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1 | /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support |
2 | * Handles all system-call specific auditing features. |
3 | * |
4 | * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina. |
5 | * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. |
6 | * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation |
7 | * All Rights Reserved. |
8 | * |
9 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
10 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by |
11 | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or |
12 | * (at your option) any later version. |
13 | * |
14 | * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, |
15 | * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of |
16 | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the |
17 | * GNU General Public License for more details. |
18 | * |
19 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License |
20 | * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software |
21 | * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA |
22 | * |
23 | * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com> |
24 | * |
25 | * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie, |
26 | * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname. |
27 | * |
28 | * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in |
29 | * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by |
30 | * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG. |
31 | * |
32 | * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>, |
33 | * 2006. |
34 | * |
35 | * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was |
36 | * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005. |
37 | * |
38 | * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional |
39 | * filesystem information. |
40 | * |
41 | * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com> |
42 | * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance. |
43 | */ |
44 | |
45 | #include <linux/init.h> |
46 | #include <asm/types.h> |
47 | #include <linux/atomic.h> |
48 | #include <linux/fs.h> |
49 | #include <linux/namei.h> |
50 | #include <linux/mm.h> |
51 | #include <linux/export.h> |
52 | #include <linux/slab.h> |
53 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
54 | #include <linux/socket.h> |
55 | #include <linux/mqueue.h> |
56 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
57 | #include <linux/personality.h> |
58 | #include <linux/time.h> |
59 | #include <linux/netlink.h> |
60 | #include <linux/compiler.h> |
61 | #include <asm/unistd.h> |
62 | #include <linux/security.h> |
63 | #include <linux/list.h> |
64 | #include <linux/tty.h> |
65 | #include <linux/binfmts.h> |
66 | #include <linux/highmem.h> |
67 | #include <linux/syscalls.h> |
68 | #include <linux/capability.h> |
69 | #include <linux/fs_struct.h> |
70 | #include <linux/compat.h> |
71 | |
72 | #include "audit.h" |
73 | |
74 | /* flags stating the success for a syscall */ |
75 | #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0 |
76 | #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1 |
77 | #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2 |
78 | |
79 | /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context |
80 | * for saving names from getname(). If we get more names we will allocate |
81 | * a name dynamically and also add those to the list anchored by names_list. */ |
82 | #define AUDIT_NAMES 5 |
83 | |
84 | /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */ |
85 | #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500 |
86 | |
87 | /* number of audit rules */ |
88 | int audit_n_rules; |
89 | |
90 | /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */ |
91 | int audit_signals; |
92 | |
93 | struct audit_cap_data { |
94 | kernel_cap_t permitted; |
95 | kernel_cap_t inheritable; |
96 | union { |
97 | unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of a file capability */ |
98 | kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of a process */ |
99 | }; |
100 | }; |
101 | |
102 | /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and |
103 | * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved |
104 | * pointers at syscall exit time). |
105 | * |
106 | * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. |
107 | */ |
108 | struct audit_names { |
109 | struct list_head list; /* audit_context->names_list */ |
110 | struct filename *name; |
111 | unsigned long ino; |
112 | dev_t dev; |
113 | umode_t mode; |
114 | kuid_t uid; |
115 | kgid_t gid; |
116 | dev_t rdev; |
117 | u32 osid; |
118 | struct audit_cap_data fcap; |
119 | unsigned int fcap_ver; |
120 | int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */ |
121 | unsigned char type; /* record type */ |
122 | bool name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */ |
123 | /* |
124 | * This was an allocated audit_names and not from the array of |
125 | * names allocated in the task audit context. Thus this name |
126 | * should be freed on syscall exit |
127 | */ |
128 | bool should_free; |
129 | }; |
130 | |
131 | struct audit_aux_data { |
132 | struct audit_aux_data *next; |
133 | int type; |
134 | }; |
135 | |
136 | #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0 |
137 | |
138 | /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */ |
139 | #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16 |
140 | |
141 | struct audit_aux_data_execve { |
142 | struct audit_aux_data d; |
143 | int argc; |
144 | int envc; |
145 | struct mm_struct *mm; |
146 | }; |
147 | |
148 | struct audit_aux_data_pids { |
149 | struct audit_aux_data d; |
150 | pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
151 | kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
152 | kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
153 | unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
154 | u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
155 | char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN]; |
156 | int pid_count; |
157 | }; |
158 | |
159 | struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps { |
160 | struct audit_aux_data d; |
161 | struct audit_cap_data fcap; |
162 | unsigned int fcap_ver; |
163 | struct audit_cap_data old_pcap; |
164 | struct audit_cap_data new_pcap; |
165 | }; |
166 | |
167 | struct audit_aux_data_capset { |
168 | struct audit_aux_data d; |
169 | pid_t pid; |
170 | struct audit_cap_data cap; |
171 | }; |
172 | |
173 | struct audit_tree_refs { |
174 | struct audit_tree_refs *next; |
175 | struct audit_chunk *c[31]; |
176 | }; |
177 | |
178 | /* The per-task audit context. */ |
179 | struct audit_context { |
180 | int dummy; /* must be the first element */ |
181 | int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */ |
182 | enum audit_state state, current_state; |
183 | unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */ |
184 | int major; /* syscall number */ |
185 | struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */ |
186 | unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */ |
187 | long return_code;/* syscall return code */ |
188 | u64 prio; |
189 | int return_valid; /* return code is valid */ |
190 | /* |
191 | * The names_list is the list of all audit_names collected during this |
192 | * syscall. The first AUDIT_NAMES entries in the names_list will |
193 | * actually be from the preallocated_names array for performance |
194 | * reasons. Except during allocation they should never be referenced |
195 | * through the preallocated_names array and should only be found/used |
196 | * by running the names_list. |
197 | */ |
198 | struct audit_names preallocated_names[AUDIT_NAMES]; |
199 | int name_count; /* total records in names_list */ |
200 | struct list_head names_list; /* anchor for struct audit_names->list */ |
201 | char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */ |
202 | struct path pwd; |
203 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; |
204 | struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids; |
205 | struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr; |
206 | size_t sockaddr_len; |
207 | /* Save things to print about task_struct */ |
208 | pid_t pid, ppid; |
209 | kuid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid; |
210 | kgid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid; |
211 | unsigned long personality; |
212 | int arch; |
213 | |
214 | pid_t target_pid; |
215 | kuid_t target_auid; |
216 | kuid_t target_uid; |
217 | unsigned int target_sessionid; |
218 | u32 target_sid; |
219 | char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; |
220 | |
221 | struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees; |
222 | struct list_head killed_trees; |
223 | int tree_count; |
224 | |
225 | int type; |
226 | union { |
227 | struct { |
228 | int nargs; |
229 | long args[6]; |
230 | } socketcall; |
231 | struct { |
232 | kuid_t uid; |
233 | kgid_t gid; |
234 | umode_t mode; |
235 | u32 osid; |
236 | int has_perm; |
237 | uid_t perm_uid; |
238 | gid_t perm_gid; |
239 | umode_t perm_mode; |
240 | unsigned long qbytes; |
241 | } ipc; |
242 | struct { |
243 | mqd_t mqdes; |
244 | struct mq_attr mqstat; |
245 | } mq_getsetattr; |
246 | struct { |
247 | mqd_t mqdes; |
248 | int sigev_signo; |
249 | } mq_notify; |
250 | struct { |
251 | mqd_t mqdes; |
252 | size_t msg_len; |
253 | unsigned int msg_prio; |
254 | struct timespec abs_timeout; |
255 | } mq_sendrecv; |
256 | struct { |
257 | int oflag; |
258 | umode_t mode; |
259 | struct mq_attr attr; |
260 | } mq_open; |
261 | struct { |
262 | pid_t pid; |
263 | struct audit_cap_data cap; |
264 | } capset; |
265 | struct { |
266 | int fd; |
267 | int flags; |
268 | } mmap; |
269 | }; |
270 | int fds[2]; |
271 | |
272 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
273 | int put_count; |
274 | int ino_count; |
275 | #endif |
276 | }; |
277 | |
278 | static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask) |
279 | { |
280 | int n = ACC_MODE(flags); |
281 | if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT)) |
282 | n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE; |
283 | return n & mask; |
284 | } |
285 | |
286 | static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask) |
287 | { |
288 | unsigned n; |
289 | if (unlikely(!ctx)) |
290 | return 0; |
291 | n = ctx->major; |
292 | |
293 | switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) { |
294 | case 0: /* native */ |
295 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && |
296 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n)) |
297 | return 1; |
298 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && |
299 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n)) |
300 | return 1; |
301 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && |
302 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n)) |
303 | return 1; |
304 | return 0; |
305 | case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */ |
306 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && |
307 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n)) |
308 | return 1; |
309 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && |
310 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n)) |
311 | return 1; |
312 | if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && |
313 | audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n)) |
314 | return 1; |
315 | return 0; |
316 | case 2: /* open */ |
317 | return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]); |
318 | case 3: /* openat */ |
319 | return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]); |
320 | case 4: /* socketcall */ |
321 | return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND); |
322 | case 5: /* execve */ |
323 | return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC; |
324 | default: |
325 | return 0; |
326 | } |
327 | } |
328 | |
329 | static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val) |
330 | { |
331 | struct audit_names *n; |
332 | umode_t mode = (umode_t)val; |
333 | |
334 | if (unlikely(!ctx)) |
335 | return 0; |
336 | |
337 | list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
338 | if ((n->ino != -1) && |
339 | ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode)) |
340 | return 1; |
341 | } |
342 | |
343 | return 0; |
344 | } |
345 | |
346 | /* |
347 | * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *; |
348 | * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data. |
349 | * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees. |
350 | * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL, |
351 | * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously, |
352 | * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself. |
353 | * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff. |
354 | */ |
355 | |
356 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
357 | static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx) |
358 | { |
359 | if (!ctx->prio) { |
360 | ctx->prio = 1; |
361 | ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; |
362 | } |
363 | } |
364 | |
365 | static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk) |
366 | { |
367 | struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; |
368 | int left = ctx->tree_count; |
369 | if (likely(left)) { |
370 | p->c[--left] = chunk; |
371 | ctx->tree_count = left; |
372 | return 1; |
373 | } |
374 | if (!p) |
375 | return 0; |
376 | p = p->next; |
377 | if (p) { |
378 | p->c[30] = chunk; |
379 | ctx->trees = p; |
380 | ctx->tree_count = 30; |
381 | return 1; |
382 | } |
383 | return 0; |
384 | } |
385 | |
386 | static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) |
387 | { |
388 | struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; |
389 | ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL); |
390 | if (!ctx->trees) { |
391 | ctx->trees = p; |
392 | return 0; |
393 | } |
394 | if (p) |
395 | p->next = ctx->trees; |
396 | else |
397 | ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees; |
398 | ctx->tree_count = 31; |
399 | return 1; |
400 | } |
401 | #endif |
402 | |
403 | static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, |
404 | struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count) |
405 | { |
406 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
407 | struct audit_tree_refs *q; |
408 | int n; |
409 | if (!p) { |
410 | /* we started with empty chain */ |
411 | p = ctx->first_trees; |
412 | count = 31; |
413 | /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */ |
414 | if (!p) |
415 | return; |
416 | } |
417 | n = count; |
418 | for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) { |
419 | while (n--) { |
420 | audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); |
421 | q->c[n] = NULL; |
422 | } |
423 | } |
424 | while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) { |
425 | audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); |
426 | q->c[n] = NULL; |
427 | } |
428 | ctx->trees = p; |
429 | ctx->tree_count = count; |
430 | #endif |
431 | } |
432 | |
433 | static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) |
434 | { |
435 | struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q; |
436 | for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) { |
437 | q = p->next; |
438 | kfree(p); |
439 | } |
440 | } |
441 | |
442 | static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree) |
443 | { |
444 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
445 | struct audit_tree_refs *p; |
446 | int n; |
447 | if (!tree) |
448 | return 0; |
449 | /* full ones */ |
450 | for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) { |
451 | for (n = 0; n < 31; n++) |
452 | if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) |
453 | return 1; |
454 | } |
455 | /* partial */ |
456 | if (p) { |
457 | for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++) |
458 | if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) |
459 | return 1; |
460 | } |
461 | #endif |
462 | return 0; |
463 | } |
464 | |
465 | static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid, |
466 | struct audit_names *name, |
467 | struct audit_field *f, |
468 | struct audit_context *ctx) |
469 | { |
470 | struct audit_names *n; |
471 | int rc; |
472 | |
473 | if (name) { |
474 | rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid); |
475 | if (rc) |
476 | return rc; |
477 | } |
478 | |
479 | if (ctx) { |
480 | list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
481 | rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid); |
482 | if (rc) |
483 | return rc; |
484 | } |
485 | } |
486 | return 0; |
487 | } |
488 | |
489 | static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid, |
490 | struct audit_names *name, |
491 | struct audit_field *f, |
492 | struct audit_context *ctx) |
493 | { |
494 | struct audit_names *n; |
495 | int rc; |
496 | |
497 | if (name) { |
498 | rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid); |
499 | if (rc) |
500 | return rc; |
501 | } |
502 | |
503 | if (ctx) { |
504 | list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
505 | rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid); |
506 | if (rc) |
507 | return rc; |
508 | } |
509 | } |
510 | return 0; |
511 | } |
512 | |
513 | static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, |
514 | const struct cred *cred, |
515 | struct audit_field *f, |
516 | struct audit_context *ctx, |
517 | struct audit_names *name) |
518 | { |
519 | switch (f->val) { |
520 | /* process to file object comparisons */ |
521 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID: |
522 | return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx); |
523 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID: |
524 | return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx); |
525 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID: |
526 | return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx); |
527 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID: |
528 | return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx); |
529 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID: |
530 | return audit_compare_uid(tsk->loginuid, name, f, ctx); |
531 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID: |
532 | return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx); |
533 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID: |
534 | return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx); |
535 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID: |
536 | return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx); |
537 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID: |
538 | return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx); |
539 | /* uid comparisons */ |
540 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID: |
541 | return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, tsk->loginuid); |
542 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID: |
543 | return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid); |
544 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID: |
545 | return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid); |
546 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID: |
547 | return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid); |
548 | /* auid comparisons */ |
549 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID: |
550 | return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->euid); |
551 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID: |
552 | return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->suid); |
553 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID: |
554 | return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->fsuid); |
555 | /* euid comparisons */ |
556 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID: |
557 | return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid); |
558 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID: |
559 | return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid); |
560 | /* suid comparisons */ |
561 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID: |
562 | return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid); |
563 | /* gid comparisons */ |
564 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID: |
565 | return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid); |
566 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID: |
567 | return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid); |
568 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID: |
569 | return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid); |
570 | /* egid comparisons */ |
571 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID: |
572 | return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid); |
573 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID: |
574 | return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid); |
575 | /* sgid comparison */ |
576 | case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID: |
577 | return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid); |
578 | default: |
579 | WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n"); |
580 | return 0; |
581 | } |
582 | return 0; |
583 | } |
584 | |
585 | /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */ |
586 | /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 |
587 | * otherwise. |
588 | * |
589 | * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are |
590 | * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are |
591 | * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock. |
592 | */ |
593 | static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, |
594 | struct audit_krule *rule, |
595 | struct audit_context *ctx, |
596 | struct audit_names *name, |
597 | enum audit_state *state, |
598 | bool task_creation) |
599 | { |
600 | const struct cred *cred; |
601 | int i, need_sid = 1; |
602 | u32 sid; |
603 | |
604 | cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation); |
605 | |
606 | for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { |
607 | struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; |
608 | struct audit_names *n; |
609 | int result = 0; |
610 | |
611 | switch (f->type) { |
612 | case AUDIT_PID: |
613 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val); |
614 | break; |
615 | case AUDIT_PPID: |
616 | if (ctx) { |
617 | if (!ctx->ppid) |
618 | ctx->ppid = sys_getppid(); |
619 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val); |
620 | } |
621 | break; |
622 | case AUDIT_UID: |
623 | result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid); |
624 | break; |
625 | case AUDIT_EUID: |
626 | result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid); |
627 | break; |
628 | case AUDIT_SUID: |
629 | result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid); |
630 | break; |
631 | case AUDIT_FSUID: |
632 | result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid); |
633 | break; |
634 | case AUDIT_GID: |
635 | result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid); |
636 | break; |
637 | case AUDIT_EGID: |
638 | result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid); |
639 | break; |
640 | case AUDIT_SGID: |
641 | result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid); |
642 | break; |
643 | case AUDIT_FSGID: |
644 | result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid); |
645 | break; |
646 | case AUDIT_PERS: |
647 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val); |
648 | break; |
649 | case AUDIT_ARCH: |
650 | if (ctx) |
651 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val); |
652 | break; |
653 | |
654 | case AUDIT_EXIT: |
655 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) |
656 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val); |
657 | break; |
658 | case AUDIT_SUCCESS: |
659 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) { |
660 | if (f->val) |
661 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS); |
662 | else |
663 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE); |
664 | } |
665 | break; |
666 | case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: |
667 | if (name) { |
668 | if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) || |
669 | audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val)) |
670 | ++result; |
671 | } else if (ctx) { |
672 | list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
673 | if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) || |
674 | audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) { |
675 | ++result; |
676 | break; |
677 | } |
678 | } |
679 | } |
680 | break; |
681 | case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: |
682 | if (name) { |
683 | if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) || |
684 | audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val)) |
685 | ++result; |
686 | } else if (ctx) { |
687 | list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
688 | if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) || |
689 | audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) { |
690 | ++result; |
691 | break; |
692 | } |
693 | } |
694 | } |
695 | break; |
696 | case AUDIT_INODE: |
697 | if (name) |
698 | result = (name->ino == f->val); |
699 | else if (ctx) { |
700 | list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
701 | if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) { |
702 | ++result; |
703 | break; |
704 | } |
705 | } |
706 | } |
707 | break; |
708 | case AUDIT_OBJ_UID: |
709 | if (name) { |
710 | result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid); |
711 | } else if (ctx) { |
712 | list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
713 | if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) { |
714 | ++result; |
715 | break; |
716 | } |
717 | } |
718 | } |
719 | break; |
720 | case AUDIT_OBJ_GID: |
721 | if (name) { |
722 | result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid); |
723 | } else if (ctx) { |
724 | list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
725 | if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) { |
726 | ++result; |
727 | break; |
728 | } |
729 | } |
730 | } |
731 | break; |
732 | case AUDIT_WATCH: |
733 | if (name) |
734 | result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev); |
735 | break; |
736 | case AUDIT_DIR: |
737 | if (ctx) |
738 | result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree); |
739 | break; |
740 | case AUDIT_LOGINUID: |
741 | result = 0; |
742 | if (ctx) |
743 | result = audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->uid); |
744 | break; |
745 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: |
746 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: |
747 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: |
748 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: |
749 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: |
750 | /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating |
751 | a temporary error. We simply treat this as a |
752 | match for now to avoid losing information that |
753 | may be wanted. An error message will also be |
754 | logged upon error */ |
755 | if (f->lsm_rule) { |
756 | if (need_sid) { |
757 | security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); |
758 | need_sid = 0; |
759 | } |
760 | result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, |
761 | f->op, |
762 | f->lsm_rule, |
763 | ctx); |
764 | } |
765 | break; |
766 | case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: |
767 | case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: |
768 | case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: |
769 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: |
770 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: |
771 | /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR |
772 | also applies here */ |
773 | if (f->lsm_rule) { |
774 | /* Find files that match */ |
775 | if (name) { |
776 | result = security_audit_rule_match( |
777 | name->osid, f->type, f->op, |
778 | f->lsm_rule, ctx); |
779 | } else if (ctx) { |
780 | list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
781 | if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type, |
782 | f->op, f->lsm_rule, |
783 | ctx)) { |
784 | ++result; |
785 | break; |
786 | } |
787 | } |
788 | } |
789 | /* Find ipc objects that match */ |
790 | if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) |
791 | break; |
792 | if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, |
793 | f->type, f->op, |
794 | f->lsm_rule, ctx)) |
795 | ++result; |
796 | } |
797 | break; |
798 | case AUDIT_ARG0: |
799 | case AUDIT_ARG1: |
800 | case AUDIT_ARG2: |
801 | case AUDIT_ARG3: |
802 | if (ctx) |
803 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val); |
804 | break; |
805 | case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: |
806 | /* ignore this field for filtering */ |
807 | result = 1; |
808 | break; |
809 | case AUDIT_PERM: |
810 | result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val); |
811 | break; |
812 | case AUDIT_FILETYPE: |
813 | result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val); |
814 | break; |
815 | case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE: |
816 | result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name); |
817 | break; |
818 | } |
819 | if (!result) |
820 | return 0; |
821 | } |
822 | |
823 | if (ctx) { |
824 | if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio) |
825 | return 0; |
826 | if (rule->filterkey) { |
827 | kfree(ctx->filterkey); |
828 | ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); |
829 | } |
830 | ctx->prio = rule->prio; |
831 | } |
832 | switch (rule->action) { |
833 | case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; |
834 | case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; |
835 | } |
836 | return 1; |
837 | } |
838 | |
839 | /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is |
840 | * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task |
841 | * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid. |
842 | */ |
843 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key) |
844 | { |
845 | struct audit_entry *e; |
846 | enum audit_state state; |
847 | |
848 | rcu_read_lock(); |
849 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) { |
850 | if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, |
851 | &state, true)) { |
852 | if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) |
853 | *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); |
854 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
855 | return state; |
856 | } |
857 | } |
858 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
859 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; |
860 | } |
861 | |
862 | /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the |
863 | * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is |
864 | * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit |
865 | * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT). |
866 | */ |
867 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, |
868 | struct audit_context *ctx, |
869 | struct list_head *list) |
870 | { |
871 | struct audit_entry *e; |
872 | enum audit_state state; |
873 | |
874 | if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid) |
875 | return AUDIT_DISABLED; |
876 | |
877 | rcu_read_lock(); |
878 | if (!list_empty(list)) { |
879 | int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); |
880 | int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); |
881 | |
882 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { |
883 | if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && |
884 | audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL, |
885 | &state, false)) { |
886 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
887 | ctx->current_state = state; |
888 | return state; |
889 | } |
890 | } |
891 | } |
892 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
893 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; |
894 | } |
895 | |
896 | /* |
897 | * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match. |
898 | * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash |
899 | */ |
900 | static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk, |
901 | struct audit_names *n, |
902 | struct audit_context *ctx) { |
903 | int word, bit; |
904 | int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino); |
905 | struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h]; |
906 | struct audit_entry *e; |
907 | enum audit_state state; |
908 | |
909 | word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); |
910 | bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); |
911 | |
912 | if (list_empty(list)) |
913 | return 0; |
914 | |
915 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { |
916 | if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && |
917 | audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) { |
918 | ctx->current_state = state; |
919 | return 1; |
920 | } |
921 | } |
922 | |
923 | return 0; |
924 | } |
925 | |
926 | /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been |
927 | * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash |
928 | * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names. |
929 | * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall(). |
930 | */ |
931 | void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx) |
932 | { |
933 | struct audit_names *n; |
934 | |
935 | if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid) |
936 | return; |
937 | |
938 | rcu_read_lock(); |
939 | |
940 | list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
941 | if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx)) |
942 | break; |
943 | } |
944 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
945 | } |
946 | |
947 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk, |
948 | int return_valid, |
949 | long return_code) |
950 | { |
951 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; |
952 | |
953 | if (!context) |
954 | return NULL; |
955 | context->return_valid = return_valid; |
956 | |
957 | /* |
958 | * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual |
959 | * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific |
960 | * signal handlers |
961 | * |
962 | * This is actually a test for: |
963 | * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) || |
964 | * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) |
965 | * |
966 | * but is faster than a bunch of || |
967 | */ |
968 | if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) && |
969 | (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) && |
970 | (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD)) |
971 | context->return_code = -EINTR; |
972 | else |
973 | context->return_code = return_code; |
974 | |
975 | if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) { |
976 | audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]); |
977 | audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context); |
978 | } |
979 | |
980 | tsk->audit_context = NULL; |
981 | return context; |
982 | } |
983 | |
984 | static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) |
985 | { |
986 | struct audit_names *n, *next; |
987 | |
988 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 |
989 | if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) { |
990 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d" |
991 | " name_count=%d put_count=%d" |
992 | " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n", |
993 | __FILE__, __LINE__, |
994 | context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall, |
995 | context->name_count, context->put_count, |
996 | context->ino_count); |
997 | list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { |
998 | printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, |
999 | n->name, n->name->name ?: "(null)"); |
1000 | } |
1001 | dump_stack(); |
1002 | return; |
1003 | } |
1004 | #endif |
1005 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
1006 | context->put_count = 0; |
1007 | context->ino_count = 0; |
1008 | #endif |
1009 | |
1010 | list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) { |
1011 | list_del(&n->list); |
1012 | if (n->name && n->name_put) |
1013 | __putname(n->name); |
1014 | if (n->should_free) |
1015 | kfree(n); |
1016 | } |
1017 | context->name_count = 0; |
1018 | path_put(&context->pwd); |
1019 | context->pwd.dentry = NULL; |
1020 | context->pwd.mnt = NULL; |
1021 | } |
1022 | |
1023 | static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) |
1024 | { |
1025 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; |
1026 | |
1027 | while ((aux = context->aux)) { |
1028 | context->aux = aux->next; |
1029 | kfree(aux); |
1030 | } |
1031 | while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) { |
1032 | context->aux_pids = aux->next; |
1033 | kfree(aux); |
1034 | } |
1035 | } |
1036 | |
1037 | static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context, |
1038 | enum audit_state state) |
1039 | { |
1040 | memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context)); |
1041 | context->state = state; |
1042 | context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0; |
1043 | } |
1044 | |
1045 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state) |
1046 | { |
1047 | struct audit_context *context; |
1048 | |
1049 | if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL))) |
1050 | return NULL; |
1051 | audit_zero_context(context, state); |
1052 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees); |
1053 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list); |
1054 | return context; |
1055 | } |
1056 | |
1057 | /** |
1058 | * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task |
1059 | * @tsk: task |
1060 | * |
1061 | * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context |
1062 | * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the |
1063 | * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is |
1064 | * needed. |
1065 | */ |
1066 | int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) |
1067 | { |
1068 | struct audit_context *context; |
1069 | enum audit_state state; |
1070 | char *key = NULL; |
1071 | |
1072 | if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled)) |
1073 | return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */ |
1074 | |
1075 | state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key); |
1076 | if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) |
1077 | return 0; |
1078 | |
1079 | if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) { |
1080 | kfree(key); |
1081 | audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc"); |
1082 | return -ENOMEM; |
1083 | } |
1084 | context->filterkey = key; |
1085 | |
1086 | tsk->audit_context = context; |
1087 | set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); |
1088 | return 0; |
1089 | } |
1090 | |
1091 | static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) |
1092 | { |
1093 | audit_free_names(context); |
1094 | unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); |
1095 | free_tree_refs(context); |
1096 | audit_free_aux(context); |
1097 | kfree(context->filterkey); |
1098 | kfree(context->sockaddr); |
1099 | kfree(context); |
1100 | } |
1101 | |
1102 | void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) |
1103 | { |
1104 | char *ctx = NULL; |
1105 | unsigned len; |
1106 | int error; |
1107 | u32 sid; |
1108 | |
1109 | security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); |
1110 | if (!sid) |
1111 | return; |
1112 | |
1113 | error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len); |
1114 | if (error) { |
1115 | if (error != -EINVAL) |
1116 | goto error_path; |
1117 | return; |
1118 | } |
1119 | |
1120 | audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx); |
1121 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); |
1122 | return; |
1123 | |
1124 | error_path: |
1125 | audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context"); |
1126 | return; |
1127 | } |
1128 | |
1129 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context); |
1130 | |
1131 | void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk) |
1132 | { |
1133 | const struct cred *cred; |
1134 | char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)]; |
1135 | struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm; |
1136 | char *tty; |
1137 | |
1138 | if (!ab) |
1139 | return; |
1140 | |
1141 | /* tsk == current */ |
1142 | cred = current_cred(); |
1143 | |
1144 | spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock); |
1145 | if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty) |
1146 | tty = tsk->signal->tty->name; |
1147 | else |
1148 | tty = "(none)"; |
1149 | spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock); |
1150 | |
1151 | |
1152 | audit_log_format(ab, |
1153 | " ppid=%ld pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u" |
1154 | " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u" |
1155 | " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u ses=%u tty=%s", |
1156 | sys_getppid(), |
1157 | tsk->pid, |
1158 | from_kuid(&init_user_ns, tsk->loginuid), |
1159 | from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uid), |
1160 | from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->gid), |
1161 | from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->euid), |
1162 | from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->suid), |
1163 | from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid), |
1164 | from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->egid), |
1165 | from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->sgid), |
1166 | from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid), |
1167 | tsk->sessionid, tty); |
1168 | |
1169 | get_task_comm(name, tsk); |
1170 | audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); |
1171 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name); |
1172 | |
1173 | if (mm) { |
1174 | down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); |
1175 | if (mm->exe_file) |
1176 | audit_log_d_path(ab, " exe=", &mm->exe_file->f_path); |
1177 | up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); |
1178 | } |
1179 | audit_log_task_context(ab); |
1180 | } |
1181 | |
1182 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_info); |
1183 | |
1184 | static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, |
1185 | kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid, |
1186 | u32 sid, char *comm) |
1187 | { |
1188 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
1189 | char *ctx = NULL; |
1190 | u32 len; |
1191 | int rc = 0; |
1192 | |
1193 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID); |
1194 | if (!ab) |
1195 | return rc; |
1196 | |
1197 | audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, |
1198 | from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid), |
1199 | from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid); |
1200 | if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) { |
1201 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)"); |
1202 | rc = 1; |
1203 | } else { |
1204 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); |
1205 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); |
1206 | } |
1207 | audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm="); |
1208 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm); |
1209 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1210 | |
1211 | return rc; |
1212 | } |
1213 | |
1214 | /* |
1215 | * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't |
1216 | * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being |
1217 | * within about 500 bytes (next page boundary) |
1218 | * |
1219 | * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when |
1220 | * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting |
1221 | * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to |
1222 | * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space |
1223 | * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was. |
1224 | */ |
1225 | static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context, |
1226 | struct audit_buffer **ab, |
1227 | int arg_num, |
1228 | size_t *len_sent, |
1229 | const char __user *p, |
1230 | char *buf) |
1231 | { |
1232 | char arg_num_len_buf[12]; |
1233 | const char __user *tmp_p = p; |
1234 | /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */ |
1235 | size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5; |
1236 | size_t len, len_left, to_send; |
1237 | size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN; |
1238 | unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0; |
1239 | int ret; |
1240 | |
1241 | /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */ |
1242 | len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1; |
1243 | |
1244 | /* |
1245 | * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings |
1246 | * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar |
1247 | * for strings that are too long, we should not have created |
1248 | * any. |
1249 | */ |
1250 | if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) { |
1251 | WARN_ON(1); |
1252 | send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); |
1253 | return -1; |
1254 | } |
1255 | |
1256 | /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */ |
1257 | do { |
1258 | if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN) |
1259 | to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN; |
1260 | else |
1261 | to_send = len_left; |
1262 | ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send); |
1263 | /* |
1264 | * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just |
1265 | * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user- |
1266 | * space yet. |
1267 | */ |
1268 | if (ret) { |
1269 | WARN_ON(1); |
1270 | send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); |
1271 | return -1; |
1272 | } |
1273 | buf[to_send] = '\0'; |
1274 | has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send); |
1275 | if (has_cntl) { |
1276 | /* |
1277 | * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only |
1278 | * send half as much in each message |
1279 | */ |
1280 | max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2; |
1281 | break; |
1282 | } |
1283 | len_left -= to_send; |
1284 | tmp_p += to_send; |
1285 | } while (len_left > 0); |
1286 | |
1287 | len_left = len; |
1288 | |
1289 | if (len > max_execve_audit_len) |
1290 | too_long = 1; |
1291 | |
1292 | /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */ |
1293 | for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) { |
1294 | int room_left; |
1295 | |
1296 | if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len) |
1297 | to_send = max_execve_audit_len; |
1298 | else |
1299 | to_send = len_left; |
1300 | |
1301 | /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */ |
1302 | room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent; |
1303 | if (has_cntl) |
1304 | room_left -= (to_send * 2); |
1305 | else |
1306 | room_left -= to_send; |
1307 | if (room_left < 0) { |
1308 | *len_sent = 0; |
1309 | audit_log_end(*ab); |
1310 | *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE); |
1311 | if (!*ab) |
1312 | return 0; |
1313 | } |
1314 | |
1315 | /* |
1316 | * first record needs to say how long the original string was |
1317 | * so we can be sure nothing was lost. |
1318 | */ |
1319 | if ((i == 0) && (too_long)) |
1320 | audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num, |
1321 | has_cntl ? 2*len : len); |
1322 | |
1323 | /* |
1324 | * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already |
1325 | * filled buf above when we checked for control characters |
1326 | * so don't bother with another copy_from_user |
1327 | */ |
1328 | if (len >= max_execve_audit_len) |
1329 | ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send); |
1330 | else |
1331 | ret = 0; |
1332 | if (ret) { |
1333 | WARN_ON(1); |
1334 | send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); |
1335 | return -1; |
1336 | } |
1337 | buf[to_send] = '\0'; |
1338 | |
1339 | /* actually log it */ |
1340 | audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num); |
1341 | if (too_long) |
1342 | audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i); |
1343 | audit_log_format(*ab, "="); |
1344 | if (has_cntl) |
1345 | audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send); |
1346 | else |
1347 | audit_log_string(*ab, buf); |
1348 | |
1349 | p += to_send; |
1350 | len_left -= to_send; |
1351 | *len_sent += arg_num_len; |
1352 | if (has_cntl) |
1353 | *len_sent += to_send * 2; |
1354 | else |
1355 | *len_sent += to_send; |
1356 | } |
1357 | /* include the null we didn't log */ |
1358 | return len + 1; |
1359 | } |
1360 | |
1361 | static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context, |
1362 | struct audit_buffer **ab, |
1363 | struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi) |
1364 | { |
1365 | int i, len; |
1366 | size_t len_sent = 0; |
1367 | const char __user *p; |
1368 | char *buf; |
1369 | |
1370 | if (axi->mm != current->mm) |
1371 | return; /* execve failed, no additional info */ |
1372 | |
1373 | p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start; |
1374 | |
1375 | audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", axi->argc); |
1376 | |
1377 | /* |
1378 | * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just |
1379 | * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size |
1380 | * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg() |
1381 | * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe. |
1382 | */ |
1383 | buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL); |
1384 | if (!buf) { |
1385 | audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n"); |
1386 | return; |
1387 | } |
1388 | |
1389 | for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) { |
1390 | len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i, |
1391 | &len_sent, p, buf); |
1392 | if (len <= 0) |
1393 | break; |
1394 | p += len; |
1395 | } |
1396 | kfree(buf); |
1397 | } |
1398 | |
1399 | static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap) |
1400 | { |
1401 | int i; |
1402 | |
1403 | audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix); |
1404 | CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) { |
1405 | audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]); |
1406 | } |
1407 | } |
1408 | |
1409 | static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name) |
1410 | { |
1411 | kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted; |
1412 | kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable; |
1413 | int log = 0; |
1414 | |
1415 | if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) { |
1416 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm); |
1417 | log = 1; |
1418 | } |
1419 | if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) { |
1420 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh); |
1421 | log = 1; |
1422 | } |
1423 | |
1424 | if (log) |
1425 | audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver); |
1426 | } |
1427 | |
1428 | static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) |
1429 | { |
1430 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
1431 | int i; |
1432 | |
1433 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type); |
1434 | if (!ab) |
1435 | return; |
1436 | |
1437 | switch (context->type) { |
1438 | case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: { |
1439 | int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs; |
1440 | audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs); |
1441 | for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) |
1442 | audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, |
1443 | context->socketcall.args[i]); |
1444 | break; } |
1445 | case AUDIT_IPC: { |
1446 | u32 osid = context->ipc.osid; |
1447 | |
1448 | audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho", |
1449 | from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid), |
1450 | from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid), |
1451 | context->ipc.mode); |
1452 | if (osid) { |
1453 | char *ctx = NULL; |
1454 | u32 len; |
1455 | if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) { |
1456 | audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid); |
1457 | *call_panic = 1; |
1458 | } else { |
1459 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); |
1460 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); |
1461 | } |
1462 | } |
1463 | if (context->ipc.has_perm) { |
1464 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1465 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, |
1466 | AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM); |
1467 | if (unlikely(!ab)) |
1468 | return; |
1469 | audit_log_format(ab, |
1470 | "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho", |
1471 | context->ipc.qbytes, |
1472 | context->ipc.perm_uid, |
1473 | context->ipc.perm_gid, |
1474 | context->ipc.perm_mode); |
1475 | } |
1476 | break; } |
1477 | case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: { |
1478 | audit_log_format(ab, |
1479 | "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld " |
1480 | "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld", |
1481 | context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode, |
1482 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags, |
1483 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg, |
1484 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize, |
1485 | context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs); |
1486 | break; } |
1487 | case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: { |
1488 | audit_log_format(ab, |
1489 | "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u " |
1490 | "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld", |
1491 | context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes, |
1492 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len, |
1493 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio, |
1494 | context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec, |
1495 | context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec); |
1496 | break; } |
1497 | case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: { |
1498 | audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d", |
1499 | context->mq_notify.mqdes, |
1500 | context->mq_notify.sigev_signo); |
1501 | break; } |
1502 | case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: { |
1503 | struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat; |
1504 | audit_log_format(ab, |
1505 | "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld " |
1506 | "mq_curmsgs=%ld ", |
1507 | context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes, |
1508 | attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg, |
1509 | attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs); |
1510 | break; } |
1511 | case AUDIT_CAPSET: { |
1512 | audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid); |
1513 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable); |
1514 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted); |
1515 | audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective); |
1516 | break; } |
1517 | case AUDIT_MMAP: { |
1518 | audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd, |
1519 | context->mmap.flags); |
1520 | break; } |
1521 | } |
1522 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1523 | } |
1524 | |
1525 | static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n, |
1526 | int record_num, int *call_panic) |
1527 | { |
1528 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
1529 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH); |
1530 | if (!ab) |
1531 | return; /* audit_panic has been called */ |
1532 | |
1533 | audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num); |
1534 | |
1535 | if (n->name) { |
1536 | switch (n->name_len) { |
1537 | case AUDIT_NAME_FULL: |
1538 | /* log the full path */ |
1539 | audit_log_format(ab, " name="); |
1540 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name); |
1541 | break; |
1542 | case 0: |
1543 | /* name was specified as a relative path and the |
1544 | * directory component is the cwd */ |
1545 | audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd); |
1546 | break; |
1547 | default: |
1548 | /* log the name's directory component */ |
1549 | audit_log_format(ab, " name="); |
1550 | audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name, |
1551 | n->name_len); |
1552 | } |
1553 | } else |
1554 | audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)"); |
1555 | |
1556 | if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) { |
1557 | audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu" |
1558 | " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho" |
1559 | " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", |
1560 | n->ino, |
1561 | MAJOR(n->dev), |
1562 | MINOR(n->dev), |
1563 | n->mode, |
1564 | from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid), |
1565 | from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid), |
1566 | MAJOR(n->rdev), |
1567 | MINOR(n->rdev)); |
1568 | } |
1569 | if (n->osid != 0) { |
1570 | char *ctx = NULL; |
1571 | u32 len; |
1572 | if (security_secid_to_secctx( |
1573 | n->osid, &ctx, &len)) { |
1574 | audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid); |
1575 | *call_panic = 2; |
1576 | } else { |
1577 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); |
1578 | security_release_secctx(ctx, len); |
1579 | } |
1580 | } |
1581 | |
1582 | audit_log_fcaps(ab, n); |
1583 | |
1584 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1585 | } |
1586 | |
1587 | static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk) |
1588 | { |
1589 | int i, call_panic = 0; |
1590 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
1591 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; |
1592 | struct audit_names *n; |
1593 | |
1594 | /* tsk == current */ |
1595 | context->personality = tsk->personality; |
1596 | |
1597 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL); |
1598 | if (!ab) |
1599 | return; /* audit_panic has been called */ |
1600 | audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d", |
1601 | context->arch, context->major); |
1602 | if (context->personality != PER_LINUX) |
1603 | audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality); |
1604 | if (context->return_valid) |
1605 | audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", |
1606 | (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no", |
1607 | context->return_code); |
1608 | |
1609 | audit_log_format(ab, |
1610 | " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d", |
1611 | context->argv[0], |
1612 | context->argv[1], |
1613 | context->argv[2], |
1614 | context->argv[3], |
1615 | context->name_count); |
1616 | |
1617 | audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk); |
1618 | audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey); |
1619 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1620 | |
1621 | for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) { |
1622 | |
1623 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type); |
1624 | if (!ab) |
1625 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ |
1626 | |
1627 | switch (aux->type) { |
1628 | |
1629 | case AUDIT_EXECVE: { |
1630 | struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux; |
1631 | audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi); |
1632 | break; } |
1633 | |
1634 | case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: { |
1635 | struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux; |
1636 | audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver); |
1637 | audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted); |
1638 | audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable); |
1639 | audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE); |
1640 | audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted); |
1641 | audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable); |
1642 | audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective); |
1643 | audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted); |
1644 | audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable); |
1645 | audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective); |
1646 | break; } |
1647 | |
1648 | } |
1649 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1650 | } |
1651 | |
1652 | if (context->type) |
1653 | show_special(context, &call_panic); |
1654 | |
1655 | if (context->fds[0] >= 0) { |
1656 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR); |
1657 | if (ab) { |
1658 | audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", |
1659 | context->fds[0], context->fds[1]); |
1660 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1661 | } |
1662 | } |
1663 | |
1664 | if (context->sockaddr_len) { |
1665 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR); |
1666 | if (ab) { |
1667 | audit_log_format(ab, "saddr="); |
1668 | audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr, |
1669 | context->sockaddr_len); |
1670 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1671 | } |
1672 | } |
1673 | |
1674 | for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) { |
1675 | struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; |
1676 | |
1677 | for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) |
1678 | if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], |
1679 | axs->target_auid[i], |
1680 | axs->target_uid[i], |
1681 | axs->target_sessionid[i], |
1682 | axs->target_sid[i], |
1683 | axs->target_comm[i])) |
1684 | call_panic = 1; |
1685 | } |
1686 | |
1687 | if (context->target_pid && |
1688 | audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, |
1689 | context->target_auid, context->target_uid, |
1690 | context->target_sessionid, |
1691 | context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) |
1692 | call_panic = 1; |
1693 | |
1694 | if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { |
1695 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); |
1696 | if (ab) { |
1697 | audit_log_d_path(ab, " cwd=", &context->pwd); |
1698 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1699 | } |
1700 | } |
1701 | |
1702 | i = 0; |
1703 | list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) |
1704 | audit_log_name(context, n, i++, &call_panic); |
1705 | |
1706 | /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ |
1707 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE); |
1708 | if (ab) |
1709 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1710 | if (call_panic) |
1711 | audit_panic("error converting sid to string"); |
1712 | } |
1713 | |
1714 | /** |
1715 | * audit_free - free a per-task audit context |
1716 | * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free |
1717 | * |
1718 | * Called from copy_process and do_exit |
1719 | */ |
1720 | void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) |
1721 | { |
1722 | struct audit_context *context; |
1723 | |
1724 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0); |
1725 | if (!context) |
1726 | return; |
1727 | |
1728 | /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit |
1729 | * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. |
1730 | * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this |
1731 | * in the context of the idle thread */ |
1732 | /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */ |
1733 | if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) |
1734 | audit_log_exit(context, tsk); |
1735 | if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) |
1736 | audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees); |
1737 | |
1738 | audit_free_context(context); |
1739 | } |
1740 | |
1741 | /** |
1742 | * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry |
1743 | * @arch: architecture type |
1744 | * @major: major syscall type (function) |
1745 | * @a1: additional syscall register 1 |
1746 | * @a2: additional syscall register 2 |
1747 | * @a3: additional syscall register 3 |
1748 | * @a4: additional syscall register 4 |
1749 | * |
1750 | * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the |
1751 | * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or |
1752 | * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the |
1753 | * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT, |
1754 | * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it |
1755 | * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it |
1756 | * be written). |
1757 | */ |
1758 | void __audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major, |
1759 | unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, |
1760 | unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4) |
1761 | { |
1762 | struct task_struct *tsk = current; |
1763 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; |
1764 | enum audit_state state; |
1765 | |
1766 | if (!context) |
1767 | return; |
1768 | |
1769 | BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count); |
1770 | |
1771 | if (!audit_enabled) |
1772 | return; |
1773 | |
1774 | context->arch = arch; |
1775 | context->major = major; |
1776 | context->argv[0] = a1; |
1777 | context->argv[1] = a2; |
1778 | context->argv[2] = a3; |
1779 | context->argv[3] = a4; |
1780 | |
1781 | state = context->state; |
1782 | context->dummy = !audit_n_rules; |
1783 | if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) { |
1784 | context->prio = 0; |
1785 | state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]); |
1786 | } |
1787 | if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) |
1788 | return; |
1789 | |
1790 | context->serial = 0; |
1791 | context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME; |
1792 | context->in_syscall = 1; |
1793 | context->current_state = state; |
1794 | context->ppid = 0; |
1795 | } |
1796 | |
1797 | /** |
1798 | * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call |
1799 | * @success: success value of the syscall |
1800 | * @return_code: return value of the syscall |
1801 | * |
1802 | * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as |
1803 | * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from |
1804 | * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit |
1805 | * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, |
1806 | * free the names stored from getname(). |
1807 | */ |
1808 | void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) |
1809 | { |
1810 | struct task_struct *tsk = current; |
1811 | struct audit_context *context; |
1812 | |
1813 | if (success) |
1814 | success = AUDITSC_SUCCESS; |
1815 | else |
1816 | success = AUDITSC_FAILURE; |
1817 | |
1818 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, success, return_code); |
1819 | if (!context) |
1820 | return; |
1821 | |
1822 | if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) |
1823 | audit_log_exit(context, tsk); |
1824 | |
1825 | context->in_syscall = 0; |
1826 | context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0; |
1827 | |
1828 | if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) |
1829 | audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees); |
1830 | |
1831 | audit_free_names(context); |
1832 | unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); |
1833 | audit_free_aux(context); |
1834 | context->aux = NULL; |
1835 | context->aux_pids = NULL; |
1836 | context->target_pid = 0; |
1837 | context->target_sid = 0; |
1838 | context->sockaddr_len = 0; |
1839 | context->type = 0; |
1840 | context->fds[0] = -1; |
1841 | if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) { |
1842 | kfree(context->filterkey); |
1843 | context->filterkey = NULL; |
1844 | } |
1845 | tsk->audit_context = context; |
1846 | } |
1847 | |
1848 | static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode) |
1849 | { |
1850 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
1851 | struct audit_context *context; |
1852 | struct audit_tree_refs *p; |
1853 | struct audit_chunk *chunk; |
1854 | int count; |
1855 | if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) |
1856 | return; |
1857 | context = current->audit_context; |
1858 | p = context->trees; |
1859 | count = context->tree_count; |
1860 | rcu_read_lock(); |
1861 | chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); |
1862 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1863 | if (!chunk) |
1864 | return; |
1865 | if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) |
1866 | return; |
1867 | if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) { |
1868 | printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); |
1869 | audit_set_auditable(context); |
1870 | audit_put_chunk(chunk); |
1871 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
1872 | return; |
1873 | } |
1874 | put_tree_ref(context, chunk); |
1875 | #endif |
1876 | } |
1877 | |
1878 | static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry) |
1879 | { |
1880 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
1881 | struct audit_context *context; |
1882 | struct audit_tree_refs *p; |
1883 | const struct dentry *d, *parent; |
1884 | struct audit_chunk *drop; |
1885 | unsigned long seq; |
1886 | int count; |
1887 | |
1888 | context = current->audit_context; |
1889 | p = context->trees; |
1890 | count = context->tree_count; |
1891 | retry: |
1892 | drop = NULL; |
1893 | d = dentry; |
1894 | rcu_read_lock(); |
1895 | seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock); |
1896 | for(;;) { |
1897 | struct inode *inode = d->d_inode; |
1898 | if (inode && unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) { |
1899 | struct audit_chunk *chunk; |
1900 | chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); |
1901 | if (chunk) { |
1902 | if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) { |
1903 | drop = chunk; |
1904 | break; |
1905 | } |
1906 | } |
1907 | } |
1908 | parent = d->d_parent; |
1909 | if (parent == d) |
1910 | break; |
1911 | d = parent; |
1912 | } |
1913 | if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */ |
1914 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1915 | if (!drop) { |
1916 | /* just a race with rename */ |
1917 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
1918 | goto retry; |
1919 | } |
1920 | audit_put_chunk(drop); |
1921 | if (grow_tree_refs(context)) { |
1922 | /* OK, got more space */ |
1923 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
1924 | goto retry; |
1925 | } |
1926 | /* too bad */ |
1927 | printk(KERN_WARNING |
1928 | "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); |
1929 | unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
1930 | audit_set_auditable(context); |
1931 | return; |
1932 | } |
1933 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1934 | #endif |
1935 | } |
1936 | |
1937 | static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context, |
1938 | unsigned char type) |
1939 | { |
1940 | struct audit_names *aname; |
1941 | |
1942 | if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) { |
1943 | aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count]; |
1944 | memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname)); |
1945 | } else { |
1946 | aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS); |
1947 | if (!aname) |
1948 | return NULL; |
1949 | aname->should_free = true; |
1950 | } |
1951 | |
1952 | aname->ino = (unsigned long)-1; |
1953 | aname->type = type; |
1954 | list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list); |
1955 | |
1956 | context->name_count++; |
1957 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
1958 | context->ino_count++; |
1959 | #endif |
1960 | return aname; |
1961 | } |
1962 | |
1963 | /** |
1964 | * audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry |
1965 | * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname |
1966 | * |
1967 | * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an |
1968 | * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename |
1969 | * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL. |
1970 | */ |
1971 | struct filename * |
1972 | __audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr) |
1973 | { |
1974 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
1975 | struct audit_names *n; |
1976 | |
1977 | list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { |
1978 | if (!n->name) |
1979 | continue; |
1980 | if (n->name->uptr == uptr) |
1981 | return n->name; |
1982 | } |
1983 | return NULL; |
1984 | } |
1985 | |
1986 | /** |
1987 | * audit_getname - add a name to the list |
1988 | * @name: name to add |
1989 | * |
1990 | * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context. |
1991 | * Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). |
1992 | */ |
1993 | void __audit_getname(struct filename *name) |
1994 | { |
1995 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
1996 | struct audit_names *n; |
1997 | |
1998 | if (!context->in_syscall) { |
1999 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 |
2000 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n", |
2001 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); |
2002 | dump_stack(); |
2003 | #endif |
2004 | return; |
2005 | } |
2006 | |
2007 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
2008 | /* The filename _must_ have a populated ->name */ |
2009 | BUG_ON(!name->name); |
2010 | #endif |
2011 | |
2012 | n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN); |
2013 | if (!n) |
2014 | return; |
2015 | |
2016 | n->name = name; |
2017 | n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; |
2018 | n->name_put = true; |
2019 | name->aname = n; |
2020 | |
2021 | if (!context->pwd.dentry) |
2022 | get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd); |
2023 | } |
2024 | |
2025 | /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request |
2026 | * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname |
2027 | * |
2028 | * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context, |
2029 | * then we delay the putname until syscall exit. |
2030 | * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname(). |
2031 | */ |
2032 | void audit_putname(struct filename *name) |
2033 | { |
2034 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2035 | |
2036 | BUG_ON(!context); |
2037 | if (!context->in_syscall) { |
2038 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 |
2039 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n", |
2040 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); |
2041 | if (context->name_count) { |
2042 | struct audit_names *n; |
2043 | int i; |
2044 | |
2045 | list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) |
2046 | printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, |
2047 | n->name, n->name->name ?: "(null)"); |
2048 | } |
2049 | #endif |
2050 | __putname(name); |
2051 | } |
2052 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
2053 | else { |
2054 | ++context->put_count; |
2055 | if (context->put_count > context->name_count) { |
2056 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d" |
2057 | " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d" |
2058 | " put_count=%d\n", |
2059 | __FILE__, __LINE__, |
2060 | context->serial, context->major, |
2061 | context->in_syscall, name->name, |
2062 | context->name_count, context->put_count); |
2063 | dump_stack(); |
2064 | } |
2065 | } |
2066 | #endif |
2067 | } |
2068 | |
2069 | static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry) |
2070 | { |
2071 | struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps; |
2072 | int rc; |
2073 | |
2074 | if (!dentry) |
2075 | return 0; |
2076 | |
2077 | rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps); |
2078 | if (rc) |
2079 | return rc; |
2080 | |
2081 | name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted; |
2082 | name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable; |
2083 | name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); |
2084 | name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; |
2085 | |
2086 | return 0; |
2087 | } |
2088 | |
2089 | |
2090 | /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */ |
2091 | static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry, |
2092 | const struct inode *inode) |
2093 | { |
2094 | name->ino = inode->i_ino; |
2095 | name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; |
2096 | name->mode = inode->i_mode; |
2097 | name->uid = inode->i_uid; |
2098 | name->gid = inode->i_gid; |
2099 | name->rdev = inode->i_rdev; |
2100 | security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid); |
2101 | audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry); |
2102 | } |
2103 | |
2104 | /** |
2105 | * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup |
2106 | * @name: name being audited |
2107 | * @dentry: dentry being audited |
2108 | * @parent: does this dentry represent the parent? |
2109 | */ |
2110 | void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry, |
2111 | unsigned int parent) |
2112 | { |
2113 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2114 | const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
2115 | struct audit_names *n; |
2116 | |
2117 | if (!context->in_syscall) |
2118 | return; |
2119 | |
2120 | if (!name) |
2121 | goto out_alloc; |
2122 | |
2123 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
2124 | /* The struct filename _must_ have a populated ->name */ |
2125 | BUG_ON(!name->name); |
2126 | #endif |
2127 | /* |
2128 | * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can |
2129 | * just use it directly if the type is correct. |
2130 | */ |
2131 | n = name->aname; |
2132 | if (n) { |
2133 | if (parent) { |
2134 | if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT || |
2135 | n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) |
2136 | goto out; |
2137 | } else { |
2138 | if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT) |
2139 | goto out; |
2140 | } |
2141 | } |
2142 | |
2143 | list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) { |
2144 | /* does the name pointer match? */ |
2145 | if (!n->name || n->name->name != name->name) |
2146 | continue; |
2147 | |
2148 | /* match the correct record type */ |
2149 | if (parent) { |
2150 | if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT || |
2151 | n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) |
2152 | goto out; |
2153 | } else { |
2154 | if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT) |
2155 | goto out; |
2156 | } |
2157 | } |
2158 | |
2159 | out_alloc: |
2160 | /* unable to find the name from a previous getname(). Allocate a new |
2161 | * anonymous entry. |
2162 | */ |
2163 | n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL); |
2164 | if (!n) |
2165 | return; |
2166 | out: |
2167 | if (parent) { |
2168 | n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL; |
2169 | n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT; |
2170 | } else { |
2171 | n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; |
2172 | n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL; |
2173 | } |
2174 | handle_path(dentry); |
2175 | audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode); |
2176 | } |
2177 | |
2178 | /** |
2179 | * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects |
2180 | * @parent: inode of dentry parent |
2181 | * @dentry: dentry being audited |
2182 | * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for |
2183 | * |
2184 | * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode |
2185 | * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent. |
2186 | * This call updates the audit context with the child's information. |
2187 | * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after |
2188 | * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object |
2189 | * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during |
2190 | * unsuccessful attempts. |
2191 | */ |
2192 | void __audit_inode_child(const struct inode *parent, |
2193 | const struct dentry *dentry, |
2194 | const unsigned char type) |
2195 | { |
2196 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2197 | const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
2198 | const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name; |
2199 | struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL; |
2200 | |
2201 | if (!context->in_syscall) |
2202 | return; |
2203 | |
2204 | if (inode) |
2205 | handle_one(inode); |
2206 | |
2207 | /* look for a parent entry first */ |
2208 | list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { |
2209 | if (!n->name || n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT) |
2210 | continue; |
2211 | |
2212 | if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && |
2213 | !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name, n->name_len)) { |
2214 | found_parent = n; |
2215 | break; |
2216 | } |
2217 | } |
2218 | |
2219 | /* is there a matching child entry? */ |
2220 | list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { |
2221 | /* can only match entries that have a name */ |
2222 | if (!n->name || n->type != type) |
2223 | continue; |
2224 | |
2225 | /* if we found a parent, make sure this one is a child of it */ |
2226 | if (found_parent && (n->name != found_parent->name)) |
2227 | continue; |
2228 | |
2229 | if (!strcmp(dname, n->name->name) || |
2230 | !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name, |
2231 | found_parent ? |
2232 | found_parent->name_len : |
2233 | AUDIT_NAME_FULL)) { |
2234 | found_child = n; |
2235 | break; |
2236 | } |
2237 | } |
2238 | |
2239 | if (!found_parent) { |
2240 | /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */ |
2241 | n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT); |
2242 | if (!n) |
2243 | return; |
2244 | audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent); |
2245 | } |
2246 | |
2247 | if (!found_child) { |
2248 | found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type); |
2249 | if (!found_child) |
2250 | return; |
2251 | |
2252 | /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent |
2253 | * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in |
2254 | * audit_free_names() */ |
2255 | if (found_parent) { |
2256 | found_child->name = found_parent->name; |
2257 | found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; |
2258 | /* don't call __putname() */ |
2259 | found_child->name_put = false; |
2260 | } |
2261 | } |
2262 | if (inode) |
2263 | audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode); |
2264 | else |
2265 | found_child->ino = (unsigned long)-1; |
2266 | } |
2267 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child); |
2268 | |
2269 | /** |
2270 | * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values |
2271 | * @ctx: audit_context for the task |
2272 | * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context |
2273 | * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context |
2274 | * |
2275 | * Also sets the context as auditable. |
2276 | */ |
2277 | int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, |
2278 | struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial) |
2279 | { |
2280 | if (!ctx->in_syscall) |
2281 | return 0; |
2282 | if (!ctx->serial) |
2283 | ctx->serial = audit_serial(); |
2284 | t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec; |
2285 | t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec; |
2286 | *serial = ctx->serial; |
2287 | if (!ctx->prio) { |
2288 | ctx->prio = 1; |
2289 | ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; |
2290 | } |
2291 | return 1; |
2292 | } |
2293 | |
2294 | /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */ |
2295 | static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0); |
2296 | |
2297 | /** |
2298 | * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid |
2299 | * @loginuid: loginuid value |
2300 | * |
2301 | * Returns 0. |
2302 | * |
2303 | * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write(). |
2304 | */ |
2305 | int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) |
2306 | { |
2307 | struct task_struct *task = current; |
2308 | struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context; |
2309 | unsigned int sessionid; |
2310 | |
2311 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE |
2312 | if (uid_valid(task->loginuid)) |
2313 | return -EPERM; |
2314 | #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */ |
2315 | if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) |
2316 | return -EPERM; |
2317 | #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */ |
2318 | |
2319 | sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id); |
2320 | if (context && context->in_syscall) { |
2321 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
2322 | |
2323 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN); |
2324 | if (ab) { |
2325 | audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u " |
2326 | "old auid=%u new auid=%u" |
2327 | " old ses=%u new ses=%u", |
2328 | task->pid, |
2329 | from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(task)), |
2330 | from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task->loginuid), |
2331 | from_kuid(&init_user_ns, loginuid), |
2332 | task->sessionid, sessionid); |
2333 | audit_log_end(ab); |
2334 | } |
2335 | } |
2336 | task->sessionid = sessionid; |
2337 | task->loginuid = loginuid; |
2338 | return 0; |
2339 | } |
2340 | |
2341 | /** |
2342 | * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open |
2343 | * @oflag: open flag |
2344 | * @mode: mode bits |
2345 | * @attr: queue attributes |
2346 | * |
2347 | */ |
2348 | void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr) |
2349 | { |
2350 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2351 | |
2352 | if (attr) |
2353 | memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); |
2354 | else |
2355 | memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); |
2356 | |
2357 | context->mq_open.oflag = oflag; |
2358 | context->mq_open.mode = mode; |
2359 | |
2360 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN; |
2361 | } |
2362 | |
2363 | /** |
2364 | * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive |
2365 | * @mqdes: MQ descriptor |
2366 | * @msg_len: Message length |
2367 | * @msg_prio: Message priority |
2368 | * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time |
2369 | * |
2370 | */ |
2371 | void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio, |
2372 | const struct timespec *abs_timeout) |
2373 | { |
2374 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2375 | struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout; |
2376 | |
2377 | if (abs_timeout) |
2378 | memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec)); |
2379 | else |
2380 | memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec)); |
2381 | |
2382 | context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes; |
2383 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len; |
2384 | context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio; |
2385 | |
2386 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV; |
2387 | } |
2388 | |
2389 | /** |
2390 | * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify |
2391 | * @mqdes: MQ descriptor |
2392 | * @notification: Notification event |
2393 | * |
2394 | */ |
2395 | |
2396 | void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification) |
2397 | { |
2398 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2399 | |
2400 | if (notification) |
2401 | context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo; |
2402 | else |
2403 | context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0; |
2404 | |
2405 | context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes; |
2406 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY; |
2407 | } |
2408 | |
2409 | /** |
2410 | * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute |
2411 | * @mqdes: MQ descriptor |
2412 | * @mqstat: MQ flags |
2413 | * |
2414 | */ |
2415 | void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat) |
2416 | { |
2417 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2418 | context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes; |
2419 | context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat; |
2420 | context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR; |
2421 | } |
2422 | |
2423 | /** |
2424 | * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object |
2425 | * @ipcp: ipc permissions |
2426 | * |
2427 | */ |
2428 | void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) |
2429 | { |
2430 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2431 | context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid; |
2432 | context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid; |
2433 | context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode; |
2434 | context->ipc.has_perm = 0; |
2435 | security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid); |
2436 | context->type = AUDIT_IPC; |
2437 | } |
2438 | |
2439 | /** |
2440 | * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions |
2441 | * @qbytes: msgq bytes |
2442 | * @uid: msgq user id |
2443 | * @gid: msgq group id |
2444 | * @mode: msgq mode (permissions) |
2445 | * |
2446 | * Called only after audit_ipc_obj(). |
2447 | */ |
2448 | void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode) |
2449 | { |
2450 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2451 | |
2452 | context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes; |
2453 | context->ipc.perm_uid = uid; |
2454 | context->ipc.perm_gid = gid; |
2455 | context->ipc.perm_mode = mode; |
2456 | context->ipc.has_perm = 1; |
2457 | } |
2458 | |
2459 | int __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
2460 | { |
2461 | struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax; |
2462 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2463 | |
2464 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); |
2465 | if (!ax) |
2466 | return -ENOMEM; |
2467 | |
2468 | ax->argc = bprm->argc; |
2469 | ax->envc = bprm->envc; |
2470 | ax->mm = bprm->mm; |
2471 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE; |
2472 | ax->d.next = context->aux; |
2473 | context->aux = (void *)ax; |
2474 | return 0; |
2475 | } |
2476 | |
2477 | |
2478 | /** |
2479 | * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall |
2480 | * @nargs: number of args |
2481 | * @args: args array |
2482 | * |
2483 | */ |
2484 | void __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) |
2485 | { |
2486 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2487 | |
2488 | context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL; |
2489 | context->socketcall.nargs = nargs; |
2490 | memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long)); |
2491 | } |
2492 | |
2493 | /** |
2494 | * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair |
2495 | * @fd1: the first file descriptor |
2496 | * @fd2: the second file descriptor |
2497 | * |
2498 | */ |
2499 | void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2) |
2500 | { |
2501 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2502 | context->fds[0] = fd1; |
2503 | context->fds[1] = fd2; |
2504 | } |
2505 | |
2506 | /** |
2507 | * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto |
2508 | * @len: data length in user space |
2509 | * @a: data address in kernel space |
2510 | * |
2511 | * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. |
2512 | */ |
2513 | int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) |
2514 | { |
2515 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2516 | |
2517 | if (!context->sockaddr) { |
2518 | void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL); |
2519 | if (!p) |
2520 | return -ENOMEM; |
2521 | context->sockaddr = p; |
2522 | } |
2523 | |
2524 | context->sockaddr_len = len; |
2525 | memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len); |
2526 | return 0; |
2527 | } |
2528 | |
2529 | void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) |
2530 | { |
2531 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2532 | |
2533 | context->target_pid = t->pid; |
2534 | context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); |
2535 | context->target_uid = task_uid(t); |
2536 | context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); |
2537 | security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); |
2538 | memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); |
2539 | } |
2540 | |
2541 | /** |
2542 | * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem |
2543 | * @sig: signal value |
2544 | * @t: task being signaled |
2545 | * |
2546 | * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid) |
2547 | * and uid that is doing that. |
2548 | */ |
2549 | int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) |
2550 | { |
2551 | struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp; |
2552 | struct task_struct *tsk = current; |
2553 | struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context; |
2554 | kuid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t); |
2555 | |
2556 | if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) { |
2557 | if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) { |
2558 | audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid; |
2559 | if (uid_valid(tsk->loginuid)) |
2560 | audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid; |
2561 | else |
2562 | audit_sig_uid = uid; |
2563 | security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid); |
2564 | } |
2565 | if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) |
2566 | return 0; |
2567 | } |
2568 | |
2569 | /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly |
2570 | * in audit_context */ |
2571 | if (!ctx->target_pid) { |
2572 | ctx->target_pid = t->tgid; |
2573 | ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); |
2574 | ctx->target_uid = t_uid; |
2575 | ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); |
2576 | security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); |
2577 | memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); |
2578 | return 0; |
2579 | } |
2580 | |
2581 | axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids; |
2582 | if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) { |
2583 | axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC); |
2584 | if (!axp) |
2585 | return -ENOMEM; |
2586 | |
2587 | axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID; |
2588 | axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids; |
2589 | ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp; |
2590 | } |
2591 | BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS); |
2592 | |
2593 | axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid; |
2594 | axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); |
2595 | axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; |
2596 | axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); |
2597 | security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); |
2598 | memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); |
2599 | axp->pid_count++; |
2600 | |
2601 | return 0; |
2602 | } |
2603 | |
2604 | /** |
2605 | * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps |
2606 | * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed |
2607 | * @new: the proposed new credentials |
2608 | * @old: the old credentials |
2609 | * |
2610 | * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not |
2611 | * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall |
2612 | * |
2613 | * -Eric |
2614 | */ |
2615 | int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, |
2616 | const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
2617 | { |
2618 | struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax; |
2619 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2620 | struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps; |
2621 | struct dentry *dentry; |
2622 | |
2623 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); |
2624 | if (!ax) |
2625 | return -ENOMEM; |
2626 | |
2627 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS; |
2628 | ax->d.next = context->aux; |
2629 | context->aux = (void *)ax; |
2630 | |
2631 | dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry); |
2632 | get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps); |
2633 | dput(dentry); |
2634 | |
2635 | ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted; |
2636 | ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable; |
2637 | ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); |
2638 | ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; |
2639 | |
2640 | ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted; |
2641 | ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable; |
2642 | ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective; |
2643 | |
2644 | ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; |
2645 | ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable; |
2646 | ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective; |
2647 | return 0; |
2648 | } |
2649 | |
2650 | /** |
2651 | * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall |
2652 | * @pid: target pid of the capset call |
2653 | * @new: the new credentials |
2654 | * @old: the old (current) credentials |
2655 | * |
2656 | * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the |
2657 | * audit system if applicable |
2658 | */ |
2659 | void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid, |
2660 | const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
2661 | { |
2662 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2663 | context->capset.pid = pid; |
2664 | context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective; |
2665 | context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective; |
2666 | context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; |
2667 | context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET; |
2668 | } |
2669 | |
2670 | void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) |
2671 | { |
2672 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
2673 | context->mmap.fd = fd; |
2674 | context->mmap.flags = flags; |
2675 | context->type = AUDIT_MMAP; |
2676 | } |
2677 | |
2678 | static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab) |
2679 | { |
2680 | kuid_t auid, uid; |
2681 | kgid_t gid; |
2682 | unsigned int sessionid; |
2683 | |
2684 | auid = audit_get_loginuid(current); |
2685 | sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); |
2686 | current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid); |
2687 | |
2688 | audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u", |
2689 | from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid), |
2690 | from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), |
2691 | from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid), |
2692 | sessionid); |
2693 | audit_log_task_context(ab); |
2694 | audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid); |
2695 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm); |
2696 | } |
2697 | |
2698 | static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason, long signr) |
2699 | { |
2700 | audit_log_task(ab); |
2701 | audit_log_format(ab, " reason="); |
2702 | audit_log_string(ab, reason); |
2703 | audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr); |
2704 | } |
2705 | /** |
2706 | * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally |
2707 | * @signr: signal value |
2708 | * |
2709 | * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we |
2710 | * should record the event for investigation. |
2711 | */ |
2712 | void audit_core_dumps(long signr) |
2713 | { |
2714 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
2715 | |
2716 | if (!audit_enabled) |
2717 | return; |
2718 | |
2719 | if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */ |
2720 | return; |
2721 | |
2722 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND); |
2723 | if (unlikely(!ab)) |
2724 | return; |
2725 | audit_log_abend(ab, "memory violation", signr); |
2726 | audit_log_end(ab); |
2727 | } |
2728 | |
2729 | void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code) |
2730 | { |
2731 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
2732 | |
2733 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP); |
2734 | if (unlikely(!ab)) |
2735 | return; |
2736 | audit_log_task(ab); |
2737 | audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr); |
2738 | audit_log_format(ab, " syscall=%ld", syscall); |
2739 | audit_log_format(ab, " compat=%d", is_compat_task()); |
2740 | audit_log_format(ab, " ip=0x%lx", KSTK_EIP(current)); |
2741 | audit_log_format(ab, " code=0x%x", code); |
2742 | audit_log_end(ab); |
2743 | } |
2744 | |
2745 | struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void) |
2746 | { |
2747 | struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; |
2748 | if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall)) |
2749 | return NULL; |
2750 | return &ctx->killed_trees; |
2751 | } |
2752 |
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