsec = old->security; |
3325 | |
3326 | tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp); |
3327 | if (!tsec) |
3328 | return -ENOMEM; |
3329 | |
3330 | new->security = tsec; |
3331 | return 0; |
3332 | } |
3333 | |
3334 | /* |
3335 | * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds |
3336 | */ |
3337 | static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
3338 | { |
3339 | const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security; |
3340 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security; |
3341 | |
3342 | *tsec = *old_tsec; |
3343 | } |
3344 | |
3345 | /* |
3346 | * set the security data for a kernel service |
3347 | * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled |
3348 | */ |
3349 | static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) |
3350 | { |
3351 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security; |
3352 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
3353 | int ret; |
3354 | |
3355 | ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid, |
3356 | SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, |
3357 | KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE, |
3358 | NULL); |
3359 | if (ret == 0) { |
3360 | tsec->sid = secid; |
3361 | tsec->create_sid = 0; |
3362 | tsec->keycreate_sid = 0; |
3363 | tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0; |
3364 | } |
3365 | return ret; |
3366 | } |
3367 | |
3368 | /* |
3369 | * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the |
3370 | * objective context of the specified inode |
3371 | */ |
3372 | static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) |
3373 | { |
3374 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
3375 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security; |
3376 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
3377 | int ret; |
3378 | |
3379 | ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, |
3380 | SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, |
3381 | KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS, |
3382 | NULL); |
3383 | |
3384 | if (ret == 0) |
3385 | tsec->create_sid = isec->sid; |
3386 | return ret; |
3387 | } |
3388 | |
3389 | static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) |
3390 | { |
3391 | u32 sid; |
3392 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
3393 | |
3394 | sid = task_sid(current); |
3395 | |
3396 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD; |
3397 | ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name; |
3398 | |
3399 | return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, |
3400 | SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad); |
3401 | } |
3402 | |
3403 | static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) |
3404 | { |
3405 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID); |
3406 | } |
3407 | |
3408 | static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) |
3409 | { |
3410 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID); |
3411 | } |
3412 | |
3413 | static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) |
3414 | { |
3415 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION); |
3416 | } |
3417 | |
3418 | static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) |
3419 | { |
3420 | *secid = task_sid(p); |
3421 | } |
3422 | |
3423 | static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) |
3424 | { |
3425 | int rc; |
3426 | |
3427 | rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice); |
3428 | if (rc) |
3429 | return rc; |
3430 | |
3431 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); |
3432 | } |
3433 | |
3434 | static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) |
3435 | { |
3436 | int rc; |
3437 | |
3438 | rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio); |
3439 | if (rc) |
3440 | return rc; |
3441 | |
3442 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); |
3443 | } |
3444 | |
3445 | static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) |
3446 | { |
3447 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED); |
3448 | } |
3449 | |
3450 | static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, |
3451 | struct rlimit *new_rlim) |
3452 | { |
3453 | struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource; |
3454 | |
3455 | /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether |
3456 | lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can |
3457 | later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit |
3458 | upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */ |
3459 | if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max) |
3460 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT); |
3461 | |
3462 | return 0; |
3463 | } |
3464 | |
3465 | static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) |
3466 | { |
3467 | int rc; |
3468 | |
3469 | rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p); |
3470 | if (rc) |
3471 | return rc; |
3472 | |
3473 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); |
3474 | } |
3475 | |
3476 | static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) |
3477 | { |
3478 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED); |
3479 | } |
3480 | |
3481 | static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) |
3482 | { |
3483 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); |
3484 | } |
3485 | |
3486 | static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, |
3487 | int sig, u32 secid) |
3488 | { |
3489 | u32 perm; |
3490 | int rc; |
3491 | |
3492 | if (!sig) |
3493 | perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */ |
3494 | else |
3495 | perm = signal_to_av(sig); |
3496 | if (secid) |
3497 | rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p), |
3498 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); |
3499 | else |
3500 | rc = current_has_perm(p, perm); |
3501 | return rc; |
3502 | } |
3503 | |
3504 | static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) |
3505 | { |
3506 | return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD); |
3507 | } |
3508 | |
3509 | static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, |
3510 | struct inode *inode) |
3511 | { |
3512 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
3513 | u32 sid = task_sid(p); |
3514 | |
3515 | isec->sid = sid; |
3516 | isec->initialized = 1; |
3517 | } |
3518 | |
3519 | /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ |
3520 | static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, |
3521 | struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) |
3522 | { |
3523 | int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL; |
3524 | struct iphdr _iph, *ih; |
3525 | |
3526 | offset = skb_network_offset(skb); |
3527 | ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph); |
3528 | if (ih == NULL) |
3529 | goto out; |
3530 | |
3531 | ihlen = ih->ihl * 4; |
3532 | if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph)) |
3533 | goto out; |
3534 | |
3535 | ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr; |
3536 | ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr; |
3537 | ret = 0; |
3538 | |
3539 | if (proto) |
3540 | *proto = ih->protocol; |
3541 | |
3542 | switch (ih->protocol) { |
3543 | case IPPROTO_TCP: { |
3544 | struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; |
3545 | |
3546 | if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) |
3547 | break; |
3548 | |
3549 | offset += ihlen; |
3550 | th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); |
3551 | if (th == NULL) |
3552 | break; |
3553 | |
3554 | ad->u.net->sport = th->source; |
3555 | ad->u.net->dport = th->dest; |
3556 | break; |
3557 | } |
3558 | |
3559 | case IPPROTO_UDP: { |
3560 | struct udphdr _udph, *uh; |
3561 | |
3562 | if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) |
3563 | break; |
3564 | |
3565 | offset += ihlen; |
3566 | uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); |
3567 | if (uh == NULL) |
3568 | break; |
3569 | |
3570 | ad->u.net->sport = uh->source; |
3571 | ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest; |
3572 | break; |
3573 | } |
3574 | |
3575 | case IPPROTO_DCCP: { |
3576 | struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh; |
3577 | |
3578 | if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) |
3579 | break; |
3580 | |
3581 | offset += ihlen; |
3582 | dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph); |
3583 | if (dh == NULL) |
3584 | break; |
3585 | |
3586 | ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport; |
3587 | ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport; |
3588 | break; |
3589 | } |
3590 | |
3591 | default: |
3592 | break; |
3593 | } |
3594 | out: |
3595 | return ret; |
3596 | } |
3597 | |
3598 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
3599 | |
3600 | /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ |
3601 | static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, |
3602 | struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) |
3603 | { |
3604 | u8 nexthdr; |
3605 | int ret = -EINVAL, offset; |
3606 | struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6; |
3607 | __be16 frag_off; |
3608 | |
3609 | offset = skb_network_offset(skb); |
3610 | ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h); |
3611 | if (ip6 == NULL) |
3612 | goto out; |
3613 | |
3614 | ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr; |
3615 | ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr; |
3616 | ret = 0; |
3617 | |
3618 | nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr; |
3619 | offset += sizeof(_ipv6h); |
3620 | offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off); |
3621 | if (offset < 0) |
3622 | goto out; |
3623 | |
3624 | if (proto) |
3625 | *proto = nexthdr; |
3626 | |
3627 | switch (nexthdr) { |
3628 | case IPPROTO_TCP: { |
3629 | struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; |
3630 | |
3631 | th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); |
3632 | if (th == NULL) |
3633 | break; |
3634 | |
3635 | ad->u.net->sport = th->source; |
3636 | ad->u.net->dport = th->dest; |
3637 | break; |
3638 | } |
3639 | |
3640 | case IPPROTO_UDP: { |
3641 | struct udphdr _udph, *uh; |
3642 | |
3643 | uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); |
3644 | if (uh == NULL) |
3645 | break; |
3646 | |
3647 | ad->u.net->sport = uh->source; |
3648 | ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest; |
3649 | break; |
3650 | } |
3651 | |
3652 | case IPPROTO_DCCP: { |
3653 | struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh; |
3654 | |
3655 | dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph); |
3656 | if (dh == NULL) |
3657 | break; |
3658 | |
3659 | ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport; |
3660 | ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport; |
3661 | break; |
3662 | } |
3663 | |
3664 | /* includes fragments */ |
3665 | default: |
3666 | break; |
3667 | } |
3668 | out: |
3669 | return ret; |
3670 | } |
3671 | |
3672 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
3673 | |
3674 | static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, |
3675 | char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto) |
3676 | { |
3677 | char *addrp; |
3678 | int ret; |
3679 | |
3680 | switch (ad->u.net->family) { |
3681 | case PF_INET: |
3682 | ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto); |
3683 | if (ret) |
3684 | goto parse_error; |
3685 | addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr : |
3686 | &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr); |
3687 | goto okay; |
3688 | |
3689 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
3690 | case PF_INET6: |
3691 | ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto); |
3692 | if (ret) |
3693 | goto parse_error; |
3694 | addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr : |
3695 | &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr); |
3696 | goto okay; |
3697 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
3698 | default: |
3699 | addrp = NULL; |
3700 | goto okay; |
3701 | } |
3702 | |
3703 | parse_error: |
3704 | printk(KERN_WARNING |
3705 | "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb()," |
3706 | " unable to parse packet\n"); |
3707 | return ret; |
3708 | |
3709 | okay: |
3710 | if (_addrp) |
3711 | *_addrp = addrp; |
3712 | return 0; |
3713 | } |
3714 | |
3715 | /** |
3716 | * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet |
3717 | * @skb: the packet |
3718 | * @family: protocol family |
3719 | * @sid: the packet's peer label SID |
3720 | * |
3721 | * Description: |
3722 | * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine |
3723 | * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in |
3724 | * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function |
3725 | * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL) |
3726 | * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different |
3727 | * peer labels. |
3728 | * |
3729 | */ |
3730 | static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid) |
3731 | { |
3732 | int err; |
3733 | u32 xfrm_sid; |
3734 | u32 nlbl_sid; |
3735 | u32 nlbl_type; |
3736 | |
3737 | selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid); |
3738 | selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid); |
3739 | |
3740 | err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid); |
3741 | if (unlikely(err)) { |
3742 | printk(KERN_WARNING |
3743 | "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid()," |
3744 | " unable to determine packet's peer label\n"); |
3745 | return -EACCES; |
3746 | } |
3747 | |
3748 | return 0; |
3749 | } |
3750 | |
3751 | /* socket security operations */ |
3752 | |
3753 | static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, |
3754 | u16 secclass, u32 *socksid) |
3755 | { |
3756 | if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) { |
3757 | *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid; |
3758 | return 0; |
3759 | } |
3760 | |
3761 | return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL, |
3762 | socksid); |
3763 | } |
3764 | |
3765 | static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms) |
3766 | { |
3767 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
3768 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
3769 | struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; |
3770 | u32 tsid = task_sid(task); |
3771 | |
3772 | if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) |
3773 | return 0; |
3774 | |
3775 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; |
3776 | ad.u.net = &net; |
3777 | ad.u.net->sk = sk; |
3778 | |
3779 | return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad); |
3780 | } |
3781 | |
3782 | static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type, |
3783 | int protocol, int kern) |
3784 | { |
3785 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); |
3786 | u32 newsid; |
3787 | u16 secclass; |
3788 | int rc; |
3789 | |
3790 | if (kern) |
3791 | return 0; |
3792 | |
3793 | secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); |
3794 | rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid); |
3795 | if (rc) |
3796 | return rc; |
3797 | |
3798 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); |
3799 | } |
3800 | |
3801 | static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, |
3802 | int type, int protocol, int kern) |
3803 | { |
3804 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); |
3805 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; |
3806 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec; |
3807 | int err = 0; |
3808 | |
3809 | isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); |
3810 | |
3811 | if (kern) |
3812 | isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; |
3813 | else { |
3814 | err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid)); |
3815 | if (err) |
3816 | return err; |
3817 | } |
3818 | |
3819 | isec->initialized = 1; |
3820 | |
3821 | if (sock->sk) { |
3822 | sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; |
3823 | sksec->sid = isec->sid; |
3824 | sksec->sclass = isec->sclass; |
3825 | err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family); |
3826 | } |
3827 | |
3828 | return err; |
3829 | } |
3830 | |
3831 | /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind. |
3832 | Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind |
3833 | permission check between the socket and the port number. */ |
3834 | |
3835 | static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) |
3836 | { |
3837 | struct sock *sk = sock->sk; |
3838 | u16 family; |
3839 | int err; |
3840 | |
3841 | err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND); |
3842 | if (err) |
3843 | goto out; |
3844 | |
3845 | /* |
3846 | * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. |
3847 | * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just |
3848 | * check the first address now. |
3849 | */ |
3850 | family = sk->sk_family; |
3851 | if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) { |
3852 | char *addrp; |
3853 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
3854 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
3855 | struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; |
3856 | struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; |
3857 | struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; |
3858 | unsigned short snum; |
3859 | u32 sid, node_perm; |
3860 | |
3861 | if (family == PF_INET) { |
3862 | addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; |
3863 | snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); |
3864 | addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; |
3865 | } else { |
3866 | addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; |
3867 | snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); |
3868 | addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr; |
3869 | } |
3870 | |
3871 | if (snum) { |
3872 | int low, high; |
3873 | |
3874 | inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high); |
3875 | |
3876 | if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) { |
3877 | err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, |
3878 | snum, &sid); |
3879 | if (err) |
3880 | goto out; |
3881 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; |
3882 | ad.u.net = &net; |
3883 | ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum); |
3884 | ad.u.net->family = family; |
3885 | err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, |
3886 | sksec->sclass, |
3887 | SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad); |
3888 | if (err) |
3889 | goto out; |
3890 | } |
3891 | } |
3892 | |
3893 | switch (sksec->sclass) { |
3894 | case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: |
3895 | node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; |
3896 | break; |
3897 | |
3898 | case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET: |
3899 | node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; |
3900 | break; |
3901 | |
3902 | case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET: |
3903 | node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; |
3904 | break; |
3905 | |
3906 | default: |
3907 | node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; |
3908 | break; |
3909 | } |
3910 | |
3911 | err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid); |
3912 | if (err) |
3913 | goto out; |
3914 | |
3915 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; |
3916 | ad.u.net = &net; |
3917 | ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum); |
3918 | ad.u.net->family = family; |
3919 | |
3920 | if (family == PF_INET) |
3921 | ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; |
3922 | else |
3923 | ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr; |
3924 | |
3925 | err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, |
3926 | sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad); |
3927 | if (err) |
3928 | goto out; |
3929 | } |
3930 | out: |
3931 | return err; |
3932 | } |
3933 | |
3934 | static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) |
3935 | { |
3936 | struct sock *sk = sock->sk; |
3937 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
3938 | int err; |
3939 | |
3940 | err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT); |
3941 | if (err) |
3942 | return err; |
3943 | |
3944 | /* |
3945 | * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port. |
3946 | */ |
3947 | if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET || |
3948 | sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) { |
3949 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
3950 | struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; |
3951 | struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; |
3952 | struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; |
3953 | unsigned short snum; |
3954 | u32 sid, perm; |
3955 | |
3956 | if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) { |
3957 | addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; |
3958 | if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) |
3959 | return -EINVAL; |
3960 | snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); |
3961 | } else { |
3962 | addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; |
3963 | if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) |
3964 | return -EINVAL; |
3965 | snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); |
3966 | } |
3967 | |
3968 | err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid); |
3969 | if (err) |
3970 | goto out; |
3971 | |
3972 | perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ? |
3973 | TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; |
3974 | |
3975 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; |
3976 | ad.u.net = &net; |
3977 | ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum); |
3978 | ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family; |
3979 | err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad); |
3980 | if (err) |
3981 | goto out; |
3982 | } |
3983 | |
3984 | err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address); |
3985 | |
3986 | out: |
3987 | return err; |
3988 | } |
3989 | |
3990 | static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) |
3991 | { |
3992 | return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN); |
3993 | } |
3994 | |
3995 | static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) |
3996 | { |
3997 | int err; |
3998 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
3999 | struct inode_security_struct *newisec; |
4000 | |
4001 | err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT); |
4002 | if (err) |
4003 | return err; |
4004 | |
4005 | newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security; |
4006 | |
4007 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; |
4008 | newisec->sclass = isec->sclass; |
4009 | newisec->sid = isec->sid; |
4010 | newisec->initialized = 1; |
4011 | |
4012 | return 0; |
4013 | } |
4014 | |
4015 | static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, |
4016 | int size) |
4017 | { |
4018 | return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE); |
4019 | } |
4020 | |
4021 | static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, |
4022 | int size, int flags) |
4023 | { |
4024 | return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ); |
4025 | } |
4026 | |
4027 | static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) |
4028 | { |
4029 | return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR); |
4030 | } |
4031 | |
4032 | static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) |
4033 | { |
4034 | return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR); |
4035 | } |
4036 | |
4037 | static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) |
4038 | { |
4039 | int err; |
4040 | |
4041 | err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT); |
4042 | if (err) |
4043 | return err; |
4044 | |
4045 | return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname); |
4046 | } |
4047 | |
4048 | static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, |
4049 | int optname) |
4050 | { |
4051 | return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT); |
4052 | } |
4053 | |
4054 | static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) |
4055 | { |
4056 | return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN); |
4057 | } |
4058 | |
4059 | static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, |
4060 | struct sock *other, |
4061 | struct sock *newsk) |
4062 | { |
4063 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security; |
4064 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security; |
4065 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security; |
4066 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4067 | struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; |
4068 | int err; |
4069 | |
4070 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; |
4071 | ad.u.net = &net; |
4072 | ad.u.net->sk = other; |
4073 | |
4074 | err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid, |
4075 | sksec_other->sclass, |
4076 | UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad); |
4077 | if (err) |
4078 | return err; |
4079 | |
4080 | /* server child socket */ |
4081 | sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid; |
4082 | err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid, |
4083 | &sksec_new->sid); |
4084 | if (err) |
4085 | return err; |
4086 | |
4087 | /* connecting socket */ |
4088 | sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid; |
4089 | |
4090 | return 0; |
4091 | } |
4092 | |
4093 | static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, |
4094 | struct socket *other) |
4095 | { |
4096 | struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; |
4097 | struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security; |
4098 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4099 | struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; |
4100 | |
4101 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; |
4102 | ad.u.net = &net; |
4103 | ad.u.net->sk = other->sk; |
4104 | |
4105 | return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, |
4106 | &ad); |
4107 | } |
4108 | |
4109 | static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family, |
4110 | u32 peer_sid, |
4111 | struct common_audit_data *ad) |
4112 | { |
4113 | int err; |
4114 | u32 if_sid; |
4115 | u32 node_sid; |
4116 | |
4117 | err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid); |
4118 | if (err) |
4119 | return err; |
4120 | err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid, |
4121 | SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad); |
4122 | if (err) |
4123 | return err; |
4124 | |
4125 | err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid); |
4126 | if (err) |
4127 | return err; |
4128 | return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid, |
4129 | SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad); |
4130 | } |
4131 | |
4132 | static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, |
4133 | u16 family) |
4134 | { |
4135 | int err = 0; |
4136 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4137 | u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; |
4138 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4139 | struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; |
4140 | char *addrp; |
4141 | |
4142 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; |
4143 | ad.u.net = &net; |
4144 | ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; |
4145 | ad.u.net->family = family; |
4146 | err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); |
4147 | if (err) |
4148 | return err; |
4149 | |
4150 | if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) { |
4151 | err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, |
4152 | PACKET__RECV, &ad); |
4153 | if (err) |
4154 | return err; |
4155 | } |
4156 | |
4157 | err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad); |
4158 | if (err) |
4159 | return err; |
4160 | err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad); |
4161 | |
4162 | return err; |
4163 | } |
4164 | |
4165 | static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) |
4166 | { |
4167 | int err; |
4168 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4169 | u16 family = sk->sk_family; |
4170 | u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; |
4171 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4172 | struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; |
4173 | char *addrp; |
4174 | u8 secmark_active; |
4175 | u8 peerlbl_active; |
4176 | |
4177 | if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6) |
4178 | return 0; |
4179 | |
4180 | /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ |
4181 | if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) |
4182 | family = PF_INET; |
4183 | |
4184 | /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing |
4185 | * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the |
4186 | * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function |
4187 | * as fast and as clean as possible. */ |
4188 | if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer) |
4189 | return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family); |
4190 | |
4191 | secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); |
4192 | peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled(); |
4193 | if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) |
4194 | return 0; |
4195 | |
4196 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; |
4197 | ad.u.net = &net; |
4198 | ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; |
4199 | ad.u.net->family = family; |
4200 | err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); |
4201 | if (err) |
4202 | return err; |
4203 | |
4204 | if (peerlbl_active) { |
4205 | u32 peer_sid; |
4206 | |
4207 | err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid); |
4208 | if (err) |
4209 | return err; |
4210 | err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family, |
4211 | peer_sid, &ad); |
4212 | if (err) { |
4213 | selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0); |
4214 | return err; |
4215 | } |
4216 | err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER, |
4217 | PEER__RECV, &ad); |
4218 | if (err) |
4219 | selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0); |
4220 | } |
4221 | |
4222 | if (secmark_active) { |
4223 | err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, |
4224 | PACKET__RECV, &ad); |
4225 | if (err) |
4226 | return err; |
4227 | } |
4228 | |
4229 | return err; |
4230 | } |
4231 | |
4232 | static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, |
4233 | int __user *optlen, unsigned len) |
4234 | { |
4235 | int err = 0; |
4236 | char *scontext; |
4237 | u32 scontext_len; |
4238 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; |
4239 | u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL; |
4240 | |
4241 | if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET || |
4242 | sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) |
4243 | peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid; |
4244 | if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) |
4245 | return -ENOPROTOOPT; |
4246 | |
4247 | err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len); |
4248 | if (err) |
4249 | return err; |
4250 | |
4251 | if (scontext_len > len) { |
4252 | err = -ERANGE; |
4253 | goto out_len; |
4254 | } |
4255 | |
4256 | if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len)) |
4257 | err = -EFAULT; |
4258 | |
4259 | out_len: |
4260 | if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen)) |
4261 | err = -EFAULT; |
4262 | kfree(scontext); |
4263 | return err; |
4264 | } |
4265 | |
4266 | static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) |
4267 | { |
4268 | u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL; |
4269 | u16 family; |
4270 | |
4271 | if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) |
4272 | family = PF_INET; |
4273 | else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) |
4274 | family = PF_INET6; |
4275 | else if (sock) |
4276 | family = sock->sk->sk_family; |
4277 | else |
4278 | goto out; |
4279 | |
4280 | if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) |
4281 | selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid); |
4282 | else if (skb) |
4283 | selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid); |
4284 | |
4285 | out: |
4286 | *secid = peer_secid; |
4287 | if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL) |
4288 | return -EINVAL; |
4289 | return 0; |
4290 | } |
4291 | |
4292 | static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) |
4293 | { |
4294 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec; |
4295 | |
4296 | sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority); |
4297 | if (!sksec) |
4298 | return -ENOMEM; |
4299 | |
4300 | sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
4301 | sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
4302 | selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec); |
4303 | sk->sk_security = sksec; |
4304 | |
4305 | return 0; |
4306 | } |
4307 | |
4308 | static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) |
4309 | { |
4310 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4311 | |
4312 | sk->sk_security = NULL; |
4313 | selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec); |
4314 | kfree(sksec); |
4315 | } |
4316 | |
4317 | static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) |
4318 | { |
4319 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4320 | struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; |
4321 | |
4322 | newsksec->sid = sksec->sid; |
4323 | newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid; |
4324 | newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass; |
4325 | |
4326 | selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec); |
4327 | } |
4328 | |
4329 | static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid) |
4330 | { |
4331 | if (!sk) |
4332 | *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET; |
4333 | else { |
4334 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4335 | |
4336 | *secid = sksec->sid; |
4337 | } |
4338 | } |
4339 | |
4340 | static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) |
4341 | { |
4342 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security; |
4343 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4344 | |
4345 | if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 || |
4346 | sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) |
4347 | isec->sid = sksec->sid; |
4348 | sksec->sclass = isec->sclass; |
4349 | } |
4350 | |
4351 | static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, |
4352 | struct request_sock *req) |
4353 | { |
4354 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4355 | int err; |
4356 | u16 family = sk->sk_family; |
4357 | u32 newsid; |
4358 | u32 peersid; |
4359 | |
4360 | /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ |
4361 | if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) |
4362 | family = PF_INET; |
4363 | |
4364 | err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid); |
4365 | if (err) |
4366 | return err; |
4367 | if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) { |
4368 | req->secid = sksec->sid; |
4369 | req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL; |
4370 | } else { |
4371 | err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid); |
4372 | if (err) |
4373 | return err; |
4374 | req->secid = newsid; |
4375 | req->peer_secid = peersid; |
4376 | } |
4377 | |
4378 | return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family); |
4379 | } |
4380 | |
4381 | static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, |
4382 | const struct request_sock *req) |
4383 | { |
4384 | struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; |
4385 | |
4386 | newsksec->sid = req->secid; |
4387 | newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid; |
4388 | /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the |
4389 | new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet. |
4390 | So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which |
4391 | time it will have been created and available. */ |
4392 | |
4393 | /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only |
4394 | * thread with access to newsksec */ |
4395 | selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family); |
4396 | } |
4397 | |
4398 | static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) |
4399 | { |
4400 | u16 family = sk->sk_family; |
4401 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4402 | |
4403 | /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ |
4404 | if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) |
4405 | family = PF_INET; |
4406 | |
4407 | selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid); |
4408 | } |
4409 | |
4410 | static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid) |
4411 | { |
4412 | const struct task_security_struct *__tsec; |
4413 | u32 tsid; |
4414 | |
4415 | __tsec = current_security(); |
4416 | tsid = __tsec->sid; |
4417 | |
4418 | return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL); |
4419 | } |
4420 | |
4421 | static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void) |
4422 | { |
4423 | atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount); |
4424 | } |
4425 | |
4426 | static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void) |
4427 | { |
4428 | atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount); |
4429 | } |
4430 | |
4431 | static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, |
4432 | struct flowi *fl) |
4433 | { |
4434 | fl->flowi_secid = req->secid; |
4435 | } |
4436 | |
4437 | static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void) |
4438 | { |
4439 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
4440 | |
4441 | /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket |
4442 | * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense, |
4443 | * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and |
4444 | * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple |
4445 | * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to |
4446 | * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */ |
4447 | |
4448 | return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE, |
4449 | NULL); |
4450 | } |
4451 | |
4452 | static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk) |
4453 | { |
4454 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4455 | |
4456 | /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it |
4457 | * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply |
4458 | * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled |
4459 | * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly |
4460 | * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling |
4461 | * protocols were being used */ |
4462 | |
4463 | /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use |
4464 | * the sockcreate SID here */ |
4465 | |
4466 | sksec->sid = current_sid(); |
4467 | sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET; |
4468 | } |
4469 | |
4470 | static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk) |
4471 | { |
4472 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4473 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
4474 | int err; |
4475 | |
4476 | err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, |
4477 | TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL); |
4478 | if (err) |
4479 | return err; |
4480 | err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, |
4481 | TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL); |
4482 | if (err) |
4483 | return err; |
4484 | |
4485 | sksec->sid = sid; |
4486 | |
4487 | return 0; |
4488 | } |
4489 | |
4490 | static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) |
4491 | { |
4492 | int err = 0; |
4493 | u32 perm; |
4494 | struct nlmsghdr *nlh; |
4495 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4496 | |
4497 | if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) { |
4498 | err = -EINVAL; |
4499 | goto out; |
4500 | } |
4501 | nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb); |
4502 | |
4503 | err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm); |
4504 | if (err) { |
4505 | if (err == -EINVAL) { |
4506 | audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, |
4507 | "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message" |
4508 | " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n", |
4509 | nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass); |
4510 | if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown()) |
4511 | err = 0; |
4512 | } |
4513 | |
4514 | /* Ignore */ |
4515 | if (err == -ENOENT) |
4516 | err = 0; |
4517 | goto out; |
4518 | } |
4519 | |
4520 | err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm); |
4521 | out: |
4522 | return err; |
4523 | } |
4524 | |
4525 | #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER |
4526 | |
4527 | static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, |
4528 | u16 family) |
4529 | { |
4530 | int err; |
4531 | char *addrp; |
4532 | u32 peer_sid; |
4533 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4534 | struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; |
4535 | u8 secmark_active; |
4536 | u8 netlbl_active; |
4537 | u8 peerlbl_active; |
4538 | |
4539 | if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer) |
4540 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4541 | |
4542 | secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); |
4543 | netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled(); |
4544 | peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled(); |
4545 | if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) |
4546 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4547 | |
4548 | if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0) |
4549 | return NF_DROP; |
4550 | |
4551 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; |
4552 | ad.u.net = &net; |
4553 | ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; |
4554 | ad.u.net->family = family; |
4555 | if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0) |
4556 | return NF_DROP; |
4557 | |
4558 | if (peerlbl_active) { |
4559 | err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family, |
4560 | peer_sid, &ad); |
4561 | if (err) { |
4562 | selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1); |
4563 | return NF_DROP; |
4564 | } |
4565 | } |
4566 | |
4567 | if (secmark_active) |
4568 | if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark, |
4569 | SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad)) |
4570 | return NF_DROP; |
4571 | |
4572 | if (netlbl_active) |
4573 | /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING |
4574 | * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary |
4575 | * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH |
4576 | * protection */ |
4577 | if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0) |
4578 | return NF_DROP; |
4579 | |
4580 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4581 | } |
4582 | |
4583 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum, |
4584 | struct sk_buff *skb, |
4585 | const struct net_device *in, |
4586 | const struct net_device *out, |
4587 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) |
4588 | { |
4589 | return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET); |
4590 | } |
4591 | |
4592 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
4593 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum, |
4594 | struct sk_buff *skb, |
4595 | const struct net_device *in, |
4596 | const struct net_device *out, |
4597 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) |
4598 | { |
4599 | return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6); |
4600 | } |
4601 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
4602 | |
4603 | static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb, |
4604 | u16 family) |
4605 | { |
4606 | u32 sid; |
4607 | |
4608 | if (!netlbl_enabled()) |
4609 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4610 | |
4611 | /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path |
4612 | * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling |
4613 | * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */ |
4614 | if (skb->sk) { |
4615 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security; |
4616 | sid = sksec->sid; |
4617 | } else |
4618 | sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; |
4619 | if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0) |
4620 | return NF_DROP; |
4621 | |
4622 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4623 | } |
4624 | |
4625 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum, |
4626 | struct sk_buff *skb, |
4627 | const struct net_device *in, |
4628 | const struct net_device *out, |
4629 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) |
4630 | { |
4631 | return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET); |
4632 | } |
4633 | |
4634 | static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, |
4635 | int ifindex, |
4636 | u16 family) |
4637 | { |
4638 | struct sock *sk = skb->sk; |
4639 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec; |
4640 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4641 | struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; |
4642 | char *addrp; |
4643 | u8 proto; |
4644 | |
4645 | if (sk == NULL) |
4646 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4647 | sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4648 | |
4649 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; |
4650 | ad.u.net = &net; |
4651 | ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; |
4652 | ad.u.net->family = family; |
4653 | if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto)) |
4654 | return NF_DROP; |
4655 | |
4656 | if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) |
4657 | if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, |
4658 | SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad)) |
4659 | return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); |
4660 | |
4661 | if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto)) |
4662 | return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); |
4663 | |
4664 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4665 | } |
4666 | |
4667 | static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, |
4668 | u16 family) |
4669 | { |
4670 | u32 secmark_perm; |
4671 | u32 peer_sid; |
4672 | struct sock *sk; |
4673 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4674 | struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; |
4675 | char *addrp; |
4676 | u8 secmark_active; |
4677 | u8 peerlbl_active; |
4678 | |
4679 | /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing |
4680 | * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the |
4681 | * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function |
4682 | * as fast and as clean as possible. */ |
4683 | if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer) |
4684 | return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family); |
4685 | #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM |
4686 | /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec |
4687 | * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks |
4688 | * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks |
4689 | * when the packet is on it's final way out. |
4690 | * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst |
4691 | * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */ |
4692 | if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL) |
4693 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4694 | #endif |
4695 | secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); |
4696 | peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled(); |
4697 | if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) |
4698 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4699 | |
4700 | /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the |
4701 | * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local |
4702 | * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label |
4703 | * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */ |
4704 | sk = skb->sk; |
4705 | if (sk == NULL) { |
4706 | if (skb->skb_iif) { |
4707 | secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT; |
4708 | if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid)) |
4709 | return NF_DROP; |
4710 | } else { |
4711 | secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; |
4712 | peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; |
4713 | } |
4714 | } else { |
4715 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4716 | peer_sid = sksec->sid; |
4717 | secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; |
4718 | } |
4719 | |
4720 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; |
4721 | ad.u.net = &net; |
4722 | ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; |
4723 | ad.u.net->family = family; |
4724 | if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL)) |
4725 | return NF_DROP; |
4726 | |
4727 | if (secmark_active) |
4728 | if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark, |
4729 | SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad)) |
4730 | return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); |
4731 | |
4732 | if (peerlbl_active) { |
4733 | u32 if_sid; |
4734 | u32 node_sid; |
4735 | |
4736 | if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid)) |
4737 | return NF_DROP; |
4738 | if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid, |
4739 | SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad)) |
4740 | return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); |
4741 | |
4742 | if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid)) |
4743 | return NF_DROP; |
4744 | if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid, |
4745 | SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad)) |
4746 | return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); |
4747 | } |
4748 | |
4749 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4750 | } |
4751 | |
4752 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum, |
4753 | struct sk_buff *skb, |
4754 | const struct net_device *in, |
4755 | const struct net_device *out, |
4756 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) |
4757 | { |
4758 | return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET); |
4759 | } |
4760 | |
4761 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
4762 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum, |
4763 | struct sk_buff *skb, |
4764 | const struct net_device *in, |
4765 | const struct net_device *out, |
4766 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) |
4767 | { |
4768 | return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6); |
4769 | } |
4770 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
4771 | |
4772 | #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ |
4773 | |
4774 | static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) |
4775 | { |
4776 | int err; |
4777 | |
4778 | err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb); |
4779 | if (err) |
4780 | return err; |
4781 | |
4782 | return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb); |
4783 | } |
4784 | |
4785 | static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task, |
4786 | struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, |
4787 | u16 sclass) |
4788 | { |
4789 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
4790 | u32 sid; |
4791 | |
4792 | isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
4793 | if (!isec) |
4794 | return -ENOMEM; |
4795 | |
4796 | sid = task_sid(task); |
4797 | isec->sclass = sclass; |
4798 | isec->sid = sid; |
4799 | perm->security = isec; |
4800 | |
4801 | return 0; |
4802 | } |
4803 | |
4804 | static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm) |
4805 | { |
4806 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security; |
4807 | perm->security = NULL; |
4808 | kfree(isec); |
4809 | } |
4810 | |
4811 | static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) |
4812 | { |
4813 | struct msg_security_struct *msec; |
4814 | |
4815 | msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
4816 | if (!msec) |
4817 | return -ENOMEM; |
4818 | |
4819 | msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
4820 | msg->security = msec; |
4821 | |
4822 | return 0; |
4823 | } |
4824 | |
4825 | static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg) |
4826 | { |
4827 | struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security; |
4828 | |
4829 | msg->security = NULL; |
4830 | kfree(msec); |
4831 | } |
4832 | |
4833 | static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms, |
4834 | u32 perms) |
4835 | { |
4836 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
4837 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4838 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
4839 | |
4840 | isec = ipc_perms->security; |
4841 | |
4842 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; |
4843 | ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key; |
4844 | |
4845 | return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad); |
4846 | } |
4847 | |
4848 | static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) |
4849 | { |
4850 | return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg); |
4851 | } |
4852 | |
4853 | static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg) |
4854 | { |
4855 | msg_msg_free_security(msg); |
4856 | } |
4857 | |
4858 | /* message queue security operations */ |
4859 | static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq) |
4860 | { |
4861 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
4862 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4863 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
4864 | int rc; |
4865 | |
4866 | rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ); |
4867 | if (rc) |
4868 | return rc; |
4869 | |
4870 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; |
4871 | |
4872 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; |
4873 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; |
4874 | |
4875 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, |
4876 | MSGQ__CREATE, &ad); |
4877 | if (rc) { |
4878 | ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm); |
4879 | return rc; |
4880 | } |
4881 | return 0; |
4882 | } |
4883 | |
4884 | static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq) |
4885 | { |
4886 | ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm); |
4887 | } |
4888 | |
4889 | static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg) |
4890 | { |
4891 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
4892 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4893 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
4894 | |
4895 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; |
4896 | |
4897 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; |
4898 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; |
4899 | |
4900 | return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, |
4901 | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad); |
4902 | } |
4903 | |
4904 | static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd) |
4905 | { |
4906 | int err; |
4907 | int perms; |
4908 | |
4909 | switch (cmd) { |
4910 | case IPC_INFO: |
4911 | case MSG_INFO: |
4912 | /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ |
4913 | return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO); |
4914 | case IPC_STAT: |
4915 | case MSG_STAT: |
4916 | perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE; |
4917 | break; |
4918 | case IPC_SET: |
4919 | perms = MSGQ__SETATTR; |
4920 | break; |
4921 | case IPC_RMID: |
4922 | perms = MSGQ__DESTROY; |
4923 | break; |
4924 | default: |
4925 | return 0; |
4926 | } |
4927 | |
4928 | err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms); |
4929 | return err; |
4930 | } |
4931 | |
4932 | static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) |
4933 | { |
4934 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
4935 | struct msg_security_struct *msec; |
4936 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4937 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
4938 | int rc; |
4939 | |
4940 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; |
4941 | msec = msg->security; |
4942 | |
4943 | /* |
4944 | * First time through, need to assign label to the message |
4945 | */ |
4946 | if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) { |
4947 | /* |
4948 | * Compute new sid based on current process and |
4949 | * message queue this message will be stored in |
4950 | */ |
4951 | rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, |
4952 | NULL, &msec->sid); |
4953 | if (rc) |
4954 | return rc; |
4955 | } |
4956 | |
4957 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; |
4958 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; |
4959 | |
4960 | /* Can this process write to the queue? */ |
4961 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, |
4962 | MSGQ__WRITE, &ad); |
4963 | if (!rc) |
4964 | /* Can this process send the message */ |
4965 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, |
4966 | MSG__SEND, &ad); |
4967 | if (!rc) |
4968 | /* Can the message be put in the queue? */ |
4969 | rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, |
4970 | MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad); |
4971 | |
4972 | return rc; |
4973 | } |
4974 | |
4975 | static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, |
4976 | struct task_struct *target, |
4977 | long type, int mode) |
4978 | { |
4979 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
4980 | struct msg_security_struct *msec; |
4981 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4982 | u32 sid = task_sid(target); |
4983 | int rc; |
4984 | |
4985 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; |
4986 | msec = msg->security; |
4987 | |
4988 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; |
4989 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; |
4990 | |
4991 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, |
4992 | SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad); |
4993 | if (!rc) |
4994 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, |
4995 | SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad); |
4996 | return rc; |
4997 | } |
4998 | |
4999 | /* Shared Memory security operations */ |
5000 | static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) |
5001 | { |
5002 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
5003 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
5004 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
5005 | int rc; |
5006 | |
5007 | rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM); |
5008 | if (rc) |
5009 | return rc; |
5010 | |
5011 | isec = shp->shm_perm.security; |
5012 | |
5013 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; |
5014 | ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key; |
5015 | |
5016 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, |
5017 | SHM__CREATE, &ad); |
5018 | if (rc) { |
5019 | ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm); |
5020 | return rc; |
5021 | } |
5022 | return 0; |
5023 | } |
5024 | |
5025 | static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) |
5026 | { |
5027 | ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm); |
5028 | } |
5029 | |
5030 | static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg) |
5031 | { |
5032 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
5033 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
5034 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
5035 | |
5036 | isec = shp->shm_perm.security; |
5037 | |
5038 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; |
5039 | ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key; |
5040 | |
5041 | return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, |
5042 | SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); |
5043 | } |
5044 | |
5045 | /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */ |
5046 | static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd) |
5047 | { |
5048 | int perms; |
5049 | int err; |
5050 | |
5051 | switch (cmd) { |
5052 | case IPC_INFO: |
5053 | case SHM_INFO: |
5054 | /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ |
5055 | return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO); |
5056 | case IPC_STAT: |
5057 | case SHM_STAT: |
5058 | perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE; |
5059 | break; |
5060 | case IPC_SET: |
5061 | perms = SHM__SETATTR; |
5062 | break; |
5063 | case SHM_LOCK: |
5064 | case SHM_UNLOCK: |
5065 | perms = SHM__LOCK; |
5066 | break; |
5067 | case IPC_RMID: |
5068 | perms = SHM__DESTROY; |
5069 | break; |
5070 | default: |
5071 | return 0; |
5072 | } |
5073 | |
5074 | err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms); |
5075 | return err; |
5076 | } |
5077 | |
5078 | static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, |
5079 | char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) |
5080 | { |
5081 | u32 perms; |
5082 | |
5083 | if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY) |
5084 | perms = SHM__READ; |
5085 | else |
5086 | perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE; |
5087 | |
5088 | return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms); |
5089 | } |
5090 | |
5091 | /* Semaphore security operations */ |
5092 | static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma) |
5093 | { |
5094 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
5095 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
5096 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
5097 | int rc; |
5098 | |
5099 | rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM); |
5100 | if (rc) |
5101 | return rc; |
5102 | |
5103 | isec = sma->sem_perm.security; |
5104 | |
5105 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; |
5106 | ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key; |
5107 | |
5108 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, |
5109 | SEM__CREATE, &ad); |
5110 | if (rc) { |
5111 | ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm); |
5112 | return rc; |
5113 | } |
5114 | return 0; |
5115 | } |
5116 | |
5117 | static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma) |
5118 | { |
5119 | ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm); |
5120 | } |
5121 | |
5122 | static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg) |
5123 | { |
5124 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
5125 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
5126 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
5127 | |
5128 | isec = sma->sem_perm.security; |
5129 | |
5130 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; |
5131 | ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key; |
5132 | |
5133 | return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, |
5134 | SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); |
5135 | } |
5136 | |
5137 | /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */ |
5138 | static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd) |
5139 | { |
5140 | int err; |
5141 | u32 perms; |
5142 | |
5143 | switch (cmd) { |
5144 | case IPC_INFO: |
5145 | case SEM_INFO: |
5146 | /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ |
5147 | return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO); |
5148 | case GETPID: |
5149 | case GETNCNT: |
5150 | case GETZCNT: |
5151 | perms = SEM__GETATTR; |
5152 | break; |
5153 | case GETVAL: |
5154 | case GETALL: |
5155 | perms = SEM__READ; |
5156 | break; |
5157 | case SETVAL: |
5158 | case SETALL: |
5159 | perms = SEM__WRITE; |
5160 | break; |
5161 | case IPC_RMID: |
5162 | perms = SEM__DESTROY; |
5163 | break; |
5164 | case IPC_SET: |
5165 | perms = SEM__SETATTR; |
5166 | break; |
5167 | case IPC_STAT: |
5168 | case SEM_STAT: |
5169 | perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE; |
5170 | break; |
5171 | default: |
5172 | return 0; |
5173 | } |
5174 | |
5175 | err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms); |
5176 | return err; |
5177 | } |
5178 | |
5179 | static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, |
5180 | struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter) |
5181 | { |
5182 | u32 perms; |
5183 | |
5184 | if (alter) |
5185 | perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE; |
5186 | else |
5187 | perms = SEM__READ; |
5188 | |
5189 | return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms); |
5190 | } |
5191 | |
5192 | static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) |
5193 | { |
5194 | u32 av = 0; |
5195 | |
5196 | av = 0; |
5197 | if (flag & S_IRUGO) |
5198 | av |= IPC__UNIX_READ; |
5199 | if (flag & S_IWUGO) |
5200 | av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE; |
5201 | |
5202 | if (av == 0) |
5203 | return 0; |
5204 | |
5205 | return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av); |
5206 | } |
5207 | |
5208 | static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) |
5209 | { |
5210 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security; |
5211 | *secid = isec->sid; |
5212 | } |
5213 | |
5214 | static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) |
5215 | { |
5216 | if (inode) |
5217 | inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry); |
5218 | } |
5219 | |
5220 | static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, |
5221 | char *name, char **value) |
5222 | { |
5223 | const struct task_security_struct *__tsec; |
5224 | u32 sid; |
5225 | int error; |
5226 | unsigned len; |
5227 | |
5228 | if (current != p) { |
5229 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR); |
5230 | if (error) |
5231 | return error; |
5232 | } |
5233 | |
5234 | rcu_read_lock(); |
5235 | __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security; |
5236 | |
5237 | if (!strcmp(name, "current")) |
5238 | sid = __tsec->sid; |
5239 | else if (!strcmp(name, "prev")) |
5240 | sid = __tsec->osid; |
5241 | else if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) |
5242 | sid = __tsec->exec_sid; |
5243 | else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) |
5244 | sid = __tsec->create_sid; |
5245 | else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) |
5246 | sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid; |
5247 | else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) |
5248 | sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid; |
5249 | else |
5250 | goto invalid; |
5251 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
5252 | |
5253 | if (!sid) |
5254 | return 0; |
5255 | |
5256 | error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len); |
5257 | if (error) |
5258 | return error; |
5259 | return len; |
5260 | |
5261 | invalid: |
5262 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
5263 | return -EINVAL; |
5264 | } |
5265 | |
5266 | static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, |
5267 | char *name, void *value, size_t size) |
5268 | { |
5269 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
5270 | struct task_struct *tracer; |
5271 | struct cred *new; |
5272 | u32 sid = 0, ptsid; |
5273 | int error; |
5274 | char *str = value; |
5275 | |
5276 | if (current != p) { |
5277 | /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own |
5278 | security attributes. */ |
5279 | return -EACCES; |
5280 | } |
5281 | |
5282 | /* |
5283 | * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all. |
5284 | * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the |
5285 | * above restriction is ever removed. |
5286 | */ |
5287 | if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) |
5288 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC); |
5289 | else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) |
5290 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE); |
5291 | else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) |
5292 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE); |
5293 | else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) |
5294 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE); |
5295 | else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) |
5296 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT); |
5297 | else |
5298 | error = -EINVAL; |
5299 | if (error) |
5300 | return error; |
5301 | |
5302 | /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */ |
5303 | if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') { |
5304 | if (str[size-1] == '\n') { |
5305 | str[size-1] = 0; |
5306 | size--; |
5307 | } |
5308 | error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid); |
5309 | if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { |
5310 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { |
5311 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
5312 | size_t audit_size; |
5313 | |
5314 | /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the |
5315 | * context contains a nul and we should audit that */ |
5316 | if (str[size - 1] == '\0') |
5317 | audit_size = size - 1; |
5318 | else |
5319 | audit_size = size; |
5320 | ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR); |
5321 | audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context="); |
5322 | audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size); |
5323 | audit_log_end(ab); |
5324 | |
5325 | return error; |
5326 | } |
5327 | error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, |
5328 | &sid); |
5329 | } |
5330 | if (error) |
5331 | return error; |
5332 | } |
5333 | |
5334 | new = prepare_creds(); |
5335 | if (!new) |
5336 | return -ENOMEM; |
5337 | |
5338 | /* Permission checking based on the specified context is |
5339 | performed during the actual operation (execve, |
5340 | open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the |
5341 | operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve |
5342 | checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The |
5343 | operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */ |
5344 | tsec = new->security; |
5345 | if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) { |
5346 | tsec->exec_sid = sid; |
5347 | } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { |
5348 | tsec->create_sid = sid; |
5349 | } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) { |
5350 | error = may_create_key(sid, p); |
5351 | if (error) |
5352 | goto abort_change; |
5353 | tsec->keycreate_sid = sid; |
5354 | } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) { |
5355 | tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid; |
5356 | } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) { |
5357 | error = -EINVAL; |
5358 | if (sid == 0) |
5359 | goto abort_change; |
5360 | |
5361 | /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */ |
5362 | error = -EPERM; |
5363 | if (!current_is_single_threaded()) { |
5364 | error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid); |
5365 | if (error) |
5366 | goto abort_change; |
5367 | } |
5368 | |
5369 | /* Check permissions for the transition. */ |
5370 | error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, |
5371 | PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL); |
5372 | if (error) |
5373 | goto abort_change; |
5374 | |
5375 | /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok. |
5376 | Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */ |
5377 | ptsid = 0; |
5378 | task_lock(p); |
5379 | tracer = ptrace_parent(p); |
5380 | if (tracer) |
5381 | ptsid = task_sid(tracer); |
5382 | task_unlock(p); |
5383 | |
5384 | if (tracer) { |
5385 | error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, |
5386 | PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); |
5387 | if (error) |
5388 | goto abort_change; |
5389 | } |
5390 | |
5391 | tsec->sid = sid; |
5392 | } else { |
5393 | error = -EINVAL; |
5394 | goto abort_change; |
5395 | } |
5396 | |
5397 | commit_creds(new); |
5398 | return size; |
5399 | |
5400 | abort_change: |
5401 | abort_creds(new); |
5402 | return error; |
5403 | } |
5404 | |
5405 | static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) |
5406 | { |
5407 | return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen); |
5408 | } |
5409 | |
5410 | static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) |
5411 | { |
5412 | return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid); |
5413 | } |
5414 | |
5415 | static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) |
5416 | { |
5417 | kfree(secdata); |
5418 | } |
5419 | |
5420 | /* |
5421 | * called with inode->i_mutex locked |
5422 | */ |
5423 | static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) |
5424 | { |
5425 | return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0); |
5426 | } |
5427 | |
5428 | /* |
5429 | * called with inode->i_mutex locked |
5430 | */ |
5431 | static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) |
5432 | { |
5433 | return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0); |
5434 | } |
5435 | |
5436 | static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) |
5437 | { |
5438 | int len = 0; |
5439 | len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, |
5440 | ctx, true); |
5441 | if (len < 0) |
5442 | return len; |
5443 | *ctxlen = len; |
5444 | return 0; |
5445 | } |
5446 | #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS |
5447 | |
5448 | static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred, |
5449 | unsigned long flags) |
5450 | { |
5451 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
5452 | struct key_security_struct *ksec; |
5453 | |
5454 | ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
5455 | if (!ksec) |
5456 | return -ENOMEM; |
5457 | |
5458 | tsec = cred->security; |
5459 | if (tsec->keycreate_sid) |
5460 | ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid; |
5461 | else |
5462 | ksec->sid = tsec->sid; |
5463 | |
5464 | k->security = ksec; |
5465 | return 0; |
5466 | } |
5467 | |
5468 | static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k) |
5469 | { |
5470 | struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security; |
5471 | |
5472 | k->security = NULL; |
5473 | kfree(ksec); |
5474 | } |
5475 | |
5476 | static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, |
5477 | const struct cred *cred, |
5478 | key_perm_t perm) |
5479 | { |
5480 | struct key *key; |
5481 | struct key_security_struct *ksec; |
5482 | u32 sid; |
5483 | |
5484 | /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the |
5485 | permission check. No serious, additional covert channels |
5486 | appear to be created. */ |
5487 | if (perm == 0) |
5488 | return 0; |
5489 | |
5490 | sid = cred_sid(cred); |
5491 | |
5492 | key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); |
5493 | ksec = key->security; |
5494 | |
5495 | return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL); |
5496 | } |
5497 | |
5498 | static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) |
5499 | { |
5500 | struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security; |
5501 | char *context = NULL; |
5502 | unsigned len; |
5503 | int rc; |
5504 | |
5505 | rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len); |
5506 | if (!rc) |
5507 | rc = len; |
5508 | *_buffer = context; |
5509 | return rc; |
5510 | } |
5511 | |
5512 | #endif |
5513 | |
5514 | static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { |
5515 | .name = "selinux", |
5516 | |
5517 | .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check, |
5518 | .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme, |
5519 | .capget = selinux_capget, |
5520 | .capset = selinux_capset, |
5521 | .capable = selinux_capable, |
5522 | .quotactl = selinux_quotactl, |
5523 | .quota_on = selinux_quota_on, |
5524 | .syslog = selinux_syslog, |
5525 | .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory, |
5526 | |
5527 | .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send, |
5528 | |
5529 | .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds, |
5530 | .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds, |
5531 | .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds, |
5532 | .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec, |
5533 | |
5534 | .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security, |
5535 | .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security, |
5536 | .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data, |
5537 | .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount, |
5538 | .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount, |
5539 | .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options, |
5540 | .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs, |
5541 | .sb_mount = selinux_mount, |
5542 | .sb_umount = selinux_umount, |
5543 | .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts, |
5544 | .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts, |
5545 | .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str, |
5546 | |
5547 | |
5548 | .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security, |
5549 | .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security, |
5550 | .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security, |
5551 | .inode_create = selinux_inode_create, |
5552 | .inode_link = selinux_inode_link, |
5553 | .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink, |
5554 | .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink, |
5555 | .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir, |
5556 | .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir, |
5557 | .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod, |
5558 | .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename, |
5559 | .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink, |
5560 | .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link, |
5561 | .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission, |
5562 | .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr, |
5563 | .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr, |
5564 | .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr, |
5565 | .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr, |
5566 | .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr, |
5567 | .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr, |
5568 | .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr, |
5569 | .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity, |
5570 | .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity, |
5571 | .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity, |
5572 | .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid, |
5573 | |
5574 | .file_permission = selinux_file_permission, |
5575 | .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security, |
5576 | .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security, |
5577 | .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl, |
5578 | .mmap_file = selinux_mmap_file, |
5579 | .mmap_addr = selinux_mmap_addr, |
5580 | .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect, |
5581 | .file_lock = selinux_file_lock, |
5582 | .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl, |
5583 | .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner, |
5584 | .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask, |
5585 | .file_receive = selinux_file_receive, |
5586 | |
5587 | .file_open = selinux_file_open, |
5588 | |
5589 | .task_create = selinux_task_create, |
5590 | .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank, |
5591 | .cred_free = selinux_cred_free, |
5592 | .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare, |
5593 | .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer, |
5594 | .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as, |
5595 | .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as, |
5596 | .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request, |
5597 | .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid, |
5598 | .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid, |
5599 | .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid, |
5600 | .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid, |
5601 | .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice, |
5602 | .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio, |
5603 | .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio, |
5604 | .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit, |
5605 | .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler, |
5606 | .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler, |
5607 | .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory, |
5608 | .task_kill = selinux_task_kill, |
5609 | .task_wait = selinux_task_wait, |
5610 | .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode, |
5611 | |
5612 | .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission, |
5613 | .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid, |
5614 | |
5615 | .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security, |
5616 | .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security, |
5617 | |
5618 | .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security, |
5619 | .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security, |
5620 | .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate, |
5621 | .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl, |
5622 | .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd, |
5623 | .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv, |
5624 | |
5625 | .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security, |
5626 | .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security, |
5627 | .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate, |
5628 | .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl, |
5629 | .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat, |
5630 | |
5631 | .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security, |
5632 | .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security, |
5633 | .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate, |
5634 | .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl, |
5635 | .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop, |
5636 | |
5637 | .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate, |
5638 | |
5639 | .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr, |
5640 | .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr, |
5641 | |
5642 | .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx, |
5643 | .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid, |
5644 | .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx, |
5645 | .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx, |
5646 | .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx, |
5647 | .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx, |
5648 | |
5649 | .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect, |
5650 | .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send, |
5651 | |
5652 | .socket_create = selinux_socket_create, |
5653 | .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create, |
5654 | .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind, |
5655 | .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect, |
5656 | .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen, |
5657 | .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept, |
5658 | .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg, |
5659 | .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg, |
5660 | .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname, |
5661 | .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername, |
5662 | .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt, |
5663 | .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt, |
5664 | .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown, |
5665 | .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb, |
5666 | .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream, |
5667 | .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram, |
5668 | .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security, |
5669 | .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security, |
5670 | .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security, |
5671 | .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid, |
5672 | .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft, |
5673 | .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request, |
5674 | .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone, |
5675 | .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established, |
5676 | .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet, |
5677 | .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc, |
5678 | .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec, |
5679 | .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow, |
5680 | .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create, |
5681 | .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create, |
5682 | .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach, |
5683 | |
5684 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM |
5685 | .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc, |
5686 | .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone, |
5687 | .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free, |
5688 | .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete, |
5689 | .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc, |
5690 | .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free, |
5691 | .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete, |
5692 | .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup, |
5693 | .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, |
5694 | .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session, |
5695 | #endif |
5696 | |
5697 | #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS |
5698 | .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc, |
5699 | .key_free = selinux_key_free, |
5700 | .key_permission = selinux_key_permission, |
5701 | .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity, |
5702 | #endif |
5703 | |
5704 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT |
5705 | .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init, |
5706 | .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known, |
5707 | .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match, |
5708 | .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free, |
5709 | #endif |
5710 | }; |
5711 | |
5712 | static __init int selinux_init(void) |
5713 | { |
5714 | if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) { |
5715 | selinux_enabled = 0; |
5716 | return 0; |
5717 | } |
5718 | |
5719 | if (!selinux_enabled) { |
5720 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n"); |
5721 | return 0; |
5722 | } |
5723 | |
5724 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n"); |
5725 | |
5726 | /* Set the security state for the initial task. */ |
5727 | cred_init_security(); |
5728 | |
5729 | default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC); |
5730 | |
5731 | sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security", |
5732 | sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), |
5733 | 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); |
5734 | avc_init(); |
5735 | |
5736 | if (register_security(&selinux_ops)) |
5737 | panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n"); |
5738 | |
5739 | if (selinux_enforcing) |
5740 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n"); |
5741 | else |
5742 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n"); |
5743 | |
5744 | return 0; |
5745 | } |
5746 | |
5747 | static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused) |
5748 | { |
5749 | superblock_doinit(sb, NULL); |
5750 | } |
5751 | |
5752 | void selinux_complete_init(void) |
5753 | { |
5754 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n"); |
5755 | |
5756 | /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */ |
5757 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n"); |
5758 | iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL); |
5759 | } |
5760 | |
5761 | /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label |
5762 | all processes and objects when they are created. */ |
5763 | security_initcall(selinux_init); |
5764 | |
5765 | #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) |
5766 | |
5767 | static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = { |
5768 | { |
5769 | .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute, |
5770 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, |
5771 | .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, |
5772 | .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, |
5773 | .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, |
5774 | }, |
5775 | { |
5776 | .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward, |
5777 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, |
5778 | .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, |
5779 | .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD, |
5780 | .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, |
5781 | }, |
5782 | { |
5783 | .hook = selinux_ipv4_output, |
5784 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, |
5785 | .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, |
5786 | .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, |
5787 | .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, |
5788 | } |
5789 | }; |
5790 | |
5791 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
5792 | |
5793 | static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = { |
5794 | { |
5795 | .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute, |
5796 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, |
5797 | .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6, |
5798 | .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, |
5799 | .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, |
5800 | }, |
5801 | { |
5802 | .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward, |
5803 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, |
5804 | .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6, |
5805 | .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD, |
5806 | .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, |
5807 | } |
5808 | }; |
5809 | |
5810 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
5811 | |
5812 | static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void) |
5813 | { |
5814 | int err = 0; |
5815 | |
5816 | if (!selinux_enabled) |
5817 | goto out; |
5818 | |
5819 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n"); |
5820 | |
5821 | err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops)); |
5822 | if (err) |
5823 | panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err); |
5824 | |
5825 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
5826 | err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops)); |
5827 | if (err) |
5828 | panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err); |
5829 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
5830 | |
5831 | out: |
5832 | return err; |
5833 | } |
5834 | |
5835 | __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init); |
5836 | |
5837 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE |
5838 | static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void) |
5839 | { |
5840 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n"); |
5841 | |
5842 | nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops)); |
5843 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
5844 | nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops)); |
5845 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
5846 | } |
5847 | #endif |
5848 | |
5849 | #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ |
5850 | |
5851 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE |
5852 | #define selinux_nf_ip_exit() |
5853 | #endif |
5854 | |
5855 | #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ |
5856 | |
5857 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE |
5858 | static int selinux_disabled; |
5859 | |
5860 | int selinux_disable(void) |
5861 | { |
5862 | if (ss_initialized) { |
5863 | /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */ |
5864 | return -EINVAL; |
5865 | } |
5866 | |
5867 | if (selinux_disabled) { |
5868 | /* Only do this once. */ |
5869 | return -EINVAL; |
5870 | } |
5871 | |
5872 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n"); |
5873 | |
5874 | selinux_disabled = 1; |
5875 | selinux_enabled = 0; |
5876 | |
5877 | reset_security_ops(); |
5878 | |
5879 | /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */ |
5880 | avc_disable(); |
5881 | |
5882 | /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */ |
5883 | selinux_nf_ip_exit(); |
5884 | |
5885 | /* Unregister selinuxfs. */ |
5886 | exit_sel_fs(); |
5887 | |
5888 | return 0; |
5889 | } |
5890 | #endif |
5891 |
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