Root/
1 | /* |
2 | * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module |
3 | * |
4 | * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations. |
5 | * |
6 | * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> |
7 | * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com> |
8 | * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com> |
9 | * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> |
10 | * |
11 | * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. |
12 | * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> |
13 | * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
14 | * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. |
15 | * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> |
16 | * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. |
17 | * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
18 | * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd. |
19 | * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp> |
20 | * |
21 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
22 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, |
23 | * as published by the Free Software Foundation. |
24 | */ |
25 | |
26 | #include <linux/init.h> |
27 | #include <linux/kernel.h> |
28 | #include <linux/tracehook.h> |
29 | #include <linux/errno.h> |
30 | #include <linux/sched.h> |
31 | #include <linux/security.h> |
32 | #include <linux/xattr.h> |
33 | #include <linux/capability.h> |
34 | #include <linux/unistd.h> |
35 | #include <linux/mm.h> |
36 | #include <linux/mman.h> |
37 | #include <linux/slab.h> |
38 | #include <linux/pagemap.h> |
39 | #include <linux/swap.h> |
40 | #include <linux/spinlock.h> |
41 | #include <linux/syscalls.h> |
42 | #include <linux/file.h> |
43 | #include <linux/fdtable.h> |
44 | #include <linux/namei.h> |
45 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
46 | #include <linux/proc_fs.h> |
47 | #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h> |
48 | #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> |
49 | #include <linux/tty.h> |
50 | #include <net/icmp.h> |
51 | #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */ |
52 | #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */ |
53 | #include <net/net_namespace.h> |
54 | #include <net/netlabel.h> |
55 | #include <linux/uaccess.h> |
56 | #include <asm/ioctls.h> |
57 | #include <asm/atomic.h> |
58 | #include <linux/bitops.h> |
59 | #include <linux/interrupt.h> |
60 | #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */ |
61 | #include <linux/netlink.h> |
62 | #include <linux/tcp.h> |
63 | #include <linux/udp.h> |
64 | #include <linux/dccp.h> |
65 | #include <linux/quota.h> |
66 | #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */ |
67 | #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */ |
68 | #include <linux/parser.h> |
69 | #include <linux/nfs_mount.h> |
70 | #include <net/ipv6.h> |
71 | #include <linux/hugetlb.h> |
72 | #include <linux/personality.h> |
73 | #include <linux/sysctl.h> |
74 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
75 | #include <linux/string.h> |
76 | #include <linux/selinux.h> |
77 | #include <linux/mutex.h> |
78 | #include <linux/posix-timers.h> |
79 | #include <linux/syslog.h> |
80 | |
81 | #include "avc.h" |
82 | #include "objsec.h" |
83 | #include "netif.h" |
84 | #include "netnode.h" |
85 | #include "netport.h" |
86 | #include "xfrm.h" |
87 | #include "netlabel.h" |
88 | #include "audit.h" |
89 | |
90 | #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" |
91 | #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX |
92 | |
93 | #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5 |
94 | |
95 | extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm); |
96 | extern struct security_operations *security_ops; |
97 | |
98 | /* SECMARK reference count */ |
99 | atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0); |
100 | |
101 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP |
102 | int selinux_enforcing; |
103 | |
104 | static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str) |
105 | { |
106 | unsigned long enforcing; |
107 | if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing)) |
108 | selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0; |
109 | return 1; |
110 | } |
111 | __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup); |
112 | #endif |
113 | |
114 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM |
115 | int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; |
116 | |
117 | static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str) |
118 | { |
119 | unsigned long enabled; |
120 | if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled)) |
121 | selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; |
122 | return 1; |
123 | } |
124 | __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup); |
125 | #else |
126 | int selinux_enabled = 1; |
127 | #endif |
128 | |
129 | /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized |
130 | before the policy was loaded. */ |
131 | static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head); |
132 | static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock); |
133 | |
134 | static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache; |
135 | |
136 | /** |
137 | * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled |
138 | * |
139 | * Description: |
140 | * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK |
141 | * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than |
142 | * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is |
143 | * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. |
144 | * |
145 | */ |
146 | static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void) |
147 | { |
148 | return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0); |
149 | } |
150 | |
151 | /* |
152 | * initialise the security for the init task |
153 | */ |
154 | static void cred_init_security(void) |
155 | { |
156 | struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred; |
157 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
158 | |
159 | tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
160 | if (!tsec) |
161 | panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n"); |
162 | |
163 | tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; |
164 | cred->security = tsec; |
165 | } |
166 | |
167 | /* |
168 | * get the security ID of a set of credentials |
169 | */ |
170 | static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred) |
171 | { |
172 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
173 | |
174 | tsec = cred->security; |
175 | return tsec->sid; |
176 | } |
177 | |
178 | /* |
179 | * get the objective security ID of a task |
180 | */ |
181 | static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task) |
182 | { |
183 | u32 sid; |
184 | |
185 | rcu_read_lock(); |
186 | sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task)); |
187 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
188 | return sid; |
189 | } |
190 | |
191 | /* |
192 | * get the subjective security ID of the current task |
193 | */ |
194 | static inline u32 current_sid(void) |
195 | { |
196 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security; |
197 | |
198 | return tsec->sid; |
199 | } |
200 | |
201 | /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */ |
202 | |
203 | static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) |
204 | { |
205 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
206 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
207 | |
208 | isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS); |
209 | if (!isec) |
210 | return -ENOMEM; |
211 | |
212 | mutex_init(&isec->lock); |
213 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list); |
214 | isec->inode = inode; |
215 | isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
216 | isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE; |
217 | isec->task_sid = sid; |
218 | inode->i_security = isec; |
219 | |
220 | return 0; |
221 | } |
222 | |
223 | static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) |
224 | { |
225 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
226 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; |
227 | |
228 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
229 | if (!list_empty(&isec->list)) |
230 | list_del_init(&isec->list); |
231 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
232 | |
233 | inode->i_security = NULL; |
234 | kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec); |
235 | } |
236 | |
237 | static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file) |
238 | { |
239 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; |
240 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
241 | |
242 | fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
243 | if (!fsec) |
244 | return -ENOMEM; |
245 | |
246 | fsec->sid = sid; |
247 | fsec->fown_sid = sid; |
248 | file->f_security = fsec; |
249 | |
250 | return 0; |
251 | } |
252 | |
253 | static void file_free_security(struct file *file) |
254 | { |
255 | struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; |
256 | file->f_security = NULL; |
257 | kfree(fsec); |
258 | } |
259 | |
260 | static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) |
261 | { |
262 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; |
263 | |
264 | sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
265 | if (!sbsec) |
266 | return -ENOMEM; |
267 | |
268 | mutex_init(&sbsec->lock); |
269 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list); |
270 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head); |
271 | spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
272 | sbsec->sb = sb; |
273 | sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
274 | sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE; |
275 | sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
276 | sb->s_security = sbsec; |
277 | |
278 | return 0; |
279 | } |
280 | |
281 | static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb) |
282 | { |
283 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; |
284 | |
285 | spin_lock(&sb_security_lock); |
286 | if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list)) |
287 | list_del_init(&sbsec->list); |
288 | spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock); |
289 | |
290 | sb->s_security = NULL; |
291 | kfree(sbsec); |
292 | } |
293 | |
294 | static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) |
295 | { |
296 | struct sk_security_struct *ssec; |
297 | |
298 | ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority); |
299 | if (!ssec) |
300 | return -ENOMEM; |
301 | |
302 | ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
303 | ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
304 | sk->sk_security = ssec; |
305 | |
306 | selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec); |
307 | |
308 | return 0; |
309 | } |
310 | |
311 | static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) |
312 | { |
313 | struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security; |
314 | |
315 | sk->sk_security = NULL; |
316 | selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec); |
317 | kfree(ssec); |
318 | } |
319 | |
320 | /* The security server must be initialized before |
321 | any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */ |
322 | extern int ss_initialized; |
323 | |
324 | /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */ |
325 | |
326 | static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = { |
327 | "uses xattr", |
328 | "uses transition SIDs", |
329 | "uses task SIDs", |
330 | "uses genfs_contexts", |
331 | "not configured for labeling", |
332 | "uses mountpoint labeling", |
333 | }; |
334 | |
335 | static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry); |
336 | |
337 | static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode) |
338 | { |
339 | return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL); |
340 | } |
341 | |
342 | enum { |
343 | Opt_error = -1, |
344 | Opt_context = 1, |
345 | Opt_fscontext = 2, |
346 | Opt_defcontext = 3, |
347 | Opt_rootcontext = 4, |
348 | Opt_labelsupport = 5, |
349 | }; |
350 | |
351 | static const match_table_t tokens = { |
352 | {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"}, |
353 | {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"}, |
354 | {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"}, |
355 | {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"}, |
356 | {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR}, |
357 | {Opt_error, NULL}, |
358 | }; |
359 | |
360 | #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n" |
361 | |
362 | static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid, |
363 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, |
364 | const struct cred *cred) |
365 | { |
366 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; |
367 | int rc; |
368 | |
369 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
370 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); |
371 | if (rc) |
372 | return rc; |
373 | |
374 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
375 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL); |
376 | return rc; |
377 | } |
378 | |
379 | static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid, |
380 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, |
381 | const struct cred *cred) |
382 | { |
383 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; |
384 | int rc; |
385 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
386 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); |
387 | if (rc) |
388 | return rc; |
389 | |
390 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
391 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL); |
392 | return rc; |
393 | } |
394 | |
395 | static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) |
396 | { |
397 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; |
398 | struct dentry *root = sb->s_root; |
399 | struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode; |
400 | int rc = 0; |
401 | |
402 | if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { |
403 | /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no |
404 | error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on |
405 | the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be |
406 | the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have |
407 | assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */ |
408 | if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) { |
409 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no " |
410 | "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); |
411 | rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; |
412 | goto out; |
413 | } |
414 | rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); |
415 | if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) { |
416 | if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) |
417 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " |
418 | "%s) has no security xattr handler\n", |
419 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); |
420 | else |
421 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " |
422 | "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id, |
423 | sb->s_type->name, -rc); |
424 | goto out; |
425 | } |
426 | } |
427 | |
428 | sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP); |
429 | |
430 | if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) |
431 | printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n", |
432 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); |
433 | else |
434 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n", |
435 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, |
436 | labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]); |
437 | |
438 | if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS || |
439 | sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT || |
440 | sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE || |
441 | sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) |
442 | sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP; |
443 | |
444 | /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/ |
445 | if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0) |
446 | sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP; |
447 | |
448 | /* Initialize the root inode. */ |
449 | rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root); |
450 | |
451 | /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g. |
452 | inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created |
453 | during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly |
454 | populates itself. */ |
455 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
456 | next_inode: |
457 | if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) { |
458 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = |
459 | list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next, |
460 | struct inode_security_struct, list); |
461 | struct inode *inode = isec->inode; |
462 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
463 | inode = igrab(inode); |
464 | if (inode) { |
465 | if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode)) |
466 | inode_doinit(inode); |
467 | iput(inode); |
468 | } |
469 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
470 | list_del_init(&isec->list); |
471 | goto next_inode; |
472 | } |
473 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
474 | out: |
475 | return rc; |
476 | } |
477 | |
478 | /* |
479 | * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security |
480 | * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying |
481 | * mount options, or whatever. |
482 | */ |
483 | static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb, |
484 | struct security_mnt_opts *opts) |
485 | { |
486 | int rc = 0, i; |
487 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; |
488 | char *context = NULL; |
489 | u32 len; |
490 | char tmp; |
491 | |
492 | security_init_mnt_opts(opts); |
493 | |
494 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) |
495 | return -EINVAL; |
496 | |
497 | if (!ss_initialized) |
498 | return -EINVAL; |
499 | |
500 | tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK; |
501 | /* count the number of mount options for this sb */ |
502 | for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { |
503 | if (tmp & 0x01) |
504 | opts->num_mnt_opts++; |
505 | tmp >>= 1; |
506 | } |
507 | /* Check if the Label support flag is set */ |
508 | if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) |
509 | opts->num_mnt_opts++; |
510 | |
511 | opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC); |
512 | if (!opts->mnt_opts) { |
513 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
514 | goto out_free; |
515 | } |
516 | |
517 | opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC); |
518 | if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) { |
519 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
520 | goto out_free; |
521 | } |
522 | |
523 | i = 0; |
524 | if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) { |
525 | rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len); |
526 | if (rc) |
527 | goto out_free; |
528 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; |
529 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT; |
530 | } |
531 | if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) { |
532 | rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len); |
533 | if (rc) |
534 | goto out_free; |
535 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; |
536 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT; |
537 | } |
538 | if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) { |
539 | rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len); |
540 | if (rc) |
541 | goto out_free; |
542 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; |
543 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT; |
544 | } |
545 | if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) { |
546 | struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode; |
547 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security; |
548 | |
549 | rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len); |
550 | if (rc) |
551 | goto out_free; |
552 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; |
553 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; |
554 | } |
555 | if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) { |
556 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL; |
557 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP; |
558 | } |
559 | |
560 | BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts); |
561 | |
562 | return 0; |
563 | |
564 | out_free: |
565 | security_free_mnt_opts(opts); |
566 | return rc; |
567 | } |
568 | |
569 | static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag, |
570 | u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid) |
571 | { |
572 | char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK; |
573 | |
574 | /* check if the old mount command had the same options */ |
575 | if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) |
576 | if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) || |
577 | (old_sid != new_sid)) |
578 | return 1; |
579 | |
580 | /* check if we were passed the same options twice, |
581 | * aka someone passed context=a,context=b |
582 | */ |
583 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) |
584 | if (mnt_flags & flag) |
585 | return 1; |
586 | return 0; |
587 | } |
588 | |
589 | /* |
590 | * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point |
591 | * labeling information. |
592 | */ |
593 | static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, |
594 | struct security_mnt_opts *opts) |
595 | { |
596 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
597 | int rc = 0, i; |
598 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; |
599 | const char *name = sb->s_type->name; |
600 | struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode; |
601 | struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security; |
602 | u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0; |
603 | u32 defcontext_sid = 0; |
604 | char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts; |
605 | int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags; |
606 | int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts; |
607 | |
608 | mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock); |
609 | |
610 | if (!ss_initialized) { |
611 | if (!num_opts) { |
612 | /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, |
613 | after the initial policy is loaded and the security |
614 | server is ready to handle calls. */ |
615 | spin_lock(&sb_security_lock); |
616 | if (list_empty(&sbsec->list)) |
617 | list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head); |
618 | spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock); |
619 | goto out; |
620 | } |
621 | rc = -EINVAL; |
622 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options " |
623 | "before the security server is initialized\n"); |
624 | goto out; |
625 | } |
626 | |
627 | /* |
628 | * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once |
629 | * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs. |
630 | * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data |
631 | * we need to skip the double mount verification. |
632 | * |
633 | * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first |
634 | * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using |
635 | * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options |
636 | * will be used for both mounts) |
637 | */ |
638 | if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) |
639 | && (num_opts == 0)) |
640 | goto out; |
641 | |
642 | /* |
643 | * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids. |
644 | * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more |
645 | * than once with different security options. |
646 | */ |
647 | for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) { |
648 | u32 sid; |
649 | |
650 | if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP) |
651 | continue; |
652 | rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], |
653 | strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid); |
654 | if (rc) { |
655 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" |
656 | "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", |
657 | mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc); |
658 | goto out; |
659 | } |
660 | switch (flags[i]) { |
661 | case FSCONTEXT_MNT: |
662 | fscontext_sid = sid; |
663 | |
664 | if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, |
665 | fscontext_sid)) |
666 | goto out_double_mount; |
667 | |
668 | sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT; |
669 | break; |
670 | case CONTEXT_MNT: |
671 | context_sid = sid; |
672 | |
673 | if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, |
674 | context_sid)) |
675 | goto out_double_mount; |
676 | |
677 | sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT; |
678 | break; |
679 | case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: |
680 | rootcontext_sid = sid; |
681 | |
682 | if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, |
683 | rootcontext_sid)) |
684 | goto out_double_mount; |
685 | |
686 | sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; |
687 | |
688 | break; |
689 | case DEFCONTEXT_MNT: |
690 | defcontext_sid = sid; |
691 | |
692 | if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, |
693 | defcontext_sid)) |
694 | goto out_double_mount; |
695 | |
696 | sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT; |
697 | |
698 | break; |
699 | default: |
700 | rc = -EINVAL; |
701 | goto out; |
702 | } |
703 | } |
704 | |
705 | if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { |
706 | /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */ |
707 | if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts) |
708 | goto out_double_mount; |
709 | rc = 0; |
710 | goto out; |
711 | } |
712 | |
713 | if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0) |
714 | sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC; |
715 | |
716 | /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */ |
717 | rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid); |
718 | if (rc) { |
719 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", |
720 | __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc); |
721 | goto out; |
722 | } |
723 | |
724 | /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */ |
725 | if (fscontext_sid) { |
726 | rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred); |
727 | if (rc) |
728 | goto out; |
729 | |
730 | sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid; |
731 | } |
732 | |
733 | /* |
734 | * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior. |
735 | * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set |
736 | * the superblock context if not already set. |
737 | */ |
738 | if (context_sid) { |
739 | if (!fscontext_sid) { |
740 | rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, |
741 | cred); |
742 | if (rc) |
743 | goto out; |
744 | sbsec->sid = context_sid; |
745 | } else { |
746 | rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, |
747 | cred); |
748 | if (rc) |
749 | goto out; |
750 | } |
751 | if (!rootcontext_sid) |
752 | rootcontext_sid = context_sid; |
753 | |
754 | sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid; |
755 | sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT; |
756 | } |
757 | |
758 | if (rootcontext_sid) { |
759 | rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, |
760 | cred); |
761 | if (rc) |
762 | goto out; |
763 | |
764 | root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid; |
765 | root_isec->initialized = 1; |
766 | } |
767 | |
768 | if (defcontext_sid) { |
769 | if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { |
770 | rc = -EINVAL; |
771 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is " |
772 | "invalid for this filesystem type\n"); |
773 | goto out; |
774 | } |
775 | |
776 | if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) { |
777 | rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid, |
778 | sbsec, cred); |
779 | if (rc) |
780 | goto out; |
781 | } |
782 | |
783 | sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid; |
784 | } |
785 | |
786 | rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb); |
787 | out: |
788 | mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock); |
789 | return rc; |
790 | out_double_mount: |
791 | rc = -EINVAL; |
792 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different " |
793 | "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name); |
794 | goto out; |
795 | } |
796 | |
797 | static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, |
798 | struct super_block *newsb) |
799 | { |
800 | const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security; |
801 | struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security; |
802 | |
803 | int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT); |
804 | int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT); |
805 | int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT); |
806 | |
807 | /* |
808 | * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm |
809 | * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal |
810 | * with it later |
811 | */ |
812 | if (!ss_initialized) { |
813 | spin_lock(&sb_security_lock); |
814 | if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list)) |
815 | list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head); |
816 | spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock); |
817 | return; |
818 | } |
819 | |
820 | /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */ |
821 | BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)); |
822 | |
823 | /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */ |
824 | if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) |
825 | return; |
826 | |
827 | mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock); |
828 | |
829 | newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags; |
830 | |
831 | newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid; |
832 | newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid; |
833 | newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior; |
834 | |
835 | if (set_context) { |
836 | u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid; |
837 | |
838 | if (!set_fscontext) |
839 | newsbsec->sid = sid; |
840 | if (!set_rootcontext) { |
841 | struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode; |
842 | struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security; |
843 | newisec->sid = sid; |
844 | } |
845 | newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid; |
846 | } |
847 | if (set_rootcontext) { |
848 | const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode; |
849 | const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security; |
850 | struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode; |
851 | struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security; |
852 | |
853 | newisec->sid = oldisec->sid; |
854 | } |
855 | |
856 | sb_finish_set_opts(newsb); |
857 | mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock); |
858 | } |
859 | |
860 | static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options, |
861 | struct security_mnt_opts *opts) |
862 | { |
863 | char *p; |
864 | char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL; |
865 | char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL; |
866 | int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0; |
867 | |
868 | opts->num_mnt_opts = 0; |
869 | |
870 | /* Standard string-based options. */ |
871 | while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) { |
872 | int token; |
873 | substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; |
874 | |
875 | if (!*p) |
876 | continue; |
877 | |
878 | token = match_token(p, tokens, args); |
879 | |
880 | switch (token) { |
881 | case Opt_context: |
882 | if (context || defcontext) { |
883 | rc = -EINVAL; |
884 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); |
885 | goto out_err; |
886 | } |
887 | context = match_strdup(&args[0]); |
888 | if (!context) { |
889 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
890 | goto out_err; |
891 | } |
892 | break; |
893 | |
894 | case Opt_fscontext: |
895 | if (fscontext) { |
896 | rc = -EINVAL; |
897 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); |
898 | goto out_err; |
899 | } |
900 | fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); |
901 | if (!fscontext) { |
902 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
903 | goto out_err; |
904 | } |
905 | break; |
906 | |
907 | case Opt_rootcontext: |
908 | if (rootcontext) { |
909 | rc = -EINVAL; |
910 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); |
911 | goto out_err; |
912 | } |
913 | rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); |
914 | if (!rootcontext) { |
915 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
916 | goto out_err; |
917 | } |
918 | break; |
919 | |
920 | case Opt_defcontext: |
921 | if (context || defcontext) { |
922 | rc = -EINVAL; |
923 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); |
924 | goto out_err; |
925 | } |
926 | defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); |
927 | if (!defcontext) { |
928 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
929 | goto out_err; |
930 | } |
931 | break; |
932 | case Opt_labelsupport: |
933 | break; |
934 | default: |
935 | rc = -EINVAL; |
936 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n"); |
937 | goto out_err; |
938 | |
939 | } |
940 | } |
941 | |
942 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
943 | opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC); |
944 | if (!opts->mnt_opts) |
945 | goto out_err; |
946 | |
947 | opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC); |
948 | if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) { |
949 | kfree(opts->mnt_opts); |
950 | goto out_err; |
951 | } |
952 | |
953 | if (fscontext) { |
954 | opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext; |
955 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT; |
956 | } |
957 | if (context) { |
958 | opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context; |
959 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT; |
960 | } |
961 | if (rootcontext) { |
962 | opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext; |
963 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; |
964 | } |
965 | if (defcontext) { |
966 | opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext; |
967 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT; |
968 | } |
969 | |
970 | opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts; |
971 | return 0; |
972 | |
973 | out_err: |
974 | kfree(context); |
975 | kfree(defcontext); |
976 | kfree(fscontext); |
977 | kfree(rootcontext); |
978 | return rc; |
979 | } |
980 | /* |
981 | * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec |
982 | */ |
983 | static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data) |
984 | { |
985 | int rc = 0; |
986 | char *options = data; |
987 | struct security_mnt_opts opts; |
988 | |
989 | security_init_mnt_opts(&opts); |
990 | |
991 | if (!data) |
992 | goto out; |
993 | |
994 | BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA); |
995 | |
996 | rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts); |
997 | if (rc) |
998 | goto out_err; |
999 | |
1000 | out: |
1001 | rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts); |
1002 | |
1003 | out_err: |
1004 | security_free_mnt_opts(&opts); |
1005 | return rc; |
1006 | } |
1007 | |
1008 | static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m, |
1009 | struct security_mnt_opts *opts) |
1010 | { |
1011 | int i; |
1012 | char *prefix; |
1013 | |
1014 | for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) { |
1015 | char *has_comma; |
1016 | |
1017 | if (opts->mnt_opts[i]) |
1018 | has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ','); |
1019 | else |
1020 | has_comma = NULL; |
1021 | |
1022 | switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) { |
1023 | case CONTEXT_MNT: |
1024 | prefix = CONTEXT_STR; |
1025 | break; |
1026 | case FSCONTEXT_MNT: |
1027 | prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR; |
1028 | break; |
1029 | case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: |
1030 | prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR; |
1031 | break; |
1032 | case DEFCONTEXT_MNT: |
1033 | prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR; |
1034 | break; |
1035 | case SE_SBLABELSUPP: |
1036 | seq_putc(m, ','); |
1037 | seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR); |
1038 | continue; |
1039 | default: |
1040 | BUG(); |
1041 | }; |
1042 | /* we need a comma before each option */ |
1043 | seq_putc(m, ','); |
1044 | seq_puts(m, prefix); |
1045 | if (has_comma) |
1046 | seq_putc(m, '\"'); |
1047 | seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]); |
1048 | if (has_comma) |
1049 | seq_putc(m, '\"'); |
1050 | } |
1051 | } |
1052 | |
1053 | static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) |
1054 | { |
1055 | struct security_mnt_opts opts; |
1056 | int rc; |
1057 | |
1058 | rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts); |
1059 | if (rc) { |
1060 | /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */ |
1061 | if (rc == -EINVAL) |
1062 | rc = 0; |
1063 | return rc; |
1064 | } |
1065 | |
1066 | selinux_write_opts(m, &opts); |
1067 | |
1068 | security_free_mnt_opts(&opts); |
1069 | |
1070 | return rc; |
1071 | } |
1072 | |
1073 | static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode) |
1074 | { |
1075 | switch (mode & S_IFMT) { |
1076 | case S_IFSOCK: |
1077 | return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE; |
1078 | case S_IFLNK: |
1079 | return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE; |
1080 | case S_IFREG: |
1081 | return SECCLASS_FILE; |
1082 | case S_IFBLK: |
1083 | return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE; |
1084 | case S_IFDIR: |
1085 | return SECCLASS_DIR; |
1086 | case S_IFCHR: |
1087 | return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE; |
1088 | case S_IFIFO: |
1089 | return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE; |
1090 | |
1091 | } |
1092 | |
1093 | return SECCLASS_FILE; |
1094 | } |
1095 | |
1096 | static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol) |
1097 | { |
1098 | return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP); |
1099 | } |
1100 | |
1101 | static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol) |
1102 | { |
1103 | return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP); |
1104 | } |
1105 | |
1106 | static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol) |
1107 | { |
1108 | switch (family) { |
1109 | case PF_UNIX: |
1110 | switch (type) { |
1111 | case SOCK_STREAM: |
1112 | case SOCK_SEQPACKET: |
1113 | return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET; |
1114 | case SOCK_DGRAM: |
1115 | return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET; |
1116 | } |
1117 | break; |
1118 | case PF_INET: |
1119 | case PF_INET6: |
1120 | switch (type) { |
1121 | case SOCK_STREAM: |
1122 | if (default_protocol_stream(protocol)) |
1123 | return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET; |
1124 | else |
1125 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; |
1126 | case SOCK_DGRAM: |
1127 | if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol)) |
1128 | return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET; |
1129 | else |
1130 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; |
1131 | case SOCK_DCCP: |
1132 | return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET; |
1133 | default: |
1134 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; |
1135 | } |
1136 | break; |
1137 | case PF_NETLINK: |
1138 | switch (protocol) { |
1139 | case NETLINK_ROUTE: |
1140 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET; |
1141 | case NETLINK_FIREWALL: |
1142 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET; |
1143 | case NETLINK_INET_DIAG: |
1144 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET; |
1145 | case NETLINK_NFLOG: |
1146 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET; |
1147 | case NETLINK_XFRM: |
1148 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET; |
1149 | case NETLINK_SELINUX: |
1150 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET; |
1151 | case NETLINK_AUDIT: |
1152 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET; |
1153 | case NETLINK_IP6_FW: |
1154 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET; |
1155 | case NETLINK_DNRTMSG: |
1156 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET; |
1157 | case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT: |
1158 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET; |
1159 | default: |
1160 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET; |
1161 | } |
1162 | case PF_PACKET: |
1163 | return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET; |
1164 | case PF_KEY: |
1165 | return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET; |
1166 | case PF_APPLETALK: |
1167 | return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET; |
1168 | } |
1169 | |
1170 | return SECCLASS_SOCKET; |
1171 | } |
1172 | |
1173 | #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS |
1174 | static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de, |
1175 | u16 tclass, |
1176 | u32 *sid) |
1177 | { |
1178 | int buflen, rc; |
1179 | char *buffer, *path, *end; |
1180 | |
1181 | buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); |
1182 | if (!buffer) |
1183 | return -ENOMEM; |
1184 | |
1185 | buflen = PAGE_SIZE; |
1186 | end = buffer+buflen; |
1187 | *--end = '\0'; |
1188 | buflen--; |
1189 | path = end-1; |
1190 | *path = '/'; |
1191 | while (de && de != de->parent) { |
1192 | buflen -= de->namelen + 1; |
1193 | if (buflen < 0) |
1194 | break; |
1195 | end -= de->namelen; |
1196 | memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen); |
1197 | *--end = '/'; |
1198 | path = end; |
1199 | de = de->parent; |
1200 | } |
1201 | rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid); |
1202 | free_page((unsigned long)buffer); |
1203 | return rc; |
1204 | } |
1205 | #else |
1206 | static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de, |
1207 | u16 tclass, |
1208 | u32 *sid) |
1209 | { |
1210 | return -EINVAL; |
1211 | } |
1212 | #endif |
1213 | |
1214 | /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */ |
1215 | static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry) |
1216 | { |
1217 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL; |
1218 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
1219 | u32 sid; |
1220 | struct dentry *dentry; |
1221 | #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 |
1222 | char *context = NULL; |
1223 | unsigned len = 0; |
1224 | int rc = 0; |
1225 | |
1226 | if (isec->initialized) |
1227 | goto out; |
1228 | |
1229 | mutex_lock(&isec->lock); |
1230 | if (isec->initialized) |
1231 | goto out_unlock; |
1232 | |
1233 | sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; |
1234 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) { |
1235 | /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, |
1236 | after the initial policy is loaded and the security |
1237 | server is ready to handle calls. */ |
1238 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
1239 | if (list_empty(&isec->list)) |
1240 | list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head); |
1241 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
1242 | goto out_unlock; |
1243 | } |
1244 | |
1245 | switch (sbsec->behavior) { |
1246 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR: |
1247 | if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) { |
1248 | isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid; |
1249 | break; |
1250 | } |
1251 | |
1252 | /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one. |
1253 | Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */ |
1254 | if (opt_dentry) { |
1255 | /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */ |
1256 | dentry = dget(opt_dentry); |
1257 | } else { |
1258 | /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */ |
1259 | dentry = d_find_alias(inode); |
1260 | } |
1261 | if (!dentry) { |
1262 | /* |
1263 | * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed |
1264 | * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we |
1265 | * may find inodes that have no dentry on the |
1266 | * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these |
1267 | * will get fixed up the next time we go through |
1268 | * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could |
1269 | * be used again by userspace. |
1270 | */ |
1271 | goto out_unlock; |
1272 | } |
1273 | |
1274 | len = INITCONTEXTLEN; |
1275 | context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS); |
1276 | if (!context) { |
1277 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
1278 | dput(dentry); |
1279 | goto out_unlock; |
1280 | } |
1281 | context[len] = '\0'; |
1282 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, |
1283 | context, len); |
1284 | if (rc == -ERANGE) { |
1285 | kfree(context); |
1286 | |
1287 | /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ |
1288 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, |
1289 | NULL, 0); |
1290 | if (rc < 0) { |
1291 | dput(dentry); |
1292 | goto out_unlock; |
1293 | } |
1294 | len = rc; |
1295 | context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS); |
1296 | if (!context) { |
1297 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
1298 | dput(dentry); |
1299 | goto out_unlock; |
1300 | } |
1301 | context[len] = '\0'; |
1302 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, |
1303 | XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, |
1304 | context, len); |
1305 | } |
1306 | dput(dentry); |
1307 | if (rc < 0) { |
1308 | if (rc != -ENODATA) { |
1309 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned " |
1310 | "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__, |
1311 | -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); |
1312 | kfree(context); |
1313 | goto out_unlock; |
1314 | } |
1315 | /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */ |
1316 | sid = sbsec->def_sid; |
1317 | rc = 0; |
1318 | } else { |
1319 | rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid, |
1320 | sbsec->def_sid, |
1321 | GFP_NOFS); |
1322 | if (rc) { |
1323 | char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id; |
1324 | unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino; |
1325 | |
1326 | if (rc == -EINVAL) { |
1327 | if (printk_ratelimit()) |
1328 | printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid " |
1329 | "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the " |
1330 | "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context); |
1331 | } else { |
1332 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) " |
1333 | "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", |
1334 | __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino); |
1335 | } |
1336 | kfree(context); |
1337 | /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */ |
1338 | rc = 0; |
1339 | break; |
1340 | } |
1341 | } |
1342 | kfree(context); |
1343 | isec->sid = sid; |
1344 | break; |
1345 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK: |
1346 | isec->sid = isec->task_sid; |
1347 | break; |
1348 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS: |
1349 | /* Default to the fs SID. */ |
1350 | isec->sid = sbsec->sid; |
1351 | |
1352 | /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */ |
1353 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); |
1354 | rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, |
1355 | sbsec->sid, |
1356 | isec->sclass, |
1357 | &sid); |
1358 | if (rc) |
1359 | goto out_unlock; |
1360 | isec->sid = sid; |
1361 | break; |
1362 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT: |
1363 | isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid; |
1364 | break; |
1365 | default: |
1366 | /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */ |
1367 | isec->sid = sbsec->sid; |
1368 | |
1369 | if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { |
1370 | struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode); |
1371 | if (proci->pde) { |
1372 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); |
1373 | rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde, |
1374 | isec->sclass, |
1375 | &sid); |
1376 | if (rc) |
1377 | goto out_unlock; |
1378 | isec->sid = sid; |
1379 | } |
1380 | } |
1381 | break; |
1382 | } |
1383 | |
1384 | isec->initialized = 1; |
1385 | |
1386 | out_unlock: |
1387 | mutex_unlock(&isec->lock); |
1388 | out: |
1389 | if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE) |
1390 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); |
1391 | return rc; |
1392 | } |
1393 | |
1394 | /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */ |
1395 | static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig) |
1396 | { |
1397 | u32 perm = 0; |
1398 | |
1399 | switch (sig) { |
1400 | case SIGCHLD: |
1401 | /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */ |
1402 | perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD; |
1403 | break; |
1404 | case SIGKILL: |
1405 | /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ |
1406 | perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL; |
1407 | break; |
1408 | case SIGSTOP: |
1409 | /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ |
1410 | perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP; |
1411 | break; |
1412 | default: |
1413 | /* All other signals. */ |
1414 | perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL; |
1415 | break; |
1416 | } |
1417 | |
1418 | return perm; |
1419 | } |
1420 | |
1421 | /* |
1422 | * Check permission between a pair of credentials |
1423 | * fork check, ptrace check, etc. |
1424 | */ |
1425 | static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor, |
1426 | const struct cred *target, |
1427 | u32 perms) |
1428 | { |
1429 | u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target); |
1430 | |
1431 | return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL); |
1432 | } |
1433 | |
1434 | /* |
1435 | * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks, |
1436 | * fork check, ptrace check, etc. |
1437 | * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target |
1438 | * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1 |
1439 | */ |
1440 | static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1, |
1441 | const struct task_struct *tsk2, |
1442 | u32 perms) |
1443 | { |
1444 | const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2; |
1445 | u32 sid1, sid2; |
1446 | |
1447 | rcu_read_lock(); |
1448 | __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid; |
1449 | __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid; |
1450 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1451 | return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL); |
1452 | } |
1453 | |
1454 | /* |
1455 | * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks, |
1456 | * fork check, ptrace check, etc. |
1457 | * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target |
1458 | * - this uses current's subjective creds |
1459 | */ |
1460 | static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk, |
1461 | u32 perms) |
1462 | { |
1463 | u32 sid, tsid; |
1464 | |
1465 | sid = current_sid(); |
1466 | tsid = task_sid(tsk); |
1467 | return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL); |
1468 | } |
1469 | |
1470 | #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63 |
1471 | #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63. |
1472 | #endif |
1473 | |
1474 | /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */ |
1475 | static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk, |
1476 | const struct cred *cred, |
1477 | int cap, int audit) |
1478 | { |
1479 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
1480 | struct av_decision avd; |
1481 | u16 sclass; |
1482 | u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); |
1483 | u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap); |
1484 | int rc; |
1485 | |
1486 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP); |
1487 | ad.tsk = tsk; |
1488 | ad.u.cap = cap; |
1489 | |
1490 | switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) { |
1491 | case 0: |
1492 | sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY; |
1493 | break; |
1494 | case 1: |
1495 | sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2; |
1496 | break; |
1497 | default: |
1498 | printk(KERN_ERR |
1499 | "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap); |
1500 | BUG(); |
1501 | } |
1502 | |
1503 | rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd); |
1504 | if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) |
1505 | avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad); |
1506 | return rc; |
1507 | } |
1508 | |
1509 | /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */ |
1510 | static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk, |
1511 | u32 perms) |
1512 | { |
1513 | u32 sid = task_sid(tsk); |
1514 | |
1515 | return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, |
1516 | SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL); |
1517 | } |
1518 | |
1519 | /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode. |
1520 | The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit |
1521 | data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */ |
1522 | static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, |
1523 | struct inode *inode, |
1524 | u32 perms, |
1525 | struct common_audit_data *adp) |
1526 | { |
1527 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
1528 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
1529 | u32 sid; |
1530 | |
1531 | validate_creds(cred); |
1532 | |
1533 | if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) |
1534 | return 0; |
1535 | |
1536 | sid = cred_sid(cred); |
1537 | isec = inode->i_security; |
1538 | |
1539 | if (!adp) { |
1540 | adp = &ad; |
1541 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); |
1542 | ad.u.fs.inode = inode; |
1543 | } |
1544 | |
1545 | return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp); |
1546 | } |
1547 | |
1548 | /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing |
1549 | the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the |
1550 | pathname if needed. */ |
1551 | static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, |
1552 | struct vfsmount *mnt, |
1553 | struct dentry *dentry, |
1554 | u32 av) |
1555 | { |
1556 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
1557 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
1558 | |
1559 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); |
1560 | ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt; |
1561 | ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; |
1562 | return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); |
1563 | } |
1564 | |
1565 | /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to |
1566 | access an inode in a given way. Check access to the |
1567 | descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to |
1568 | check a particular permission to the file. |
1569 | Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it |
1570 | has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then |
1571 | access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases |
1572 | where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */ |
1573 | static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, |
1574 | struct file *file, |
1575 | u32 av) |
1576 | { |
1577 | struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; |
1578 | struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; |
1579 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
1580 | u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); |
1581 | int rc; |
1582 | |
1583 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); |
1584 | ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path; |
1585 | |
1586 | if (sid != fsec->sid) { |
1587 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, |
1588 | SECCLASS_FD, |
1589 | FD__USE, |
1590 | &ad); |
1591 | if (rc) |
1592 | goto out; |
1593 | } |
1594 | |
1595 | /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */ |
1596 | rc = 0; |
1597 | if (av) |
1598 | rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); |
1599 | |
1600 | out: |
1601 | return rc; |
1602 | } |
1603 | |
1604 | /* Check whether a task can create a file. */ |
1605 | static int may_create(struct inode *dir, |
1606 | struct dentry *dentry, |
1607 | u16 tclass) |
1608 | { |
1609 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
1610 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; |
1611 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec; |
1612 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; |
1613 | u32 sid, newsid; |
1614 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
1615 | int rc; |
1616 | |
1617 | dsec = dir->i_security; |
1618 | sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; |
1619 | |
1620 | sid = tsec->sid; |
1621 | newsid = tsec->create_sid; |
1622 | |
1623 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); |
1624 | ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; |
1625 | |
1626 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, |
1627 | DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, |
1628 | &ad); |
1629 | if (rc) |
1630 | return rc; |
1631 | |
1632 | if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) { |
1633 | rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid); |
1634 | if (rc) |
1635 | return rc; |
1636 | } |
1637 | |
1638 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad); |
1639 | if (rc) |
1640 | return rc; |
1641 | |
1642 | return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid, |
1643 | SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
1644 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); |
1645 | } |
1646 | |
1647 | /* Check whether a task can create a key. */ |
1648 | static int may_create_key(u32 ksid, |
1649 | struct task_struct *ctx) |
1650 | { |
1651 | u32 sid = task_sid(ctx); |
1652 | |
1653 | return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL); |
1654 | } |
1655 | |
1656 | #define MAY_LINK 0 |
1657 | #define MAY_UNLINK 1 |
1658 | #define MAY_RMDIR 2 |
1659 | |
1660 | /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */ |
1661 | static int may_link(struct inode *dir, |
1662 | struct dentry *dentry, |
1663 | int kind) |
1664 | |
1665 | { |
1666 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec; |
1667 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
1668 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
1669 | u32 av; |
1670 | int rc; |
1671 | |
1672 | dsec = dir->i_security; |
1673 | isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security; |
1674 | |
1675 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); |
1676 | ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; |
1677 | |
1678 | av = DIR__SEARCH; |
1679 | av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME); |
1680 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); |
1681 | if (rc) |
1682 | return rc; |
1683 | |
1684 | switch (kind) { |
1685 | case MAY_LINK: |
1686 | av = FILE__LINK; |
1687 | break; |
1688 | case MAY_UNLINK: |
1689 | av = FILE__UNLINK; |
1690 | break; |
1691 | case MAY_RMDIR: |
1692 | av = DIR__RMDIR; |
1693 | break; |
1694 | default: |
1695 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n", |
1696 | __func__, kind); |
1697 | return 0; |
1698 | } |
1699 | |
1700 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad); |
1701 | return rc; |
1702 | } |
1703 | |
1704 | static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, |
1705 | struct dentry *old_dentry, |
1706 | struct inode *new_dir, |
1707 | struct dentry *new_dentry) |
1708 | { |
1709 | struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec; |
1710 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
1711 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
1712 | u32 av; |
1713 | int old_is_dir, new_is_dir; |
1714 | int rc; |
1715 | |
1716 | old_dsec = old_dir->i_security; |
1717 | old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security; |
1718 | old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode); |
1719 | new_dsec = new_dir->i_security; |
1720 | |
1721 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); |
1722 | |
1723 | ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry; |
1724 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, |
1725 | DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad); |
1726 | if (rc) |
1727 | return rc; |
1728 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid, |
1729 | old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad); |
1730 | if (rc) |
1731 | return rc; |
1732 | if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) { |
1733 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid, |
1734 | old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad); |
1735 | if (rc) |
1736 | return rc; |
1737 | } |
1738 | |
1739 | ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry; |
1740 | av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH; |
1741 | if (new_dentry->d_inode) |
1742 | av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME; |
1743 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); |
1744 | if (rc) |
1745 | return rc; |
1746 | if (new_dentry->d_inode) { |
1747 | new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security; |
1748 | new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode); |
1749 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid, |
1750 | new_isec->sclass, |
1751 | (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad); |
1752 | if (rc) |
1753 | return rc; |
1754 | } |
1755 | |
1756 | return 0; |
1757 | } |
1758 | |
1759 | /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */ |
1760 | static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, |
1761 | struct super_block *sb, |
1762 | u32 perms, |
1763 | struct common_audit_data *ad) |
1764 | { |
1765 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; |
1766 | u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); |
1767 | |
1768 | sbsec = sb->s_security; |
1769 | return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad); |
1770 | } |
1771 | |
1772 | /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */ |
1773 | static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask) |
1774 | { |
1775 | u32 av = 0; |
1776 | |
1777 | if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) { |
1778 | if (mask & MAY_EXEC) |
1779 | av |= FILE__EXECUTE; |
1780 | if (mask & MAY_READ) |
1781 | av |= FILE__READ; |
1782 | |
1783 | if (mask & MAY_APPEND) |
1784 | av |= FILE__APPEND; |
1785 | else if (mask & MAY_WRITE) |
1786 | av |= FILE__WRITE; |
1787 | |
1788 | } else { |
1789 | if (mask & MAY_EXEC) |
1790 | av |= DIR__SEARCH; |
1791 | if (mask & MAY_WRITE) |
1792 | av |= DIR__WRITE; |
1793 | if (mask & MAY_READ) |
1794 | av |= DIR__READ; |
1795 | } |
1796 | |
1797 | return av; |
1798 | } |
1799 | |
1800 | /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */ |
1801 | static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file) |
1802 | { |
1803 | u32 av = 0; |
1804 | |
1805 | if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) |
1806 | av |= FILE__READ; |
1807 | if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) { |
1808 | if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND) |
1809 | av |= FILE__APPEND; |
1810 | else |
1811 | av |= FILE__WRITE; |
1812 | } |
1813 | if (!av) { |
1814 | /* |
1815 | * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use. |
1816 | */ |
1817 | av = FILE__IOCTL; |
1818 | } |
1819 | |
1820 | return av; |
1821 | } |
1822 | |
1823 | /* |
1824 | * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open |
1825 | * open permission. |
1826 | */ |
1827 | static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file) |
1828 | { |
1829 | u32 av = file_to_av(file); |
1830 | |
1831 | if (selinux_policycap_openperm) { |
1832 | mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode; |
1833 | /* |
1834 | * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open' |
1835 | */ |
1836 | if (S_ISREG(mode)) |
1837 | av |= FILE__OPEN; |
1838 | else if (S_ISCHR(mode)) |
1839 | av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN; |
1840 | else if (S_ISBLK(mode)) |
1841 | av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN; |
1842 | else if (S_ISFIFO(mode)) |
1843 | av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN; |
1844 | else if (S_ISDIR(mode)) |
1845 | av |= DIR__OPEN; |
1846 | else if (S_ISSOCK(mode)) |
1847 | av |= SOCK_FILE__OPEN; |
1848 | else |
1849 | printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with " |
1850 | "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode); |
1851 | } |
1852 | return av; |
1853 | } |
1854 | |
1855 | /* Hook functions begin here. */ |
1856 | |
1857 | static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, |
1858 | unsigned int mode) |
1859 | { |
1860 | int rc; |
1861 | |
1862 | rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode); |
1863 | if (rc) |
1864 | return rc; |
1865 | |
1866 | if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) { |
1867 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
1868 | u32 csid = task_sid(child); |
1869 | return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL); |
1870 | } |
1871 | |
1872 | return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE); |
1873 | } |
1874 | |
1875 | static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) |
1876 | { |
1877 | int rc; |
1878 | |
1879 | rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent); |
1880 | if (rc) |
1881 | return rc; |
1882 | |
1883 | return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE); |
1884 | } |
1885 | |
1886 | static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, |
1887 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) |
1888 | { |
1889 | int error; |
1890 | |
1891 | error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP); |
1892 | if (error) |
1893 | return error; |
1894 | |
1895 | return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); |
1896 | } |
1897 | |
1898 | static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, |
1899 | const kernel_cap_t *effective, |
1900 | const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, |
1901 | const kernel_cap_t *permitted) |
1902 | { |
1903 | int error; |
1904 | |
1905 | error = cap_capset(new, old, |
1906 | effective, inheritable, permitted); |
1907 | if (error) |
1908 | return error; |
1909 | |
1910 | return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP); |
1911 | } |
1912 | |
1913 | /* |
1914 | * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook, |
1915 | * which was removed). |
1916 | * |
1917 | * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux |
1918 | * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not |
1919 | * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of |
1920 | * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook. |
1921 | */ |
1922 | |
1923 | static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, |
1924 | int cap, int audit) |
1925 | { |
1926 | int rc; |
1927 | |
1928 | rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit); |
1929 | if (rc) |
1930 | return rc; |
1931 | |
1932 | return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit); |
1933 | } |
1934 | |
1935 | static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid) |
1936 | { |
1937 | int buflen, rc; |
1938 | char *buffer, *path, *end; |
1939 | |
1940 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
1941 | buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); |
1942 | if (!buffer) |
1943 | goto out; |
1944 | |
1945 | buflen = PAGE_SIZE; |
1946 | end = buffer+buflen; |
1947 | *--end = '\0'; |
1948 | buflen--; |
1949 | path = end-1; |
1950 | *path = '/'; |
1951 | while (table) { |
1952 | const char *name = table->procname; |
1953 | size_t namelen = strlen(name); |
1954 | buflen -= namelen + 1; |
1955 | if (buflen < 0) |
1956 | goto out_free; |
1957 | end -= namelen; |
1958 | memcpy(end, name, namelen); |
1959 | *--end = '/'; |
1960 | path = end; |
1961 | table = table->parent; |
1962 | } |
1963 | buflen -= 4; |
1964 | if (buflen < 0) |
1965 | goto out_free; |
1966 | end -= 4; |
1967 | memcpy(end, "/sys", 4); |
1968 | path = end; |
1969 | rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid); |
1970 | out_free: |
1971 | free_page((unsigned long)buffer); |
1972 | out: |
1973 | return rc; |
1974 | } |
1975 | |
1976 | static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op) |
1977 | { |
1978 | int error = 0; |
1979 | u32 av; |
1980 | u32 tsid, sid; |
1981 | int rc; |
1982 | |
1983 | sid = current_sid(); |
1984 | |
1985 | rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ? |
1986 | SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid); |
1987 | if (rc) { |
1988 | /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */ |
1989 | tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL; |
1990 | } |
1991 | |
1992 | /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating |
1993 | * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */ |
1994 | if (op == 001) { |
1995 | error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, |
1996 | SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL); |
1997 | } else { |
1998 | av = 0; |
1999 | if (op & 004) |
2000 | av |= FILE__READ; |
2001 | if (op & 002) |
2002 | av |= FILE__WRITE; |
2003 | if (av) |
2004 | error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, |
2005 | SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL); |
2006 | } |
2007 | |
2008 | return error; |
2009 | } |
2010 | |
2011 | static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) |
2012 | { |
2013 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2014 | int rc = 0; |
2015 | |
2016 | if (!sb) |
2017 | return 0; |
2018 | |
2019 | switch (cmds) { |
2020 | case Q_SYNC: |
2021 | case Q_QUOTAON: |
2022 | case Q_QUOTAOFF: |
2023 | case Q_SETINFO: |
2024 | case Q_SETQUOTA: |
2025 | rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL); |
2026 | break; |
2027 | case Q_GETFMT: |
2028 | case Q_GETINFO: |
2029 | case Q_GETQUOTA: |
2030 | rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL); |
2031 | break; |
2032 | default: |
2033 | rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */ |
2034 | break; |
2035 | } |
2036 | return rc; |
2037 | } |
2038 | |
2039 | static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) |
2040 | { |
2041 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2042 | |
2043 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON); |
2044 | } |
2045 | |
2046 | static int selinux_syslog(int type, bool from_file) |
2047 | { |
2048 | int rc; |
2049 | |
2050 | rc = cap_syslog(type, from_file); |
2051 | if (rc) |
2052 | return rc; |
2053 | |
2054 | switch (type) { |
2055 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */ |
2056 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */ |
2057 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ); |
2058 | break; |
2059 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */ |
2060 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */ |
2061 | /* Set level of messages printed to console */ |
2062 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL: |
2063 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE); |
2064 | break; |
2065 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */ |
2066 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */ |
2067 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */ |
2068 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */ |
2069 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */ |
2070 | default: |
2071 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD); |
2072 | break; |
2073 | } |
2074 | return rc; |
2075 | } |
2076 | |
2077 | /* |
2078 | * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual |
2079 | * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to |
2080 | * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not. |
2081 | * |
2082 | * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all |
2083 | * processes that allocate mappings. |
2084 | */ |
2085 | static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) |
2086 | { |
2087 | int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0; |
2088 | |
2089 | rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, |
2090 | SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); |
2091 | if (rc == 0) |
2092 | cap_sys_admin = 1; |
2093 | |
2094 | return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); |
2095 | } |
2096 | |
2097 | /* binprm security operations */ |
2098 | |
2099 | static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
2100 | { |
2101 | const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec; |
2102 | struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; |
2103 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
2104 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
2105 | struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; |
2106 | int rc; |
2107 | |
2108 | rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm); |
2109 | if (rc) |
2110 | return rc; |
2111 | |
2112 | /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not |
2113 | * the script interpreter */ |
2114 | if (bprm->cred_prepared) |
2115 | return 0; |
2116 | |
2117 | old_tsec = current_security(); |
2118 | new_tsec = bprm->cred->security; |
2119 | isec = inode->i_security; |
2120 | |
2121 | /* Default to the current task SID. */ |
2122 | new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid; |
2123 | new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid; |
2124 | |
2125 | /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */ |
2126 | new_tsec->create_sid = 0; |
2127 | new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0; |
2128 | new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0; |
2129 | |
2130 | if (old_tsec->exec_sid) { |
2131 | new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid; |
2132 | /* Reset exec SID on execve. */ |
2133 | new_tsec->exec_sid = 0; |
2134 | } else { |
2135 | /* Check for a default transition on this program. */ |
2136 | rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, |
2137 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid); |
2138 | if (rc) |
2139 | return rc; |
2140 | } |
2141 | |
2142 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); |
2143 | ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path; |
2144 | |
2145 | if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) |
2146 | new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid; |
2147 | |
2148 | if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) { |
2149 | rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, |
2150 | SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad); |
2151 | if (rc) |
2152 | return rc; |
2153 | } else { |
2154 | /* Check permissions for the transition. */ |
2155 | rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, |
2156 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad); |
2157 | if (rc) |
2158 | return rc; |
2159 | |
2160 | rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid, |
2161 | SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad); |
2162 | if (rc) |
2163 | return rc; |
2164 | |
2165 | /* Check for shared state */ |
2166 | if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) { |
2167 | rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, |
2168 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE, |
2169 | NULL); |
2170 | if (rc) |
2171 | return -EPERM; |
2172 | } |
2173 | |
2174 | /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that |
2175 | * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */ |
2176 | if (bprm->unsafe & |
2177 | (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) { |
2178 | struct task_struct *tracer; |
2179 | struct task_security_struct *sec; |
2180 | u32 ptsid = 0; |
2181 | |
2182 | rcu_read_lock(); |
2183 | tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current); |
2184 | if (likely(tracer != NULL)) { |
2185 | sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security; |
2186 | ptsid = sec->sid; |
2187 | } |
2188 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
2189 | |
2190 | if (ptsid != 0) { |
2191 | rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid, |
2192 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, |
2193 | PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); |
2194 | if (rc) |
2195 | return -EPERM; |
2196 | } |
2197 | } |
2198 | |
2199 | /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */ |
2200 | bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; |
2201 | } |
2202 | |
2203 | return 0; |
2204 | } |
2205 | |
2206 | static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
2207 | { |
2208 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2209 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; |
2210 | u32 sid, osid; |
2211 | int atsecure = 0; |
2212 | |
2213 | sid = tsec->sid; |
2214 | osid = tsec->osid; |
2215 | |
2216 | if (osid != sid) { |
2217 | /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless |
2218 | the noatsecure permission is granted between |
2219 | the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */ |
2220 | atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, |
2221 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, |
2222 | PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL); |
2223 | } |
2224 | |
2225 | return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm)); |
2226 | } |
2227 | |
2228 | extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount; |
2229 | extern struct dentry *selinux_null; |
2230 | |
2231 | /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */ |
2232 | static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, |
2233 | struct files_struct *files) |
2234 | { |
2235 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
2236 | struct file *file, *devnull = NULL; |
2237 | struct tty_struct *tty; |
2238 | struct fdtable *fdt; |
2239 | long j = -1; |
2240 | int drop_tty = 0; |
2241 | |
2242 | tty = get_current_tty(); |
2243 | if (tty) { |
2244 | file_list_lock(); |
2245 | if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) { |
2246 | struct inode *inode; |
2247 | |
2248 | /* Revalidate access to controlling tty. |
2249 | Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather |
2250 | than using file_has_perm, as this particular open |
2251 | file may belong to another process and we are only |
2252 | interested in the inode-based check here. */ |
2253 | file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list); |
2254 | inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; |
2255 | if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode, |
2256 | FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) { |
2257 | drop_tty = 1; |
2258 | } |
2259 | } |
2260 | file_list_unlock(); |
2261 | tty_kref_put(tty); |
2262 | } |
2263 | /* Reset controlling tty. */ |
2264 | if (drop_tty) |
2265 | no_tty(); |
2266 | |
2267 | /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */ |
2268 | |
2269 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); |
2270 | |
2271 | spin_lock(&files->file_lock); |
2272 | for (;;) { |
2273 | unsigned long set, i; |
2274 | int fd; |
2275 | |
2276 | j++; |
2277 | i = j * __NFDBITS; |
2278 | fdt = files_fdtable(files); |
2279 | if (i >= fdt->max_fds) |
2280 | break; |
2281 | set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j]; |
2282 | if (!set) |
2283 | continue; |
2284 | spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); |
2285 | for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) { |
2286 | if (set & 1) { |
2287 | file = fget(i); |
2288 | if (!file) |
2289 | continue; |
2290 | if (file_has_perm(cred, |
2291 | file, |
2292 | file_to_av(file))) { |
2293 | sys_close(i); |
2294 | fd = get_unused_fd(); |
2295 | if (fd != i) { |
2296 | if (fd >= 0) |
2297 | put_unused_fd(fd); |
2298 | fput(file); |
2299 | continue; |
2300 | } |
2301 | if (devnull) { |
2302 | get_file(devnull); |
2303 | } else { |
2304 | devnull = dentry_open( |
2305 | dget(selinux_null), |
2306 | mntget(selinuxfs_mount), |
2307 | O_RDWR, cred); |
2308 | if (IS_ERR(devnull)) { |
2309 | devnull = NULL; |
2310 | put_unused_fd(fd); |
2311 | fput(file); |
2312 | continue; |
2313 | } |
2314 | } |
2315 | fd_install(fd, devnull); |
2316 | } |
2317 | fput(file); |
2318 | } |
2319 | } |
2320 | spin_lock(&files->file_lock); |
2321 | |
2322 | } |
2323 | spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); |
2324 | } |
2325 | |
2326 | /* |
2327 | * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec |
2328 | */ |
2329 | static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
2330 | { |
2331 | struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; |
2332 | struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim; |
2333 | int rc, i; |
2334 | |
2335 | new_tsec = bprm->cred->security; |
2336 | if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid) |
2337 | return; |
2338 | |
2339 | /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */ |
2340 | flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files); |
2341 | |
2342 | /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */ |
2343 | current->pdeath_signal = 0; |
2344 | |
2345 | /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old |
2346 | * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current |
2347 | * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit. |
2348 | * |
2349 | * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be |
2350 | * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's |
2351 | * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits |
2352 | * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is |
2353 | * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK. |
2354 | */ |
2355 | rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, |
2356 | PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL); |
2357 | if (rc) { |
2358 | for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) { |
2359 | rlim = current->signal->rlim + i; |
2360 | initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i; |
2361 | rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur); |
2362 | } |
2363 | update_rlimit_cpu(current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur); |
2364 | } |
2365 | } |
2366 | |
2367 | /* |
2368 | * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials |
2369 | * due to exec |
2370 | */ |
2371 | static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
2372 | { |
2373 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); |
2374 | struct itimerval itimer; |
2375 | u32 osid, sid; |
2376 | int rc, i; |
2377 | |
2378 | osid = tsec->osid; |
2379 | sid = tsec->sid; |
2380 | |
2381 | if (sid == osid) |
2382 | return; |
2383 | |
2384 | /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID. |
2385 | * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and |
2386 | * flush and unblock signals. |
2387 | * |
2388 | * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any |
2389 | * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID. |
2390 | */ |
2391 | rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL); |
2392 | if (rc) { |
2393 | memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer); |
2394 | for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) |
2395 | do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL); |
2396 | spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); |
2397 | if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) { |
2398 | __flush_signals(current); |
2399 | flush_signal_handlers(current, 1); |
2400 | sigemptyset(¤t->blocked); |
2401 | } |
2402 | spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); |
2403 | } |
2404 | |
2405 | /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck |
2406 | * wait permission to the new task SID. */ |
2407 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock); |
2408 | __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent); |
2409 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
2410 | } |
2411 | |
2412 | /* superblock security operations */ |
2413 | |
2414 | static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) |
2415 | { |
2416 | return superblock_alloc_security(sb); |
2417 | } |
2418 | |
2419 | static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb) |
2420 | { |
2421 | superblock_free_security(sb); |
2422 | } |
2423 | |
2424 | static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen) |
2425 | { |
2426 | if (plen > olen) |
2427 | return 0; |
2428 | |
2429 | return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen); |
2430 | } |
2431 | |
2432 | static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len) |
2433 | { |
2434 | return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || |
2435 | match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || |
2436 | match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || |
2437 | match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || |
2438 | match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len)); |
2439 | } |
2440 | |
2441 | static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len) |
2442 | { |
2443 | if (!*first) { |
2444 | **to = ','; |
2445 | *to += 1; |
2446 | } else |
2447 | *first = 0; |
2448 | memcpy(*to, from, len); |
2449 | *to += len; |
2450 | } |
2451 | |
2452 | static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, |
2453 | int len) |
2454 | { |
2455 | int current_size = 0; |
2456 | |
2457 | if (!*first) { |
2458 | **to = '|'; |
2459 | *to += 1; |
2460 | } else |
2461 | *first = 0; |
2462 | |
2463 | while (current_size < len) { |
2464 | if (*from != '"') { |
2465 | **to = *from; |
2466 | *to += 1; |
2467 | } |
2468 | from += 1; |
2469 | current_size += 1; |
2470 | } |
2471 | } |
2472 | |
2473 | static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy) |
2474 | { |
2475 | int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0; |
2476 | char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end; |
2477 | char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec; |
2478 | int open_quote = 0; |
2479 | |
2480 | in_curr = orig; |
2481 | sec_curr = copy; |
2482 | |
2483 | nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); |
2484 | if (!nosec) { |
2485 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
2486 | goto out; |
2487 | } |
2488 | |
2489 | nosec_save = nosec; |
2490 | fnosec = fsec = 1; |
2491 | in_save = in_end = orig; |
2492 | |
2493 | do { |
2494 | if (*in_end == '"') |
2495 | open_quote = !open_quote; |
2496 | if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) || |
2497 | *in_end == '\0') { |
2498 | int len = in_end - in_curr; |
2499 | |
2500 | if (selinux_option(in_curr, len)) |
2501 | take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len); |
2502 | else |
2503 | take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len); |
2504 | |
2505 | in_curr = in_end + 1; |
2506 | } |
2507 | } while (*in_end++); |
2508 | |
2509 | strcpy(in_save, nosec_save); |
2510 | free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save); |
2511 | out: |
2512 | return rc; |
2513 | } |
2514 | |
2515 | static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) |
2516 | { |
2517 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2518 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
2519 | int rc; |
2520 | |
2521 | rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data); |
2522 | if (rc) |
2523 | return rc; |
2524 | |
2525 | /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */ |
2526 | if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT) |
2527 | return 0; |
2528 | |
2529 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); |
2530 | ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root; |
2531 | return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad); |
2532 | } |
2533 | |
2534 | static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) |
2535 | { |
2536 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2537 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
2538 | |
2539 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); |
2540 | ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root; |
2541 | return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad); |
2542 | } |
2543 | |
2544 | static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name, |
2545 | struct path *path, |
2546 | char *type, |
2547 | unsigned long flags, |
2548 | void *data) |
2549 | { |
2550 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2551 | |
2552 | if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) |
2553 | return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb, |
2554 | FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL); |
2555 | else |
2556 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry, |
2557 | FILE__MOUNTON); |
2558 | } |
2559 | |
2560 | static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) |
2561 | { |
2562 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2563 | |
2564 | return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb, |
2565 | FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL); |
2566 | } |
2567 | |
2568 | /* inode security operations */ |
2569 | |
2570 | static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) |
2571 | { |
2572 | return inode_alloc_security(inode); |
2573 | } |
2574 | |
2575 | static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) |
2576 | { |
2577 | inode_free_security(inode); |
2578 | } |
2579 | |
2580 | static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, |
2581 | char **name, void **value, |
2582 | size_t *len) |
2583 | { |
2584 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2585 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; |
2586 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec; |
2587 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; |
2588 | u32 sid, newsid, clen; |
2589 | int rc; |
2590 | char *namep = NULL, *context; |
2591 | |
2592 | dsec = dir->i_security; |
2593 | sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; |
2594 | |
2595 | sid = tsec->sid; |
2596 | newsid = tsec->create_sid; |
2597 | |
2598 | if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) { |
2599 | rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, |
2600 | inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode), |
2601 | &newsid); |
2602 | if (rc) { |
2603 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: " |
2604 | "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s " |
2605 | "ino=%ld)\n", |
2606 | __func__, |
2607 | -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); |
2608 | return rc; |
2609 | } |
2610 | } |
2611 | |
2612 | /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */ |
2613 | if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { |
2614 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
2615 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); |
2616 | isec->sid = newsid; |
2617 | isec->initialized = 1; |
2618 | } |
2619 | |
2620 | if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) |
2621 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
2622 | |
2623 | if (name) { |
2624 | namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS); |
2625 | if (!namep) |
2626 | return -ENOMEM; |
2627 | *name = namep; |
2628 | } |
2629 | |
2630 | if (value && len) { |
2631 | rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen); |
2632 | if (rc) { |
2633 | kfree(namep); |
2634 | return rc; |
2635 | } |
2636 | *value = context; |
2637 | *len = clen; |
2638 | } |
2639 | |
2640 | return 0; |
2641 | } |
2642 | |
2643 | static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask) |
2644 | { |
2645 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE); |
2646 | } |
2647 | |
2648 | static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) |
2649 | { |
2650 | return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK); |
2651 | } |
2652 | |
2653 | static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) |
2654 | { |
2655 | return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK); |
2656 | } |
2657 | |
2658 | static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) |
2659 | { |
2660 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE); |
2661 | } |
2662 | |
2663 | static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask) |
2664 | { |
2665 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR); |
2666 | } |
2667 | |
2668 | static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) |
2669 | { |
2670 | return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR); |
2671 | } |
2672 | |
2673 | static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev) |
2674 | { |
2675 | return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode)); |
2676 | } |
2677 | |
2678 | static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry, |
2679 | struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry) |
2680 | { |
2681 | return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry); |
2682 | } |
2683 | |
2684 | static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) |
2685 | { |
2686 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2687 | |
2688 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ); |
2689 | } |
2690 | |
2691 | static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata) |
2692 | { |
2693 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2694 | |
2695 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ); |
2696 | } |
2697 | |
2698 | static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) |
2699 | { |
2700 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2701 | |
2702 | if (!mask) { |
2703 | /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ |
2704 | return 0; |
2705 | } |
2706 | |
2707 | return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, |
2708 | file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL); |
2709 | } |
2710 | |
2711 | static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) |
2712 | { |
2713 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2714 | unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid; |
2715 | |
2716 | /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */ |
2717 | if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) { |
2718 | ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE | |
2719 | ATTR_FORCE); |
2720 | if (!ia_valid) |
2721 | return 0; |
2722 | } |
2723 | |
2724 | if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID | |
2725 | ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) |
2726 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); |
2727 | |
2728 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE); |
2729 | } |
2730 | |
2731 | static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) |
2732 | { |
2733 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2734 | |
2735 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); |
2736 | } |
2737 | |
2738 | static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) |
2739 | { |
2740 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2741 | |
2742 | if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, |
2743 | sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) { |
2744 | if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) { |
2745 | if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP)) |
2746 | return -EPERM; |
2747 | } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { |
2748 | /* A different attribute in the security namespace. |
2749 | Restrict to administrator. */ |
2750 | return -EPERM; |
2751 | } |
2752 | } |
2753 | |
2754 | /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the |
2755 | ordinary setattr permission. */ |
2756 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); |
2757 | } |
2758 | |
2759 | static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, |
2760 | const void *value, size_t size, int flags) |
2761 | { |
2762 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
2763 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
2764 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; |
2765 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
2766 | u32 newsid, sid = current_sid(); |
2767 | int rc = 0; |
2768 | |
2769 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) |
2770 | return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name); |
2771 | |
2772 | sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; |
2773 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) |
2774 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
2775 | |
2776 | if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode)) |
2777 | return -EPERM; |
2778 | |
2779 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); |
2780 | ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; |
2781 | |
2782 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, |
2783 | FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad); |
2784 | if (rc) |
2785 | return rc; |
2786 | |
2787 | rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid); |
2788 | if (rc == -EINVAL) { |
2789 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
2790 | return rc; |
2791 | rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid); |
2792 | } |
2793 | if (rc) |
2794 | return rc; |
2795 | |
2796 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass, |
2797 | FILE__RELABELTO, &ad); |
2798 | if (rc) |
2799 | return rc; |
2800 | |
2801 | rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid, |
2802 | isec->sclass); |
2803 | if (rc) |
2804 | return rc; |
2805 | |
2806 | return avc_has_perm(newsid, |
2807 | sbsec->sid, |
2808 | SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
2809 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, |
2810 | &ad); |
2811 | } |
2812 | |
2813 | static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, |
2814 | const void *value, size_t size, |
2815 | int flags) |
2816 | { |
2817 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
2818 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
2819 | u32 newsid; |
2820 | int rc; |
2821 | |
2822 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { |
2823 | /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */ |
2824 | return; |
2825 | } |
2826 | |
2827 | rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid); |
2828 | if (rc) { |
2829 | printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID" |
2830 | "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n", |
2831 | inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc); |
2832 | return; |
2833 | } |
2834 | |
2835 | isec->sid = newsid; |
2836 | return; |
2837 | } |
2838 | |
2839 | static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) |
2840 | { |
2841 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2842 | |
2843 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); |
2844 | } |
2845 | |
2846 | static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) |
2847 | { |
2848 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2849 | |
2850 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); |
2851 | } |
2852 | |
2853 | static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) |
2854 | { |
2855 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) |
2856 | return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name); |
2857 | |
2858 | /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label. |
2859 | You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */ |
2860 | return -EACCES; |
2861 | } |
2862 | |
2863 | /* |
2864 | * Copy the inode security context value to the user. |
2865 | * |
2866 | * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook. |
2867 | */ |
2868 | static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) |
2869 | { |
2870 | u32 size; |
2871 | int error; |
2872 | char *context = NULL; |
2873 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
2874 | |
2875 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) |
2876 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
2877 | |
2878 | /* |
2879 | * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context |
2880 | * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise, |
2881 | * use the in-core value under current policy. |
2882 | * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since |
2883 | * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly |
2884 | * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the |
2885 | * in-core context value, not a denial. |
2886 | */ |
2887 | error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN, |
2888 | SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); |
2889 | if (!error) |
2890 | error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context, |
2891 | &size); |
2892 | else |
2893 | error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size); |
2894 | if (error) |
2895 | return error; |
2896 | error = size; |
2897 | if (alloc) { |
2898 | *buffer = context; |
2899 | goto out_nofree; |
2900 | } |
2901 | kfree(context); |
2902 | out_nofree: |
2903 | return error; |
2904 | } |
2905 | |
2906 | static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, |
2907 | const void *value, size_t size, int flags) |
2908 | { |
2909 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
2910 | u32 newsid; |
2911 | int rc; |
2912 | |
2913 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) |
2914 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
2915 | |
2916 | if (!value || !size) |
2917 | return -EACCES; |
2918 | |
2919 | rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid); |
2920 | if (rc) |
2921 | return rc; |
2922 | |
2923 | isec->sid = newsid; |
2924 | isec->initialized = 1; |
2925 | return 0; |
2926 | } |
2927 | |
2928 | static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) |
2929 | { |
2930 | const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX); |
2931 | if (buffer && len <= buffer_size) |
2932 | memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len); |
2933 | return len; |
2934 | } |
2935 | |
2936 | static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) |
2937 | { |
2938 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
2939 | *secid = isec->sid; |
2940 | } |
2941 | |
2942 | /* file security operations */ |
2943 | |
2944 | static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) |
2945 | { |
2946 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2947 | struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; |
2948 | |
2949 | /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */ |
2950 | if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE)) |
2951 | mask |= MAY_APPEND; |
2952 | |
2953 | return file_has_perm(cred, file, |
2954 | file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask)); |
2955 | } |
2956 | |
2957 | static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) |
2958 | { |
2959 | struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; |
2960 | struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; |
2961 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
2962 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
2963 | |
2964 | if (!mask) |
2965 | /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ |
2966 | return 0; |
2967 | |
2968 | if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid && |
2969 | fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno()) |
2970 | /* No change since dentry_open check. */ |
2971 | return 0; |
2972 | |
2973 | return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask); |
2974 | } |
2975 | |
2976 | static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) |
2977 | { |
2978 | return file_alloc_security(file); |
2979 | } |
2980 | |
2981 | static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file) |
2982 | { |
2983 | file_free_security(file); |
2984 | } |
2985 | |
2986 | static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, |
2987 | unsigned long arg) |
2988 | { |
2989 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
2990 | u32 av = 0; |
2991 | |
2992 | if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) |
2993 | av |= FILE__WRITE; |
2994 | if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ) |
2995 | av |= FILE__READ; |
2996 | if (!av) |
2997 | av = FILE__IOCTL; |
2998 | |
2999 | return file_has_perm(cred, file, av); |
3000 | } |
3001 | |
3002 | static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared) |
3003 | { |
3004 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
3005 | int rc = 0; |
3006 | |
3007 | #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32 |
3008 | if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) { |
3009 | /* |
3010 | * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a |
3011 | * private file mapping that will also be writable. |
3012 | * This has an additional check. |
3013 | */ |
3014 | rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM); |
3015 | if (rc) |
3016 | goto error; |
3017 | } |
3018 | #endif |
3019 | |
3020 | if (file) { |
3021 | /* read access is always possible with a mapping */ |
3022 | u32 av = FILE__READ; |
3023 | |
3024 | /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */ |
3025 | if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)) |
3026 | av |= FILE__WRITE; |
3027 | |
3028 | if (prot & PROT_EXEC) |
3029 | av |= FILE__EXECUTE; |
3030 | |
3031 | return file_has_perm(cred, file, av); |
3032 | } |
3033 | |
3034 | error: |
3035 | return rc; |
3036 | } |
3037 | |
3038 | static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, |
3039 | unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, |
3040 | unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) |
3041 | { |
3042 | int rc = 0; |
3043 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
3044 | |
3045 | /* |
3046 | * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before |
3047 | * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt |
3048 | * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even |
3049 | * if DAC would have also denied the operation. |
3050 | */ |
3051 | if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) { |
3052 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, |
3053 | MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL); |
3054 | if (rc) |
3055 | return rc; |
3056 | } |
3057 | |
3058 | /* do DAC check on address space usage */ |
3059 | rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); |
3060 | if (rc || addr_only) |
3061 | return rc; |
3062 | |
3063 | if (selinux_checkreqprot) |
3064 | prot = reqprot; |
3065 | |
3066 | return file_map_prot_check(file, prot, |
3067 | (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED); |
3068 | } |
3069 | |
3070 | static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, |
3071 | unsigned long reqprot, |
3072 | unsigned long prot) |
3073 | { |
3074 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
3075 | |
3076 | if (selinux_checkreqprot) |
3077 | prot = reqprot; |
3078 | |
3079 | #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32 |
3080 | if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { |
3081 | int rc = 0; |
3082 | if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk && |
3083 | vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) { |
3084 | rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP); |
3085 | } else if (!vma->vm_file && |
3086 | vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack && |
3087 | vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) { |
3088 | rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK); |
3089 | } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) { |
3090 | /* |
3091 | * We are making executable a file mapping that has |
3092 | * had some COW done. Since pages might have been |
3093 | * written, check ability to execute the possibly |
3094 | * modified content. This typically should only |
3095 | * occur for text relocations. |
3096 | */ |
3097 | rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD); |
3098 | } |
3099 | if (rc) |
3100 | return rc; |
3101 | } |
3102 | #endif |
3103 | |
3104 | return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED); |
3105 | } |
3106 | |
3107 | static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) |
3108 | { |
3109 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
3110 | |
3111 | return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK); |
3112 | } |
3113 | |
3114 | static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, |
3115 | unsigned long arg) |
3116 | { |
3117 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
3118 | int err = 0; |
3119 | |
3120 | switch (cmd) { |
3121 | case F_SETFL: |
3122 | if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) { |
3123 | err = -EINVAL; |
3124 | break; |
3125 | } |
3126 | |
3127 | if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) { |
3128 | err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE); |
3129 | break; |
3130 | } |
3131 | /* fall through */ |
3132 | case F_SETOWN: |
3133 | case F_SETSIG: |
3134 | case F_GETFL: |
3135 | case F_GETOWN: |
3136 | case F_GETSIG: |
3137 | /* Just check FD__USE permission */ |
3138 | err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0); |
3139 | break; |
3140 | case F_GETLK: |
3141 | case F_SETLK: |
3142 | case F_SETLKW: |
3143 | #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 |
3144 | case F_GETLK64: |
3145 | case F_SETLK64: |
3146 | case F_SETLKW64: |
3147 | #endif |
3148 | if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) { |
3149 | err = -EINVAL; |
3150 | break; |
3151 | } |
3152 | err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK); |
3153 | break; |
3154 | } |
3155 | |
3156 | return err; |
3157 | } |
3158 | |
3159 | static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) |
3160 | { |
3161 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; |
3162 | |
3163 | fsec = file->f_security; |
3164 | fsec->fown_sid = current_sid(); |
3165 | |
3166 | return 0; |
3167 | } |
3168 | |
3169 | static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, |
3170 | struct fown_struct *fown, int signum) |
3171 | { |
3172 | struct file *file; |
3173 | u32 sid = task_sid(tsk); |
3174 | u32 perm; |
3175 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; |
3176 | |
3177 | /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */ |
3178 | file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner); |
3179 | |
3180 | fsec = file->f_security; |
3181 | |
3182 | if (!signum) |
3183 | perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */ |
3184 | else |
3185 | perm = signal_to_av(signum); |
3186 | |
3187 | return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid, |
3188 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); |
3189 | } |
3190 | |
3191 | static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file) |
3192 | { |
3193 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
3194 | |
3195 | return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file)); |
3196 | } |
3197 | |
3198 | static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) |
3199 | { |
3200 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; |
3201 | struct inode *inode; |
3202 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
3203 | |
3204 | inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; |
3205 | fsec = file->f_security; |
3206 | isec = inode->i_security; |
3207 | /* |
3208 | * Save inode label and policy sequence number |
3209 | * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission |
3210 | * can determine whether revalidation is necessary. |
3211 | * Task label is already saved in the file security |
3212 | * struct as its SID. |
3213 | */ |
3214 | fsec->isid = isec->sid; |
3215 | fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(); |
3216 | /* |
3217 | * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed |
3218 | * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving |
3219 | * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted. |
3220 | * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the |
3221 | * new inode label or new policy. |
3222 | * This check is not redundant - do not remove. |
3223 | */ |
3224 | return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL); |
3225 | } |
3226 | |
3227 | /* task security operations */ |
3228 | |
3229 | static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags) |
3230 | { |
3231 | return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK); |
3232 | } |
3233 | |
3234 | /* |
3235 | * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials |
3236 | */ |
3237 | static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) |
3238 | { |
3239 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
3240 | |
3241 | tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp); |
3242 | if (!tsec) |
3243 | return -ENOMEM; |
3244 | |
3245 | cred->security = tsec; |
3246 | return 0; |
3247 | } |
3248 | |
3249 | /* |
3250 | * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials |
3251 | */ |
3252 | static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred) |
3253 | { |
3254 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; |
3255 | |
3256 | BUG_ON((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE); |
3257 | cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL; |
3258 | kfree(tsec); |
3259 | } |
3260 | |
3261 | /* |
3262 | * prepare a new set of credentials for modification |
3263 | */ |
3264 | static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, |
3265 | gfp_t gfp) |
3266 | { |
3267 | const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec; |
3268 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
3269 | |
3270 | old_tsec = old->security; |
3271 | |
3272 | tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp); |
3273 | if (!tsec) |
3274 | return -ENOMEM; |
3275 | |
3276 | new->security = tsec; |
3277 | return 0; |
3278 | } |
3279 | |
3280 | /* |
3281 | * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds |
3282 | */ |
3283 | static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
3284 | { |
3285 | const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security; |
3286 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security; |
3287 | |
3288 | *tsec = *old_tsec; |
3289 | } |
3290 | |
3291 | /* |
3292 | * set the security data for a kernel service |
3293 | * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled |
3294 | */ |
3295 | static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) |
3296 | { |
3297 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security; |
3298 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
3299 | int ret; |
3300 | |
3301 | ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid, |
3302 | SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, |
3303 | KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE, |
3304 | NULL); |
3305 | if (ret == 0) { |
3306 | tsec->sid = secid; |
3307 | tsec->create_sid = 0; |
3308 | tsec->keycreate_sid = 0; |
3309 | tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0; |
3310 | } |
3311 | return ret; |
3312 | } |
3313 | |
3314 | /* |
3315 | * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the |
3316 | * objective context of the specified inode |
3317 | */ |
3318 | static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) |
3319 | { |
3320 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
3321 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security; |
3322 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
3323 | int ret; |
3324 | |
3325 | ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, |
3326 | SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, |
3327 | KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS, |
3328 | NULL); |
3329 | |
3330 | if (ret == 0) |
3331 | tsec->create_sid = isec->sid; |
3332 | return ret; |
3333 | } |
3334 | |
3335 | static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) |
3336 | { |
3337 | u32 sid; |
3338 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
3339 | |
3340 | sid = task_sid(current); |
3341 | |
3342 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD); |
3343 | ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name; |
3344 | |
3345 | return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, |
3346 | SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad); |
3347 | } |
3348 | |
3349 | static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) |
3350 | { |
3351 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID); |
3352 | } |
3353 | |
3354 | static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) |
3355 | { |
3356 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID); |
3357 | } |
3358 | |
3359 | static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) |
3360 | { |
3361 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION); |
3362 | } |
3363 | |
3364 | static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) |
3365 | { |
3366 | *secid = task_sid(p); |
3367 | } |
3368 | |
3369 | static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) |
3370 | { |
3371 | int rc; |
3372 | |
3373 | rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice); |
3374 | if (rc) |
3375 | return rc; |
3376 | |
3377 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); |
3378 | } |
3379 | |
3380 | static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) |
3381 | { |
3382 | int rc; |
3383 | |
3384 | rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio); |
3385 | if (rc) |
3386 | return rc; |
3387 | |
3388 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); |
3389 | } |
3390 | |
3391 | static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) |
3392 | { |
3393 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED); |
3394 | } |
3395 | |
3396 | static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) |
3397 | { |
3398 | struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource; |
3399 | |
3400 | /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether |
3401 | lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can |
3402 | later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit |
3403 | upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */ |
3404 | if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max) |
3405 | return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT); |
3406 | |
3407 | return 0; |
3408 | } |
3409 | |
3410 | static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp) |
3411 | { |
3412 | int rc; |
3413 | |
3414 | rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp); |
3415 | if (rc) |
3416 | return rc; |
3417 | |
3418 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); |
3419 | } |
3420 | |
3421 | static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) |
3422 | { |
3423 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED); |
3424 | } |
3425 | |
3426 | static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) |
3427 | { |
3428 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); |
3429 | } |
3430 | |
3431 | static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, |
3432 | int sig, u32 secid) |
3433 | { |
3434 | u32 perm; |
3435 | int rc; |
3436 | |
3437 | if (!sig) |
3438 | perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */ |
3439 | else |
3440 | perm = signal_to_av(sig); |
3441 | if (secid) |
3442 | rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p), |
3443 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); |
3444 | else |
3445 | rc = current_has_perm(p, perm); |
3446 | return rc; |
3447 | } |
3448 | |
3449 | static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) |
3450 | { |
3451 | return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD); |
3452 | } |
3453 | |
3454 | static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, |
3455 | struct inode *inode) |
3456 | { |
3457 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
3458 | u32 sid = task_sid(p); |
3459 | |
3460 | isec->sid = sid; |
3461 | isec->initialized = 1; |
3462 | } |
3463 | |
3464 | /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ |
3465 | static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, |
3466 | struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) |
3467 | { |
3468 | int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL; |
3469 | struct iphdr _iph, *ih; |
3470 | |
3471 | offset = skb_network_offset(skb); |
3472 | ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph); |
3473 | if (ih == NULL) |
3474 | goto out; |
3475 | |
3476 | ihlen = ih->ihl * 4; |
3477 | if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph)) |
3478 | goto out; |
3479 | |
3480 | ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr; |
3481 | ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr; |
3482 | ret = 0; |
3483 | |
3484 | if (proto) |
3485 | *proto = ih->protocol; |
3486 | |
3487 | switch (ih->protocol) { |
3488 | case IPPROTO_TCP: { |
3489 | struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; |
3490 | |
3491 | if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) |
3492 | break; |
3493 | |
3494 | offset += ihlen; |
3495 | th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); |
3496 | if (th == NULL) |
3497 | break; |
3498 | |
3499 | ad->u.net.sport = th->source; |
3500 | ad->u.net.dport = th->dest; |
3501 | break; |
3502 | } |
3503 | |
3504 | case IPPROTO_UDP: { |
3505 | struct udphdr _udph, *uh; |
3506 | |
3507 | if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) |
3508 | break; |
3509 | |
3510 | offset += ihlen; |
3511 | uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); |
3512 | if (uh == NULL) |
3513 | break; |
3514 | |
3515 | ad->u.net.sport = uh->source; |
3516 | ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest; |
3517 | break; |
3518 | } |
3519 | |
3520 | case IPPROTO_DCCP: { |
3521 | struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh; |
3522 | |
3523 | if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) |
3524 | break; |
3525 | |
3526 | offset += ihlen; |
3527 | dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph); |
3528 | if (dh == NULL) |
3529 | break; |
3530 | |
3531 | ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport; |
3532 | ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport; |
3533 | break; |
3534 | } |
3535 | |
3536 | default: |
3537 | break; |
3538 | } |
3539 | out: |
3540 | return ret; |
3541 | } |
3542 | |
3543 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
3544 | |
3545 | /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ |
3546 | static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, |
3547 | struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) |
3548 | { |
3549 | u8 nexthdr; |
3550 | int ret = -EINVAL, offset; |
3551 | struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6; |
3552 | |
3553 | offset = skb_network_offset(skb); |
3554 | ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h); |
3555 | if (ip6 == NULL) |
3556 | goto out; |
3557 | |
3558 | ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr); |
3559 | ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr); |
3560 | ret = 0; |
3561 | |
3562 | nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr; |
3563 | offset += sizeof(_ipv6h); |
3564 | offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr); |
3565 | if (offset < 0) |
3566 | goto out; |
3567 | |
3568 | if (proto) |
3569 | *proto = nexthdr; |
3570 | |
3571 | switch (nexthdr) { |
3572 | case IPPROTO_TCP: { |
3573 | struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; |
3574 | |
3575 | th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); |
3576 | if (th == NULL) |
3577 | break; |
3578 | |
3579 | ad->u.net.sport = th->source; |
3580 | ad->u.net.dport = th->dest; |
3581 | break; |
3582 | } |
3583 | |
3584 | case IPPROTO_UDP: { |
3585 | struct udphdr _udph, *uh; |
3586 | |
3587 | uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); |
3588 | if (uh == NULL) |
3589 | break; |
3590 | |
3591 | ad->u.net.sport = uh->source; |
3592 | ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest; |
3593 | break; |
3594 | } |
3595 | |
3596 | case IPPROTO_DCCP: { |
3597 | struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh; |
3598 | |
3599 | dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph); |
3600 | if (dh == NULL) |
3601 | break; |
3602 | |
3603 | ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport; |
3604 | ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport; |
3605 | break; |
3606 | } |
3607 | |
3608 | /* includes fragments */ |
3609 | default: |
3610 | break; |
3611 | } |
3612 | out: |
3613 | return ret; |
3614 | } |
3615 | |
3616 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
3617 | |
3618 | static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, |
3619 | char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto) |
3620 | { |
3621 | char *addrp; |
3622 | int ret; |
3623 | |
3624 | switch (ad->u.net.family) { |
3625 | case PF_INET: |
3626 | ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto); |
3627 | if (ret) |
3628 | goto parse_error; |
3629 | addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr : |
3630 | &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr); |
3631 | goto okay; |
3632 | |
3633 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
3634 | case PF_INET6: |
3635 | ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto); |
3636 | if (ret) |
3637 | goto parse_error; |
3638 | addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr : |
3639 | &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr); |
3640 | goto okay; |
3641 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
3642 | default: |
3643 | addrp = NULL; |
3644 | goto okay; |
3645 | } |
3646 | |
3647 | parse_error: |
3648 | printk(KERN_WARNING |
3649 | "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb()," |
3650 | " unable to parse packet\n"); |
3651 | return ret; |
3652 | |
3653 | okay: |
3654 | if (_addrp) |
3655 | *_addrp = addrp; |
3656 | return 0; |
3657 | } |
3658 | |
3659 | /** |
3660 | * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet |
3661 | * @skb: the packet |
3662 | * @family: protocol family |
3663 | * @sid: the packet's peer label SID |
3664 | * |
3665 | * Description: |
3666 | * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine |
3667 | * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in |
3668 | * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function |
3669 | * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL) |
3670 | * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different |
3671 | * peer labels. |
3672 | * |
3673 | */ |
3674 | static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid) |
3675 | { |
3676 | int err; |
3677 | u32 xfrm_sid; |
3678 | u32 nlbl_sid; |
3679 | u32 nlbl_type; |
3680 | |
3681 | selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid); |
3682 | selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid); |
3683 | |
3684 | err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid); |
3685 | if (unlikely(err)) { |
3686 | printk(KERN_WARNING |
3687 | "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid()," |
3688 | " unable to determine packet's peer label\n"); |
3689 | return -EACCES; |
3690 | } |
3691 | |
3692 | return 0; |
3693 | } |
3694 | |
3695 | /* socket security operations */ |
3696 | static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock, |
3697 | u32 perms) |
3698 | { |
3699 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
3700 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
3701 | u32 sid; |
3702 | int err = 0; |
3703 | |
3704 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; |
3705 | |
3706 | if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) |
3707 | goto out; |
3708 | sid = task_sid(task); |
3709 | |
3710 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); |
3711 | ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk; |
3712 | err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad); |
3713 | |
3714 | out: |
3715 | return err; |
3716 | } |
3717 | |
3718 | static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type, |
3719 | int protocol, int kern) |
3720 | { |
3721 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
3722 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; |
3723 | u32 sid, newsid; |
3724 | u16 secclass; |
3725 | int err = 0; |
3726 | |
3727 | if (kern) |
3728 | goto out; |
3729 | |
3730 | sid = tsec->sid; |
3731 | newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid; |
3732 | |
3733 | secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); |
3734 | err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); |
3735 | |
3736 | out: |
3737 | return err; |
3738 | } |
3739 | |
3740 | static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, |
3741 | int type, int protocol, int kern) |
3742 | { |
3743 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
3744 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; |
3745 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
3746 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec; |
3747 | u32 sid, newsid; |
3748 | int err = 0; |
3749 | |
3750 | sid = tsec->sid; |
3751 | newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid; |
3752 | |
3753 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; |
3754 | |
3755 | if (kern) |
3756 | isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; |
3757 | else if (newsid) |
3758 | isec->sid = newsid; |
3759 | else |
3760 | isec->sid = sid; |
3761 | |
3762 | isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); |
3763 | isec->initialized = 1; |
3764 | |
3765 | if (sock->sk) { |
3766 | sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; |
3767 | sksec->sid = isec->sid; |
3768 | sksec->sclass = isec->sclass; |
3769 | err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family); |
3770 | } |
3771 | |
3772 | return err; |
3773 | } |
3774 | |
3775 | /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind. |
3776 | Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind |
3777 | permission check between the socket and the port number. */ |
3778 | |
3779 | static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) |
3780 | { |
3781 | u16 family; |
3782 | int err; |
3783 | |
3784 | err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND); |
3785 | if (err) |
3786 | goto out; |
3787 | |
3788 | /* |
3789 | * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. |
3790 | * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just |
3791 | * check the first address now. |
3792 | */ |
3793 | family = sock->sk->sk_family; |
3794 | if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) { |
3795 | char *addrp; |
3796 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
3797 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
3798 | struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; |
3799 | struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; |
3800 | unsigned short snum; |
3801 | struct sock *sk = sock->sk; |
3802 | u32 sid, node_perm; |
3803 | |
3804 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; |
3805 | |
3806 | if (family == PF_INET) { |
3807 | addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; |
3808 | snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); |
3809 | addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; |
3810 | } else { |
3811 | addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; |
3812 | snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); |
3813 | addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr; |
3814 | } |
3815 | |
3816 | if (snum) { |
3817 | int low, high; |
3818 | |
3819 | inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high); |
3820 | |
3821 | if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) { |
3822 | err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, |
3823 | snum, &sid); |
3824 | if (err) |
3825 | goto out; |
3826 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); |
3827 | ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum); |
3828 | ad.u.net.family = family; |
3829 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, |
3830 | isec->sclass, |
3831 | SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad); |
3832 | if (err) |
3833 | goto out; |
3834 | } |
3835 | } |
3836 | |
3837 | switch (isec->sclass) { |
3838 | case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: |
3839 | node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; |
3840 | break; |
3841 | |
3842 | case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET: |
3843 | node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; |
3844 | break; |
3845 | |
3846 | case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET: |
3847 | node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; |
3848 | break; |
3849 | |
3850 | default: |
3851 | node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; |
3852 | break; |
3853 | } |
3854 | |
3855 | err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid); |
3856 | if (err) |
3857 | goto out; |
3858 | |
3859 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); |
3860 | ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum); |
3861 | ad.u.net.family = family; |
3862 | |
3863 | if (family == PF_INET) |
3864 | ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; |
3865 | else |
3866 | ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr); |
3867 | |
3868 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, |
3869 | isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad); |
3870 | if (err) |
3871 | goto out; |
3872 | } |
3873 | out: |
3874 | return err; |
3875 | } |
3876 | |
3877 | static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) |
3878 | { |
3879 | struct sock *sk = sock->sk; |
3880 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
3881 | int err; |
3882 | |
3883 | err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT); |
3884 | if (err) |
3885 | return err; |
3886 | |
3887 | /* |
3888 | * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port. |
3889 | */ |
3890 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; |
3891 | if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET || |
3892 | isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) { |
3893 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
3894 | struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; |
3895 | struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; |
3896 | unsigned short snum; |
3897 | u32 sid, perm; |
3898 | |
3899 | if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) { |
3900 | addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; |
3901 | if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) |
3902 | return -EINVAL; |
3903 | snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); |
3904 | } else { |
3905 | addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; |
3906 | if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) |
3907 | return -EINVAL; |
3908 | snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); |
3909 | } |
3910 | |
3911 | err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid); |
3912 | if (err) |
3913 | goto out; |
3914 | |
3915 | perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ? |
3916 | TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; |
3917 | |
3918 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); |
3919 | ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum); |
3920 | ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family; |
3921 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad); |
3922 | if (err) |
3923 | goto out; |
3924 | } |
3925 | |
3926 | err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address); |
3927 | |
3928 | out: |
3929 | return err; |
3930 | } |
3931 | |
3932 | static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) |
3933 | { |
3934 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN); |
3935 | } |
3936 | |
3937 | static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) |
3938 | { |
3939 | int err; |
3940 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
3941 | struct inode_security_struct *newisec; |
3942 | |
3943 | err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT); |
3944 | if (err) |
3945 | return err; |
3946 | |
3947 | newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security; |
3948 | |
3949 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; |
3950 | newisec->sclass = isec->sclass; |
3951 | newisec->sid = isec->sid; |
3952 | newisec->initialized = 1; |
3953 | |
3954 | return 0; |
3955 | } |
3956 | |
3957 | static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, |
3958 | int size) |
3959 | { |
3960 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE); |
3961 | } |
3962 | |
3963 | static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, |
3964 | int size, int flags) |
3965 | { |
3966 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ); |
3967 | } |
3968 | |
3969 | static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) |
3970 | { |
3971 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR); |
3972 | } |
3973 | |
3974 | static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) |
3975 | { |
3976 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR); |
3977 | } |
3978 | |
3979 | static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) |
3980 | { |
3981 | int err; |
3982 | |
3983 | err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT); |
3984 | if (err) |
3985 | return err; |
3986 | |
3987 | return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname); |
3988 | } |
3989 | |
3990 | static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, |
3991 | int optname) |
3992 | { |
3993 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT); |
3994 | } |
3995 | |
3996 | static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) |
3997 | { |
3998 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN); |
3999 | } |
4000 | |
4001 | static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, |
4002 | struct socket *other, |
4003 | struct sock *newsk) |
4004 | { |
4005 | struct sk_security_struct *ssec; |
4006 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
4007 | struct inode_security_struct *other_isec; |
4008 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4009 | int err; |
4010 | |
4011 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; |
4012 | other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security; |
4013 | |
4014 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); |
4015 | ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; |
4016 | |
4017 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid, |
4018 | isec->sclass, |
4019 | UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad); |
4020 | if (err) |
4021 | return err; |
4022 | |
4023 | /* connecting socket */ |
4024 | ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; |
4025 | ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid; |
4026 | |
4027 | /* server child socket */ |
4028 | ssec = newsk->sk_security; |
4029 | ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid; |
4030 | err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid); |
4031 | |
4032 | return err; |
4033 | } |
4034 | |
4035 | static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, |
4036 | struct socket *other) |
4037 | { |
4038 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
4039 | struct inode_security_struct *other_isec; |
4040 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4041 | int err; |
4042 | |
4043 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; |
4044 | other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security; |
4045 | |
4046 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); |
4047 | ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; |
4048 | |
4049 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid, |
4050 | isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad); |
4051 | if (err) |
4052 | return err; |
4053 | |
4054 | return 0; |
4055 | } |
4056 | |
4057 | static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family, |
4058 | u32 peer_sid, |
4059 | struct common_audit_data *ad) |
4060 | { |
4061 | int err; |
4062 | u32 if_sid; |
4063 | u32 node_sid; |
4064 | |
4065 | err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid); |
4066 | if (err) |
4067 | return err; |
4068 | err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid, |
4069 | SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad); |
4070 | if (err) |
4071 | return err; |
4072 | |
4073 | err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid); |
4074 | if (err) |
4075 | return err; |
4076 | return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid, |
4077 | SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad); |
4078 | } |
4079 | |
4080 | static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, |
4081 | u16 family) |
4082 | { |
4083 | int err = 0; |
4084 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4085 | u32 peer_sid; |
4086 | u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; |
4087 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4088 | char *addrp; |
4089 | |
4090 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); |
4091 | ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif; |
4092 | ad.u.net.family = family; |
4093 | err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); |
4094 | if (err) |
4095 | return err; |
4096 | |
4097 | if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) { |
4098 | err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, |
4099 | PACKET__RECV, &ad); |
4100 | if (err) |
4101 | return err; |
4102 | } |
4103 | |
4104 | if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) { |
4105 | err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid); |
4106 | if (err) |
4107 | return err; |
4108 | err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, |
4109 | SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad); |
4110 | if (err) |
4111 | selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0); |
4112 | } else { |
4113 | err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad); |
4114 | if (err) |
4115 | return err; |
4116 | err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad); |
4117 | } |
4118 | |
4119 | return err; |
4120 | } |
4121 | |
4122 | static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) |
4123 | { |
4124 | int err; |
4125 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4126 | u16 family = sk->sk_family; |
4127 | u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; |
4128 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4129 | char *addrp; |
4130 | u8 secmark_active; |
4131 | u8 peerlbl_active; |
4132 | |
4133 | if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6) |
4134 | return 0; |
4135 | |
4136 | /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ |
4137 | if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) |
4138 | family = PF_INET; |
4139 | |
4140 | /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing |
4141 | * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the |
4142 | * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function |
4143 | * as fast and as clean as possible. */ |
4144 | if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer) |
4145 | return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family); |
4146 | |
4147 | secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); |
4148 | peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled(); |
4149 | if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) |
4150 | return 0; |
4151 | |
4152 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); |
4153 | ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif; |
4154 | ad.u.net.family = family; |
4155 | err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); |
4156 | if (err) |
4157 | return err; |
4158 | |
4159 | if (peerlbl_active) { |
4160 | u32 peer_sid; |
4161 | |
4162 | err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid); |
4163 | if (err) |
4164 | return err; |
4165 | err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family, |
4166 | peer_sid, &ad); |
4167 | if (err) { |
4168 | selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0); |
4169 | return err; |
4170 | } |
4171 | err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER, |
4172 | PEER__RECV, &ad); |
4173 | if (err) |
4174 | selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0); |
4175 | } |
4176 | |
4177 | if (secmark_active) { |
4178 | err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, |
4179 | PACKET__RECV, &ad); |
4180 | if (err) |
4181 | return err; |
4182 | } |
4183 | |
4184 | return err; |
4185 | } |
4186 | |
4187 | static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, |
4188 | int __user *optlen, unsigned len) |
4189 | { |
4190 | int err = 0; |
4191 | char *scontext; |
4192 | u32 scontext_len; |
4193 | struct sk_security_struct *ssec; |
4194 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
4195 | u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL; |
4196 | |
4197 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; |
4198 | |
4199 | if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET || |
4200 | isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) { |
4201 | ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; |
4202 | peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid; |
4203 | } |
4204 | if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) { |
4205 | err = -ENOPROTOOPT; |
4206 | goto out; |
4207 | } |
4208 | |
4209 | err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len); |
4210 | |
4211 | if (err) |
4212 | goto out; |
4213 | |
4214 | if (scontext_len > len) { |
4215 | err = -ERANGE; |
4216 | goto out_len; |
4217 | } |
4218 | |
4219 | if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len)) |
4220 | err = -EFAULT; |
4221 | |
4222 | out_len: |
4223 | if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen)) |
4224 | err = -EFAULT; |
4225 | |
4226 | kfree(scontext); |
4227 | out: |
4228 | return err; |
4229 | } |
4230 | |
4231 | static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) |
4232 | { |
4233 | u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL; |
4234 | u16 family; |
4235 | |
4236 | if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) |
4237 | family = PF_INET; |
4238 | else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) |
4239 | family = PF_INET6; |
4240 | else if (sock) |
4241 | family = sock->sk->sk_family; |
4242 | else |
4243 | goto out; |
4244 | |
4245 | if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) |
4246 | selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid); |
4247 | else if (skb) |
4248 | selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid); |
4249 | |
4250 | out: |
4251 | *secid = peer_secid; |
4252 | if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL) |
4253 | return -EINVAL; |
4254 | return 0; |
4255 | } |
4256 | |
4257 | static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) |
4258 | { |
4259 | return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority); |
4260 | } |
4261 | |
4262 | static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) |
4263 | { |
4264 | sk_free_security(sk); |
4265 | } |
4266 | |
4267 | static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) |
4268 | { |
4269 | struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security; |
4270 | struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security; |
4271 | |
4272 | newssec->sid = ssec->sid; |
4273 | newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid; |
4274 | newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass; |
4275 | |
4276 | selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec); |
4277 | } |
4278 | |
4279 | static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid) |
4280 | { |
4281 | if (!sk) |
4282 | *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET; |
4283 | else { |
4284 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4285 | |
4286 | *secid = sksec->sid; |
4287 | } |
4288 | } |
4289 | |
4290 | static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) |
4291 | { |
4292 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security; |
4293 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4294 | |
4295 | if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 || |
4296 | sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) |
4297 | isec->sid = sksec->sid; |
4298 | sksec->sclass = isec->sclass; |
4299 | } |
4300 | |
4301 | static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, |
4302 | struct request_sock *req) |
4303 | { |
4304 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4305 | int err; |
4306 | u16 family = sk->sk_family; |
4307 | u32 newsid; |
4308 | u32 peersid; |
4309 | |
4310 | /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ |
4311 | if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) |
4312 | family = PF_INET; |
4313 | |
4314 | err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid); |
4315 | if (err) |
4316 | return err; |
4317 | if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) { |
4318 | req->secid = sksec->sid; |
4319 | req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL; |
4320 | } else { |
4321 | err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid); |
4322 | if (err) |
4323 | return err; |
4324 | req->secid = newsid; |
4325 | req->peer_secid = peersid; |
4326 | } |
4327 | |
4328 | return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family); |
4329 | } |
4330 | |
4331 | static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, |
4332 | const struct request_sock *req) |
4333 | { |
4334 | struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; |
4335 | |
4336 | newsksec->sid = req->secid; |
4337 | newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid; |
4338 | /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the |
4339 | new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet. |
4340 | So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which |
4341 | time it will have been created and available. */ |
4342 | |
4343 | /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only |
4344 | * thread with access to newsksec */ |
4345 | selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family); |
4346 | } |
4347 | |
4348 | static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) |
4349 | { |
4350 | u16 family = sk->sk_family; |
4351 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4352 | |
4353 | /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ |
4354 | if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) |
4355 | family = PF_INET; |
4356 | |
4357 | selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid); |
4358 | } |
4359 | |
4360 | static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, |
4361 | struct flowi *fl) |
4362 | { |
4363 | fl->secid = req->secid; |
4364 | } |
4365 | |
4366 | static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void) |
4367 | { |
4368 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
4369 | |
4370 | /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket |
4371 | * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense, |
4372 | * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and |
4373 | * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple |
4374 | * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to |
4375 | * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */ |
4376 | |
4377 | return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE, |
4378 | NULL); |
4379 | } |
4380 | |
4381 | static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk) |
4382 | { |
4383 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4384 | |
4385 | /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it |
4386 | * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply |
4387 | * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled |
4388 | * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly |
4389 | * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling |
4390 | * protocols were being used */ |
4391 | |
4392 | /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use |
4393 | * the sockcreate SID here */ |
4394 | |
4395 | sksec->sid = current_sid(); |
4396 | sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET; |
4397 | } |
4398 | |
4399 | static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk) |
4400 | { |
4401 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4402 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
4403 | int err; |
4404 | |
4405 | err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, |
4406 | TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL); |
4407 | if (err) |
4408 | return err; |
4409 | err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, |
4410 | TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL); |
4411 | if (err) |
4412 | return err; |
4413 | |
4414 | sksec->sid = sid; |
4415 | |
4416 | return 0; |
4417 | } |
4418 | |
4419 | static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) |
4420 | { |
4421 | int err = 0; |
4422 | u32 perm; |
4423 | struct nlmsghdr *nlh; |
4424 | struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket; |
4425 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; |
4426 | |
4427 | if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) { |
4428 | err = -EINVAL; |
4429 | goto out; |
4430 | } |
4431 | nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb); |
4432 | |
4433 | err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm); |
4434 | if (err) { |
4435 | if (err == -EINVAL) { |
4436 | audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, |
4437 | "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message" |
4438 | " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n", |
4439 | nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass); |
4440 | if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown()) |
4441 | err = 0; |
4442 | } |
4443 | |
4444 | /* Ignore */ |
4445 | if (err == -ENOENT) |
4446 | err = 0; |
4447 | goto out; |
4448 | } |
4449 | |
4450 | err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm); |
4451 | out: |
4452 | return err; |
4453 | } |
4454 | |
4455 | #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER |
4456 | |
4457 | static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, |
4458 | u16 family) |
4459 | { |
4460 | int err; |
4461 | char *addrp; |
4462 | u32 peer_sid; |
4463 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4464 | u8 secmark_active; |
4465 | u8 netlbl_active; |
4466 | u8 peerlbl_active; |
4467 | |
4468 | if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer) |
4469 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4470 | |
4471 | secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); |
4472 | netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled(); |
4473 | peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled(); |
4474 | if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) |
4475 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4476 | |
4477 | if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0) |
4478 | return NF_DROP; |
4479 | |
4480 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); |
4481 | ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; |
4482 | ad.u.net.family = family; |
4483 | if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0) |
4484 | return NF_DROP; |
4485 | |
4486 | if (peerlbl_active) { |
4487 | err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family, |
4488 | peer_sid, &ad); |
4489 | if (err) { |
4490 | selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1); |
4491 | return NF_DROP; |
4492 | } |
4493 | } |
4494 | |
4495 | if (secmark_active) |
4496 | if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark, |
4497 | SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad)) |
4498 | return NF_DROP; |
4499 | |
4500 | if (netlbl_active) |
4501 | /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING |
4502 | * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary |
4503 | * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH |
4504 | * protection */ |
4505 | if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0) |
4506 | return NF_DROP; |
4507 | |
4508 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4509 | } |
4510 | |
4511 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum, |
4512 | struct sk_buff *skb, |
4513 | const struct net_device *in, |
4514 | const struct net_device *out, |
4515 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) |
4516 | { |
4517 | return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET); |
4518 | } |
4519 | |
4520 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
4521 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum, |
4522 | struct sk_buff *skb, |
4523 | const struct net_device *in, |
4524 | const struct net_device *out, |
4525 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) |
4526 | { |
4527 | return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6); |
4528 | } |
4529 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
4530 | |
4531 | static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb, |
4532 | u16 family) |
4533 | { |
4534 | u32 sid; |
4535 | |
4536 | if (!netlbl_enabled()) |
4537 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4538 | |
4539 | /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path |
4540 | * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling |
4541 | * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */ |
4542 | if (skb->sk) { |
4543 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security; |
4544 | sid = sksec->sid; |
4545 | } else |
4546 | sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; |
4547 | if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0) |
4548 | return NF_DROP; |
4549 | |
4550 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4551 | } |
4552 | |
4553 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum, |
4554 | struct sk_buff *skb, |
4555 | const struct net_device *in, |
4556 | const struct net_device *out, |
4557 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) |
4558 | { |
4559 | return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET); |
4560 | } |
4561 | |
4562 | static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, |
4563 | int ifindex, |
4564 | u16 family) |
4565 | { |
4566 | struct sock *sk = skb->sk; |
4567 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec; |
4568 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4569 | char *addrp; |
4570 | u8 proto; |
4571 | |
4572 | if (sk == NULL) |
4573 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4574 | sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4575 | |
4576 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); |
4577 | ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; |
4578 | ad.u.net.family = family; |
4579 | if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto)) |
4580 | return NF_DROP; |
4581 | |
4582 | if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) |
4583 | if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, |
4584 | SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad)) |
4585 | return NF_DROP; |
4586 | |
4587 | if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) |
4588 | if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto)) |
4589 | return NF_DROP; |
4590 | |
4591 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4592 | } |
4593 | |
4594 | static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, |
4595 | u16 family) |
4596 | { |
4597 | u32 secmark_perm; |
4598 | u32 peer_sid; |
4599 | struct sock *sk; |
4600 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4601 | char *addrp; |
4602 | u8 secmark_active; |
4603 | u8 peerlbl_active; |
4604 | |
4605 | /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing |
4606 | * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the |
4607 | * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function |
4608 | * as fast and as clean as possible. */ |
4609 | if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer) |
4610 | return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family); |
4611 | #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM |
4612 | /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec |
4613 | * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks |
4614 | * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks |
4615 | * when the packet is on it's final way out. |
4616 | * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst |
4617 | * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */ |
4618 | if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL) |
4619 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4620 | #endif |
4621 | secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); |
4622 | peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled(); |
4623 | if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) |
4624 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4625 | |
4626 | /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the |
4627 | * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local |
4628 | * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label |
4629 | * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */ |
4630 | sk = skb->sk; |
4631 | if (sk == NULL) { |
4632 | switch (family) { |
4633 | case PF_INET: |
4634 | if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED) |
4635 | secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT; |
4636 | else |
4637 | secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; |
4638 | break; |
4639 | case PF_INET6: |
4640 | if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED) |
4641 | secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT; |
4642 | else |
4643 | secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; |
4644 | break; |
4645 | default: |
4646 | return NF_DROP; |
4647 | } |
4648 | if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) { |
4649 | if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid)) |
4650 | return NF_DROP; |
4651 | } else |
4652 | peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; |
4653 | } else { |
4654 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
4655 | peer_sid = sksec->sid; |
4656 | secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; |
4657 | } |
4658 | |
4659 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); |
4660 | ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; |
4661 | ad.u.net.family = family; |
4662 | if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL)) |
4663 | return NF_DROP; |
4664 | |
4665 | if (secmark_active) |
4666 | if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark, |
4667 | SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad)) |
4668 | return NF_DROP; |
4669 | |
4670 | if (peerlbl_active) { |
4671 | u32 if_sid; |
4672 | u32 node_sid; |
4673 | |
4674 | if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid)) |
4675 | return NF_DROP; |
4676 | if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid, |
4677 | SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad)) |
4678 | return NF_DROP; |
4679 | |
4680 | if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid)) |
4681 | return NF_DROP; |
4682 | if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid, |
4683 | SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad)) |
4684 | return NF_DROP; |
4685 | } |
4686 | |
4687 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
4688 | } |
4689 | |
4690 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum, |
4691 | struct sk_buff *skb, |
4692 | const struct net_device *in, |
4693 | const struct net_device *out, |
4694 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) |
4695 | { |
4696 | return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET); |
4697 | } |
4698 | |
4699 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
4700 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum, |
4701 | struct sk_buff *skb, |
4702 | const struct net_device *in, |
4703 | const struct net_device *out, |
4704 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) |
4705 | { |
4706 | return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6); |
4707 | } |
4708 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
4709 | |
4710 | #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ |
4711 | |
4712 | static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) |
4713 | { |
4714 | int err; |
4715 | |
4716 | err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb); |
4717 | if (err) |
4718 | return err; |
4719 | |
4720 | return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb); |
4721 | } |
4722 | |
4723 | static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability) |
4724 | { |
4725 | int err; |
4726 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4727 | |
4728 | err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability); |
4729 | if (err) |
4730 | return err; |
4731 | |
4732 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP); |
4733 | ad.u.cap = capability; |
4734 | |
4735 | return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, |
4736 | SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad); |
4737 | } |
4738 | |
4739 | static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task, |
4740 | struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, |
4741 | u16 sclass) |
4742 | { |
4743 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
4744 | u32 sid; |
4745 | |
4746 | isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
4747 | if (!isec) |
4748 | return -ENOMEM; |
4749 | |
4750 | sid = task_sid(task); |
4751 | isec->sclass = sclass; |
4752 | isec->sid = sid; |
4753 | perm->security = isec; |
4754 | |
4755 | return 0; |
4756 | } |
4757 | |
4758 | static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm) |
4759 | { |
4760 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security; |
4761 | perm->security = NULL; |
4762 | kfree(isec); |
4763 | } |
4764 | |
4765 | static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) |
4766 | { |
4767 | struct msg_security_struct *msec; |
4768 | |
4769 | msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
4770 | if (!msec) |
4771 | return -ENOMEM; |
4772 | |
4773 | msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
4774 | msg->security = msec; |
4775 | |
4776 | return 0; |
4777 | } |
4778 | |
4779 | static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg) |
4780 | { |
4781 | struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security; |
4782 | |
4783 | msg->security = NULL; |
4784 | kfree(msec); |
4785 | } |
4786 | |
4787 | static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms, |
4788 | u32 perms) |
4789 | { |
4790 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
4791 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4792 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
4793 | |
4794 | isec = ipc_perms->security; |
4795 | |
4796 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); |
4797 | ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key; |
4798 | |
4799 | return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad); |
4800 | } |
4801 | |
4802 | static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) |
4803 | { |
4804 | return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg); |
4805 | } |
4806 | |
4807 | static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg) |
4808 | { |
4809 | msg_msg_free_security(msg); |
4810 | } |
4811 | |
4812 | /* message queue security operations */ |
4813 | static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq) |
4814 | { |
4815 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
4816 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4817 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
4818 | int rc; |
4819 | |
4820 | rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ); |
4821 | if (rc) |
4822 | return rc; |
4823 | |
4824 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; |
4825 | |
4826 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); |
4827 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; |
4828 | |
4829 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, |
4830 | MSGQ__CREATE, &ad); |
4831 | if (rc) { |
4832 | ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm); |
4833 | return rc; |
4834 | } |
4835 | return 0; |
4836 | } |
4837 | |
4838 | static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq) |
4839 | { |
4840 | ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm); |
4841 | } |
4842 | |
4843 | static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg) |
4844 | { |
4845 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
4846 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4847 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
4848 | |
4849 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; |
4850 | |
4851 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); |
4852 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; |
4853 | |
4854 | return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, |
4855 | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad); |
4856 | } |
4857 | |
4858 | static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd) |
4859 | { |
4860 | int err; |
4861 | int perms; |
4862 | |
4863 | switch (cmd) { |
4864 | case IPC_INFO: |
4865 | case MSG_INFO: |
4866 | /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ |
4867 | return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO); |
4868 | case IPC_STAT: |
4869 | case MSG_STAT: |
4870 | perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE; |
4871 | break; |
4872 | case IPC_SET: |
4873 | perms = MSGQ__SETATTR; |
4874 | break; |
4875 | case IPC_RMID: |
4876 | perms = MSGQ__DESTROY; |
4877 | break; |
4878 | default: |
4879 | return 0; |
4880 | } |
4881 | |
4882 | err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms); |
4883 | return err; |
4884 | } |
4885 | |
4886 | static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) |
4887 | { |
4888 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
4889 | struct msg_security_struct *msec; |
4890 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4891 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
4892 | int rc; |
4893 | |
4894 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; |
4895 | msec = msg->security; |
4896 | |
4897 | /* |
4898 | * First time through, need to assign label to the message |
4899 | */ |
4900 | if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) { |
4901 | /* |
4902 | * Compute new sid based on current process and |
4903 | * message queue this message will be stored in |
4904 | */ |
4905 | rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, |
4906 | &msec->sid); |
4907 | if (rc) |
4908 | return rc; |
4909 | } |
4910 | |
4911 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); |
4912 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; |
4913 | |
4914 | /* Can this process write to the queue? */ |
4915 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, |
4916 | MSGQ__WRITE, &ad); |
4917 | if (!rc) |
4918 | /* Can this process send the message */ |
4919 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, |
4920 | MSG__SEND, &ad); |
4921 | if (!rc) |
4922 | /* Can the message be put in the queue? */ |
4923 | rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, |
4924 | MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad); |
4925 | |
4926 | return rc; |
4927 | } |
4928 | |
4929 | static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, |
4930 | struct task_struct *target, |
4931 | long type, int mode) |
4932 | { |
4933 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
4934 | struct msg_security_struct *msec; |
4935 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4936 | u32 sid = task_sid(target); |
4937 | int rc; |
4938 | |
4939 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; |
4940 | msec = msg->security; |
4941 | |
4942 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); |
4943 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; |
4944 | |
4945 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, |
4946 | SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad); |
4947 | if (!rc) |
4948 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, |
4949 | SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad); |
4950 | return rc; |
4951 | } |
4952 | |
4953 | /* Shared Memory security operations */ |
4954 | static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) |
4955 | { |
4956 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
4957 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4958 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
4959 | int rc; |
4960 | |
4961 | rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM); |
4962 | if (rc) |
4963 | return rc; |
4964 | |
4965 | isec = shp->shm_perm.security; |
4966 | |
4967 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); |
4968 | ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key; |
4969 | |
4970 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, |
4971 | SHM__CREATE, &ad); |
4972 | if (rc) { |
4973 | ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm); |
4974 | return rc; |
4975 | } |
4976 | return 0; |
4977 | } |
4978 | |
4979 | static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) |
4980 | { |
4981 | ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm); |
4982 | } |
4983 | |
4984 | static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg) |
4985 | { |
4986 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
4987 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
4988 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
4989 | |
4990 | isec = shp->shm_perm.security; |
4991 | |
4992 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); |
4993 | ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key; |
4994 | |
4995 | return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, |
4996 | SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); |
4997 | } |
4998 | |
4999 | /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */ |
5000 | static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd) |
5001 | { |
5002 | int perms; |
5003 | int err; |
5004 | |
5005 | switch (cmd) { |
5006 | case IPC_INFO: |
5007 | case SHM_INFO: |
5008 | /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ |
5009 | return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO); |
5010 | case IPC_STAT: |
5011 | case SHM_STAT: |
5012 | perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE; |
5013 | break; |
5014 | case IPC_SET: |
5015 | perms = SHM__SETATTR; |
5016 | break; |
5017 | case SHM_LOCK: |
5018 | case SHM_UNLOCK: |
5019 | perms = SHM__LOCK; |
5020 | break; |
5021 | case IPC_RMID: |
5022 | perms = SHM__DESTROY; |
5023 | break; |
5024 | default: |
5025 | return 0; |
5026 | } |
5027 | |
5028 | err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms); |
5029 | return err; |
5030 | } |
5031 | |
5032 | static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, |
5033 | char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) |
5034 | { |
5035 | u32 perms; |
5036 | |
5037 | if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY) |
5038 | perms = SHM__READ; |
5039 | else |
5040 | perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE; |
5041 | |
5042 | return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms); |
5043 | } |
5044 | |
5045 | /* Semaphore security operations */ |
5046 | static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma) |
5047 | { |
5048 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
5049 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
5050 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
5051 | int rc; |
5052 | |
5053 | rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM); |
5054 | if (rc) |
5055 | return rc; |
5056 | |
5057 | isec = sma->sem_perm.security; |
5058 | |
5059 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); |
5060 | ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key; |
5061 | |
5062 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, |
5063 | SEM__CREATE, &ad); |
5064 | if (rc) { |
5065 | ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm); |
5066 | return rc; |
5067 | } |
5068 | return 0; |
5069 | } |
5070 | |
5071 | static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma) |
5072 | { |
5073 | ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm); |
5074 | } |
5075 | |
5076 | static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg) |
5077 | { |
5078 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
5079 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
5080 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
5081 | |
5082 | isec = sma->sem_perm.security; |
5083 | |
5084 | COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); |
5085 | ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key; |
5086 | |
5087 | return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, |
5088 | SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); |
5089 | } |
5090 | |
5091 | /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */ |
5092 | static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd) |
5093 | { |
5094 | int err; |
5095 | u32 perms; |
5096 | |
5097 | switch (cmd) { |
5098 | case IPC_INFO: |
5099 | case SEM_INFO: |
5100 | /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ |
5101 | return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO); |
5102 | case GETPID: |
5103 | case GETNCNT: |
5104 | case GETZCNT: |
5105 | perms = SEM__GETATTR; |
5106 | break; |
5107 | case GETVAL: |
5108 | case GETALL: |
5109 | perms = SEM__READ; |
5110 | break; |
5111 | case SETVAL: |
5112 | case SETALL: |
5113 | perms = SEM__WRITE; |
5114 | break; |
5115 | case IPC_RMID: |
5116 | perms = SEM__DESTROY; |
5117 | break; |
5118 | case IPC_SET: |
5119 | perms = SEM__SETATTR; |
5120 | break; |
5121 | case IPC_STAT: |
5122 | case SEM_STAT: |
5123 | perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE; |
5124 | break; |
5125 | default: |
5126 | return 0; |
5127 | } |
5128 | |
5129 | err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms); |
5130 | return err; |
5131 | } |
5132 | |
5133 | static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, |
5134 | struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter) |
5135 | { |
5136 | u32 perms; |
5137 | |
5138 | if (alter) |
5139 | perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE; |
5140 | else |
5141 | perms = SEM__READ; |
5142 | |
5143 | return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms); |
5144 | } |
5145 | |
5146 | static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) |
5147 | { |
5148 | u32 av = 0; |
5149 | |
5150 | av = 0; |
5151 | if (flag & S_IRUGO) |
5152 | av |= IPC__UNIX_READ; |
5153 | if (flag & S_IWUGO) |
5154 | av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE; |
5155 | |
5156 | if (av == 0) |
5157 | return 0; |
5158 | |
5159 | return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av); |
5160 | } |
5161 | |
5162 | static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) |
5163 | { |
5164 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security; |
5165 | *secid = isec->sid; |
5166 | } |
5167 | |
5168 | static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) |
5169 | { |
5170 | if (inode) |
5171 | inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry); |
5172 | } |
5173 | |
5174 | static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, |
5175 | char *name, char **value) |
5176 | { |
5177 | const struct task_security_struct *__tsec; |
5178 | u32 sid; |
5179 | int error; |
5180 | unsigned len; |
5181 | |
5182 | if (current != p) { |
5183 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR); |
5184 | if (error) |
5185 | return error; |
5186 | } |
5187 | |
5188 | rcu_read_lock(); |
5189 | __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security; |
5190 | |
5191 | if (!strcmp(name, "current")) |
5192 | sid = __tsec->sid; |
5193 | else if (!strcmp(name, "prev")) |
5194 | sid = __tsec->osid; |
5195 | else if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) |
5196 | sid = __tsec->exec_sid; |
5197 | else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) |
5198 | sid = __tsec->create_sid; |
5199 | else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) |
5200 | sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid; |
5201 | else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) |
5202 | sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid; |
5203 | else |
5204 | goto invalid; |
5205 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
5206 | |
5207 | if (!sid) |
5208 | return 0; |
5209 | |
5210 | error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len); |
5211 | if (error) |
5212 | return error; |
5213 | return len; |
5214 | |
5215 | invalid: |
5216 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
5217 | return -EINVAL; |
5218 | } |
5219 | |
5220 | static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, |
5221 | char *name, void *value, size_t size) |
5222 | { |
5223 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
5224 | struct task_struct *tracer; |
5225 | struct cred *new; |
5226 | u32 sid = 0, ptsid; |
5227 | int error; |
5228 | char *str = value; |
5229 | |
5230 | if (current != p) { |
5231 | /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own |
5232 | security attributes. */ |
5233 | return -EACCES; |
5234 | } |
5235 | |
5236 | /* |
5237 | * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all. |
5238 | * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the |
5239 | * above restriction is ever removed. |
5240 | */ |
5241 | if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) |
5242 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC); |
5243 | else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) |
5244 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE); |
5245 | else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) |
5246 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE); |
5247 | else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) |
5248 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE); |
5249 | else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) |
5250 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT); |
5251 | else |
5252 | error = -EINVAL; |
5253 | if (error) |
5254 | return error; |
5255 | |
5256 | /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */ |
5257 | if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') { |
5258 | if (str[size-1] == '\n') { |
5259 | str[size-1] = 0; |
5260 | size--; |
5261 | } |
5262 | error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid); |
5263 | if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { |
5264 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) |
5265 | return error; |
5266 | error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, |
5267 | &sid); |
5268 | } |
5269 | if (error) |
5270 | return error; |
5271 | } |
5272 | |
5273 | new = prepare_creds(); |
5274 | if (!new) |
5275 | return -ENOMEM; |
5276 | |
5277 | /* Permission checking based on the specified context is |
5278 | performed during the actual operation (execve, |
5279 | open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the |
5280 | operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve |
5281 | checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The |
5282 | operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */ |
5283 | tsec = new->security; |
5284 | if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) { |
5285 | tsec->exec_sid = sid; |
5286 | } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { |
5287 | tsec->create_sid = sid; |
5288 | } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) { |
5289 | error = may_create_key(sid, p); |
5290 | if (error) |
5291 | goto abort_change; |
5292 | tsec->keycreate_sid = sid; |
5293 | } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) { |
5294 | tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid; |
5295 | } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) { |
5296 | error = -EINVAL; |
5297 | if (sid == 0) |
5298 | goto abort_change; |
5299 | |
5300 | /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */ |
5301 | error = -EPERM; |
5302 | if (!current_is_single_threaded()) { |
5303 | error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid); |
5304 | if (error) |
5305 | goto abort_change; |
5306 | } |
5307 | |
5308 | /* Check permissions for the transition. */ |
5309 | error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, |
5310 | PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL); |
5311 | if (error) |
5312 | goto abort_change; |
5313 | |
5314 | /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok. |
5315 | Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */ |
5316 | ptsid = 0; |
5317 | task_lock(p); |
5318 | tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p); |
5319 | if (tracer) |
5320 | ptsid = task_sid(tracer); |
5321 | task_unlock(p); |
5322 | |
5323 | if (tracer) { |
5324 | error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, |
5325 | PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); |
5326 | if (error) |
5327 | goto abort_change; |
5328 | } |
5329 | |
5330 | tsec->sid = sid; |
5331 | } else { |
5332 | error = -EINVAL; |
5333 | goto abort_change; |
5334 | } |
5335 | |
5336 | commit_creds(new); |
5337 | return size; |
5338 | |
5339 | abort_change: |
5340 | abort_creds(new); |
5341 | return error; |
5342 | } |
5343 | |
5344 | static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) |
5345 | { |
5346 | return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen); |
5347 | } |
5348 | |
5349 | static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) |
5350 | { |
5351 | return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid); |
5352 | } |
5353 | |
5354 | static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) |
5355 | { |
5356 | kfree(secdata); |
5357 | } |
5358 | |
5359 | /* |
5360 | * called with inode->i_mutex locked |
5361 | */ |
5362 | static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) |
5363 | { |
5364 | return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0); |
5365 | } |
5366 | |
5367 | /* |
5368 | * called with inode->i_mutex locked |
5369 | */ |
5370 | static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) |
5371 | { |
5372 | return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0); |
5373 | } |
5374 | |
5375 | static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) |
5376 | { |
5377 | int len = 0; |
5378 | len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, |
5379 | ctx, true); |
5380 | if (len < 0) |
5381 | return len; |
5382 | *ctxlen = len; |
5383 | return 0; |
5384 | } |
5385 | #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS |
5386 | |
5387 | static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred, |
5388 | unsigned long flags) |
5389 | { |
5390 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
5391 | struct key_security_struct *ksec; |
5392 | |
5393 | ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
5394 | if (!ksec) |
5395 | return -ENOMEM; |
5396 | |
5397 | tsec = cred->security; |
5398 | if (tsec->keycreate_sid) |
5399 | ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid; |
5400 | else |
5401 | ksec->sid = tsec->sid; |
5402 | |
5403 | k->security = ksec; |
5404 | return 0; |
5405 | } |
5406 | |
5407 | static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k) |
5408 | { |
5409 | struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security; |
5410 | |
5411 | k->security = NULL; |
5412 | kfree(ksec); |
5413 | } |
5414 | |
5415 | static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, |
5416 | const struct cred *cred, |
5417 | key_perm_t perm) |
5418 | { |
5419 | struct key *key; |
5420 | struct key_security_struct *ksec; |
5421 | u32 sid; |
5422 | |
5423 | /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the |
5424 | permission check. No serious, additional covert channels |
5425 | appear to be created. */ |
5426 | if (perm == 0) |
5427 | return 0; |
5428 | |
5429 | sid = cred_sid(cred); |
5430 | |
5431 | key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); |
5432 | ksec = key->security; |
5433 | |
5434 | return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL); |
5435 | } |
5436 | |
5437 | static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) |
5438 | { |
5439 | struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security; |
5440 | char *context = NULL; |
5441 | unsigned len; |
5442 | int rc; |
5443 | |
5444 | rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len); |
5445 | if (!rc) |
5446 | rc = len; |
5447 | *_buffer = context; |
5448 | return rc; |
5449 | } |
5450 | |
5451 | #endif |
5452 | |
5453 | static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { |
5454 | .name = "selinux", |
5455 | |
5456 | .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check, |
5457 | .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme, |
5458 | .capget = selinux_capget, |
5459 | .capset = selinux_capset, |
5460 | .sysctl = selinux_sysctl, |
5461 | .capable = selinux_capable, |
5462 | .quotactl = selinux_quotactl, |
5463 | .quota_on = selinux_quota_on, |
5464 | .syslog = selinux_syslog, |
5465 | .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory, |
5466 | |
5467 | .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send, |
5468 | .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv, |
5469 | |
5470 | .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds, |
5471 | .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds, |
5472 | .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds, |
5473 | .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec, |
5474 | |
5475 | .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security, |
5476 | .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security, |
5477 | .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data, |
5478 | .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount, |
5479 | .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options, |
5480 | .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs, |
5481 | .sb_mount = selinux_mount, |
5482 | .sb_umount = selinux_umount, |
5483 | .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts, |
5484 | .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts, |
5485 | .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str, |
5486 | |
5487 | |
5488 | .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security, |
5489 | .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security, |
5490 | .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security, |
5491 | .inode_create = selinux_inode_create, |
5492 | .inode_link = selinux_inode_link, |
5493 | .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink, |
5494 | .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink, |
5495 | .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir, |
5496 | .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir, |
5497 | .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod, |
5498 | .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename, |
5499 | .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink, |
5500 | .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link, |
5501 | .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission, |
5502 | .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr, |
5503 | .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr, |
5504 | .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr, |
5505 | .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr, |
5506 | .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr, |
5507 | .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr, |
5508 | .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr, |
5509 | .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity, |
5510 | .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity, |
5511 | .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity, |
5512 | .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid, |
5513 | |
5514 | .file_permission = selinux_file_permission, |
5515 | .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security, |
5516 | .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security, |
5517 | .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl, |
5518 | .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap, |
5519 | .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect, |
5520 | .file_lock = selinux_file_lock, |
5521 | .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl, |
5522 | .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner, |
5523 | .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask, |
5524 | .file_receive = selinux_file_receive, |
5525 | |
5526 | .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open, |
5527 | |
5528 | .task_create = selinux_task_create, |
5529 | .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank, |
5530 | .cred_free = selinux_cred_free, |
5531 | .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare, |
5532 | .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer, |
5533 | .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as, |
5534 | .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as, |
5535 | .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request, |
5536 | .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid, |
5537 | .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid, |
5538 | .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid, |
5539 | .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid, |
5540 | .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice, |
5541 | .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio, |
5542 | .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio, |
5543 | .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit, |
5544 | .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler, |
5545 | .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler, |
5546 | .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory, |
5547 | .task_kill = selinux_task_kill, |
5548 | .task_wait = selinux_task_wait, |
5549 | .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode, |
5550 | |
5551 | .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission, |
5552 | .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid, |
5553 | |
5554 | .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security, |
5555 | .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security, |
5556 | |
5557 | .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security, |
5558 | .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security, |
5559 | .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate, |
5560 | .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl, |
5561 | .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd, |
5562 | .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv, |
5563 | |
5564 | .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security, |
5565 | .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security, |
5566 | .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate, |
5567 | .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl, |
5568 | .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat, |
5569 | |
5570 | .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security, |
5571 | .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security, |
5572 | .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate, |
5573 | .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl, |
5574 | .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop, |
5575 | |
5576 | .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate, |
5577 | |
5578 | .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr, |
5579 | .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr, |
5580 | |
5581 | .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx, |
5582 | .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid, |
5583 | .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx, |
5584 | .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx, |
5585 | .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx, |
5586 | .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx, |
5587 | |
5588 | .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect, |
5589 | .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send, |
5590 | |
5591 | .socket_create = selinux_socket_create, |
5592 | .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create, |
5593 | .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind, |
5594 | .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect, |
5595 | .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen, |
5596 | .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept, |
5597 | .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg, |
5598 | .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg, |
5599 | .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname, |
5600 | .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername, |
5601 | .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt, |
5602 | .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt, |
5603 | .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown, |
5604 | .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb, |
5605 | .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream, |
5606 | .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram, |
5607 | .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security, |
5608 | .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security, |
5609 | .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security, |
5610 | .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid, |
5611 | .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft, |
5612 | .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request, |
5613 | .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone, |
5614 | .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established, |
5615 | .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow, |
5616 | .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create, |
5617 | .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create, |
5618 | .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach, |
5619 | |
5620 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM |
5621 | .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc, |
5622 | .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone, |
5623 | .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free, |
5624 | .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete, |
5625 | .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc, |
5626 | .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free, |
5627 | .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete, |
5628 | .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup, |
5629 | .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, |
5630 | .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session, |
5631 | #endif |
5632 | |
5633 | #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS |
5634 | .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc, |
5635 | .key_free = selinux_key_free, |
5636 | .key_permission = selinux_key_permission, |
5637 | .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity, |
5638 | #endif |
5639 | |
5640 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT |
5641 | .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init, |
5642 | .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known, |
5643 | .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match, |
5644 | .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free, |
5645 | #endif |
5646 | }; |
5647 | |
5648 | static __init int selinux_init(void) |
5649 | { |
5650 | if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) { |
5651 | selinux_enabled = 0; |
5652 | return 0; |
5653 | } |
5654 | |
5655 | if (!selinux_enabled) { |
5656 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n"); |
5657 | return 0; |
5658 | } |
5659 | |
5660 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n"); |
5661 | |
5662 | /* Set the security state for the initial task. */ |
5663 | cred_init_security(); |
5664 | |
5665 | sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security", |
5666 | sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), |
5667 | 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); |
5668 | avc_init(); |
5669 | |
5670 | if (register_security(&selinux_ops)) |
5671 | panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n"); |
5672 | |
5673 | if (selinux_enforcing) |
5674 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n"); |
5675 | else |
5676 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n"); |
5677 | |
5678 | return 0; |
5679 | } |
5680 | |
5681 | void selinux_complete_init(void) |
5682 | { |
5683 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n"); |
5684 | |
5685 | /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */ |
5686 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n"); |
5687 | spin_lock(&sb_lock); |
5688 | spin_lock(&sb_security_lock); |
5689 | next_sb: |
5690 | if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) { |
5691 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = |
5692 | list_entry(superblock_security_head.next, |
5693 | struct superblock_security_struct, |
5694 | list); |
5695 | struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb; |
5696 | sb->s_count++; |
5697 | spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock); |
5698 | spin_unlock(&sb_lock); |
5699 | down_read(&sb->s_umount); |
5700 | if (sb->s_root) |
5701 | superblock_doinit(sb, NULL); |
5702 | drop_super(sb); |
5703 | spin_lock(&sb_lock); |
5704 | spin_lock(&sb_security_lock); |
5705 | list_del_init(&sbsec->list); |
5706 | goto next_sb; |
5707 | } |
5708 | spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock); |
5709 | spin_unlock(&sb_lock); |
5710 | } |
5711 | |
5712 | /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label |
5713 | all processes and objects when they are created. */ |
5714 | security_initcall(selinux_init); |
5715 | |
5716 | #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) |
5717 | |
5718 | static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = { |
5719 | { |
5720 | .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute, |
5721 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, |
5722 | .pf = PF_INET, |
5723 | .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, |
5724 | .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, |
5725 | }, |
5726 | { |
5727 | .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward, |
5728 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, |
5729 | .pf = PF_INET, |
5730 | .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD, |
5731 | .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, |
5732 | }, |
5733 | { |
5734 | .hook = selinux_ipv4_output, |
5735 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, |
5736 | .pf = PF_INET, |
5737 | .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, |
5738 | .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, |
5739 | } |
5740 | }; |
5741 | |
5742 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
5743 | |
5744 | static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = { |
5745 | { |
5746 | .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute, |
5747 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, |
5748 | .pf = PF_INET6, |
5749 | .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, |
5750 | .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, |
5751 | }, |
5752 | { |
5753 | .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward, |
5754 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, |
5755 | .pf = PF_INET6, |
5756 | .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD, |
5757 | .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, |
5758 | } |
5759 | }; |
5760 | |
5761 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
5762 | |
5763 | static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void) |
5764 | { |
5765 | int err = 0; |
5766 | |
5767 | if (!selinux_enabled) |
5768 | goto out; |
5769 | |
5770 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n"); |
5771 | |
5772 | err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops)); |
5773 | if (err) |
5774 | panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err); |
5775 | |
5776 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
5777 | err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops)); |
5778 | if (err) |
5779 | panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err); |
5780 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
5781 | |
5782 | out: |
5783 | return err; |
5784 | } |
5785 | |
5786 | __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init); |
5787 | |
5788 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE |
5789 | static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void) |
5790 | { |
5791 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n"); |
5792 | |
5793 | nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops)); |
5794 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
5795 | nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops)); |
5796 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
5797 | } |
5798 | #endif |
5799 | |
5800 | #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ |
5801 | |
5802 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE |
5803 | #define selinux_nf_ip_exit() |
5804 | #endif |
5805 | |
5806 | #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ |
5807 | |
5808 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE |
5809 | static int selinux_disabled; |
5810 | |
5811 | int selinux_disable(void) |
5812 | { |
5813 | extern void exit_sel_fs(void); |
5814 | |
5815 | if (ss_initialized) { |
5816 | /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */ |
5817 | return -EINVAL; |
5818 | } |
5819 | |
5820 | if (selinux_disabled) { |
5821 | /* Only do this once. */ |
5822 | return -EINVAL; |
5823 | } |
5824 | |
5825 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n"); |
5826 | |
5827 | selinux_disabled = 1; |
5828 | selinux_enabled = 0; |
5829 | |
5830 | reset_security_ops(); |
5831 | |
5832 | /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */ |
5833 | avc_disable(); |
5834 | |
5835 | /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */ |
5836 | selinux_nf_ip_exit(); |
5837 | |
5838 | /* Unregister selinuxfs. */ |
5839 | exit_sel_fs(); |
5840 | |
5841 | return 0; |
5842 | } |
5843 | #endif |
5844 |
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